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The Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era:
An Introduction
VED P. NANDA*
I.
After the United Nations Security Council, acting under Chapter VII
of the U.N. Carter, authorized collective measures against Iraq's invasion
and annexation of Kuwait in Resolution 678,1 the United States and the
coalition troops struck Saddam Hussein's occupying forces in Iraq.2 The
43-day Gulf War forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and accept the
terms of a permanent cease-fire arrangement.' Since the end of the war,
the United Nations has been actively engaged in the implementation of
the historic Security Council Resolution 687, which in its nine-part text
set out specific conditions by which international peace and security
would be restored to the region.'
Resolution 687 is unprecedented in its reach. Under it, the Security
Council demanded that Iraq and Kuwait respect the inviolability of the
1963 international boundary between them and called upon the Secre-
* Thompson G. Marsh Professor of International Law and Director, International Le-
gal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law. This is an adapted version of the
remarks made by the author as the opening address of a regional conference of the Ameri-
can Society of International Law, funded by the Ford Foundation, and hosted by the Inter-
national Legal Studies Program, University of Denver College of Law, at the Law School on
March 15, 1991.
1. See Security Council Resolution 678, Nov. 29, 1990, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1565
(1990). For an account of U.N. action, see Ved Nanda, The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait - the
U.N. Response, 15 S. ILL. U.L.J. 431 (1991) [hereinafter Nanda].
2. Hostilities began on the evening of January 16, 1991. For summary statements of the
representatives of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the United States on the beginning of the
military operations, see U.N. CHRONICLE, June 1991, at 9.
3. See War in Persian Gulf Area Ends, id. at 4.
4. Security Council Resolution 687, April 3, 1991, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
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tary-General to help demarcate that boundary. 5 Among other provisions,
the Security Council decided that, "Iraq shall unconditionally accept the
destruction, removal, or rendering harmless, under international supervi-
sion," of all its chemical and biological weapons and ballistic missiles with
a range greater than 150 kilometers, and provided for the development of
a plan to ensure its implementation.6 The Council also reaffirmed Iraq's
liability "under international law for any direct loss, damage .... or injury
to foreign governments, nationals and corporations, as a result of its un-
lawful invasion and occupation of Kuwait."7
The debate will undoubtedly continue on whether the action by the
coalition forces was an international enforcement action or a collective
self-defense action,8 whether the decision process leading to the adoption
and execution of Security Council Resolution 678 was in conformity with
the letter and spirit of the U.N. Charter,9 and what the implications of
the Security Council decisions are for future action.10
My purpose here is not to enter this important debate but to make
some preliminary observations on the subject of this conference, namely,
the use of force in the post-cold war era.
II.
By all accounts the process of ending the cold war has not only ear-
nestly begun but has gathered considerable momentum. Consider the dy-
namics of economic, political and social changes sweeping the erstwhile
Eastern bloc states. The transformation of societies in Central and East-
ern Europe, independence of the Baltic Republics, and the disintegration
of centralized authority and control of the federal government in the So-
viet Union and the evolving relationships between and among the other
Republics there, are unambiguous indicators of a historic change. The
Warsaw Pact is extinct, NATO is seeking a reorientation and a fresh
mandate, bipolarity has ended, Europe has a new persona, and the forces
of democratization, liberalization, and privatization are auguring a new
era in East-West relations. This post-cold war environment presents a
unique opportunity for revisiting the existing norms on the use of force in
the international arena.
The new era holds promise for the establishment of what President
5. See id., Part A, at 849.
6. See id., Part C, at 850-51.
7. See id., Part E, at 852.
8. See Eugene Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self-Defense?,
85 AM. J. INT'L L. 506 (1991). See also LAW AND FORCE IN THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ORDER
(Lori F. Damrosch & David J. Scheffer eds. 1991).
9. See Burns Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
10. See Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 2
(1991). See also Agora, The Gulf Crisis in International and Foreign Relations Law, id. at
63.
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Bush calls "a new world order." In his 1991 address on the State of the
Union, the President explained that at stake in the Gulf War was the
"big idea" of such an order, "where diverse nations are drawn together in
common cause to achieve the universal aspirations of mankind - peace
and security, freedom, and the rule of law.""
In the same address, after predicting that the coalition forces "will
succeed in the Gulf," he suggested that when they did, "the world com-
munity will have sent an enduring warning to any dictator or despot, pre-
sent or future, who contemplates . . .aggression."" He continued: "The
world can, therefore, seize this opportunity to fulfill the long-held prom-
ise of a new world order, where brutality will go unrewarded and aggres-
sion will meet collective resistance."13
There are legitimate questions about the meaning and content of the
new world order, and as to how new it is, and what is new about it. 4 It is,
however, fair to conclude from President Bush's statements that the new
world order would be built on the foundation of the rule of law and a
regime of collective resistance to deter aggression, and if deterrence fails,
collective measures to resist aggression and restore international peace
and security.
The initial United Nations response to the Gulf Crisis was marked by
a resolute stand of the Security Council against Iraq's aggression. The
Council acted within six hours after the invasion on August 2, 1990, and
adopted a resolution, by a vote of 14 to 0, with Yemen abstaining, con-
demning the Iraqi invasion and demanding an unconditional and immedi-
ate withdrawal of Iraqi forces from Kuwait."3 The Security Council acted
collectively, in a manner the U.N. founders had prescribed in the Charter
and had envisaged that it would act for the maintenance of international
peace and security. Its next response was four days later, with the imposi-
tion of a sweeping sanctions regime against Iraq, including an arms and
trade ban. 6 The Council decided to establish a sanctions committee to
monitor the implementation of the resolution. Again, no Council member
voted against the resolution, although Cuba and Yemen abstained, and
the vote was 13 to none.
When several more Security Council resolutions failed to bring about
a change in Iraq's aggressive and intransigent policies in the Gulf, the
Council on November 29, 1990, after lengthy deliberations, adopted a res-
olution authorizing states to use force in order to implement its resolu-
11. George Bush, Address Before a Joint Session of the Congress on the State of the
Union, 27 WKLY. COMP. PslIDENrIAL Docs., Jan 29, 1991, at 90.
12. Id. at 95.
13. Id.
14. See, e.g., Symposium: What's New About the New World Order?, 15 FLETCHER Fo-
RUM OF WORLD AFF. 1 (Summer 1991); Louis Sohn, How New is the New International
Legal Order?, 20 DENY. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y (1992).
15. See Nanda, supra note 1, at 434-35.
16. See id. at 435-36.
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tions. It gave Iraq "one final opportunity, as a pause of good will," to
comply fully with its resolutions by January 15, 1991. If Iraq failed to
comply, the Council authorized states cooperating with the Government
of Kuwait "to use all necessary means to uphold and implement the Se-
curity Council .. . [r]esolutions and to restore international peace and
security in the area.
1 7
When the coalition forces struck on January 16, 1991, it was not a
Security Council action undertaken pursuant to Article 42 after the de-
termination by the Council that the measures it had taken under Articles
40 and 41 against Iraq had proven inadequate. As a highly regarded for-
mer U.N. official has noted, the United States assumed the leadership
role during the Gulf crisis in exploring a "parallel operation" to that of
the Security Council for the protection of Saudi Arabia."' Among others,
Professor Richard Falk has criticized the Security Council for its refusal
"to control the United States and the coalition, allowing the U.N. to be-
come formally associated with waging unrestricted warfare" in the Gulf.,'
The Report of the U.N. Secretary-General on the Work of the Or-
ganization, issued in September 1991, offers some pertinent observations
on the U.N. action in the Gulf crisis:
Another important aspect is that the enforcement action was not
carried out exactly in the form foreseen by Articles 42 et sequentia of
Chapter VII. Instead, the Council authorized the use of force on a
national and coalition basis. In the circumstances and given the costs
imposed and capabilities demanded by modern warfare, the arrange-
ment seemed unavoidable. However, the experience of operations in
the Gulf suggests the need for a collective reflection on questions re-
lating to the future use of the powers vested in the Security Council
under Chapter VII.
In order to preclude controversy, these questions should include
the mechanisms required for the Council to satisfy itself that the rule
of proportionality in the employment of armed force is observed and
the rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflicts are com-
plied with. Moreover, careful thought will have to be given to ensuring
that the application of Chapter VII measures is not perceived to be
overextended. In today's conditions of economic interdependence, the
effect of the imposition of comprehensive economic sanctions on third
States that are economic partners of the offender State requires that
Article 50 of the Charter be supplemented by appropriate agreements
creating obligations to assist concretely the disadvantaged third State
or States. The human effect of sanctions on the population of an of-
fending State, if it lacks the political means to bring about a reversal
17. Id. at 440. See generally id. at 436-40.
18. See Brian Urquhart, Learning from the Gulf, N.Y. REviEw OF BOOKS, March 7,
1991, at 34.
19. Richard Falk, Reflections on the Gulf War Experience: Force and War in the
United Nations System 22 (manuscript dated May 28, 1991, on record at the offices of the
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y).
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of the policy that gives rise to the'offence, will also need to be care-
fully borne in mind. As I stated at meetings of the Security Council,
enforcement is a collective engagement, which requires a discipline all
its own.2 0
This criticism of the United Nations action notwithstanding, the fact
remains that during the early phases of the Gulf Crisis, the Security
Council demonstrated the capacity and willingness to take collective mea-
sures for repelling aggression. The post-cold war era offers the opportu-
nity to realize the United Nations' potential for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security. This would undoubtedly include the use of
collective measures as envisaged under Chapter VII, especially the estab-
lishment of a Military Staff Committee and standing forces under U.N.
command for peacekeeping and even enforcement purposes.21 But, even
more important, effective mechanisms will be instituted, including the en-
hanced use of the authority of the Secretary-General's office in the en-
gagement of preventive diplomacy and toward the promotion, utilization
and further strengthening of the available means for pacific settlement of
international disputes.
This new opportunity can be distinguished from the period following
the Second World War, which was also popularly regarded as the dawn of
a new era,22 in that the present period results from superpower coopera-
tion during a period of peace: cooperation was chosen as a preferred pol-
icy by the two superpowers rather than as a last resort forced upon them
by a struggle against a common threat. Viewed in this light, it is not sur-
prising that the new global order after World War II failed due to lack of
cooperation since the common threat had been removed.22
Despite the fact that the prospects for the present era of cooperation
seem brighter, it is foolhardy to assume that there remain no severe
threats to global peace and security. For example, ethnic and regional
conflicts, especially claims for self-determination, are major potential
threats.
III.
The papers published in this symposium issue are the product of a
Regional Conference of the American Society of International Law, enti-
tled "Use of Force in the Post-Cold War Era," hosted by the Interna-
tional Legal Studies Program of the University of Denver College of Law
and funded by the Ford Foundation. The Conference was held on March
15, 1991 at the College of Law. The subject areas discussed ranged from
20. U.N. Doc. A/46/1, at 607 (Sept. 6, 1991).
21. See, e.g., Bruce Russett & James S. Sutterlin, The U.N. in a New World Order, 70
FOREIGN AFF. 69, 83 (Spring 1991).
22. See Brian Urquhart, Problems and Prospects of the United Nations, 44 INT'L J.
803, 804 (Autumn 1989).
23. See id. at 804-05.
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humanitarian intervention, self-defense, and self-determination, to the
use of the United Nations and other multilateral machinery to limit and
regulate the unauthorized use of force in the international arena.
Professor Kevin Ryan discusses "humanitarian intervention," that is,
intervention by a state in the territory of another state on humanitarian
grounds. The ostensible purpose of such interventions is to bring a halt to
egregious violations of human rights. He analyzes the problems inherent
in the application of this doctrine, concluding with the warning that "na-
tions must be extremely wary of using force, regardless of how legitimate
that use may seem to be." This warning is given because of the strict
prohibition under international law on use of force against the territorial
integrity and political independence of another state24 and the inadequa-
cies of the existing mechanisms for international fact-finding. Professor
Ryan acknowledges, however, the primacy of human rights under contem-
porary international law and the duty of states under Articles 55 and 56
to promote respect for international human rights.
Of particular concern to Professor Ryan is intervention on behalf of a
people claiming self-determination. He contends that the doctrine of self-
determination is "extremely complicated." Nevertheless, once the recom-
mended criteria are met, he would consider humanitarian intervention le-
gitimate even in cases involving the claim of self-determination, prefering
that such intervention be undertaken multilaterally.
Professor David Penna inquires into the United Nations' role in se-
curity. He discusses the evolution of the self-defense exception to the rule
against the use of force in the cold war setting. He then presents alterna-
tive systems of self-defense, including their logistical ramifications, and
analyzes the Gulf conflict. Last, he explores the application of the self-
defense doctrine in the new post-cold war system.
In examining the United Nations' response to the invasion of Kuwait,
Professor Penna studies the various resolutions of the Security Council,
their ambiguities and uncertainties, and the interpretation of these reso-
lutions by the coalition partners. He discusses how various states deter-
mined whether the criteria of necessity and proportionality in judging the
permissibility of the use of force were met. In this context, he examines
the differentiation between state actions in collective self-defense under
Article 51 and U.N. enforcement actions under Chapter VII.
Professor Penna concludes by stating that the powers given to states
under Article 51 and the power of the Security Council to "maintain in-
ternational peace and security" became "fused" - or "confused" - in
the Kuwait crisis. The implications, he finds, are for an increased role for
the Security Council in self-defense determinations and for states in col-
lective self-defense actions. Ultimately he concludes that the Kuwait cri-
24. See U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4), which embodies the authoritative community proscrip-
tion of "the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence
of any state or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."
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sis signals the globalization of the security system, a promising evolution.
Dr. Charles Milligan studies the option of economic sanctions against
Iraq as a viable alternative to the use of force in the Gulf crisis. He begins
by detailing the U.N. Charter's provisions which call for restrained mea-
sures in the enforcement of Security Council actions. He notes that force
is only to be used as a last resort, and only within limitations placed upon
it under the authorizing resolution and provisions of other articles of the
U.N. Charter.
Next Dr. Milligan describes hindrances to the effectiveness of the
U.N., stating that the cold war made impossible the cooperation between
states necessary for progress under the U.N. However, he lauds the U.N.
peace-keeping forces as being of tremendous potential in the avoidance of
massive hostilities.
Dr. Milligan then examines the costs .of the Gulf war, including the
financial loss, loss of life, the plight of refugees, degradation of the envi-
ronment, and the plunder of resources. By contrast he studies the nonvio-
lent alternatives, principally the use of economic sanctions, including the
disadvantages of sanctions and why such alternatives are politically un-
popular. He concludes by noting a double standard between the pro-
nouncements of peaceful settlement of disputes by the United States for
other nations and its handling of its own conflicts. In the end, he empha-
sizes: "There are times in life when destructive force must be used. But
this should be a last resort in international relations, and if we are ever to
have a livable world it is imperative that we learn better ways to use al-
ternatives to force."
Professor James Nafziger presents a comprehensive study of what he
calls, "the battle-strewn terrain of self-determination and humanitarian
intervention." His goal is to "highlight the aridity of those rights." He
accomplishes this goal admirably by providing an appropriate historical
context and by analyzing these concepts in light of state practice, authori-
tative pronouncements of regional and international intergovernmental
organizations, judicial decisions, and publicists' writings.
After demonstrating the normative ambiguities inherent in these
rights and raising pertinent questions related to the difficulty of applying
these concepts in a changing world, Professor Nafziger suggests that "the
new reality of a community of power" demands that multilateral deci-
sions be taken pertaining to the application of these concepts. Specifi-
cally, he illustrates how this might occur by reference to the United Na-
tions and the European Community. He concludes:
Perhaps the day will arrive when unilateral self-determination and
humanitarian intervention will have become largely obsolete. Instead,
turning these terms around, the global community will rely on inter-
national and regional organizations to make binding humanitarian de-
terminations about self-determination by states as well as foreign in-
terventions. We may learn to rely, after so many battles, on the better
angels of our nature ....
1991
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This symposium issue has discussed only selected aspects of the use
of force. The message is clear: the post-cold war era promises the regula-
tion of the unauthorized use of force by multilateral means. Another mes-
sage which is implicit even if not well-defined in these papers is that
states share a common interest in voluntarily exercising principled con-
straints on the use of force. Whether and when this new world order is
established, where the rule of law and not the rule of the jungle prevails,
will be determined by the vision and will of the major actors in the inter-
national arena. Consequently, the primary responsibility for the estab-
lishment of such order lies with the permanent members of the Security
Council and the Secretary-General of the United Nations.
Self-Determination and Humanitarian
Intervention in a Community of Power
JAMES A.R. NAFZIGER*
The night can sweat with terror as before
We pieced our thoughts into philosophy,
And planned to bring the world under a rule,
Who are but weasels fighting in a hole.
-W. B. Yeats'
In the gradual transition from a balance of power system of interna-
tional relations to a community of power,' forces of both integration and
fragmentation have gained momentum. s Economic integration of the Eu-
ropean Community, for example, has been offset by political disintegra-
tion to the east and a resurgence of policy differences throughout the con-
tinent. In the Middle East, Iraq's acceptance of greater Kurdish
autonomy may be a trade-off for reintegrating Iraq into regional and in-
ternational relationships and restoring its access to foreign trade markets.
China, Taiwan and the two Koreas acknowledged their political divisions
in return for greater integration into global institutions. As these adjust-
ments to a new order demonstrate, short-term fragmentation may en-
hance or detract from long-term integration. The forces are both comple-
* Professor of Law, Willamette University College of Law; B.A., M.A. University of
Wisconsin; J.D. Harvard University.
1. Nineteen Hundred and Nineteen, in SELECTED POEMS AND Two PLAYS OF WILLIAM
BUTLER YEATS 109 (Macha Louis Rosenthal ed., 1962). This passage, which concludes the
stanza that begins, "Now days are dragon-ridden, the nightmare [rlides upon sleep," reflects
on the Irish "Troubles" following the 1916 Easter Rebellion during World War I. In The
Second Coming, Yeats opens on a similar note of despair about the centrifugal tendencies of
the world around him:
Turning and turning in the widening gyre
The falcon cannot hear the falconer;
Things fall apart; the centre cannot hold;
Mere anarchy is loosed upon the world.
Id. at 91. The anxious, contemporary ring of these lines may soften if one considers the
Wilsonian legacy from the same period of international institutions to help restore and
maintain order.
2. "There must be, not a balance of power, but a community of power; not organized
rivalries, but an organized common peace." Address by Woodrow Wilson to the United
States Senate (January 22, 1917), reprinted in 40 THE PAPERS OF WOODROW WILSON: Nov.
20, 1916 - JAN. 23, 1917, 536 (Arthur Link ed., 1982).
3. See John L. Gaddis, Toward the Post-Cold War World, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 102 (1991)
(discussion of the forces of integration in global communications, economics, security, ideas,
and peacemaking; and fragmentation, especially of states such as the Soviet Union and Yu-
goslavia under internal pressures for self-determination by constituent republics and
regions).
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mentary and antithetical in the fluctuating circumstances of the post-
Cold War era.
For lawyers, this process of change raises a welter of issues, of which
claimed rights of self-determination and humanitarian intervention are
prominent.4 When should international law bless self-determination that
fragments previously unified "nations," or authorize the use of force for
humanitarian reasons? Is self-determination alone a valid justification for
humanitarian intervention? What means of giving effect to either of these
claimed rights are appropriate and feasible? When is unilateral interven-
tion for humanitarian reasons acceptable in the absence of an effective
system of peaceful dispute resolution and collective security under the
United Nations Charter? What should be the role of the United Nations
in implementing self-determination and humanitarian intervention dur-
ing a transition to a community of power? When do concerns about
human rights - whose immediate promotion and protection have gener-
ally been left to domestic authority - become issues of international
peace and security? How can the UN reconcile its intervention on behalf
of human rights with rules and principles of non-interference in the do-
mestic affairs of states? How can multilateral mechanisms be improved to
respond more efficiently and effectively to issues of self-determination
and humanitarian intervention?
Answers to such questions have been exceptionally difficult for three
reasons: (1) the vagueness of international standards for self-determina-
tion and humanitarian intervention, unilateral or collective; (2) the reli-
ance of enforcement measures on an accurate description of often contro-
versial facts and unilateral interpretations of critical events and norms;
and (3) the fragility of multilateral means to avoid and resolve disputes.
Although the concepts of self-determination and humanitarian interven-
tion are well-established in diplomatic communication and enshrined in
international legal debates, their content remains disappointingly vague.
They do provide a basic vocabulary for claim and counterclaim and for
resolving disputes. In spite of this, they have never assisted effectively in
resolving concrete problems, except in the most obvious contexts. For ex-
ample, although the issue of self-determination has figured prominently
in debates about the Falkland/Malvinas Islands, the United Nations has
come to no definitive conclusion about its applicability, because of confuz
sion about the meaning and scope of the right.5
In the post-Cold War system, however, multilateralism offers a prom-
ising and practical alternative to jurisprudential hairsplitting and a jum-
bled practice of states to guide decisions about claims of self-determina-
4. Among the troublesome legal issues of the post-Cold War era, self-determination and
humanitarian intervention are singled out for attention in this article because of their grow-
ing prominence and interrelationship. International and regional institutions may also im-
prove the implementation of both.
5. See MICHAEL AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 296-97
(5th ed. 1984).
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tion and humanitarian intervention. The community of power, though
still incipient, is becoming a reality. The end of East-West bipolarity and
a confidence in the United Nations and regional frameworks has
presented new opportunities for improved standard-setting, fact-finding
and mediated responses to self-determination and humanitarian interven-
tion claims. Of course, favoring multilateral responses to national crises of
international significance is nothing new. What is new is the heightened
capacity of multilateral institutions to do so.
This study will first revisit the battle-strewn terrain of self-determi-
nation and humanitarian intervention in order to highlight the aridity of
those rights.6 As the study later suggests, however, the post-Cold War era
may be a good time for the global community to move on to the more
fertile ground of multilateralism. It seems time, in other words, to shift
attention and resources from endless debates about terminology and his-
torical justification to more practical discussions about reconciling con-
flicting interests in an emerging community of power. The past is signifi-
cant prologue to a consideration of alternatives for constructing a better
world order.7
6. The literature on these topics is vast. For bibliographical references, see BURNS WES-
TON ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 737 (2d ed. 1990) (self-determination
and minority rights); id. at 964 (humanitarian intervention); FERNANDO TES6N, HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988) (humanitarian
intervention).
7. Struggles of external and internal self-determination, like instances of intervention,
are kaleidoscopic. For example, in just one month (March 1990, which the author randomly
selected), the following events occurred: the first nonpartisan elections were held in the So-
viet Union; Boris Yeltsin won a seat in the Russian Supreme Soviet; the Third Soviet Con-
gress of People's Deputies repealed a constitutional guarantee of Communist Party monop-
oly; Mikhail Gorbachev was elected to a newly defined presidency with broader powers; the
Supreme Soviet of Georgia denounced its incorporation 49 years earlier into the Soviet
Union, apparently unwilling to wait for a 50th birthday cake; Estonia declared its right to
secede from the Soviet Union; and Lithuania declared its independence, formed a coalition
government, and was confronted by Soviet convoys and paratroopers.
Also in March 1990, Soviet troops began to withdraw from Hungary; free elections were
held in East Germany; and Serbia assumed direct control of police in rebellious Kosovo, the
ethnically Albanian, supposedly autonomous region. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela, re-
cently released from prison, assumed leadership of the African National Congress; called for
a continuation of United Nations sanctions against his country, and prepared for first-ever
talks with President de Klerk, just as South African troops intervened in the "homeland" of
Ciskei. Elsewhere in Africa, Namibia gained independence with help from the United Na-
tions, after 75 years of South African control, and promptly became a U.N. member; France
airlifted troops to reestablish order in Gabon, which had been torn by pro-democracy strikes
and protests; and in Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, running against the historical tide, termed
his party's landslide election a "mandate to create a one-party state." In Latin America,
among other events: Grenada experienced a peaceful transition of governments after parlia-
mentary elections; and Nicaragua ended its long civil war after United Nations-assisted
elections, beginning a remarkable government transition under UN supervision. In Asia, In-
dia withdrew the last of its peace-keeping troops from Sri Lanka, and sent in its security
police against Muslim insurgents in Kashmir. Coercive measures against political dissidents
in China increased. See generally Peter Hayes, Chronology 1990, 70:1 FOREIGN AFF. 206
(1991).
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I. SELF-DETERMINATION
In today's world, a global identity crisis pits popular aspirations
against national and international cohesion, ensuring that struggles for
self-determination will play a major role in global affairs. In addition,
global communication has introduced a new kind of domino effect, in
which the achievement of liberty in one country seems to cause repressive
regimes to topple, or at least to wobble, in others.' National issues of self-
determination quickly become issues of international peace and security.
Claims for internal self-determination - the right of peoples to deter-
mine their domestic political, economic and social systems democratically
- have become as resonant as claims for external self-determination -
the right of peoples to determine their institutions and way of life free of
outside control or interference.
The origin of self-determination, as a right of peoples rather than
individuals, lies in critiques of sovereignty by Grotius and Pufendorf and
in the libertarian movements of the eighteenth century." With its claim of
inalienable rights, the United States' Declaration of Independence pro-
vided the cornerstone for a modern regime of popular aspirations. In the
twentieth century, Woodrow Wilson and V.I. Lenin both championed the
principle of self-determination.10 The peace treaties following World War
I established a nation-system in Europe and regimes of rights for minor-
ity populations based on what was then regarded as a fledgling principle
of self-determination. The Covenant of the League of Nations established
a measure of self-determination for mandated territories, but did not ar-
ticulate a general principle."' The Atlantic Charter12 influenced delegates
to the San Francisco Conference in 1945 to incorporate a general princi-
ple of self-determination into Article 1(2) of the United Nations Charter.
Accordingly, a central purpose of the organization is to, "develop friendly
relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights
and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate mea-
What may be most striking about the events of March 1990, or any month in this ex-
traordinary period of time, is the following: first, the variety of ways in which self-determi-
nation was expressed; second, the frequency of state intervention, sometimes assisting popu-
lar aspirations from inside and outside but too often suppressing them; and, third, the
increasing role of United Nations intervention of various kinds on behalf of self-determina-
tion and democracy.
8. "A new kind of domino theory has emerged, in which the achievement of liberty in
one country causes repressive regimes to topple, or at least wobble in others." Gaddis, supra
note 3, at 103.
9. SARAH WAMBAUGH, A MONOGRAPH ON PLEBEscITEs wrrH A COLLECTION OF SPECIAL
DocuMENTs 1, 4 (1920) (an excellent treatise on self-determination in the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries).
10. See ROBERT SCHAEFFER, WARPATHS: THE POLTICS OF PARTITION (1990).
11. For a summary of pertinent pre-World War II history, see Daniel Thirer, Self-
Determination, in 8 ENCYC. PuB. INT'L L. 470 (Rudolph Bernhardt ed., 1981).
12. See Edward Laing, The Contribution of the Atlantic Charter to Human Rights
Law and Humanitarian Universalism, 26 WILLAMETTE L. REv. 113 (1989).
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sures to strengthen universal peace." 3 Provisions in Articles 55,14 7315
and 76(1)6 were intended to confirm the principle. Article 21(3) of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which provides a customary
elaboration of Article 55, states that, "The will of the people shall be the
basis of the authority of government.' 7 This provision merits special at-
tention. Although the Universal Declaration does not refer to self-deter-
mination by that term, Article 21(3) stands out in this first International
Bill of Rights because of its attribution of a democratic right to a "peo-
ple" rather than to individuals. The coincidence of the political will of the.
people with a full expression of self-determination is apparent. Some
13. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(2)(emphasis added).
14. Article 55.
With a view to the creation of conditions of stability and well-being which
are necessary for peaceful and friendly relations among nations based on re-
spect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of people, the
United Nations shall promote:
a. higher standards of living, full employment, and conditions of eco-
nomic and social progress and development;
b. solutions of international economic, social, health, and related
problems; and international cultural and educational co-operation; and
c. universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamen-
tal freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion.
Id. art. 55 (emphasis added).
15. Article 73.
Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for
the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full
measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the
inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the
obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace
and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabi-
tants of these territories, and, to this end:
b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspi-
rations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive develop-
ment of their free political institutions, according to the particular cir-
cumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of
advancement ....
Id. art. 73.
16. Article 76.
The basic objectives of the trusteeship system, in accordance with the Pur-
poses of the United Nations laid down in Article 1 of the present Charter, shall
be:
b. to promote the political, economic, social, and educational advance-
ment of the inhabitants of the trust territories, and their progressive
development towards self-government or independence as may be ap-
propriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peo-
ples and the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, and as
may be provided by the terms of each trusteeship agreement ....
Id. art. 76. (emphasis added).
17. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 21(3), G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc. A/810,
at 75 (1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
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have argued, therefore, that the Universal Declaration can be interpreted
to endorse a political right of internal self-determination. Thus, what
originated in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as an external
right of people to be free of foreign domination, was arguably broadened
under the Universal Declaration (and by reference, the Charter) into an
internal right of democratic franchise."8 This argument is controversial,
however, both because it is based on a provision of the Universal Declara-
tion that makes no explicit reference to self-determination and because
the existence of a right of internal self-determination is itself
controversial.
The right of self-determination has been most clearly recognized in
the context of post-World War II decolonization. Indeed, the Declaration
on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,
which was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assem-
bly, provided the first detailed articulation of the right.1 The Interna-
tional Court of Justice helped develop the right of self-determination in
two cases arising out of colonialism. In the Namibia case,20 the Court af-
firmed the applicability of self-determination in non-self-governing terri-
tories. In the Western Sahara case,2 1 the Court simply proclaimed the
right of peoples to determine their political status by their freely ex-
pressed will. Numerous General Assembly and Security Council resolu-
tions have applied a right of self-determination to condemn racist re-
gimes, particularly in Rhodesia and South Africa, and to vindicate the
rights of Palestinians. 22
The most important provision for a general right of self-determina-
18. Jordan Paust, International Legal Standards Concerning the Legitimacy of Gov-
ernmental Power, 5 AM. U.J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 1063 (1990).
19. The Declaration states:
2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development.
5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territo-
ries or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to trans-
fer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or
reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without
any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy
complete independence and freedom.
Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G. A. Res.
1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960)(emphasis
added).
20. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.C.J. 16 (June 21). See generally JOHN DUGARD, THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA/
NAMIBIA DISPUTE (1973).
21. Advisory Opinion on Western Sahara, 1975 I.C.J. 12, 31-35 (Oct. 16, 1975).
22. For a partial listing of these documents, see Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as
a Human Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198, 252, nn. 85-86 (W.
Michael Reisman & Burns Weston eds., 1976).
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tion is found in Articles 1(1) and (3) of the International Covenants on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights and on Civil and Political Rights,2"
both of which entered into force in 1976. It is significant that the two
Covenants correlate self-determination with political freedom, and that
this is not explicitly limited to freedom from external (foreign)
domination.
Other instruments substantiate this right of self-determination. The
1970 Declaration on Friendly Relations provides that, "By virtue of the
principle of equal rights and self-determination . . .all peoples have the
right to determine, without external interference, their political status...
and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the
provisions of the Charter ... [and] the duty to promote ... self-determi-
nation of peoples .... ,,24 The Final Act (Helsinki Accords) of the Confer-
ence on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE), which has played a
significant role in reshaping Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, pro-
vides a recital of the right of self-determination 25 that concisely encapsu-
23. The Covenants state:
1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social
and cultural development....
3. The States Parties to the present Covenant... shall promote the realization
of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity
with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations.
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR,
21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social and Cultural Rights, id. at 49 (emphasis added)[hereinafter Covenants].
24. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G. A.
Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970) [hereinaf-
ter Declaration on Friendly Relations].
25. The Helsinki Accords state:
PRINCIPLE VIII
The participating States will respect the equal rights of peoples and their
right to self-determination, acting at all times in conformity with the purposes
and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and with the relevant
norms of international law, including those relating to territorial integrity of
States.
By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peo-
ples, all peoples always have the right, in full freedom, to determine, when and
as they wish, their internal and external political status, without external inter-
ference, and to pursue as they wish their political, economic, social and cul-
tural development.
The participating States reaffirm the universal significance of respect for
and effective exercise of equal rights and self-determination of peoples for the
development of friendly relations among themselves as among all States; they
also recall the importance of the elimination of any form of violation of this
principle.
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE): Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, Princi-
ple VIII, reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 1292, 1295 (1975) [hereinafter Helsinki Accords] (emphasis
added).
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lates current thinking.16
Subsequent instruments of the CSCE have incorporated the follow-
ing language: "We reaffirm the equal rights of peoples and their right to
self-determination in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations
and with the relevant norms of international law, including those relating
to territorial integrity of states. 2 7 Unfortunately, the CSCE documents
do not elaborate the right any further, so that their reaffirmation of it
might be interpreted either as boiler-plate language or, more likely, terms
of art elaborated in other instruments.
The context of the CSCE reaffirmation suggests that the right of self-
determination was intended to be quite narrow. In the Charter of Paris
the right appears under the heading, "Friendly Relations among Partici-
pating States,' '2 8 rather than "Human Dimension." 9 The latter heading
refers to the salient commitments of CSCE members in implementing
human rights and fundamental freedoms. Because the "Human Dimen-
sion" section devotes particular attention to the rights of national minori-
ties, it is reasonable to infer that, as in the Helsinki Accords, the internal
rights of national minorities do not fall within the definition of self-deter-
mination in the Charter of Paris.
The Copenhagen Document"0 reinforces this construction. The ab-
26. Note these useful conclusions drawn from Principle VIII:
- One, it clearly applies to peoples within a sovereign state as it is ad-
dressed particularly to the states of Europe.
- Two, it does not apply to "national minorities" as such, since such
groups are covered by Principle VII and in that respect are not accorded self-
determination but only minority rights. It has been suggested that peoples en-
joying a constitutional status in a multinational state (e.g. U.S.S.R. and Yugo-
slavia) are not minorities and hence have the right to self-determination. See
Antonio Cassesse [sic], The Helsinki Declaration and Self-Determination, in
HUMAN RIGHTS, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE HELSINKI AcCORDs 83, 95-103
([Thomas] Buergenthal ed. 1977).
- Three, the phrase "in full freedom" was intended to preclude coercion
by a government in respect of the choice by the peoples of their internal re-
gime or policies. This was made explicit by the sponsor, the Netherlands, and
other supporting governments. Id. [at 102-103]
- Four, the principle also recognizes that self-determination must not dis-
rupt the territorial integrity of states and therefore does not apparently sanc-
tion secession, but this is not inconsistent with recognition of internal free
choice.
Louis HENKIN ET. AL., INTERNATIONAL LAW CASES AND MATERIALS 283 (2d ed. 1987).
27. These Post-Cold War instruments include CSCE: Charter of Paris for a New Eu-
rope and Supplementary Document to Give Effect to Certain Provisions of the Charter,
Nov. 21, 1990, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 190, 197 (1991) [hereinafter Paris Charter]; and Re-
port of the CSCE Meeting of Experts on Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, Feb. 8, 1991,
reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 382, 386 (1991) [hereinafter Valletta Report on Peaceful Settlement]
(emphasis added).
28. Paris Charter, supra note 27, at 196.
29. Id. at 199.
30. CSCE: Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Conference on the Human
Dimension, reprinted in 29 I.L.M. 1305 (1990)[hereinafter Copenhagen Document].
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sence in the Copenhagen Document of a self-determination rubric sug-
gests the limits of self-determination in the post-Cold War vocabulary for
expressing a "human dimension" within the CSCE framework. The Val-
letta Report on Peaceful Settlement also seems to distinguish "self-deter-
mination" from other specific commitments undertaken by CSCE mem-
bers to protect human rights in their territories. After declaring that, "the
advancement of democracy, and respect for and exercise of human rights,
are indispensable," ' the Introduction to the Valletta Report adds that,
"they also reaffirm .. .[the right of] self-determination, ' '1 2 as if to make
the two kinds of rights disjunctive.
These post-Cold War instruments of the CSCE do not clarify the
meaning of "national minorities" except to suggest that they are not pro-
tected by the right of "self-determination." The Copenhagen Document
establishes that, "To belong to a national minority is a matter of a per-
son's individual choice,""3 thereby distancing the term further from an
objective definition. Perhaps it is possible to know a national minority
when one sees one, but impressions can be perilous.
Whether self-determination is a principle or a right once generated
heated controversy. Although that jurisprudential controversy has been
resolved in favor of establishing self-determination as a right, the norma-
tive ambiguity of the right is almost endless. The questions are legion and
always have been.34 For example:
1. Does the right apply only in non-self-governing territories, that is,
primarily in the process of decolonization? In post-independence circum-
stances, does the right extend at least to all people trapped in conquered
or ceded territories? Does it apply against occupying powers apart from
other protections of international law? If so, must the majority of the
people exercising the right actually reside in the territory of an occupying
power?
2. If the right protects people, both in non-self-governing and self-
governing territories against external interference, what may they deter-
mine exactly? Independence from indirect as well as direct foreign inter-
ference? Economic autonomy and effective, permanent sovereignty or
control over natural resources? Preservation of ethno-cultural identity?
3. Does self-determination include the right of a people to secede
from a state?
4. Which people constitute the "self' entitled to make determina-
tions? Must the "self" embrace an entire population within a particular
territory? If a group within a population may exercise the right, may sub-
groups assert the right as well? How can non-sovereign groups of people
already possess a "right" of self-determination under international law if
31. Valletta Report on Peaceful Settlement, supra note 27, at 386.
32. Id. (emphasis added).
33. Copenhagen Document, supra note 30, 1 32, at 1318.
34. See, e.g., WAMBAUGH, supra note 9, at 27.
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they are still seeking the legal status to determine their selfhood? If sub-
groups can be "selves," should the right be limited to well-defined nation-
alities? Or to "national minorities," at least to those minorities outside
the scope of the CSCE? How are they to be defined? What are the crite-
ria of eligibility? Size of the group? Power or influence? Cultural homoge-
neity? Historical purity? Economic viability? Subjective factors such as
shared perceptions of group identity? Should percentage of support
among a population be a criterion? Active support alone?
5. If multiple criteria are appropriate for defining the "self," how are
they to be applied in concrete cases? What about Albanians in the Ko-
sovo region of Yugoslavia? Afrikaaners in South Africa? The Kurds,
spread among three states? Irish Catholics in Northern Ireland? Corsi-
cans in France? The Basques in Spain? In France? In Idaho? Native
American tribes? Newly organized tribes? Hispanics in Los Angeles or
Miami?
6. May a sub-group opt out of the larger group's exercise of self-de-
termination? The Soviet Republics having achieved external self-determi-
nation, what right of self-determination exists for Russian or other minor-
ities within the new states? Does the existence of neighboring Russia, to
which those Russian minorities could migrate, weaken their claim for
greater autonomy in the newly independent states?
7. Does self-determination include a right of internal democratiza-
tion? What, precisely, is the difference between internal self-determina-
tion and democracy? Does the right to self-determination imply broader
human rights protections against encroachment by local authority?
Would it entitle people to religious freedom in a theocracy?
8. If people may determine themselves to be truly independent of
outside interference, how, logically, can the control and authority the peo-
ple thereby establish be subject to any human rights standards or other
external appraisal without their consent? Would not a full right of self-
determination logically require an attitude of cultural relativism that ac-
cepts any internal practice, however barbarous, which has been "deter-
mined" by a particular group of people?
9. By what process may self-determination be exercised? Does the
principle of nonviolence apply? Must a people first exhaust peaceful rem-
edies before using force? Must they exhaust multilateral remedies?
10. To what extent may a people legitimately enlist outside support
or intervention to facilitate their self-determination? Does implementa-
tion of the right of self-determination in one state justify humanitarian
intervention by other states?s"
35. Paradoxically, such support may thereby threaten the exercise of true self-determi-
nation. John Stuart Mill and other purists have argued that a principle of non-intervention
is therefore a necessary condition for people to be truly free; they must achieve freedom by
themselves. Thus, a nation must be free of all foreign interference in order to engage in
internal self-determination of its political, economic and cultural affairs. A contrary argu-
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To be sure, community pronouncements and state practice have
helped answer many of these questions, but the legacy of accepted and
reliable authority is still meager. The term "self-determination" still
means many different things to many different peoples (or selves).38 De-
spite several decades of efforts to clarify the standards, there is unfortu-
nately little prospect of international agreement in the near future. For
example, the criteria for recognition of the "self" entitled to exercise self-
determination are unsettled. Unfortunately, the most compelling criterion
may be the extent to which a group of people is prepared to use force.
Moreover, an insidious notion of cultural relativism inhibits what might
seem to be a natural relationship between self-determination and human
rights standards. 7
Also, there is still no agreement on whether the right to self-determi-
nation extends to secession and other acts by people in self-governing ter-
ritories. On the one hand, the right has been vindicated in a few self-
governing territories such as the Soviet Union, paradoxically without the
compulsion of the CSCE process. Post-colonial statements that purported
to insulate independent states from claims of self-determination s ' are
very questionable today. On the other hand, the general practice of states
opposes an extension of the right to people in self-governing territories. 9
States understandably fear the threat to their sovereignty, and the global
community as a whole fears the instability and potential violence inher-
ent in the right. Hence, the inviolability of boundaries has become virtu-
ally an axiom of international relations, especially among governments of
former non-self-governing territories. The result can be viewed as either a
ment, however, is that full self-determination is not a necessary condition for freedom, and
therefore, invited or otherwise permissible humanitarian intervention by outside forces does
not necessarily impair a people's freedom to exercise self-determination. For an excellent
discussion of Mill's theory, see TES6N, supra note 6, at 26.
36. "The concept of self-determination cries for definition, and few agree on its con-
tent." BARRY CARTER & PHILLIP R. TRIMBLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 1236 (1991).
37. See, e.g., Jerome Elkind, Remarks, Self-Determination: The Cases of Fiji, New
Caledonia, Namibia, and the Western Sahara, 1988 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 431.
38. For example, the Declaration on Friendly Relations, supra note 24, carves out a
major exception to "the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples," as
follows:
Nothing in the foregoing paragraphs shall be construed as authorizing or
encouraging any action which would dismember or impair, totally or in part,
the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign and independent States
conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of equal rights and
self-determination of peoples as described above and thus possessed of a gov-
ernment representing the whole people belonging to the territory without dis-
tinction as to race, creed or colour.
Id. at 123-24. As a statement of the principle of non-intervention, this provision has contin-
uing validity, but as a statement purporting to insulate self-governing territories from inter-
nal self-determination, the provision is questionable.
39. Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to
Secede, 13 CASE W. REs. J. INT'L L. 257, 271-74 (1981).
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double standard 40 - an external right obtains in non-self-governing terri-
tories but not in self-governing territories - or simply a customary defi-
nition of self-determination as "decolonization."
Critics of a right of self-determination oppose it also for historical
and institutional reasons. They argue that the right is little more than a
battle cry which has failed to promote democracy. Furthermore, it has
fostered nationalistic demagoguery,' 1 specious forms of multicultural-
ism,' and the construction of "improbable 'nation states' " " that lack an
adequate civic culture. Consequently, traditional values of social assimila-
tion and integration are sacrificed while both nations and world order are
fragmented. In an era of ethnic and irredentist strife these dangers seem
particularly pernicious.
Whether or not one agrees with such criticism, it is difficult to avoid
skepticism about relying heavily on diplomatic discourse to vindicate
claims of self-determination. United Nations-organized talks between
Greek and Turkish Cypriots collapsed after the introduction of rhetoric
about self-determination. 4' To be sure, recognition of the right has been
generally effective in facilitating decolonization and providing a frame-
work for limited multilateral settlement of competing claims. What has
been missing until recently, however, is an effective community process
for more precise rule-clarification, fact-finding and mediation to imple-
ment values underlying the right.'
40. AKEHURST, supra note 5, at 253.
41. SCHAEFFER, supra note 10, at 255.
42. For a trenchant commentary on the threat posed by identifying multiculturalism
with group separatism in a national society, see ARTHUR SCHLESINGER, JR. THE DISUNITING
OF AMERICA: REFLECTIONS ON A MULTICULTURAL SocmrY (1991). See also Arthur Schlesinger,
Jr., The Cult of Ethnicity, Good and Bad: A historian argues that multiculturalism threat-
ens the ideal that binds America, TIME, July 8, 1991, at 14. That identification, "crystallizes
the differences, magnifies tensions, intensifies hostilities." Rather than an aspiration of E
pluribus unum, "[tihe balance shifts from unum to pluribus."
43. James Clad, 'Democratic' Unraveling in Third World, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
July 24, 1991, at 19.
44. A GLOBAL AGENDA: ISSUES BEFORE THE 46TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS 53 (John Tessitore & Susan Wolfson eds., 1991)[hereinafter GLOBAL AGENDA].
45. A leading authority wrote in 1972 what has remained true for nearly two decades:
Particularly where it involves the emergence of new states on the world
scene or the reshaping of old ones, self-determination is obviously a matter of
legitimate international concern. The problem, to which no satisfactory answer
has as yet been produced, is how one sets about regularizing and bringing
under international control ... essentially a right of revolution, justified by an
appeal to principles of higher law ....
It would be a wholly new departure if norms were to be established by
which claims to self-determination could be evaluated and the Assembly, the
Security Council, or some other newly created international agency were em-
powered to take authoritative decisions, implemented in part, perhaps, through
the elaboration of a collective process of recognition by the international
community.
Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L. 459, 474 (1971).
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II. HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The right of a state to intervene in another state's territory for hu-
manitarian reasons has deep philosophical and historical roots. For exam-
ple, Emerich Vattel, who greatly influenced American revolutionaries in
their exercise of self-determination against the British Crown, argued in
1758:
If a prince, by violating the fundamental laws, gives his subjects a
lawful cause for resisting him; if, by his insupportable tyranny, he
brings on a national revolt against him, any foreign power may right-
fully give assistance to an oppressed people who ask for its aid.'
Contemporary sources for a right of intervention include moral philoso-
phy,4 7 human rights law, and state responsibility for the lives and prop-
erty of nationals.
A limited history of state practice reveals a number of military expe-
ditions that were undertaken ostensibly for humanitarian reasons. Russia
intervened on behalf of Christians in Bulgaria, Turkey, Bosnia and Her-
zegovina during the 1870's, and in the Balkans during the nineteenth and
early twentieth centuries."" India intervened to aid Bangladesh's self-de-
termination, 9 France intervened in the Central African Republic,5" and
four African States intervened in the Liberian Civil War.5" On the other
hand, humanitarian justifications of such abatement actions as those un-
dertaken by the United States in the Dominican Republic,"2 Grenada, 53
and Panama5 have been controversial.
Self-help measures or missions to rescue nationals held hostage or
46. Emerich Vattel, III LAW OF NATIONS 131 (Fenwick trans., 1964).
47. See TES6N, supra note 6.
48. Id. at 157-58.
49. Id. at 179; Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic
Tale of Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J.
INT'L L. 321 (1972); Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of
Humanitarian Intervention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275 (1973).
50. TES6N, supra note 6, at 175.
51. See Robert A. Friedlander, The Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention: UN
Precedents, US Policy and the Liberian Civil War, INT'L PRACTITIONER'S NOTEBOOK, June
1991, at 29.
52. Ved P. Nanda, The United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on
World Order - Part 1, 43 DENv. L. J. 439 (1966).
53. Compare TES6N, supra note 6, at 188. See also Fernando Tes6n & Fernando Dos-
wald-Beck, The Legality of the U.S. Intervention in Grenada, 31 NErH. INT'L L. REV. 35
(1984); Christopher C. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
131 (1984); John N. Moore, Grenada and the International Double Standard, Id. at 145;
Detlev F. Vagts, International Law under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-
Home Examination, id. at 169.
54. See Anthony D'Amato, The Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyr-
anny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990); Tom J. Farer, Panama: Beyond the Charter Paradigm,
id. at 503; Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United States Intervention in Panama under
International Law, id. at 494; Jennifer Miller, Note, International Intervention - The
United States Invasion of Panama, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 633 (1990).
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otherwise endangered on foreign territory resemble humanitarian inter-
vention in the classic sense. They rely at least as much on self-defense
and national security justifications as humanitarian ones. Examples of
rescue missions include the American/Belgian air lifts in the Congo dur-
ing the early 1960's;15 the raid on the Entebbe airport by Israeli comman-
dos;"' President Carter's ill-fated helicopter operation to rescue hostages
in Iran; 7 the intervention in Grenada;5 and most recently, rescue of U.S.
nationals during the Liberian Civil War. 9
Like self-determination, humanitarian intervention has been fraught
with ambiguity. For example:
1. What is "humanitarian?" One state's humanitarian jihad is a vic-
tim state's invasion. Human rights standards are often subject to varying
interpretations and national security exceptions.
2. Does the term "humanitarian" embrace only interventions in the
nineteenth century sense espoused by Vattel? That is, is intervention hu-
manitarian only when its purpose is to protect residents in the territory
of another state from human rights deprivations? If so, what magnitude
or patterns of deprivation justify intervention? Do only deprivations of
the most fundamental human rights justify intervention?
3. Does the term also embrace self-help or rescue missions on behalf
of the intervening state's own nationals in the territory of another state?
If so, under what circumstances and according to what criteria? May a
state undertake a rescue mission only if the other state is unable or un-
willing to protect the first state's nationals? To what extent must the in-
tervening State exhaust peaceful alternatives in an emergency? In a res-
cue mission, does it matter whether those to be rescued are primarily
citizens of the intervening state?
4. Do the nature, duration, purposes and outcome of humanitarian
intervention matter? Does a principle of proportionality apply?
Unlike self-determination, the very existence of a right of humanita-
rian intervention is controversial. Justification for any intervention in for-
eign territory must be found either in a broad reading of Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter, 0 or in an exception to that provision. Al-
55. Harold L. Weisberg, Note, The Congo Crisis 1964: A Case Study in Humanitarian
Intervention, 12 VA. J. INT'L L. 261 (1972).
56. See United Nations: Security Council Debate and Draft Resolutions Concerning the
Operation to Rescue Hijacked Hostages at the Entebbe Airport, reprinted in, 15 I.L.M.
1224 (1976).
57. N.Y. TIMES, April 25, 1980, at Al; id. April 26, 1980, at Al.
58. Moore, supra note 53, at 149.
59. Friedlander, supra note 51.
60. The Article reads as follows:
Article 2(4).
All members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat
or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any
state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
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though Article 2(4) has often been ignored by states - its "high minded
resolve" still "mocks us from the grave"'" - the essential message of re-
stricting the threat or use of force remains a basic principle of interna-
tional relations. We must take Article 2(4) seriously. It still provides the
simplest expression of community expectations about non-intervention.
The language of Article 2(4) does, of course, provide a margin for
arguing that some instances of humanitarian intervention are acceptable.
For example, Entebbe-style "mop up" operations and lightning com-
mando strikes to rescue hostages of whatever nationality may be accept-
able. When prompt withdrawal follows, such actions do not significantly
involve force "against the territorial integrity or political independence of
any state." 2 Such actions would therefore seem to be legitimate under
Article 2(4). Some argue, however, that the original intent of the Charter
was to prohibit all intervention in foreign territory that is not otherwise
authorized."2
One writer makes the intriguing suggestion that if a state risks the
lives of its citizens to achieve humanitarian ends, it ordinarily should not
withdraw quickly. If there have to be intervening states in the real world,
they should occupy the foreign territory long enough to ensure lasting
achievement of humanitarian ends, the language of Article 2(4) notwith-
standing. "If we believe that in certain ineffable cases the dangerous ex-
pedient of humanitarian intervention should be attempted, we should
concede the probable necessity of reconstructing the political order that
created the imperious necessity." 4 Thus, although multilateral recon-
struction of political order is generally preferable, when unilateral hu-
manitarian intervention does take place, the intervenor may need to stay
for a prolonged period of time before it can properly withdraw from the
foreign territory.
State intervention in the territory of another state in order to imple-
ment a basic purpose of the United Nations may not be inconsistent with
the Charter. Far from acting "in any other manner inconsistent with the
Purposes of the United Nations," 5 the intervening state's actions are ac-
tually authorized by other Charter provisions. An example of this would
be intervention for the purpose of enhancing self-determination, which is
arguably sanctioned by Article 1. This argument might seem to be espe-
cially compelling as a justification for intervention to protect a majority
Nations.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
61. Thomas M. Franck, Who Killed Article 2(4)? Or Changing Norms Governing the
Use of Force By States, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 809 (1970).
62. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
63. Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and United States Policy, in RIGHT V. MIGHT 37,
39 (2d ed. 1991).
64. Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J.
INT'L L. 117, 127 (1991).
65. U.N. CHARTER art. 2(4).
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people from violence and other violations of fundamental human rights
by a minority, as in Bangladesh (East Pakistan) before it gained indepen-
dence from Karachi."6 The most common counter-argument, however, is
that the Charter allows no human rights exceptions to its prohibition on
the threat or use of force.
6 7
The only explicit exceptions to Article 2(4) in the Charter are found
in Chapters VII and VIII. Chapter VII contains provisions for self-de-
fense or forceful measures authorized by the Security Council. Chapter
VIII allows enforcement measures by regional arrangements or agencies
authorized by the Security Council.
It has been argued that the justification for humanitarian interven-
tion by states - "the right of governments to defend defenseless victims
of oppression" 8 - is philosophically the same as that for self-defense
under Article 51 of the Charter 9 - "the right of governments to defend
the lives and property of their nationals which are threatened by foreign
invasion. 70 There is, however, no accepted legal identification between
these two types of forceful action.
State practice before the U.N. Charter has led some to argue that the
drafters of Article 2(4) intended to preserve a customary "right" of hu-
manitarian intervention. The travaux preparatoires of the San Francisco
Conference are inconclusive on this point.71 Opposing arguments are that
there never was a customary right of humanitarian intervention, that Ar-
ticle 2(4) replaces any inconsistent custom, that the Charter elsewhere
establishes the only permissible exceptions to Article 2(4), and that a gen-
eral principle of nonintervention now applies, regardless of humanitarian
exigencies or acquiescence by states.7 ' Another argument suggests a cus-
tomary right of humanitarian intervention exists due to the Cold War
reality of a stalemated United Nations, that is, that because adoption of
Article 2(4) presupposed effective institutions, self-help measures are ac-
ceptable in the absence of these institutions.
66. One scholar has argued:
[T]he demands of self-determination [can be placed] above those of "territorial
integrity" and of a "non-interventionist" stand on the part of the United Na-
tions. For where violence is perpetrated by a minority to deprive a majority of
political, economic, social and cultural rights, the principles of "territorial in-
tegrity" and "non-intervention" should not be permitted to be used as a ploy
to perpetuate the political subjugation of the majority.
Nanda, supra note 49, at 336.
67. See, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, WAR, AGGRESSION AND SELF-DEFENSE 89 (1988).
("[N]othing in the Charter substantiates the right of one State to use force against another
under the guise of ensuring the implementation of human rights.").
68. Fernando Tes6n, Remarks, 84 AM. Soc. INT'L L. PROC. 195 (1990).
69. U.N. CHARTER art. 51 (confirming "the inherent right of individual or collective self
defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations .
70. Tes6n, supra note 68.
71. TES6N, supra note 6, at 130, 134, 136.
72. Seelan Brownlie, Humanitarian Intervention, in LAW AND CIVIL WAR IN THE MOD-
ERN WORLD 217 (John Norton Moore ed., 1974).
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Even if the Charter preserves a customary right of humanitarian in-
tervention, inter-temporal construction of subsequent state practice does
not easily support its continued existence. One analysis of post-Charter
interventions by states asserts that, "there is not a single case ... where
one state has intervened in another for the exclusive purpose of halting
mass murder, much less any other gross violations of human rights." 3
Forceful actions by India in East Pakistan, Tanzania in Uganda, and Vi-
etnam in Cambodia might have been justified on grounds of humanita-
rian intervention. Instead they were justified on the basis of self-defense
from armed attack, "a claim not one of them could persuasively sustain.
Their choice hardly suggests confidence in the exculpatory power of hu-
manitarian motive."'
4
Unilateral intervention to support internal self-determination, de-
mocracy, or fundamental human rights is highly questionable on policy
grounds as well. 7 5 Intervention may have the undesirable effect of inviting
prolonged foreign hegemony, as in the Syrian and Israeli interventions in
Lebanon.76 A rule restricted to counterintervention in support of demo-
cratic forces runs the same risk. Thus, "a rule allowing humanitarian in-
tervention ... is a general license to vigilantes and opportunists to resort
to hegemonical intervention." 7 Although this observation may be more
colorful than accurate, it does serve as a general reminder that despite its
charitable sound, humanitarian intervention can readily mask an illegal
use or threat of use of force. A right to intervene for humanitarian rea-
sons is dangerously subject to abuse.78
Several publicists have collaborated in formulating a list of criteria
that, ideally, would define the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention.
These criteria, drawn from the laws of human rights and armed conflicts,
include the following: immediacy and extent of a specific threat to funda-
mental human rights; exhaustion of alternative remedies; good faith at-
tempt to secure an authoritative invitation from the target state; minimal
effect of intervention on authority structures in target state; minimal req-
uisite force; relative disinterestedness of the intervening state or states;
prompt disengagement after completion of the interventino; and full re-
porting to the Security Council and, as appropriate, regional organiza-
73. Farer, supra note 64, at 121.
74. Id. at 122.
75. See Oscar Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L.
645 (1984); CATER & TRIMBLE, supra note 36, at 1236.
76. See Nicholas 0. Berry, The Conflict Between United States Intervention and Pro-
moting Democracy in the Third World, 60 TEMP. L. Q. 1015 (1987).
77. Ian Brownlie, Thoughts on Kind-Hearted Gunmen, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 147 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1973)[hereinafter HUMANITARIAN
INTERVENTION].
78. MALCOLM N. SHAW, INTERNATIONAL LAW 423 (1977); Louis Henkin, Remarks, Biafra,
Bengal, and Beyond: International Responsibility and Genocidal Conflict 1972 AM. Soc'Y
INT'L L. PROC. 95, 96.
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tions.7 9 These criteria provide an excellent basis for multilateral prescrip-
tion, though unfortunately not an accurate description of state practice.
III. ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS DURING THE COLD WAR
Most commentators prefer multilateral or collective intervention to
unilateral intervention. Theoretically, multilateral action provides a more
reliable consensus of support, checks abuses, and better ensures that in-
tervention is warranted. Unfortunately, multilateral efforts were greatly
inhibited, if not stymied, by Cold War politics. Vetoes of important mea-
sures by Permanent Members of the Security Council paralyzed the
United Nations. The major powers simply kept self-determination issues
off the multilateral agenda, except those whose airing served their respec-
tive foreign policy objectives. Whatever its legal status, unilateral action
frequently became the only moral alternative to passive tolerance of bru-
tality and irresponsibility.8 0
The United Nations has played an instrumental role in the process of
decolonization, and has helped stabilize newly independent regimes. 1
The United Nations has adopted resolutions supporting claims for self-
governance, imposed sanctions against racist regimes in Rhodesia and
South Africa, supervised plebiscites, provided a forum for self-determina-
tion movements, received reports and inquiries from trusteeships and
other non-self-governing territories, adopted criteria for testing the extent
of self-governance, provided technical assistance to people on the path to
independence, and installed military troops to protect democratic
processes. As Secretary-General, Dag HammarskjSld, in particular, exer-
cised truly daring leadership in support of independence and of the inter-
ests of newly independent states.
On the other hand, the United Nations proved to be quite ineffective
in post-colonial situations. It failed to predict ethnic conflicts, to give ef-
fect to the aspirations of people in the nominal "republics" of federations
or unions, to mediate peaceful settlements of conflicts, to respond effec-
tively to acts of secession such as those in the Congo (Katanga), Nigeria
(Biafra), and Pakistan (Bangladesh). At least on New York's East River,
self-determination was primarily a metaphor for independence, not for
secession of people after independence nor for facilitating subsequent po-
litical and social change in self-governing states.
79. Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Intervention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea
for Constructive Alternatives, in Moore, supra note 72, at 249.
80. "(I]f we cannot perfect, as a minimum, a system of humanitarian intervention, we
have lost our humanity. If we sit passively by while the Ibos suffer genocide, we have for-
feited our right to regain it." W. Michael Reisman, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect
the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION, supra note 77, at 195.
81. "The U.N. served as the catalyst for the revolution of decolonization." Brian
Urguhart, The United Nations and its Discontents, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 15, 1990, at 11.
The summary that follows in the text is drawn from Louis HENKIN ET AL., supra note 26, at
284.
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The record of the United Nations as an instrument of humanitarian
intervention was also negligible throughout the Cold War period. A pre-
vailing interpretation of Article 2(7) of the Charter was that intervention
by the organization for humanitarian reasons would be an invasion of a
state's domestic jurisdiction. While regional organizations have assumed
some leadership, such as the fledgling Organization of Eastern Caribbean
States (OECS) in requesting U.S. troops in Grenada,82 their freedom from
superpower influence may be questioned. Furthermore, their immediate
delegation of enforcement authority to nearby military powers illustrates
the weakness of the United Nations system. General Assembly resolutions
advocating material and moral support for national liberation movements
in colonial territories stopped short of condoning humanitarian interven-
tion. Finally, the United Nations has responded infrequently to unilateral
acts of intervention within the superpowers' spheres of influence.
In sum, the United Nations was seldom given an opportunity to re-
spond effectively to issues of self-determination and humanitarian inter-
vention. The U.N. was limited by East-West spheres of influence that
were impervious to multilateral investigation and response. Moreover, the
United Nations was constrained by the reluctance of states, particularly
newly independent ones, to recognize a post-colonial right of self-deter-
mination or a responsibility for multilateral humanitarian intervention on
behalf of dissident groups.
IV. THE NEW REALITY OF A COMMUNITY OF POWER
Political conditions which prevented international institutions from
playing a greater role during the Cold War have changed. Although the
millennium has not yet arrived, the bipolar stalemate has ended.
Whatever the historical explanation, East and West have begun working
together to resolve fundamental issues, and to enlist the participation of
multilateral institutions and processes. The Conference on Security and
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) specifically recognized, "with satisfaction
the growing role of the United Nations in world affairs and its increasing
effectiveness."8 3 The Gulf War, in particular, stimulated East-West coop-
eration and practical decision-making within the United Nations. Al-
though the Gulf War was unique in many respects, it nevertheless
portends an accelerated emergence of a community of power, in the Wil-
sonian sense, to replace the bi-polar balance-of-power system. This
emerging community of power also portends, however, a proliferation of
self-determination and intervention issues that will test the strength of
multilateralism. The set of circumstances that gave rise to collective ac-
tion in the Gulf War will probably not be repeated. The disparate inter-
ests of the Permanent Members of the Security Council converged fortui-
82. See Text of Reagan's Announcement of Invasion, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 26, 1983, at
A16. For a critique of the OECS's involvement in Grenada, see Joyner, supra note 53, at
135-38.
83. Paris Charter, supra note 27, at 198.
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tously to produce agreement on enforcement action and humanitarian
measures following the war. In Europe and the Soviet Union particularly,
the lid is off the cauldron of bubbling ethnic, irredentist, and other na-
tionalist animosities. 4
Fortunately, a rejuvenated United Nations is also part of this envi-
ronment. It is now a body capable of consolidating a community of power
to address a formidable agenda of disputes, feuds, and conflicts. The
United Nations is no longer, in one poison-pen image, a "baroque appara-
tus [in which] governments might, without abating their transgressions,
go to church. 8 5 Instead of a place of sanctimonious ceremony, the United
Nations is becoming, "a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in
the attainment of [their] common ends.""6 As a service institution in the
post-Cold War era, the United Nations can better facilitate self-determi-
nation, pre-empt unilateral humanitarian intervention by states, and ini-
tiate its own form of intervention and dispute settlement when necessary.
Three years ago, a major study advised the United Nations to "do
less but do it better." The study observed that:
[T]he Security Council does not need to solve, or even ease, all of the
world's problems to be valuable. It simply has to make a positive dif-
ference in resolving a few dangerous conflicts. Even one clear victory
would begin to restore public faith in its potential.
87
Now the five permanent members of the Security Council are cooperat-
ing, and the public perceives that the Council scored its "one clear vic-
tory" in the Gulf War.8 8 The United Nations as a whole can seize the
84. Mideast Diplomacy: Excerpts from Bush's Address to General Assembly: For a
'Pax Universalis,' N.Y. TimaS, Sept. 24, 1991, at A14[hereinafter Pax Universalis]. In his
remarks, President Bush referred variously to the "resumption of history," the "revival of
history," and the "renewal of history" to free and invigorate people in the post-Cold War
era. "Communism held history captive for years, and it suspended ancient disputes and it
suppressed ethnic rivalries, nationalist aspirations and old prejudices." Id.
85. Hazzard, Reflections: Breaking Faith - 1, THE NEW YORKER, Sept. 25, 1989, at 63,
96 (an acid indictment of the United Nations by a former employee).
86. U.N. CHARTER art. 1(4).
87. See A SUCCESSOR VISION: THE UNITED NATIONS OF TOMORROW 113 (Peter J.
Fromuth ed., 1988)[hereinafter Fromuth].
88. Brzezinski has commented:
After years of ineptitude marked by Cold War divisions and unwillingness to
condemn Third World aggressors, the United Nations reclaimed a major role
in international relations. In legitimizing an international coalition that cut
across established alliances, it helped bring about the defeat of Iraq. From the
beginning the Security Council dominated the handling of the crisis, and its
early moves quickly isolated Iraq diplomatically and economically. Most mem-
bers of the General Assembly disapproved of Iraq's invasion, with its implicit
threat to their own national existence, and allowed the great powers to work
out a solution. Both the Arab League and the nonaligned movement were
hopelessly divided and without resources to act.
With each successive step, and the coalition's obvious intention to persevere,
pivotal states reversed deeply established policy positions: Turkey abandoned
its aversion to intervening in any Arab conflict that did not directly involve its
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moment to confirm its intended role of "building consensus among major
players in the world scene."8 9 The Gulf War established the ability of the
Security Council to repel aggression, restore international peace and se-
curity, impose comprehensive sanctions, and see them enforced.90 The
credibility of the United Nations as a whole is thereby increased.
The Gulf War is of particular relevance to this article. It originated
as a vindication of self-determination, and collective acts of humanitarian
intervention were carried out in its aftermath. Security Council Resolu-
tion 688,91 adopted after the Gulf War, exemplifies the reality of a compe-
tent United Nations. For the first time, the Security Council determined
that a massive flow of refugees, or displaced persons in their own terri-
tory, namely the Kurds in Iraq, threatened international peace and secur-
ity. Resolution 688 specifically condemned the repression of the Iraqi ci-
vilian population, particularly the Kurds; and it provided for, "immediate
access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of
assistance."9 " The resolution also incorporated a detailed memorandum of
understanding between the United Nations and the Iraqi government.
Precise terms of United Nations intervention were set out, including the
establishment of Humanitarian Centers (UNHUCs) in areas designated
by the United Nations.9" Resolution 688 did not purport to decide any
issues of self-determination involving Iraqi minorities, nor did it support
military intervention for humanitarian reasons. It nevertheless broke new
ground.
United Nations action on behalf of the Kurds was an extension of the
impressive regime of authority and control by which the Security Council
responded to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the first time one member of
the United Nations had purported to annex another by use of force. The
own security; Syria dropped its anti-Western stance and joined with the "im-
perialists" to topple an Arab rival; Iran did nothing to interfere with U.S.-
engineered military operations, and it impounded the Iraqi military aircraft
seeking a haven from the coalition's bombing; and Israel exercised un-
characteristic restraint, absorbing Iraqi Scud missile attacks and relying on
U.S.-manned batteries of Patriot antiballistic missiles to protect its territory,
thereby frustrating Saddam's attempt to transform the Gulf War into a new
Arab-Israeli war.
With widespread support in the United Nations, countries like Jordan, Yemen,
Libya, Algeria and the Sudan who tilted toward Iraq dared not challenge the
blockade.
Zbignew Brzezinski, Selective Global Commitment, 70 FOREIGN AFF. 1, 8
(1991).
89. Fromuth, supra note 87, at 113.
90. Bruce Russett & James S. Sutterlin, The U.N. in a New World Order, 70 FOREIGN
AFF. 69, 82-83 (1991).
91. U.N. SCOR, 45th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688 (1991), reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 858 (1991) [hereinafter S/RES/6881.
92. Id. 1 3. "Such new world law comes as a warmly welcome aspect of the new world
order." The Law Learns From the Kurds, N.Y. TIMES, April 14, 1991, at D18.
93. Memorandum of Understanding, U.N. Doc. No. S/22663, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 860
(1990).
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Security Council resolutions disclose a significant human rights orienta-
tion in the response to the invasion. 4 Foe example, Resolution 66495 de-
manded that Iraq permit and facilitate the immediate departure from
Iraq and Kuwait of third-country nationals. Resolution 677"6 struck a
theme of self-determination, condemning "attempts by Iraq to alter the
demographic composition of the population of Kuwait."97 Resolution
67898 authorized the use of "all necessary means" 99 to uphold and imple-
ment the resolutions," and requested all states to support the measures
taken under the provision.'00 It also authorized the necessary means to,
"restore international peace and security in the area."' 1 Resolution
687,102 which set forth armistice terms, enlisted Iraqi cooperation with the
International Committee of the Red Cross to facilitate the repatriation of
all Kuwaiti and third-country nationals.1 08 During the Gulf War other
United Nations bodies supplemented the Security Council's work. Gen-
eral Assembly Resolution 45/170'" demanded Iraqi compliance with in-
ternational humanitarian law, and the Commission on Human Rights ad-
dressed allegations of Iraqi government abuses of its own citizens.
Opinions differ on the validity and independence of the United Na-
tions' role in compelling Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait and to comply
with international law. Some observers dismiss the Security Council's
twelve Gulf resolutions as little more than fig leaves to mask the naked
power of the United States and its Coalition partners.0 5 Others, however,
place emphasis on the collective process through which the resolutions
were adopted. These observers note the unprecedented cooperation in
this kind of a crisis among Permanent Members of the Security Council,
and the near-unanimity of the Security Council decisions. The United
States, France and the United Kingdom strongly influenced the Security
Council resolutions, but accepted the political nature of the process.
Members have always been inclined to speak and vote their wills.' 0 6 Thus,
94. S/RES/660, 661, 662, 664, 665, 666, 667, 669, 670, 674, 677, 678, reprinted in U. N.
DEP'T OF PUB. INFO., United Nations Security Council Resolutions Relating to the Situation
between Iraq and Kuwait DPI/l104fRev. 1-40059, Feb. 1991; S/RES/687, reprinted in 30
I.L.M. 847 (1991).
95. S/RES/664, supra note 94.
96. S/RES/677, supra note 94.
97. Id. preamble.
98. S/RES/678, supra note 94.
99. Id. v 2.
100. Id. 3.
101. Id. 1 2.
102. S/RES/687, supra note 94.
103. Id. 1 30.
104. G. A. Res. 45/170 (1990).
105. See Burns H. Weston, Security Council Resolution 678 and Persian Gulf Decision
Making: Precarious Legitimacy, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1991).
. 106. Oscar Schachter, United Nations Law in the Gulf Conflict 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 542
(1991); Eugene V. Rostow, Until What? Enforcement Action or Collective Self Defense?, 85
AM. J. INT'L L. 506 (1991).
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when the global community dialed 911, the United States may have been
the first to answer. The U.S., however, did not simply grab its musket and
run off to the emergency without consulting and gaining the approval of
diverse members of the United Nations family.
Whatever the role of the United States, the Gulf War experience
demonstrated the significance of going through the United Nations drill.
Only by doing so can a state expect to enlist broad support for even the
most commendable acts of principle, such as deterring aggression and re-
storing the peace. If the intent of the United States was didactic, to
demonstrate that aggression does not pay, the only way to do so effec-
tively was to multilateralize a military response. The resulting Coalition
of forces contrasted markedly with unilateral U.S. interventions in Gre-
nada and Panama, which never gained widespread support.
Resolution 688 specifically "recall[s]' 10 7 Article 2(7) of the Charter.108
Presumably, then, the Security Council's highly interventionist program
on behalf of the Kurds in northern Iraq is deemed to be consistent with
Article 2(7). Thus, the misery of a suppressed population is no longer
deemed "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction"' 0 9 of a national gov-
ernment. Large-scale deprivations of human rights unquestionably
threaten international peace and security; hence, they engage the Security
Council's powers under Chapter VII. The Security Council's message of
involvement recognizing the international implications of severe depriva-
tion of human rights could not be clearer. Thus, Resolution 688 presaged
a larger role for humanitarian intervention under international authority.
A narrow interpretation of Article 2(7) might also suggest that the
Charter may question a state's use of force domestically. This argument
at least challenges the state's right to quash an expression of self-determi-
nation by a group of people well on the way to independence recognized
under international law. Of course, Article 2(4) speaks only to the threat
or use of force by States in their international relations. Ordinarily, that
provision would not seem to constrain a state from using force within its
territory against its own people, even though suppression of self-determi-
nation might otherwise be "inconsistent with the Purposes of the United
Nations.""l 0 In exceptional circumstances, however, a group of people
completing a process of acknowledged self-determination may claim a
limited international personality. Threat or use of force against them
107. S/RES/688, supra note 91, pmbl.
108. The U.N. Charter states:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Na-
tions to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdic-
tion of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settle-
ment under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.
U.N. CHARTER art. 2(7).
109. Id.
110. Id. art. 2(4).
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would then fall within the prohibitions of Article 2(4). An early example
was the Security Council's decision in 1947 concerning the Netherlands
and the incipient state of Indonesia.11
Once the reality of an operational alternative under the U.N. Charter
to unilateral measures is widely accepted, greater attention could turn to
the task of making those alternatives more effective. As precedent, the
United Nations has resolved numerous geopolitical disputes. For exam-
ple, the International Court of Justice has successfully adjudicated nu-
merous maritime boundaries in recent years. The U.N.'s pivotal roles in
arranging a Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and helping bring peace
to El Salvador are acclaimed; its involvement in ending civil strife in the
Western Sahara, Cyprus and Cambodia may yet bring lasting peace and
stability to those regions.
There is, however, room for improvement. The United Nations failed
to respond effectively to Iraqi threats or forestall the use of force that
initiated the Kuwaiti crisis. The Secretary-General's efforts to mediate a
solution to the Kuwaiti crisis before the January 15, 1991 deadline were
handicapped by the terms of twelve Security Council resolutions. These
gave him almost no flexibility in trying to gain an Iraqi withdrawal from
occupied Kuwait.112 As another example, questionable draftsmanship and
supervision invited mischief by the French government in the Secretary-
General's mediation of the Rainbow Warrior Affairl's between New Zea-
land and France. Cambodia's killing fields were both physical and diplo-
matic as long as the Permanent Members of the Security Council re-
mained unwilling to cooperate in a common plan of action. At the
pinnacle of formal dispute resolution, the World Court invited jurispru-
dential criticism in the Nicaragua Case"" by what some viewed as a
rather extravagant application of custom in response to sensitive issues of
intervention.
None of these examples indicates a fundamental incompetence of the
United Nations in either a general or technical sense of that word. What
the examples do suggest, however, is a reliance of the United Nations on
adherence by states to principles of good faith and cooperation. The ex-
amples above also illustrate the need to clarify the ground rules and
broaden the bases of decision-making, in order to achieve a true commu-
nity of power.
Clearly, the United Nations is constrained by financial and structural
111. 5 DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 384 (Marjorie M. Whiteman, ed., 1965)(whether
the Netherlands violated international law by engaging in hostilities against Indonesia, at
the time in the process of achieving de facto independence).
112. See Lucia Mouat, United Nations' Multiple Roles at Odds in Confronting Gulf
Crisis, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Jan. 22, 1991, at 5.
113. New Zealand v. France, April 30, 1990 (text of subsequent arbitration available
from author).
114. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities In and Against Nicaragua
(Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14 (June 27).
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limitations. The Gulf War highlighted the need to maintain an endow-
ment of financial pledges and other mutual assistance under Article 49 of
the Charter. Money is needed in order to carry out more ambitious pro-
grams of humanitarian cooperation. Also, the Gulf War experience ampli-
fied debate about structural reforms, such as the composition of the Se-
curity Council. Serious consideration of such structural alternatives as
expansion of the permanent membership of the Security Council, or elim-
ination of the veto power, may therefore be needed in the new world or-
der. Passage of Resolution 688 illustrates the advisability of reconsidering
the current structure for making decisions under Chapter VII: only be-
cause of an abstention rather than a veto by China, a Permanent Mem-
ber, did the Resolution succeed.
Other international and regional bodies can play a more important
role. After all, the United Nations is not the sum and total of a commu-
nity of power. In the aftermath of the 1991 military coup in Haiti, for
example, the Organization of American States (OAS) established powers
of humanitarian intervention that permit the organization to take "any
measures" necessary to restore democracy in member states." 5 In its 1991
summit communique, the Group of Seven endorsed the post-Gulf war
model as a basis for collective intervention to alleviate human suffering."'
The European Community has assumed the role of mediator in civil
war disputes in Europe. The Community has provided fact-finders, ob-
server teams, and other facilities to help bring information and reason to
bear on national crises, beginning with the frustrating Croatian-Serbian
imbroglio in a thoroughly fragmented Yugoslavia." 7 In the Moscow Con-
cluding Document, the CSCE for the first time unanimously agreed to
conduct investigations of human rights abuses in member states even
without their consent.' Several states have called on international and
115. See N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 2, 1991, at A6.
116.
We note that the urgent and overwhelming nature of the humanitarian
problem in Iraq caused by violent oppression by the Government required ex-
ceptional action by the international community, following UNSCR 688. We
urge the UN and its affiliated agencies to be ready to consider similar action in
the future if the circumstances require it. The international community cannot
stand idly by in cases where widespread human suffering from famine, war,
oppression, refugee flows, disease or flood reaches urgent and overwhelming
proportions.
London Economic Summit Political Declaration: Strengthening the International Order,
July 16, 1991, WKLY Comp. PREs. Doc. 963, 964 (July 22, 1991).
117. See, eg., Alan Riding, Europeans' Hopes for a Yugoslav Peace Turn to Frustra-
tion, N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 22, 1991, at E3.
118. Berlin Meeting on CSCE Council, 19-20 June, 1991, 30 I.L.M 1349 (1991). The
Moscow Concluding Document addresses the CSCE "human dimension." See text accompa-
nying and following note 27, supra. The document expands human rights-related commit-
ments of CSCE members and the Human Dimension Mechanism of the CSCE. The mecha-
nism involves a logical progression of steps for resolving human dimension issues within the
region, culminating, if necessary, in mandatory investigation by the CSCE. First, however, a
state may request that an expert mission visit its territory to provide good offices and medi-
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regional organizations to assist struggling new democracies in establishing
new institutions or in reviving dormant ones to protect human rights.
These states have also advocated rethinking the scope of the non-inter-
vention principle, in view of the new reality of collective initiatives. 1 9
V. TOWARD A STRONGER COMMUNITY OF POWER
Within a larger community of power, members of the United Nations
need to double their efforts to clarify the law of self-determination and
humanitarian intervention. They should also improve processes for sort-
ing out pertinent facts and reconciling opposing interpretations of those
rights, and encourage mediation or other peaceful techniques for settling
international disputes. It is still true today that, "No countervailing credo
yet confronts the unraveling logic of self-determination. No universal
mechanism exists to weigh the justice of competing ethnic claims. No in-
ternational authority is yet willing, let alone able, to save failing
sovereignties. 1 1
20
Although a "countervailing credo" to self-determination may not be
feasible or even advisable, the United Nations should clarify essential
rules and norms. The collapse of UN-organized talks between Greek and
Turkish Cypriots after introduction of self-determination rhetoric under-
scores the importance of a concerted effort to objectify and neutralize the
term. The General Assembly should also confront the jurisprudential ten-
sion between its human rights initiatives and principles of non-interfer-
ence. This might be undertaken by acting through the International Law
Commission. The organization needs to seek a more definitive answer to
the question: when, precisely, do human rights concerns become Chapter
ation services or undertake other means assigned by the state to resolve a particular
"human dimension" issue. The newly formulated mechanism invites all CSCE members to
exercise friendly persuasion as a means of encouraging another member state to request
such an expert mission. If the state refuses within a reasonable period of time, any six mem-
bers of the CSCE may convoke a fact-finding mission to the recalcitrant state even without
its consent. After completing an investigation (whether volutarily invited or mandatorily
imposed), the mission is instructed to prepare a report for submission to the CSCE's Com-
mittee of Senior Officials. In extraordinary circumstances, when time is of the essence, any
nine CSCE members may request the CSCE to convoke a mandatory mission without wait-
ing for the target state voluntarily to invite one. Letter from Ambassador Max M.
Kampelman to the author (Nov. 8, 1991).
119. Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, Address at Willamette University (May 12,
1991)(stressing the need for the U.N. to devote more attention to ways of intervening in
states for of human rights purposes), in STATESMAN J. (Salem, Or.), May 13, 1991, at 2. See
also CHINA POST, July 18, 1991, at 4 (Austria, France and Germany call for relaxation of
principle of non-intervention to improve enforcement of human rights). See also Pax
Universalis, supra note 84.
120. Clad, supra note 43. See also Emerson, supra note 45, at 474, 475:
Because of the great variety of situations, problems and claims, the decisions
would undoubtedly have frequently to be of an ad hoc "political" nature ....
... On the face of it, it is desirable that the United Nations be empowered
to play a larger role in relation to the always hazardous issue of self-
determination.
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VII issues of international peace and security? Articles 1(3) and 55 are
reconcilable with Article 2(7), but their mutuality needs to be formulated
more explicitly and precisely.
Clarification of rules is, however, only a small part of the opportuni-
ties and responsibilities of a community of power. Improved mechanisms
and procedures for organizational initiatives may be even more impor-
tant. The United Nations Security Council might remain in session on a
daily, year-round basis, 2 ' in order to monitor global stability and curtail
crises while still incipient. An excellent example of the Security Council's
ability to monitor and respond to crises of self-determination was its im-
position of a mandatory, though unsanctioned, embargo on arms ship-
ments to Yugoslavia.122 This decision was built explicitly upon the prece-
dent of the Security Council's initiatives to control the flow of arms
during the Kuwait crisis preceding the Gulf War.
With greater financial resources, the Secretary-General could assume
a larger role in supporting Security Council initiatives and undertake in-
formation gathering and fact-finding, contingency planning, preventive
diplomacy, and support of regional dispute resolution. The Secretary-
General can act under either Article 98 or Article 99 of the Charter. 23 For
Example, under Article 98, the Secretary-General might make recommen-
dations to the Security Council for appropriate action under Chapter VII
of the Charter. A new office of Research and Collection of Information
(ORCI) could enhance the ability of the Secretariat to carry out its re-
sponsibilities under both Articles 98 and 99 of the Charter. Specifically,
the Secretariat can play a useful role in gathering facts and preparing
background studies before referring delicate self-determination issues to
the Security Council, as in the Yugoslavian crisis.
United Nations human rights bodies can play an expanded role in
investigating and addressing issues of self-determination and deprivation
of human rights. Foremost among these bodies is the U.N. Commission
on Human Rights, which assumed an active role in Kuwait and Iraq, as-
121. "The Security Council shall be so organized as to be able to function continu-
ously." U.N. CHARTER art. 28(1).
122. See N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 1991, at A4.
123. Article 98.
The Secretary-General shall act in that capacity in all meetings of the
General Assembly, of the Security Council, of the Economic and Social Coun-
cil, and of the Trusteeship Council, and shall perform such other functions as
are entrusted to him by these organs. The Secretary-General shall make an
annual report to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization.
Article 99.
The Secretary-General may bring to the attention of the Security Council
any matter which in his opinion may threaten the maintenance of international
peace and security.
U.N. CHARTER.
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sisted by the appointment of Special Rapporteurs."' Other pertinent
bodies include the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities," 5 the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, 2 s and .the special committees established under the two
International Covenants on human rights. 2 7 Several types of human
rights mechanisms offer particular promise: working groups with indepen-
dent rapporteurs to address particular human rights issues (for example,
self-determination); special rapporteurs to examine conditions in specific
countries; committees to monitor compliance with human rights treaties,
especially those with optional mechanisms for individual complaints; the
Advisory Services program that provides technical assistance to states ex-
periencing human rights-related conflict; and public information pro-
grams to heighten awareness of human rights mechanisms."" More ambi-
tiously, the U.N. might establish a step-by-step process for investigating
humsn rights similar to the Human Dimension Mechanism of the CSCE.
The U.N. successfully supervised free elections in Namibia, Nicara-
gua, and Haiti. This led to the adoption by the 45th General Assembly of
a resolution that called upon the Secretary-General to establish a process
for responding to requests by states for electoral assistance. 2 9 The next
step might be to establish a standing United Nations electoral commis-
sion to assist in elections and the general process of internal self-determi-
nation. Free elections are, however, no guarantee of democracy or even
self-determination.
In mediating and resolving disputes that are bound to occur, five or-
ganizational tasks are essential: 1) searching for formulas to avoid and
resolve conflicts; Z) building consensus in whatever strategy is selected; 3)
conducting behind-the-scenes negotiations; 4) providing face-saving exits
from conflict; and 5) helping member states satisfy their obligations
under Articles 1(3) and 33130 of the Charter, by selecting the appropriate
124. HOWARD TOLLEY, JR., THE U.N. COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 190 (1987); GLOBAL
AGENDA, supra note 44, at 192 (role in Kuwait and Iraq).
125. Resolution 8 (VIII) of the U.N. Commission on Human Rights, 42 U.N. ESCOR,
23d Sess., 930th mtg., Supp. No. 6, at 131, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/940 (1967)(specifically author-
izing the Sub-Commission to review situations that disclose a consistent pattern of human
rights violations).
126. See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation, Mar. 7, 1966, art. 8, 660 U.N.T.S. 195, 224.
127. See Covenants, supra note 23. The two committees are the Human Rights Com-
mittee (political and civil rights) and the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights.
128. GLOBAL AGENDA, supra note 44, at 172.
129. See THE UNITED NATIONS ASSOCIATION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, THE
FORGOTTEN U.N.: AN INSIDE LOOK AT THE 45TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY 1 (1990). See generally
International Observation of Elections, 84 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 375 (1990).
130.
To achieve international co-operation in solving international problems of an
economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and
encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all
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mode of dispute resolution. It should be possible for the Secretariat to
respond routinely to popular claims for a greater measure of self-determi-
nation. An arrangement for on-going, third-party consultation might be
sufficient, and failing that, impartial review of popular claims and govern-
mental counterclaims.
The United Nations might establish a sort of multi-door interna-
tional courthouse, perhaps in the Hague or Geneva. Here, claims relating
to self-determination and intervention could be arbitrated or adjudicated.
A preliminary requirement might be recourse to mandatory mediation or
conciliation. Perhaps it is time to dust off the Clark-Sohn plan for a
World Conciliation Board" 1 that would provide expert mediators and
conciliators to review issues of self-determination. The United Nations
might also consider establishing a more formal tribunal with jurisdiction
to hear cases involving issues of political and civil rights, secession and
self-determination."' A general instrument on the settlement of disputes
is another idea whose time may have come. Meanwhile, the 1990 United
Nations Draft Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes between States' 3
and the Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between
States3 provide a reliable framework for achieving a dispute settlement
after negotiations have failed.
Regional arrangements, particularly in Europe, will be of growing as-
sistance in resolving disputes before they ripen into serious conflict. For
example, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) has mediated disputes
in the Horn of Africa, between Algeria and Moracco, Mauritania and Se-
negal, and between Benin and Niger. The CSCE's new Conflict Preven-
tion Centre and mechanism for resolving international disputes 3 5 holds
promise. Particularly noteworthy are the CSCE's plans to seek new meth-
ods for the peaceful settlement of disputes,'" "including mandatory
without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion ....
U.N. CHARTER art. 1(3).
Article 33
1. The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger
the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a
solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial
settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful
means of their own choice.
2. The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to
settle their dispute by such means.
Id. art. 33.
131. GRENVILLE CLARK & Louis B. SOHN, WORLD PEACE THROUGH WORLD LAW 335, 340
(2d ed. 1960).
132. See generally LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINA-
TION (1978).
133. Draft Rules for the Conciliation of Disputes between States, U.N. Doc. No. A/45/
742 (1990), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 229 (1991).
134. See Progress Report by the Secretary General, A/AC.182/L.68 (1990).
135. Paris Charter, supra note 27, at 207.
136. Valletta Report on Peaceful Settlement, supra note 27, at 384, 390.
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third-party involvement,' 13 7 and to develop, "new procedures involving..
• the services of experts or a roster of eminent persons experienced in
"138human rights issues ....
To strengthen the role of regional organizations, the Secretary-Gen-
eral might establish a permanent staff to coordinate the Secretariat and
regional organizations on issues of self-determination. This permanent
staff could also help strengthen regional facilities for resolving disputes
without fragmenting global efforts. With technical and financial assis-
tance from the United Nations, regional organizations could be more ef-
fective in helping ensure international peace and security. They have a
strong stake in what happens in their neighborhood, or neighborhoods in
the case of multi-regional states such as Egypt, the United States and
some members of the European Community. Proper financing will be
critical. For example, if the OAU had been better financed, it might well
have succeeded in arranging an earlier ceasefire in the Chad civil war. 39
When humanitarian intervention is unavoidable, the United Nations
should multilaterize it by exercising its enforcement powers with Resolu-
tion 688 as precedent.'40 Alternatively, the United Nations should decide
whether to authorize and regulate regional or unilateral intervention. Pro-
visional measures under Article 40 could be used,"" as in the Kuwaiti
crisis preceding the Gulf War.
In the absence of an effective, on-going enforcement mechanism that
is equipped to respond immediately to national crises of self-determina-
tion or other crises of human rights significance, the General Assembly
and the Security Council might jointly adopt a resolution on humanita-
rian intervention. It should preempt unilateral actions. Accordingly,
137. Paris Charter, supra note 27, at 201 (emphasis added).
138. Id. at 200.
139.
Stronger regional organizations, supported by a United Nations providing eco-
nomic and financial assistance, would obviate the necessity for the big powers
to get directly involved in most cases. We saw that when the OAU was willing
and almost able to protect Chad against Libya, but failed for want of adequate
financing. The United Nations refused to provide financial assistance on the
ground that this was a regional matter outside its jurisdiction-a technical
point that could have been met easily by some clever arrangement, especially
since the United Nations has been willing to support regional efforts in other
peacemaking contexts such as the Contadora Group.
Louis B. Sohn, Remarks, 83 AM. Soc'Y. INT'L. L. PROC. 443 (1990).
140. S/RES/688, supra note 91.
141. Article 40.
In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council
may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures pro-
vided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such
provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional mea-
sures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties
concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply
with such provisional measures.
U.N. CHARTER art. 40.
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member states would be authorized, only under the resolution, to under-
take measures in other states that are deemed necessary to vindicate fun-
damental human rights. Such measures might include the use of force,
unless the target state agreed within a reasonable period of time to sub-
mit immediately to fact-finding and conciliation procedures, and in good
faith to carry out any resulting recommendations or decisions. Under Ar-
ticles 98 and 99 of the U.N. Charter, the Secretary-General might con-
tinue to play a central role. Rescue missions requiring an immediate re-
sponse would be an exception; these would be governed primarily by
customary rules of law, such as immediacy, proportionality, and necessity.
Thus, humanitarian intervention by one state would only be permissible
under two circumstances: first, if a target state had declined to submit a
dispute to impartial review within a reasonable period of time; second, if
after agreeing to do so, the target state failed to comply in good faith with
resulting recommendations or decisions. Humanitarian intervention
would be subsumed within a process of community decision, and would
be authorized only as a last resort when Article 33 procedures have failed.
Effective community deliberations and collective initiatives, rather than
unilateral argument and doctrinal justification of intervention, would be-
come the hallmark of a new process of multilateral dispute resolution.
VI. CONCLUSION
Issues of self-determination and humanitarian intervention abound
in the post-Cold War era. To prevent these issues from ripening into seri-
ous threats to international peace and security, more preventive diplo-
macy, contingency planning and collective initiatives by regional and in-
ternational institutions are sorely needed. In the community of power
made possible by revived confidence of states in multilateralism, United
Nations efforts should be pre-emptive rather than reactive, practical
rather than legalistic. Perhaps the day will arrive when unilateral self-
determination and humanitarian intervention will have become largely
obsolete. Instead, turning these terms around, the global community will
rely on international and regional organizations to make binding humani-
tarian determinations about self-interventions by states as well as foreign
interventions. We may learn to rely, after so many battles, on the better
angels of our nature and become more than weasels fighting in a hole.1 42
142. First Inaugural Address by Abraham Lincoln (Mar. 4, 1861), reprinted in INAUGU-
RAL ADDRESSES OF THE PRESIDENTS OF THE UNITED STATES, S. Doc. No. 10, 101st Cong., 1st
Sess., at 133, 141 (Bicentennial ed. 1989).
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The Right to Self-Defense in the Post-Cold
War Era: The Role of the United Nations
DAVID R. PENNA*
The emergent era of superpower cooperation promises much for in-
ternational law. The institutional and legal frameworks set in place after
the close of the Second World War were premised upon an assumption of
superpower cooperation. When that cooperation was absent, it was cer-
tain that international law would play a minimal role in constraining su-
perpower conflict; since superpowers perceived that their interests were
broad in an era of competition, it was rare for both superpowers to at-
tempt to simultaneously utilize the U.N. framework to resolve "security"
issues.' With the coming of superpower cooperation and the ability of the
U.N. to act in the Iraq-Kuwait crisis, there is a certain optimism that
things have changed.2 This article explores the grounds for (and the lim-
its of) that optimism in the context of the most important international
legal principle in the security area: the right to self-defense.
Since claims of self-defense have been used to justify almost every
recent use of force,3 one can claim that the exception at times seems to
swallow the general rule against the use of force. Therefore, any attempt
to regulate the use of force in the post-Cold War era must first come to
terms with defining this exception and evolving a means to enforce this
definition in specific circumstances. The prospects for the evolution and
institutionalization of this ideal is the main focus of this article. First, the
status of the self-defense exception to the prohibition of the use of armed
force is briefly reviewed up to the end of the Cold War period. Next, al-
ternative systems of self-defense are presented and discussed, specifying
the normative and institutional requirements for each system. Then, the
major event of the post-Cold War era thus far, the Kuwait conflict, is
analyzed. In the final section of this article, the implications of the func-
tioning of a new post-Cold War system of self-defense are explored.
* Director of Publications, Center on Rights Development; B.A./M.A., 1982, Duquesne
University; J.D., 1985, University of Denver, College of Law; Ph.D. Candidate, University of
Denver Graduate School of International Studies.
1. A discussion of the failed Charter institutions with respect to security issues is given
in Anthony C. Arend, International Law and the Recourse to Force: A Shift in Paradigms
27 STAN. J. INT'L L. 1, 6-10 (1990).
2. This optimism has been endangered by attempts to remove President Gorbachev
and roll back his reforms in the Soviet Union.
3. Claims of self defense were made by Iraq in Kuwait, the Soviet Union in Afghani-
stan, the U.S. in Panama and Nicaragua, Vietnam in Cambodia, and Tanzania in Uganda,
to list just a few recent examples.
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I. THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DEFENSE
Today self-defense is the major exception to the prohibition on the
use of force by states;4 however, at one time such a general prohibition
did not exist. War was an acceptable legal relationship between states as
long as it was properly declared and waged and was for a "just" cause.
Self-defense was only one of several just causes for war or the use of
force.'
As war came to be seen as destructive, attempts were made to abolish
or limit recourse to war as a means of settling disputes. The Covenant of
the League of Nations contained mutual assurances regarding recourse to
war: war could not be resorted to if the dispute was under consideration
by the League, an arbiter or a court;6 nor could there be recourse to war if
a state complied with the judgment of one of these bodies.7 In any case,
there could be no recourse to war until at least three months after any of
these bodies rendered a decision.' The exception, of course, was self-
defense.
Self-defense also remained an important implied exception to the
Pact of Paris, which sought to abolish war as an instrument of national
policy. While the treaty makes no explicit reference to self-defense, the
parties understood that such a right was preserved. The issue was not
covered in the Pact due to the insistence of the United States, which
claimed that to define a right of self-defense would lead to the abuse of
this right by states who would seek to mold their actions to fit the lan-
guage of the exception. s
The U.N. Charter, much as the League of Nations Covenant, seeks to
limit the recourse to war. It does so through article 2(4), which prohibits
the use of force against the political independence or territorial integrity
of states.10 This principle is to be enforced by the Security Council which
has the power to act to maintain or restore international peace and secur-
ity through the implementation of a range of collective measures up to
4. Arend, supra note 1, at 29.
5. During the time of Hugo Grotius (the 17th century), a war was regarded as just if it
was in response to a "wrong received." Grotius, quoted in AHMED M. RIFAAT, INTERNATIONAL
AGGRESSION 12 (1979).
6. League of Nations Covenant, June 28, 1919, art. 12, 1, T.S. No. 4.
7. Id. art. 13, 4.
8. Id. art. 12, 1 1.
9. See Kellog, Note to French Ambassador, infra, at 37.
10. Arend claims there were only two exceptions to the use of force prohibition in Arti-
cle 2(4) under the "Charter paradigm": the Security Council power to restore international
peace and security, and self defense under article 51, Arend, supra note 1, at 1-2. Others
would contend that there may exist another basis for the use of force: humanitarian inter-
vention. See generally, FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO
LAW AND MORALITY (1988); HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION AND THE UNITED NATIONS (Rich-
ard B. Lillich ed. 1973); Ved P. Nanda, Multilateral Sanctions Against South Africa, in
EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS ON SOUTH AFRICA: THE CUTrING EDGE OF ECONOMIC INTERVENTION 15-
16, (George W. Shepherd, ed. 1991).
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and including the use of force.
This, at least, was how the structure of the U.N. was intended to
work, although, in fact, difficulties arose due to the inability of the per-
manent members to agree in most situations. Some would contend that
the current rapprochement between the superpowers will act to revitalize
this system;" it is also possible, however, that it is too late to resurrect
the system as originally intended. It may also be that the post-Cold War
changes in international politics will enable the U.N. system to be utilized
in ways the Charter framers had not intended.
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter preserves the "inherent" right of indi-
vidual and collective self-defense. That is, in a document that otherwise
limits the use of force, the Charter claims not to affect the right of self-
defense, supposedly preserving it as it existed under customary interna-
tional law. 2 However, the provision does limit the duration to act under
this right to periods prior to the Security Council action to restore inter-
national peace and security."
II. SYSTEMS OF SELF-DEFENSE
The interplay of the norms discussed above and the means of their
enforcement create a system. The same norms interpreted and enforced
through differing institutions are likely to create differing patterns of
behavior.
At this point, it may be useful to conceptualize four possible systems
of protection against aggression.1' The first is a system of each state for
itself: if a state is attacked, it is entitled to defend itself by using force.
This can be labelled a system of individual defense."5 It has a major
weakness: the stronger states can attack the weaker without much risk,
since the weak states are unlikely to be capable of inflicting much damage
on stronger states when acting individually. Therefore, each state must
maintain adequate military means "for the dangers it anticipates."1
A second system is one in which an attacked state has the right to
call upon other states to assist it in repelling an attack. Other states may
11. Thomas M. Franck, Comment, Soviet Initiatives: U.S. Responses - New Opportu-
nities for Reviving the United Nations System, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 531 (1989); John Quigley,
Comment, Perestroika and International Law, 82 AM. J. INT'L L. 788, 794-97 (1988).
12. See Oscar Schachter, Self-Defense and the Rule of Law, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 259,
259-63 (1989).
13. See Mary E. O'Connell, Enforcing the Prohibition on the Use of Force: The U.N.'s
Response To Iraq's Invasion Of Kuwait, 15 S. ILL. U. L.J. 453, 476-79 (1991).
14. I do not mean to suggest that all of these systems existed at actual periods of his-
tory; even those that did exist did not ever control all aspects of self defense in all regions.
These are just theoretic possibilities, and ideal types at that.
15. While the system described is clearly a system of individual defense, Stromberg
notes that collective security has been used in several contexts, ROLAND N. STROMBERG, COL-
LECTIVE SECURITY AND AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 191-92 (1963).
16. W. Michael Reisman, Comment, Some Lessons From Iraq: International Law and
Democratic Politics, 16 YALE J. INT'L L. 203 (1991).
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or may not respond, according to individual treaty commitments or politi-
cal considerations. The weakness of this system is that weaker states re-
main vulnerable since they may be unable to gain guarantees from allies.
A state is not totally reliant upon its own military capability, hence the
weaker the military capability, the stronger the diplomatic capability
must be to gain allies.
A third system is slightly different: it would require all other states
to respond to aggression. In this system, the aggression is viewed as a
violation of the rights of each state in the community rather than the
rights of merely the victim state. The weakness here is that some impor-
tant states may prefer to ignore violations of community norms if they do
not believe that their interests are sufficiently imperilled.
A fourth system is further institutionalized. It envisions an indepen-
dent actor as enforcer of the community norms. Individual actors would
have only very limited recourse to force, since this institutional actor, a
world government, would be viewed as having a near monopoly on the
legitimate use of force. This institution would have a duty to respond to
violations of community norms, but would not necessarily have to react
through the use of identical force;' 7 it would merely have to preserve the
community norms.
While the differences between these systems may seem slight, they
do have some important implications. While realizing the limits of anal-
ogy, it will be instructive to illustrate some of the differences by reference
to the domestic legal system.
The international right to self-defense is often analogized to the do-
mestic right of individuals to use force in self-defense."8 Take, for in-
stance, the example of an individual encountering a criminal who is a
threat to the life of the innocent individual." The first system is illus-
trated by the somewhat outmoded concept of the "fair fight." While force
is ordinarily not permissible in interpersonal relations, it may be em-
ployed if an individual is himself threatened with violence.20 Others, how-
ever, may not use violence, even against the aggressor since this would
result in an "unfair" fight and threaten the escalation of violence.2 1
17. An analogy can be made here to the domestic system where a murderer need not be
killed, nor even be met with force, if lesser measures can be successful.
18. See e.g., Hans Kelsen, Collective Security, in 49 U.S. NAVAL WAR COLLEGE INTER-
NATIONAL LAW STUDIES 1 (1954).
19. In a domestic context, Robinson notes that an individual who is the victim of ag-
gression may justifiably cause a "greater harm" in order to protect himself. He cites the case
of a victim killing three thugs in order to save his own life. This is justified because "society
highly values the protection of innocents and deplores unjustified aggression." PAUL H.
ROBINSON, 1 CRIMINAL LAW DEFENSES § 131a, at 70 (1984).
20. FREDRIC S. BAUM & JOAN BAUM, LAW OF SELF DEFENSE 6 (1970). Baum and Baum
note that Blackstone distinguished between justifiable homicide and excusable homicide,
with the former still carrying some degree of guilt. Self-defense was excusable homicide
rather than justifiable homicide and therefore had a degree of culpability.
21. This aspect has no analogy in modern law, which does allow for limited defensive
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The second system permits the wronged party to call for help, but
does not obligate others to give it.22 It still recognizes the wrong commit-
ted as essentially a private wrong and allows redress only through self-
enforcement.2"
The third system is quite different: it requires a response not only to
provide protection to weaker individuals, but also because the initial use
of force can be viewed as a wrong against each individual in the commu-
nity. The individuals act together to vindicate this wrong, but do not
delegate the responsibility to some institutional actor, which is seen as
either unresponsive or incapable of achieving the vindication of the
norms infringed.2 4 In the fourth system, any use of force is viewed as pri-
marily against the community and, in particular, against the institutional
actor or government of the community.2 5 In human systems, some vestige
of rights of self-defense would remain since the destruction of an individ-
ual life cannot be reconstituted after the fact. In a state system, however,
this is not the case. Either states are kept legally intact after their terri-
tory has been over-run, or the state can be reconstituted after the aggres-
sion has been repelled by the institutional actor's forces. Therefore, in
such a state-system, if a reliable institutional actor is created, it could be
contended that a right of self-defense would not only be unnecessary but
counterproductive .26
While identifying actual manifestations of each of these ideal systems
is difficult and likely to be imperfect, some possible historical examples
may better illustrate the workings of these systems. The first system is
illustrated in the policies of United States isolationism. For example, neu-
trality acts, 27 which prohibited the provision of assistance to either side in
an armed conflict were based upon several perceptions. First, the conflict
intervention for the protection of others; it may be illustrated, however, by rules in sport
which punish severely intervention by third persons in a brawl that has already been
started. It is common for players to be fined and suspended for being the "third man in," or
"first man off the bench" in sport. The rationale is that it is an attempt to limit violence so
that officials can control the initial outbreak. The analogy is imperfect, however, since sport
presupposes the presence of officials who will act to limit the outbreak of violence.
22. In domestic law there exists no duty to give aid to another. There are limitations on
the use of force to assist another. See ROBINSON, supra note 19, § 133.
23. This is analogous to Norman law in early England where "homicide was considered
a matter of private vengeance." BAUM & BAUM, supra note 20, at 3. It is also analogous to
some conceptions of traditional African law; see, JOHN CAMPBELL, 2 TRAVELS IN SOUTH AF-
RICA 210-11 (1822).
24. In some respects, this is the same reasoning that underlies the justification of vigi-
lante action. See CAMPBELL, supra note 23, at 49-52.
25. Some would argue that the international system ultimately protects the lives of in-
dividuals, Kelsen, supra note 18, at 1, but one must be careful not to assume an identity of
individual and state interests.
26. Kelsen, supra note 18, at 27.
27. Neutrality acts generally only banned assistance that did not have executive ap-
proval. See FRANCIS DEAK & PHILLIP C. JESSUP, 2 A COLLECTION OF NEUTRALITY LAWS, REG-
ULATIONS AND TREATIES OF VARIOUS COUNTRIES 1079-1115 (1974) (a collection of U.S. neu-
trality acts).
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did not involve United States interests, and therefore, the United States
should not become involved. Second, the participation of United States
citizens could endanger United States relations with the warring states. A
less substantial concern was to limit the conflict to the original combat-
ants and not engulf the region in war.
The second system is illustrated in the French draft of the Pact of
Paris" and implicitly in the final draft of that pact. There, states re-
nounced the use of force as an instrument of national policy. 9 However,
if a state breached its promise by employing force, all other parties were
to be released from their obligation toward the breaching party.30 While
states were not obligated to come to the defense of the victim state, many
states were obligated to do so by bilateral treaties.-"
The third system is illustrated by the European system in the Cold
War era. While the U.N. Charter permissively authorized collective self-
defense in Article 51, other agreements assured the use of force in retalia-
tion to an armed attack.3" The examples here include the NATO" and
Warsaw Pact treaties.34 Formerly, the League of Nations Covenant at-
tempted a similar, but more limited obligation, declaring, "Should-any
Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its covenants... it
shall ipso facto be deemed to have committed an act of war against all
other Members of the League. ... "" The members were to "immedi-
28. French Draft Of Treaty For The Condemnation And Renunciation Of War As An
Instrument Of National Policy, translated in 133 FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE U.S. 32-34
(1928, vol. 1) [hereinafter French Draft].
29. Id. at art. I. The renunciation was "without intention to infringe upon the exercise
of their rights of legitimate self-defense within the framework of existing treaties ..
30. Id. at art. III.
31. While the final draft of the pact, Treaty Between the United States and Other Pow-
ers, August 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, reprinted in 133 FOREIGN REL. LAW OF THE U.S. 153-56
(1928), contained no explicit recognition of the right to self defense, the Kellog criticism of
the earlier French draft claimed "[tihere is nothing in the American draft ... which re-
stricts or impairs in any way the right of self defense. That right is inherent in every sover-
eign and implicit in every treaty." Kellog, Telegram from the Secretary of State to the Am-
bassador in France (April 23, 1928), reprinted in 133 FOREIGN RL. LAW OF THE U.S. 34, 36
(1928). Kellog also noted that the Covenant of the League of Nations did not contain a
positive obligation to go to war, even against aggressors, although such an obligation did
exist in the treaties of Locarno, id. at 37. Kellog also contended that any state violating the
Pact of Paris "would automatically release the other parties from their obligations to the
treaty-breaking state. Any express recognition of this principle of law is wholly unneces-
sary." Id. at 38.
32. The decision to pursue collective security outside of the U.N. was due to not only
the superpower rivalry, but the perceived failures of the U.N. to preserve the peace in areas
where superpower interest was not yet considered to be unreconcilable, such as Palestine,
STROMBERG, supra note 15, at 191-92.
33. See North Atlantic Treaty, April 4, 1949, arts. 5-6, 63 Stat. 2241, reprinted in 4
FOREIGN REL. OF THE U.S. 281-85 (1949). An attack against one member of the alliance is
considered an attack against all.
34. Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance, May 14, 1955, 219
U.N.T.S. 3, reprinted in 49 AM. J. INT'L L. Supp. 194 (1955).
35. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 6, at art. 16, 1.
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ately" impose sanctions on the aggressor state, but members were only to
take military action under the direction of the Council, "to protect the
covenants of the League." 6
The fourth system is illustrated both by the League of Nations
scheme and the U.N. framework.3 7 Here a supranational body is charged
with maintaining international peace and security and is empowered to
take various steps against aggression. 8 Aggression in both instances is de-
fined as an international crime and treated as a wrong against the inter-
national community.
39
From the examples given above, it is obvious that these systems co-
exist. But the coexistence is tenuous; there are ideological underpinnings
of the two systems that are inconsistent and will ultimately make one
system prevail over the other."0 This is because the animating legal prin-
ciples are different. The principle underlying system three is that the use
of force is wrong because it threatens the existence or welfare of a state;
the state is viewed as the basic unit of the international system. The goal
of this system is, therefore, the preservation of states.
The fourth system, however, is focused upon the principle that the
use of force is wrong because it represents a disruption of the global or-
der. Generally, the global order will require the preservation of states, but
in some instances, the global order may require the dismantling of states
if so required by the authoritative decision-maker. Further, any use of
force represents at least a theoretical diminution of the power of the in-
stitutional actor which is supposed to hold a monopoly on the use of force
or at least have the sole power to authorize its use.
It is possible to argue that the more institutionalized system should
be preferred for several reasons. First, it appeals to the notion that fair-
ness should triumph over mere brute strength, since a properly consti-
tuted institution can be viewed as employing its power after fair consider-
ation of competing claims, and thereby acting justly. Secondly, the
institutionalization of legitimate recourse to the use of force would have
the effect of lesser recourse to force. If the institution is properly consti-
tuted, its threat of force would be so overwhelming that criminal conduct
would be deterred and individual state use of legitimate force would be
36. Id. at art. 16, 1 1-2.
37. Arend claims that the U.N. system only promised a very limited type of collective
security due to the probability of the veto: there could be no collective security through
U.N. machinery against any of the permanent members of the Security Council. Arend,
supra note 1, at 9 n.40.
38. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT, supra note 6, at art. 10; U.N. CHARTER arts. 41-42.
39. See Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, Oct. 2, 1924, art.
2, L.N.O.J., Spec. Supp., No. 23, p. 498, reprinted in RIFAAT, supra note 5, at 54-55.
40. The U.S. claimed that NATO would only be a countermeasure to immediate aggres-
sion until the Security Council was able to act, STROMBERG, supra note 15, at 194; North
Atlantic Treaty, supra note 33, arts. 5-7. The contention that the U.N. is the primary
framework is weak since it was apparent to all at the time that either the U.S. or U.S.S.R.
would utilize a veto to prevent effective Security Council action in most cases.
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unnecessary since such claims would be vindicated by institutional threat
of force.
The remainder of this article documents the trends toward the likely
forms of institutionalization, while examining the changes the post-cold
war system is likely to make in the system of self-defense prevalent in the
international community.
III. ANALYSIS OF U.N. ACTION IN KUWAIT CRISIS
When Iraq invaded Kuwait, Kuwait clearly had a right to defend it-
self. Kuwait was an independent state, and a member of the United Na-
tions, and therefore had rights under article 51 of the Charter. The right
to self-defense was acknowledged in a Security Council resolution during
the crisis.41 Therefore, Kuwaiti defensive efforts, including the efforts of
the Kuwaiti resistance after Iraq's attempted annexation, (which the U.N.
declared illegal), had a firm basis in international law.
There are, however, some specific provisions of article 51 that merit
brief but careful examination. Article 51 requires that a state report ac-
tions taken in self-defense to the Security Council. 2 This has been inter-
preted by the International Court of Justice as a requirement of a state
declaring itself the victim of an armed attack, rather than a requirement
of detailing specific defensive measures taken." Kuwait clearly did this.
Another provision of Article 51 indicates that states are free to act in
self-defense "until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to
maintain international peace and security."4" The precise meaning of this
phrase is difficult to determine. Does it mean that states must stop acting
even if Security Council actions are ineffective? That states must not act
unless the Security Council approves of its actions? That states merely
cannot take steps that would be inconsistent with Security Council ac-
tions? In the case of Kuwait, this raises an ambiguity. Was the action
taken by the Security Council merely an approval of Kuwait's measures
of collective self-defense or was it a U.N. action? Which principle was
being vindicated by the U.N. action: preservation of states or mainte-
nance of global order? Analysis of both the language of the U.N. resolu-
tions and the actions taken by the Kuwaiti alliance is necessary for a
proper examination of these questions.
The language of the Security Council resolutions is ambiguous. The
Council recognized Kuwait's right to respond with individual or collective
self-defense in an August resolution. The resolution, which imposed sanc-
41. S.C. Res. 661, U.N. SCOR, 2933rd meeting (6 Aug. 1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
1325 (1990).
42. See D.W. Grieg, Self-Defence and the Security Council: What Does Article 51 Re-
quire?, 40 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 366, 367-69 (1991).
43. Case Concerning Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
(Nicaragua v. U.S.) 1986 I.C.J. 1.
44. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
VOL. 20:1
THE RIGHT TO SELF-DEFENSE
tions on Iraq, read in part: "Affirming the inherent right of individual or
collective self-defence, in response to the armed attack by Iraq against
Kuwait, in accordance with Article 51 of the Charter. . . "' In the same
resolution, "acting under Chapter VII of the Charter," the Council calls
upon all states to impose sanctions on Iraq for a dual purpose: to secure
compliance with an earlier Security Council resolution46 and "to restore
the authority of the legitimate government of Kuwait.
4 7
In a later resolution, the Security Council called upon
1) ... those member states co-operating with the Government of Ku-
wait which are deploying maritime forces in the area to use such mea-
sures commensurate to the specific circumstances as may be necessary
under the authority of the Security Council ... to ensure strict imple-
mentation of the provisions related to ... shipping laid down in reso-
lution 661 (1990)....
3. Requests all states to provide in accordance with the Charter such
assistance as may be required by the States referred to in paragraph 1
of this resolution.4
8
The resolution also requested the states so acting to coordinate their ef-
forts through the Military Staff Committee.49
Both of these resolutions indicate some uncertainty regarding the ba-
sis for action. In the former resolution, sanctions were imposed to both
secure compliance with Security Council decisions and to assist in the
defense of Kuwait's sovereignty. The difference between the two purposes
may be considered by some to be excessively legalistic since the decision
to be complied with was one that was designed to restore the sovereignty
of Kuwait.60
Some of the implications, however, are clearer in the latter resolu-
tion. There, the states that are acting independently under the right to
self-defense are authorized to act under the authority of the Security
Council to enforce the sanctions."' Further, paragraph 3 of that resolution
is painfully unclear. It does not specify for what purpose such assistance
should be given: should it be given merely to assist those states in enforc-
ing sanctions, or should it be given to assist those states acting under
Article 51 rights of collective self-defense? At the time, the type of assis-
tance was of crucial importance since the Security Council had not yet
explicitly authorized any use of force under U.N. auspices to liberate Ku-
45. S.C. Res. 661, supra note 41.
46. S.C. Res. 660, U.N. SCOR, 2932nd mtg. (2 August 1990), reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
1325 (1990) (calling for immediate Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait).
47. S.C. Res. 661, supra note 41, at 1 2.
48. S.C. Res. 665, U.N. SCOR, 2938th mtg. (25 August 1990), 77 1-2, reprinted in 29
I.L.M. 1329-30 (1990) (emphasis added).
49. Id. at $ 4.
50. See S.C. Res. 660, supra note 46; see also S/Res/661 supra note 41, at V 2.
51. Some states, such as Britain, interpreted this resolution as providing for the use of
force. See Current Development: The Invasion of Kuwait By Iraq, 40 INT'L & CoMP. L. Q.
482, 485 (1991).
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wait directly, although it had recognized the right of Kuwait to act under
Article 51.
The resolution that seemingly authorized the use of force was resolu-
tion 678, which permitted "Member States co-operating with the Govern-
ment of Kuwait" to implement the previous resolutions by using "all nec-
essary means" if Iraq failed to fully comply before January 15, 1991.52
Further, it authorized the same states "to restore international peace and
security in the area." 53 Such a broad delegation of power seems an at-
tempt to make the alliance an organ of the United Nations. Certainly,
restoration of international peace and security, if interpreted more
broadly than expelling Iraq from Kuwait, is beyond the scope of the
traditional right to self-defense. Too broad an interpretation would have
likely endangered the alliance as well as elicited strong dissent and a pos-
sible veto in the Security Council.
Several of the governments involved in Operation Desert Storm
viewed their actions as totally justified by the principle of collective self-
defense even without Security Council authorization. Several British offi-
cials, before the November resolution, claimed that "authorization from
the Security Council was not a legal necessity for the use of force" 4 or
that the choice should not be put "wholly and entirely with the machin-
ery of the U.N.."55 However, they did recognize the political expediency
of gaining U.N. authorization.
The U.S. position was complex, if not confused. Near the end of the
Desert Storm offensive, President Bush stated the goals of the alliance:
"Our goal remains what it's been all along - Iraq's complete and uncon-
ditional compliance with all relevant United Nations resolutions and its
implementation of all the requirements to be found in Security Council
Resolution 686 . . .6
Earlier, on January 5, 1991, he had emphasized the U.N. role in cit-
ing "the condemnation of the world in the form of no less than 12 resolu-
tions of the U.N. Security Council," '5 7 but later in the same address noted
other more fundamental considerations: "We have seen too often in this
century how quickly any threat to one becomes a threat to all. At this
critical moment in history, at a time the Cold War is fading into the past,
we cannot fail. At stake is the kind of world we will inhabit."' s
52. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. SCOR, 2963rd mtg. (29 Nov. 1990), % 2, reprinted in 29 I.L.M.
1565 (1990).
53. Id.
54. Prime Minister (Mrs. Thatcher), H.C. Hansard, Vol. 177, col. 738 (6 Sept. 1990),
cited in Current Developments, supra. note 51, at 487.
55. Foreign Secretary (Mr. Hurd), H.C. Hansard, Vol. 177, col. 901 (7 Sept. 1990), cited
in Current Developments, supra note 51, at 487 n.37.
56. Remarks at a Meeting of Veterans Service Organizations, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES.
Doc. 247 (March 4, 1991).
57. Radio Address, 27 WKLY. Comp. PRES. Doc. 15 (Jan. 5, 1991).
58. Id. at 16.
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There are several ways of interpreting this passage. Its failure to be
grounded in legal considerations, and the rather grand historical analogy,
may indicate that what is at stake is U.S. leadership in the post-Cold War
era. A second interpretation, which would be more comfortable to the
other members of the alliance, would be that the grander principle at
stake is the principle of non-aggression and global security. Indeed this is
the principle Bush emphasized to the allies a few days later: "[Iraq's]
unprovoked invasion was more than an attack on Kuwait, more than the
brutal occupation of a tiny nation that posed no threat to its large and
powerful neighbor. It was an assault on the very notion of international
order."5 9
In any case, it is clear that the U.S. viewed the issues at stake as
more than a mere alliance commitment to Kuwait. The issue for analysis
here remains as what did the actors perceive as the issue at stake and
what was the perceived role of the institutional actor, the U.N.?
The U.S. view of the U.N. role may have unwittingly been stated
clearly by presidential spokesman Marlin Fitzwater in the following
statement:
The President spoke with U.N. Secretary-General Perez de Cuellar
late this afternoon to discuss the Secretary-General's upcoming visit
to Baghdad. The President wished him well and stated that he was
pleased that the Secretary-General is undertaking this mission for
peace. The President noted that the United Nations has played a key
role in building and maintaining the international coalition against
the Iraqi aggression.6
This instrumental view of the U.N. should be contrasted with the
views of other allies. For example, the Prime Minister of Canada was
quick to emphasize his country's role as a supporter of the U.N. rather
than as an ally of the U.S.: ". . . all possible diplomatic means that might
resolve the situation must be examined, and no promising avenue should
be overlooked .... [Ihf Saddam Hussein continues to reject the path of
peace, Canada will stand with the United Nations in implementing its
resolutions as Canada has always done."6 1 The reference to alliance with
the United Nations rather than the U.S. is significant since the statement
was made at a joint press conference with U.S. Secretary of State James
Baker.
The position of other governments should also be briefly considered.
Japan, for example, while not taking an active military role in the Gulf,
had an interest in shaping the new world order. In February 1991,
monthly publication of Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party summa-
59. Message to Allied Nations, 27 WKLY. COmP. PREs. Doc. 16 (Jan. 8, 1991).
60. Statement by Presidential Spokesman Marlin Fitzwater, 27 WKLY. COMP. PRES.
Doc. 31 (Jan. 10, 1991).
61. Prime Minister (Mr. Mulroney), January 14, 1991 quoted in 2 U.S. DEPT. STATE
DISPATCH 42 (Jan. 21, 1991).
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rized the government's position, noting, "[Japanese government] officials
emphasized that: 1) Japan has a duty to assist the multinational forces,
although it must make its own decisions on specific support measures,
and 2) when Americans are shedding blood, Japan cannot remain
unconcerned." 2
While Japan's earlier statements emphasized the U.N. role,"3 the lan-
guage of the February statement seems clearly in the nature of collective
self-defense concerns. This is particularly true of the second point, which
indicates a concern for the preservation of an alliance.
An Indian statement at approximately the same time places much
more emphasis on the U.N. In a February 9, 1991, statement, a Foreign
Office spokesman urged a Security Council meeting to "ensure that the
conduct of military operations is in strict conformity with U.N. Resolu-
tion 678."" The statement emphasized that the objective of the resolu-
tion was to "liberate Kuwait and not to subdue Iraq or dismantle its tech-
nological and physical infrastructure or to cripple its social and economic
life .... -65 While all these statements have different emphases, one must
ask if the differences are significant. If some of the alliance states claimed
to be acting in collective self-defense (although appreciating the U.N. au-
thorization) while others claimed that alliance forces were strictly bound
by the U.N. resolutions, was there any difference in the standards im-
posed in either case?
If it is recalled that a right to act in self-defense of others, and even
in self-defense of oneself, is only a justification for a limited use of force,
one can contend that the standards are equivalent. Self-defense under
international law requires consideration of both necessity and proportion-
ality. These are the very concerns the Indian spokesman raises in the con-
text of the harm caused to Iraqi civilians.66 These concerns would have
been relevant if the Security Council had not considered the issue at all
and the alliance states were acting purely under Article 51 rights as de-
fined in customary international law.6" Indeed, most of the debate can be
viewed as differences in perceptions of the necessity and proportionality
of the force employed. For example, many anti-war protesters in the U.S.
and elsewhere contended that the inadequacy of sanctions had not been
demonstrated." If this contention is correct, it would mean that the use
of force was not necessary.
62. Prime Minister Outlines Japan's Response to Gulf, LIBERAL STAR, Feb. 15, 1991, at
1.
63. Kaifu Stresses Resolve to Support Gulf Defense, LIBERAL STAR, Oct. 15, 1990, at 1
("Mr. Kaifu expressed full support for the international efforts in the Gulf, centering on the
U.N ..... ).
64. Official Spokesman's Statement, INDIA NEWS, Feb. 1-15, 1991, at 2.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) FOREIGN REL. L. § 905(2) and comment g (for examples).
68. See Shepherd, Middle East: A Crisis of Human Rights and World Order, GLOBAL
JUSTICE, Oct.-Nov. 1990, vol. 1, no. 3, at 1.
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IV. CONCLUSIONS
From the presentation above, several points become clear. First, in
acting in the Kuwait crisis, the Security Council not only authorized the
Desert Storm action by the Kuwait alliance, but in doing so fused (or
confused) the powers given to states under Article 51 with the power of
the Security Council "to maintain international peace and security." This
fusion was most evident in Resolution 678 which set the January 15 dead-
line for Iraq to comply with the earlier resolutions. 9 This fusion has sev-
eral implications. Initially, it indicates that the Security Council is likely
to play a more active role in defining what is proper self-defense, and
therefore, in theory at least, indicates that the Security Council will be
more likely to limit recourse to the doctrine in the future. Another impli-
cation is that the fusion of these powers will give states acting in self-
defense under U.N. authorization additional powers beyond that which
they could have claimed under customary international law. While it is
unlikely that the Security Council could authorize the use of force much
beyond the traditional limits of self-defense and still carry the coalition of
permanent members needed, it has clearly gone beyond the core rights of
self-defense in authorizing the control and supervision over Iraq's chemi-
cal and nuclear war capability.
Second, the states participating in Desert Storm, and the global com-
munity in general, may have had differing perceptions of what was at
stake in Kuwait, and in particular, the role of the United Nations in the
conflict. While it is difficult to predict how future leaders will assess the
operation, it is certainly clear that there was more than enough rhetoric
by all participants and observers regarding the vindication of interna-
tional legal principles against aggression and the enforcement of U.N. res-
olutions to suggest that the action in Kuwait may be given that signifi-
cance in the future. Given the basic agreement on the vindication of some
(but not necessarily the same) legal principle by the Kuwait alliance, it is
unlikely that the events will be remembered as American or Western
imperialism.
Third, the actions of the U.N. and the Kuwait allies does signal an
improvement in the system of international security. Where before, in the
Cold War system, a very limited type 3 system of collective security ex-
isted in Europe through NATO and WTO, the Kuwait crisis signals the
globalization of this system. While the United Nations has not developed
the kind of independent military capability that would enable it to imple-
ment a type 4 system, it appears that through the sanctioning of Article
51 actions by states, and by playing a significant role in mobilizing collec-
tive security responses, the system of international security has evolved
for the better. While this evolution is incomplete and tentative at this
time, and there will certainly be setbacks in the future when permanent
69. See S.C. Res. 678, supra note 52; see also supra notes 52 and 53, and accompanying
1991
54 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y VOL. 20:1
members disagree, the new system promises to limit the recourse to force
by aggressors, thereby accomplishing one of the major purposes of the
United Nations.
Rights, Intervention, and Self-
Determination
KEVIN RYAN*
Under current international law, military intervention, whether by
one nation or a group of nations, is generally prohibited.' Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter provides that member nations must refrain,
"in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the
territorial integrity or political independence of any State."' Similar
prohibitions are contained in the charters of regional organizations such
as the Organization of American States, the Organization of African
Unity, and the League of Arab States.3
* M.A. Princeton University 1979, J.D. University of Denver 1991; Assistant Professor,
Dept. of Justice Studies and Sociology, Norwich University. I am grateful to Ved Nanda,
Paula Rhodes, Carlos Rosencrantz, and Dennis Lynch for their comments on an earlier ver-
sion of this paper. I also thank the staff at the Hague Academy of International Law for
their assistance during my stay there in summer 1990 and my philosophical friends Ron
DiSanto, Steve Doty, Tom Duggan, and Bill St. John for their support and helpful criticism
over the years.
1. The prohibition on the unilateral use of force was not part of customary interna-
tional law prior to 1945 - at least, not clearly so. Since its incorporation in Article 2(4) of
the U.N. Charter, however, the principle of nonintervention has been generally accepted as
the heart of international law concerning the relations between states. See Falk, Comments,
69 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 192, 196-97 (1975) ("For the most fundamental postulate un-
derlying the state system is the notion that one does not try to control political develop-
ments in foreign societies"); Ved P. Nanda, Humanitarian Military Intervention, 23 WORLD
VIEW 23 (Oct. 1980) (existing rules of international law generally prohibit military interven-
tion); TERRY NARDIN, LAW, MORALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES 269-70 (1983) (duty of
nonintervention is one of, "certain principles of customary international law that are so
basic that it makes sense to say that they reflect the requirements of society in the circum-
stances of international relations."); R.J. VINCENT, NONINTERVENTION AND WORLD ORDER
(1974) (arguing on the basis of "world order principles" that nonintervention is not justi-
fied). The status of the nonintervention principle lay at the heart of the important debate
between Professors Reisman and Schachter. See W. Michael Reisman, Coercion and Self-
Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4), 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984); Oscar
Schachter, The Legality of Pro-Democratic Invasion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 645 (1984) [herein-
after Legality of Invasion]; and Oscar Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force,
82 MICH. L. REV. 1620 (1984) [hereinafter Right to Use Force].
2. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 1 4. The U.N. General Assembly has taken steps to flesh out the
implicit Charter norm of nonintervention. See e.g., Declaration on the Inadmissability of
Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence
and Sovereignty, G.A. Res. 2131 (XX) (Dec. 21, 1965). See also G.A. Res. 2255 (XXI) (Dec.
19, 1966); Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations
Among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV)
(Oct. 24, 1970). The latter Declaration has been aptly described as an authoritative interpre-
tation of the U.N. Charter. See Oscar Schachter, International Law in Theory and Practice,
178 RECUEIL DES COURS 113, 361 n.189 (1982 V).
3. See Organization of American States, art. 15, 2 U.S.T. 2394; Organization of African
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In general there are two exceptions to this prohibition. 4 The first
arises when the U.N. Security Council specifically finds that a breach of
the peace, a threat to the peace, or aggression has taken place.5 Under
those circumstances the Security Council can use force against the trans-
gressor, though the mechanism through which the Council would do this
is not clear. Most scholars cite the United Nations action in Korea as an
example of this exception.
Most nations, and many scholars, recognize humanitarian interven-
tion as a second exception to the prohibition against the use of force. This
Unity, May 25, 1963, art. III, 2 I.L.M. 766 ("non-interference in the internal affairs of
States"); League of Arab States, Mar. 22, 1945, art. 8, 70 U.N.T.S. 237 (each member "shall
respect the form of government obtaining in the other states of the League ... and shall
pledge itself not to take any action tending to change that form"). See also Treaty of
Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance (Warsaw Pact), May 14, 1955, art. 8, 219
U.N.T.S. 3 ("principles of respect for each other's independence and sovereignty and of
non-intervention in each other's domestic affairs").
4. As Professor Reisman has argued: "Article 2(4) was never an independent ethical
imperative of pacifism. In the instrument in which it appears, there is full acknowledgment
of the indispensability of the use of force to maintain community order." Reisman, supra
note 1, at 642. Further, a reading of the entire Charter should make it clear that, even when
it was written, it was designed to safeguard what Myres McDougal and his students refer to
as "minimum world public order." See MYRES S. McDOUGAL & FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO,
LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, THE LEGAL REGULATION AND INTERNATIONAL COER-
CION (1961). Of course, the meaning of texts such as the Charter changes over time as the
world takes on new shapes, as power shifts, and as new interpretive, jurisprudential, politi-
cal and ethical theories are brought to bear on it. Thus, no legal document, certainly not an
international legal document, has a single meaning written in stone forever. Each document
is susceptible to endless variations and an ever-increasing multiplicity of interpretations.
See generally Kevin Ryan & Jeff Ferrell, Knowledge, Power, and the Process of Justice, 25
CRIME & Soc. JUST. 178 (1986), and the literature cited therein.
The list of exceptions to the principle of nonintervention offers a case in point. The list
can be longer or shorter depending upon how much weight a particular commentator gives
to state practice. Activities such as antiterrorist reprisals, individual and collective enforce-
ment measures, uses of force by states to protect their own nationals abroad, and others can
be seen as exceptions to the basic principle because states practice such activities. See, e.g.,
Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 COLUM. L. REV.
1110 (1982) (arguing for the legitimacy of individual and collective enforcement actions);
Anthony D'Amato, Israel's Air Strike Upon The Iraqi Nuclear Reactor, 77 Am. J. INT'L L.
584 (1983).
5. This exception falls under a provision of the U.N. Charter asserting as one of the
purposes of the organization the prevention of the use of armed force except in the common
interest. See U.N. CHARTER preamble. The Charter specifically addresses breaches and
threats to breach the peace and the proposed U.N. response in Article 39. See generally
Nanda, supra note 1, at 23. There appears to be a consensus among the nations of the world
that military intervention is permissible under these circumstances. Of course, assertions of
consensus are always overstatements, failing to capture the real disagreement underlying
surface unanimity. Here the real disagreement is over the proper interpretation of the key
phrases in Article 39 of the Charter: what constitutes a breach of the peace? what consti-
tutes a threat to breach the peace? what is the meaning of "aggression"? Thus, although all
nations seem to agree on the broad principle that this is an exception to the nonintervention
doctrine, there is interpretive cacophony when it comes to the application of the principle to
particular cases.
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paper offers some thoughts on the legal and moral underpinnings of the
use of armed force for humanitarian purposes. In particular, it explores
the interrelationship between humanitarian intervention and the princi-
ple of self-determination, a principle increasingly cited in the contempo-
rary world by secessionist and liberation movements. As these movements
and "breakaway republics" move onto center stage in world politics, the
time has come to examine the ways in which the principle of self-determi-
nation provides both a justification for and a limitation upon the use of
force by one state against another. This paper attempts to begin that
examination.
I. HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AND THE USE OF FORCE
According to the proponents of humanitarian intervention, the use of
armed force is permitted in cases where gross and persistent violations of
human rights exist within a nation. 6 Crimes against humanity, even the
imminent threat of such crimes, it is argued, justify military action
against the government perpetrating such crimes, and although collective
action under the aegis of the U.N. or a regional organization is preferred,
intervention by a single nation is permitted in the absence of collective
action.
The legal basis for this view is relatively straightforward. Many
scholars contend that humanitarian intervention was valid under custom-
ary international law prior to the founding of the United Nations, and
several interventions in recent years have been cited as evidence of the
continuing validity within customary international law of such uses of
force." Of course, it is notoriously difficult to categorize a practice as cus-
6. See Michael J. Bazyler, Reexamining the Doctrine of Humanitarian Intervention in
Light of the Atrocities in Kampuchea and Ethiopia, 23 STAN. J. INT'L L. 547 (1987);
Claydon, Humanitarian Intervention and International Law, 1 QUEEN'S INTRA. L.J. 3, 36
(1969); SHELDON COHEN, ARMS AND JUDGMENT 79 (1989); ANTHONY A. D'AMATO, INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW: PROCESS AND PROSPECT 226 (1987); INTERNATIONAL COMMISSION OF JURISTS, THE
EVENTS IN EAST PAKISTAN 1971, 76-96 (1972), reprinted in RICHARD B. LILLICH & FRANK C.
NEWMAN, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND POLICY 487 (1979); Michael
J. Levitin, The Law of Force and the Force of Law: Grenada, the Falklands, and Humani-
tarian Intervention, 27 HAEv. INT'L L.J. 621 (1986); Richard Lillich, Forcible Self-Help by
States to Protect Human Rights, 53 IOWA L. REV. 325 (1967); Richard Lillich, Intervention
to Protect Human Rights, 15 McGILL L.J. 205 (1969); Richard Lillich, Humanitarian Inter-
vention: A Reply to Ian Brownlie and a Plea for Constructive Alternatives, in LAW AND
CIvIL WAR IN THE MODERN WORLD 231-32 (J.N. Moore ed., 1974); Myres S. McDougal & W.
Michael Reisman, Response by Professors McDougal and Reisman, 3 INT'L LAW. 438 (1969);
John N. Moore, The Control of Foreign Intervention in Internal Conflict, 9 VA. J. INT'L L.
209 (1969); Nanda, supra note 1; Reisman, supra note 1; W. Michael Reisman & Myres S.
McDougal, Humanitarian Intervention to Protect the Ibos, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
AND THE UNITED NATIONS 177 (Richard Lillich ed., 1973); FERNANDO R. TES6N, HUMANITA-
RIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND MORALITY (1988); MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND
UNJUST WARS 101-08 (1977).
7. See Tes6n, supra note 6, at 155-200. Tes6n cites as evidence of the present custom-
ary law status of humanitarian intervention India's intervention in East Pakistan in 1971,
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tomary international law. Nevertheless, a new basis for humanitarian in-
tervention emerged with the founding of the United Nations. The Pream-
ble to the U.N. Charter states explicitly that one of the purposes of the
organization is the reaffirmation of "faith in fundamental human rights
[and] in the dignity and worth of the human person."' Further, Articles 1
and 55 of the Charter commit the United Nations to promotion of univer-
sal respect for human rights and basic freedoms,9 and Article 56 gives
member nations an obligation to act, jointly or separately, to achieve the
purposes set out in Article 5510 - that is, Article 56 creates a duty to act
to promote respect for rights and freedom.
These provisions have prompted scholars to suggest that furtherance
of human rights is just as important in the framework of the United Na-
tions as the principle of nonintervention set out in Article 2(4)." This
Tanzania's attack on Idi Amin's government in Uganda in 1979, France's intervention in
Central Africa in 1979, and the United States military action in Grenada in 1983. Jean-
Pierre L. Fonteyne, The Customary International Law Doctrine of Humanitarian Inter-
vention: Its Current Validity Under the U.N. Charter, 4 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 203 (1974). See
also Anthony A. D'Amato, Trashing Customary International Law, 81 AM. J. INT'L L. 101
(1987). The classification of any one of these as a truly humanitarian intervention is dubi-
ous, however. The doubt is particularly strong in the case of the United States' intervention
in Grenada. For a discussion of the Indian intervention in East Pakistan, see infra text
accompanying notes 48-49. The Grenada intervention sparked a lively debate among inter-
national legal scholars. See Christopher C. Joyner, Reflections on the Lawfulness of Inva-
sion, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 131 (1984); Levitin, supra note 6; John N. Moore, Grenada and the
International Double Standard, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 145 (1984); Laura Wheeler, Note, The
Grenada Invasion: Expanding the Scope of Humanitarian Intervention, 8 B.C. INT'L &
COMP. L. REV. 413 (1985); Schachter, Right to Use Force, supra note 1, at 1640-41; Detlev F.
Vagts, International Law under Time Pressure: Grading the Grenada Take-home Exami-
nation, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 169 (1984). Professor D'Amato would add the United States'
invasion of Panama to the list of humanitarian interventions. Anthony A. D'Amato, The
Invasion of Panama Was a Lawful Response to Tyranny, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 516 (1990). For
a convincing critique of D'Amato's position, see Ved P. Nanda, The Validity of United
States Intervention in Panama Under International Law, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 494 (1990).
8. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
9. U.N. CHARTER arts. 1, 55.
10. U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
11. See, e.g., Nanda, supra note 1. This view, however, is not universally shared. For
instance, Louis Henkin contends: "[c]learly it was the original intent of the Charter to for-
bid the use of force even to promote human rights .... Human rights are indeed violated in
every country.... But the use of force remains itself a most serious - the most serious -
violation of human rights." Louis Henkin, Use of Force: Law and U.S. Policy, in RIGHT V.
MIGHT: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 61 (1989). Opponents of humanitarian
intervention claim that the prohibition on the use of force embodied in Article 2(4) should
be interpreted consistently with its plain language, so that permitting an exception for hu-
manitarian uses of force is impermissible. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
USE OF FORCE BY STATES 342 (1963); Tom J. Farer, Human Rights in Law's Empire: The
Jurisprudence War, 85 AM. J. INT'L L. 117, 121 (1991) (arguing that the original intent of
the drafters of the Charter was to forbid any use of force, even for humanitarian purposes,
and that state practice has not altered the contemporary meaning of the original text);
Thomas M. Franck & Nigel S. Rodley, After Bangladesh: The Law of Humanitarian Inter-
vention by Military Force, 67 AM. J. INT'L L. 275, 299-302 (1973); Schachter, Right to Use
Force, supra note 1; Schachter, Legality of Invasion, supra note 1. The International Court
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view is supported by extensive U.N. work in the human rights arena, be-
ginning with the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 2 Numer-
ous other documents have followed, produced by both the United Nations
and regional organizations, proliferating rights and reaffirming the world
community's commitment to protection of rights." Today there can be
little doubt that there are certain core human rights recognized by inter-
national law and that nations which practice, encourage, or condone ac-
tivities such as genocide, slavery or slave trade, murder, causing the dis-
appearance of individuals, torture or other cruel, inhuman, or degrading
treatment or punishments, and systematic racial discrimination, are in vi-
olation of international law. 4 Increasingly, states take what H.L.A. Hart
has called the "internal point of view" toward human rights, treating
rights as standards to evaluate each other and even themselves."
Not every violation of human rights, however, is sufficient to justify
military intervention into the affairs of another nation. How severe must
violations of rights be in order to justify the use of force against another
nation? I contend that if violations of human rights are (1) gross, (2) sys-
tematic, and (3) persistent, humanitarian intervention is justifiable to end
of Justice, in the Corfu Channel case, rejected a British claim to have used force in the
cause of international justice. Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Albania), 1949 I.C.J. 4, 35 (Judg-
ment of Apr. 9). The Court returned to the question of the validity under international law
of intervention into the affairs of another nation in the Nicaragua case, arguing that the
protection of human rights "cannot be compatible" with military actions such as those car-
ried out by the United States in Nicaragua. Nicaragua v. United States, 1986 I.C.J. 14, 134-
35 (Merits). For conflicting views on the Court's Nicaragua decision see Harold G. Maier,
Appraisals of the ICJ Decision: Nicaragua v. U.S. (Merits), 81 Am. J. INT'L L. 77 (1987).
12. G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
13. See generally INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS (Richard Lillich ed., 2d
ed. 1988).
14. This is not to deny that the "realm of rights" (to borrow a phrase from Judith
Jarvis Thomson) is dynamic rather than static. JUDITH J. THOMSON, THE REALM OF RIGHTS
(1990). Rather, the "list" of accepted rights is likely to grow and shrink over time, as atti-
tudes are altered, balances of power shift, and the number and identities of those given a
voice in the international legal forum change. (Professor Thomson would disagree with my
claim that the realm of rights expands and contracts situationally.) Thus, human rights
remains primarily a matter of customary international law, subject to all the forces affecting
custom. For a useful discussion, see THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN
NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW ch. 2 (1989). For a useful caution against the proliferation of
rights in international legal discourse, see Philip Alston, Conjuring Up New Human Rights:
A Proposal for Quality Control, 78 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (1984).
15. H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW (1961). For an example of U.N. treatment of
human rights as a basis for criticism of a member nation, see G.A. Res. 721, U.N. GAOR,
8th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 6, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1954) (condemning apartheid in South
Africa).
Nations have, however, been less willing to call for or attempt armed intervention to
stop rights violations. No nation felt strongly enough about rights violations to intervene in
East Timor when Indonesia invaded in 1975. See Roger S. Clark, The "Decolonization" of
East Timor and the United Nations Norms on Self-Determination and Aggression, 7 YALE
J. WORLD PUB. ORD. 2 (1980). Nor did nations rally to the support of the Hutu in Burundi
or the Kurds in Iraq, despite the ease with which their oppressors could have been stopped.
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those violations.'"
Gross violations of rights are those that are "particularly shocking"
due to the centrality of the right and the gravity of the violation. 7 Gross
violations affect certain "core" rights, which is to say those rights which
come closest to universal recognition, and which are at the heart of what
it means to be human. One of the philosophical sources of core rights - I
do not say the only source - is the principle of autonomy, which pro-
vides that individuals should be free and equal in the determination of
the conditions of their own lives. This means that they should enjoy equal
rights (and equal obligations) in the specification of the framework which
both creates and limits the opportunities available to them, so long as
they do not manipulate this framework to deprive others of their rights.'"
From this basic principle flow a variety of rights, including those set out
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which are rooted in the
notion of autonomy. They are designed to assure that the autonomy of
individuals is made safe against community or governmental assault. 19 To
the extent that these rights are necessary to true human autonomy, their
violation, if it is systematic and persistent, justifies humanitarian inter-
vention. To the extent that those rights can be abrogated without deny-
ing human autonomy, their violation is inadequate to justify military in-
tervention, even if it is systematic and persistent.
In addition, gross violations of rights occurs if state action directly
prevents the exercise of an individual's core rights. In other words, gross
violations are so severe as to deny fully to some or all people within a
territory the effective exercise of core rights. Partial limitations on rights
are not gross violations, no matter how permanent those limitations may
be, so long as some room is left for the exercise of the right in question.20
16. A similar conclusion is reached in MYREs S. McDOUGAL, ET AL, HUMAN RIGHTS AND
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER: THE BASIC POLICIES OF AN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF HUMAN RIGHTS 239
(1980).
17. The wording is a variation of that contained in the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOR-
EIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES §702 comment m [hereinafter Restatement].
What follows in the text adheres fairly closely to comment "m," although I seek to provide a
more detailed treatment. See also Fonteyne, supra note 7, at 258 (setting out substantive,
procedural, and preferential guidelines for the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention
under international law).
18. See DAVID HELD, MODELS OF DEMOCRACY 271 (1987). See also J. COHEN AND J. ROG-
ERS, ON DEMOCRACY (1983). Some scholars have gone so far as to suggest that the value of
maximizing human dignity is the raison d'etre of the international legal order and should
take precedence over all other competing claims. See, e.g., Reisman, supra note 1.
19. I believe the principle of autonomy lies at the heart of the Declaration's guarantee
of the liberty and security of persons, the prohibitions against slavery and torture, the right
to equality before the law, the protection against arbitrary interference with privacy, family,
home, correspondence and against attacks on honor or reputation, the right to free move-
ment, including the right to leave one's own or another country, and the right to nationality.
20. Were I developing a thoroughgoing theory of rights, I would elaborate on how much
room must be left for the exercise of any particular right. This is not the place for that
theory, however. Suffice it to say that it is precisely at this point that cultural variations and
situational contingencies play an important role in setting the boundaries of the realm of
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Rights are essentially fences built around individuals which keep others
out. A right establishes a certain "space" around a person, a "space" that
is proper to, or an extension of, that person. Human rights, in this sense,
are essentially property.2 ' Just as an easement is not a violation of one's
property right, so a limitation on a right is inadequate to constitute a
denial of that right. A right is grossly violated only if the easement be-
comes so large as to encompass the entire property - i.e., the fence is
completely gone, the space around a person invaded and placed under
adverse rule, and the ability to choose the use to which the property is
put has been entirely taken away.
Violations of rights are systematic if they are part of a "consistent
pattern," or are a matter of "state policy. '22 Systematic violations include
both overt governmental actions aimed at and effectively achieving the
goal of violating core rights, and covert but institutionalized practices, the
effect of which is to regularly prevent the exercise of core rights (e.g.,
slavery, apartheid, systematic racial discrimination).23
Finally, violations of rights are persistent when they are more than
occasional or of short duration. Persistent violations are repeated, again
and again, over time. Admittedly, it is extraordinarily difficult to deter-
mine how long a practice must endure to be persistent, but there are clear
cases on the basis of which we can assess difficult cases. The Nazi perse-
cution of the Jews provides an example and suggests key factors: the per-
secution was the stated policy of the state; it was carried out over a pe-
riod of more than ten years; it was exported to other nations; and it was
furthered through a range of different governmental activities as well as
through officially tolerated, even condoned, popular persecution. While
not all of these factors need be present, the presence of several suggests a
persistent violation of rights is in progress.2 4
II. SELF-DETERMINATION AS A BASIS FOR INTERVENTION
Thus far, I have contended that where core human rights (those
rooted in the principle of autonomy) are being grossly, systematically,
and persistently violated, humanitarian intervention to end that violation
is morally and legally permissible in principle. One of the implications of
the principle of autonomy is that government is only justifiable if it and
its policies are an expression of the self-determination of the people.2 5 In
rights. The setting of these boundaries must always be a matter of practical reason rooted in
the special features of the situation and flowing from the autonomous political action of the
people in a specific community.
21. See C.B. MacPherson, Human Rights as Property Rights, 1977 DISSENT 72. A simi-
lar position is taken by THOMSON, supra note 14, at 205-26.
22. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 17, §702 comment m.
23. See Garver, What Violence Is, THE NATION, June 24, 1968, at 817.
24. This is another place where a fuller theory of rights must be much more elaborate.
25. The social contract tradition in political theory forcefully argues this point. See, e.g.
JOHN LocKE, Two TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (Peter Laslett ed., 1988); Jean-Jaques Rous-
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order to be autonomous, people must be involved in the specification of
the framework, political, economic, and cultural, that both creates and
limits the opportunities available to them. Autonomous people are people
who, through speech and action, can participate in the creation and recre-
ation of their social world.2 6 This suggests that autonomous people must
have the right to self-determination, and that the policies and programs
of a government must be the products of, or at least consistent with, the
autonomous action.
Articles 1 and 55 of the U.N. Charter specifically refer to the princi-
ple of self-determination. One of the basic purposes of the United Na-
tions, according to Article 1(2), is to, "develop friendly relations among
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-deter-
mination of peoples .... "17 Article 55 explicitly ties the principle of self-
determination to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms,
providing that the UN promote, "universal respect for ... human rights
and fundamental freedoms," with a view to the creation of stability and
well-being based in part on the principle of equal rights and self-determi-
nation. 8 As indicated above, Article 56 gives each member nation an obli-
gation to implement the requirements of Article 55,2 thereby creating a
duty upon states to take action against a nation that denies self-determi-
nation to all or part of its people. Further, the principle of self-determi-
nation is implicated in Chapters XI, XII, and XIII of the Charter, which
relate to non-self-governing and trust territories.2 " In the years since
1945, the principle has found its way into the International Covenant on
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights, 1 the Declaration on the Granting of
seau, The Social Contract, in THE SOCIAL CONTRACT AND DISCOURSES (G.D.H. Cole ed.
1950); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF JUSTICE (J. Ladd ed., 1965). Some
philosophers argue that this requirement can never be fulfilled, and so no government is
justifiable. See ROBERT P. WOLFE, IN DEFENCE OF ANARCHISM (1970). Others contend that
the requirement can be satisfied, but only by a severely limited, minimal government. See,
e.g., ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA (1974). Still others believe autonomy is
consistent with a far less limited government. See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE
(1971); AMY GUTMANN, LmERAL EQUALITY (1980).
26. To say people must be able to participate in the constitution of their social world is
to assert that political action must be possible, not necessarily that all people take advan-
tage of the occasions to speak and act. In a passive sense people constitute their social world
no matter how oppressive their surroundings. See ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE CONSTITUTION OF
SOCIETY (1984). The principle of autonomy, however, requires more than this minimal in-
volvement. It requires active participation through speech and action in constructing and
remodeling the economic, political, and cultural structures. See HANNAH ARENDT, THE
HUMAN CONDITION (1958).
27. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
28. U.N. CHARTER art. 55.
29. See supra text accompanying notes 8-10. See also U.N. CHARTER art. 56.
30. See U.N. CHARTER arts. 73-91. Article 73, in particular, obliges states administering
non-self-governing territories "to develop self-government, to take due account of the politi-
cal aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their
free political institutions .... U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
31. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316
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Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, 2 and the Declaration of
Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations. 3 In addi-
tion, the International Court of Justice has affirmed the right to self-de-
termination in its advisory opinions in the Namibia and Western Sahara
cases.
3 4
The principle of self-determination is extremely complicated, and I
do not intend to provide a full-scale analysis in this essay.3 5 Long applied
(1967). Article 1 of the Covenant provides: "All peoples have the right of self-determination.
By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their
economic, social, and cultural development." The same wording is repeated in Article 1 of
the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st
Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
32. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961). Interestingly, and in keeping with the fact that the current realm of international
law is a system of states, the Declaration prohibits all attempts designed to achieve, "the
partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of any state."
Such a prohibition clearly cuts against most contemporary self-determination claims.
33. Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and
Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res.
2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 121, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971)("all peoples
have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and
pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every state has the duty to
respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter"). See C. Don Johnson,
Note, Toward Self-Determination - A Reappraisal as Reflected in the Declaration on
Friendly Relations, 3 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 145 (1973). The principle is also contained in
the Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res.
3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Special Sess., Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
34. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16; Western Sahara (Advisory Opinion), 1975 I.C.J. 12.
35. An extensive, indeed exhaustive, literature exists on the meaning and application of
the principle of self-determination. See M.C. Bassiouni, 'Self-Determination' and the
Palestinians, 65 AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. PROC. 31 (1971); LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LE-
GITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1978); Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination as a Human
Right, in TOWARD WORLD ORDER AND HUMAN DIGNITY 198 (W. Michael Reisman & Burns H.
Weston eds., 1976); Yoram Dinstein, Collective Human Rights of Peoples and Minorities,
25 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 102 (1976); Rupert Emerson, Self-Determination, 65 AM. J. INT'L L.
459 (1971); Robert A. Friedlander, Self-Determination: A Legal-Political Inquiry, 1 DET.
C.L. REV. 71 (1975); HAROLD S. JOHNSON, SELF-DETERMINATION WITHIN THE COMMUNITY OF
NATIONS (1967); Myres S. McDougal et al., The Protection of Respect and Human Rights:
Freedom of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. REV. 919 (1975); Ved P. Nanda,
Self-Determination Under International Law: Validity of Claims to Secede, 13 CASE W.
RES. J. INT'L L. 257 (1981); W. OFUATEY-KODJOE, THE PRINCIPLE OF SELF-DETERMINATION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW (1977); MICHLA POMERANCE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN LAW AND PRACTICE
(1982); Dov RONEN, THE QUESTION FOR SELF-DETERMINATION (1979); J.N. SAXENA, SELF-DE-
TERMINATION: FROM BIAFRA TO BANGLA DESH (1978); SELF-DETERMINATION: NATIONAL, RE-
GIONAL, AND GLOBAL DIMENSIONS (Yonah Alexander & Robert A. Friedlander eds., 1980); A.
RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION (1973); Eisuke Suzuki,
Self-Determination and World Public Order: Community Response to Territorial Separa-
tion, 16 VA. J. INT'L L. 779 (1976); Gebre H. Tesfagiorgis, Self-Determination: Its Evolution
and Practice by the United Nations and Its Application to the Case of Eritrea, 6 WIs.
INT'L L.J. 75 (1987); UMOZURiKE 0. UMOZURIKE, SELF-DETERMINATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
(1972).
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only in the colonial context, granting colonial peoples a right to self-de-
termination, 6 it has increasingly been used in the post-colonial age by
separatist groups and secessionist movements around the globe as a justi-
fication for their activities."7 Legal scholars - even the United Nations
itself - have generally agreed that the principle of self-determination
may well have applicability outside of the colonial context, though within
rather strict limits.38
Perhaps the most difficult aspect of the right to self-determination is
the delimitation of the "people" who possess it.39 How large of a group is
a "people?" What key characteristic of a group of humans distinguishes
them as a "people?" Do all members of an ethnic group constitute a
"people?" Do co-religionists or all speakers of a particular language con-
stitute a "people?" Must all be members of a single tribe? Must all live
within an already established geographical area? These are not easy ques-
tions to answer, nor is there any agreement on the answers among nations
or legal scholars. Certainly, to be a "people" a group of persons must see
themselves as a single people. But this standard is highly subjective and
changeable. Surely something else, some objective fact or set of facts
about the group, must be required.
For our purposes, let us imagine we have worked our way through
these difficulties and have located the subject of the right to self-determi-
36. As Professor Nanda has pointed out, "self-determination, at least in the specific
context of colonialism, has acquired the status of an established rule of customary interna-
tional law." Nanda, supra note 35, at 259. See also Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 35, at 147.
But see S. Prakash Sinha, Is Self-Determination Passe?, 12 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 260,
271 (1973) (insufficient evidence that self-determination has become a principle of interna-
tional law); Gross, The Right of Self-Determination in International Law, in NEW STATES
IN THE MODERN WORLD 136 (Martin Kilson ed. 1975) (decolonization insufficient to demon-
strate the establishment of self-determination as a principle of customary international law).
37. See, e.g., Agolo Auma-Osolo, A Retrospective Analysis of United Nations Activity
in the Congo and its Significance for Contemporary Africa, 8 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 451
(1975); Lung-Chu Chen & W. Michael Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for Interna-
tional Title, 81 YALE L.J. 599 (1972); John A. Collins, Note, Self-Determination in Interna-
tional Law: The Palestinians, 12 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 137 (1980); Hazen, Minorities in
Revolt: The Kurds of Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey, in THE POLITIcAL ROLE OF MINORITY
GROUPS IN THE MIDDLE EAST 49 (Ronald D. McLaurin ed. 1979); David L. Johnson, Com-
ment, Sanctions and South Africa, 19 HARV. INT'L L.J. 887 (1978); J. Robert Maguire, Note,
The Decolonization of Belize: Self-Determination v. Territorial Integrity, 22 VA. J. INT'L L.
849 (1982); Ved P. Nanda, Self-Determination in International Law: The Tragic Tale of
Two Cities - Islamabad (West Pakistan) and Dacca (East Pakistan), 66 AM. J. INT'L L.
321 (1972); CONOR C. O'BRIEN, STATES OF IRELAND (1972); Tesfagiorgis, supra note 35; Mark
A. Thiboldeau, Note, The Legality of an Independent Quebec: Canadian Constitutional
Law and Self-Determination in International Law, 3 B.C. INT'L & COMP. L. REV. 99 (1979);
M.C. van Welt van Praag, Tibet and the Right to Self-Determination, 26 WAYNE L. REV.
279 (1979).
38. See generally Nanda, supra note 35, at 263-66 (assessing various arguments against
applying self-determination outside the colonial context). For the purposes of this article, I
will assume without argument that self-determination does have applicability outside of
decolonization issues, though subject to limitations.
39. See works cited supra note 35.
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nation, that we have isolated a people which we believe has a right to self-
determination. What does that right confer?40 There are two types of an-
swers to this question, and both may be correct. The answers depend
upon a distinction between external and internal self-determination. Ex-
ternal self-determination has to do with the determination of the na-
tional self, and confers a right to independence to a people. Internal self-
determination, on the other hand, relates to the governmental, economic,
and social order within national boundaries; it confers a right to individu-
als and groups to participate in the creation and re-creation of internal
social order. I think both the right to independence and the right to par-
ticipate in the internal processes of social order construction are implicit
in the principle of self-determination, and I can see no persuasive, princi-
pled way to eliminate either one of these aspects of self-determination
from its legal meaning. Notice, however, the effect of such an understand-
ing of self-determination on the permissibility of humanitarian interven-
tion. A gross, systematic, and persistent denial of self-determination -
that is, a denial of the rights of independence and to participation in in-
ternal, interactive processes - may justify humanitarian intervention in
principle. This suggests that humanitarian intervention may be permissi-
ble to support liberation movements,4 1 but, and this is an important limi-
tation, only when the people seeking liberation have been grossly, system-
atically, and persistently denied an opportunity to determine themselves,
to establish their own nation. In addition, dictatorship, if extended be-
yond moments of immediate crisis, generally violates the self-determina-
tion principle since it places into the hands of a single individual or group
of individuals all power to determine the internal shape of a nation and
prevents people from speaking and acting to constitute their own social
order. Under a dictatorship the people are permitted no voice, are not
listened to by their governors, and are prevented from speaking in certain
ways. Any government that, in principle, prevents the exercise of people's
right to internal self-determination is illegitimate, and efforts by outside
forces to give a voice to the people are justifiable in principle.
Intervention, however, must seek to make room for the autonomous
activities of the people inside a territory in order for the use of force to be
40. The literature on this question is inconclusive. See Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 35.
41. Reisman argues that intervention to.enhance popular rule is justifiable despite the
seeming prohibition of Article 2(4). The "peoples" to which he would apply this, I believe,
are already established nations suffering under a totalitarian yoke. There are several
problems with his thesis, not least of which is that he does not extend it to include the self-
determination of peoples, such as the Eritreans or the Kurds, who have not been permitted
to establish themselves as a nation in the modern state system. In addition, Reisman seems
to be far too sanguine about the virtues of intervention, for he appears to find any interven-
tion aimed at the furtherance of self-determination to be justified under international law.
This ignores the tendency of powerful or aggressive states to claim a humanitarian justifica-
tion as a cover for non-humanitarian military adventures, the possibility that excessive force
will be used by the intervener, and the likelihood that the consequences of forceful interven-
tion will be worse (perhaps far wQrse) than the available alternatives.
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justified. The intervening party must be seeking only to destroy the barri-
ers to the exercise of self-determination, not to install its own favored
form of economic, political, or cultural order. Self-determination, as Mill
argued, is not the same as free institutions;42 rather, it is more inclusive,
describing less a particular institutional arrangement than a process by
which a community arrives at that arrangement. A nation can be self-
determining even if its people do not establish free political institutions.
This means that self-determination is denied if an invader replaces the
internal processes of creation by forcefully establishing any institutional
arrangement, however free. Such a intervener has merely replaced one
form of tyranny with another. Political freedom can be won only by the
members of the community themselves, it cannot be imposed from
without.'
III. LIMITATIONS ON HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION
The discussion to this point may appear to present a tolerant concep-
tion of the justifiability of humanitarian intervention. But humanitarian
intervention is not easily justified, and its exercise is severely limited in a
number of ways. Further, these limits are rooted not only in the practical
contingencies of particular cases, but in the very structure of the justify-
ing theory itself. While humanitarian intervention may be justified in
principle, its actual use will rarely be permissible because its use will run
afoul of one or more of these limitations.
A. Purity of Motive
The first limit stems from what can be called the "purity of motive"
requirement. The motives of the intervening nation must be "pure,"
meaning that the intervener must be seeking to end the violation of rights
and only to end such violations." Once the violations have ended, the
42. See John Stuart Mill, A Few Words on Non-Intervention, reprinted in THE VIET-
NAM WAR AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 24, 36-37 (Richard A. Falk ed., 1968).
43. The type of political institutions that emerge out of a process of self-determination
depends upon the interactive processes of the political culture in a particular nation. Politi-
cal institutions grown in the soil of another political culture cannot successfully be trans-
planted to nations whose cultural soil will not support them. This has been the experience
of imposed U.S. modeled democracies in many parts of the world. See NOAM CHOMSKY &
EDWARD S. HERMAN, THE WASHINGTON CONNECTION AND THIRD WORLD FASCISM (1979);
PENNY LERNOUX, CRY OF THE PEOPLE (1980). See also GABRIEL A. ALMOND & SIDNEY VERBA,
CIVIc CULTURE (1963).
44. Compare Comment, Humanitarian Intervention in International Law: The French
Intervention in Syria Re-examined, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 182, 190 (1986); Franck &
Rodley, supra note 11, at 278-79 ("must have occurred when the humanitarian motive is at
least balanced, if not outweighed, by a desire to protect alien property or to reinforce socio-
political and economic instruments of the status quo"). Michael Walzer claims to have
found no examples of pure humanitarian intervention. "States don't send their soldiers into
other states, it seems, only in order to save lives. The lives of foreigners don't weigh that
heavily in the scales of domestic decision-making." WALZER, supra note 6, at 101-02. See
also BROWNLIE, supra note 11, at 339-40; Farer, supra note 11, at 121.
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intervening state must leave the field open for the self-determination of
the now-liberated people. It is wrong to intervene on behalf of people and
fail to respect their own ends by imposing one's own self-interested ends
on them."5 An intervention which, in reality, is designed to achieve the
selfish purposes of the intervening party - e.g., to rid itself of an annoy-
ing, belligerent, or merely uncooperative neighbor, or to establish any vi-
sion of world order (no matter how benevolent) - exceeds this strict lim-
itation, and, hence, is unjustified.
Notice how the principle of self-determination operates both as a jus-
tification for humanitarian intervention and as a limit on how it is prac-
ticed. Humanitarian intervention to end a denial of self-determination is
permissible only when the people are free to engage in self-determination.
If after the intervention they still will not have the opportunity to consti-
tute for themselves the social order in which they will live, the interven-
tion is not justified.
The purity of motive requirement has two significant implications.
First, interventions with mixed motives - combining a desire to end a
denial of rights with a desire to achieve certain selfish utilitarian goals of
the intervener - are not justified, for it is not truly humanitarian in na-
ture. Many commentators argue that mixed motives are permissible so
long as "the overriding motive is the protection of human rights. 4' But it
is highly unlikely that any state will confess to the nefarious motives un-
derlying its decision to use armed force; instead, its public pronounce-
ments will loudly proclaim that humanitarian concerns are uppermost in
its thoughts. How is it possible to sift through the fog of public relations
and ascertain what motive is "really overriding?" Further, one extremely
difficult problem with any theory that refers to the motives of "states" is
that a "state" cannot be the possessor of motives. State action is action
by one or a group of individuals in the name of the state. These individu-
als may be working from a variety of motives, and it is possible that no
two of the individuals will have the same motives or combination of mo-
tives. The motive of a "state," then, will always be a congeries of different
motives. This difficulty is shared by both the mixed motive proponents
and those, who insist that motives must be purely humanitarian. Never-
theless, where different motives appear to be behind the actions of a
state, it is far easier to apply the purity of motive standard than to con-
duct the weighing process necessary to determine the "overriding" motive
of state action.
More importantly, permitting mixed motives is to court the danger
that the assertion of humanitarian concern will be merely a cover for
other, quite different, actual interests .4  With the assurance that other
45. See Levitin, supra note 6, at 652; WALZER, supra note 6, at 104.
46. Lillich, Forcible Self-Help, supra note 6, at 350-51. See also Ved P. Nanda, The
United States' Action in the 1965 Dominican Crisis: Impact on World Order (pts. I & II),
43 DEN. L.J. 439, 475 (1966), 44 DEN. L.J. 225 (1967); Fonteyne, supra note 7, at 262.
47. This concern underlies Schachter's critique of Reisman's expansive view on the le-
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motives are permissible so long as the humanitarian one is foremost,
states will be encouraged to use force first and later engage in creative
accounting to fit their actions into the balance sheet in the legally pre-
scribed manner. The predictable result will be that powerful and aggres-
sive states will be given a license to romp over their neighbor's soil in
pursuit of selfish ends. Further, the only safeguard against such an even-
tuality is to recognize that the only justification for humanitarian inter-
vention is to end the violation of human rights, and that particular inter-
ventions can only be justified if the intervener's motives are completely
parallel with this justification.
Many writers cite the 1971 Indian intervention in East Pakistan as
an example of humanitarian intervention. 48 But despite India's rhetoric,
and despite the fact that conditions in East Pakistan would have justified
humanitarian intervention, India's motives were mixed, and so its inter-
vention was unjustified. Undoubtedly the series of massacres of East
Pakistani Bengalis by West Pakistani troops constituted genocide, and,
hence, would have justified military intervention to stop them. But India
did not intervene to stop the massacres solely because doing so was the
humanitarian thing to do. Rather, it was in India's interest to end the
massacres and thereby solve a serious refugee problem. Further, India
benefitted enormously by the secession of East from West Pakistan, for
this ended a situation in which India was virtually surrounded by a rela-
tively powerful nation with which relations were anything but cordial.
Thus, the massacres provided a convenient pretext for carrying out an
important goal of Indian domestic and foreign policy. It is highly unlikely
that India would have invaded had it not stood to gain greatly from doing
so: nations are usually reluctant to help others if it is not in their own
interest. Thus, the motivating force behind the intervention was not hu-
manitarian concern, but self-interest, and although in the abstract an in-
tervention in East Pakistan was assuredly justifiable, India's intervention
was not.49
Second, interventions which use excessive force - whether in terms
of quantity of force, duration of involvement, or geographical extent of
military action - are also unjustifiable. This is merely a restatement of
the traditional principle of proportionality: force must be proportional to
the size of the wrong being addressed. 50 Given that the purpose of hu-
gality of the use of force. See Schachter, Legality of Invasion, supra note 1.
48. See, e.g., WALZER, supra note 6, at 105; COHEN, supra note 6, at 79. Curiously, India
itself did not assert the violation of rights as the justification for its intervention, claiming
instead that it acted in self-defense (a much less persuasive claim).
49. See Franck & Rodley, supra note 11 (reaching a similar conclusion). Contra Rich-
ard Lillich, Rapporteur, The International Protection of Human Rights by General Inter-
national Law, Second Interim Report of the Sub-Committee, in REPORT OF THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COMMITTEE ON HUMAN RIGHTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION 38, 54 (1972).
50. For a recent statement of this principle in regard to humanitarian intervention, see
Tes6n, supra note 6, at 5. See also Nanda, supra note 1, at 24; Nanda, supra note 46, pt. I
at 475; Moore, supra note 6, at 264.
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manitarian intervention is to liberate people from their oppressors, the
only force that is justified is the force that is necessary and sufficient to
end the violation of rights. The use of excessive force, force that is dispro-
portionate to the demands of the situation, renders the action unjustified.
Lengthy involvement in the internal affairs of a nation beyond the time
needed to inititate the process of self-determination, or taking advantage
of a chaotic situation to push one's military forces into places where their
presence is not necessary to foster self-determination, bespeak motives
other than a concern for rights. The purity of motive requirement strictly
limits the quantity, duration, and extent of the use of armed force to
what must be used to end the violation of rights and forbids any use of
force which flows from any other purpose.
B. The Consequences of Intervention
Additional limitations on humanitarian intervention are founded on
the expected consequences of the use of armed force in any given situa-
tion. For humanitarian intervention to be proper in any given case, its
reasonably foreseeable consequences must be better than the reasonably
foreseeable consequences of each available alternative. This does not
mean that humanitarian intervention must be the last resort; indeed, it
may theoretically be the first resort. What is required is not that all the
other alternatives be tried, but that they be considered seriously, and that
when compared to intervention the other alternatives seem reasonably
likely to produce worse results than intervention.
The consequences of international actions, particularly those involv-
ing the use of force, should be assessed on the basis of three considera-
tions: justice, autonomy, and welfare. 1 An intervention that is likely to
lead to a more just society is, in that regard, morally justified; an inter-
vention that is likely to produce a less just social order is not.2 Likewise,
an intervention that enhances human autonomy is more likely to be justi-
fied than an intervention that diminishes autonomy. Finally, an interven-
tion that increases human happiness, and especially one that reduces
human suffering, is more justifiable than an intervention that increases
suffering. In determining whether or not an intervention is justified as a
means of correcting the grave wrongs against which it is directed, its
probable consequences for justice, autonomy, and human welfare should
be ascertained, and compared with the probable consequences of the
51. See Robert Audi, On the Meaning and Justification of Violence, in VIOLENCE 59
(Jerome A. Shaffer ed., 1971).
52. This essay is not the place to develop a theory of justice. In general, I conceive
justice to be a micro-phenomenon, a local production of the interaction of people within
narrowly defined groups. Thus, conceptions of justice vary from group to group, as well as
from moral tradition to moral tradition. See ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE?
WHICH RATIONALITY? (1988). I am skeptical of any attempt to develop grand, macro-level
theories of justice. Rather, justice must be defined - since there is no eternal essence of
justice - in the terms of those to whose interrelations it applies.
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available alternatives. Intervention is only justified if it is the alternative
that realistically and foreseeably will produce the best consequences mea-
sured by these considerations."3
Considerations of autonomy make the consequences to the people
whose rights were being violated of particular importance.54 If the goal of
intervention is to stop the violation of human rights, it is essential that it
have a significant likelihood of success. If people are already being op-
pressed, military action against the government brings with it the great
danger that the level of oppression and suffering, and the extent of
human rights violations, will only be increased, initially as an internal
response to the intervention, and in the long term as a corrective to those
who may have supported (in whatever way) a failed intervention. A state
contemplating intervention must carefully evaluate the probability that
its action will actually liberate a people so that they can create a viable
national self and participate in the constitution of their own social order.
Interventions which seem unlikely to have these results are not justified.
Further, considerations of justice, autonomy, and welfare all suggest
that states recognize that any use of force, coupled with an accepted
claim that the use was permitted under international law, may very well
have the result that armed attacks against peaceful governments will be
legitimated, making it easier for other states with less admirable motives
to use force in less justifiable circumstances. 5 A world in which armed
force is too easily justified is one in which powerful and aggressive nations
can bully other nations and claim international law (as they have histori-
53. Notice I do not base the legitimacy of the intervention on the actual consequences,
but only on foreseeable consequences. It is foolish to expect states and their leaders to be
seers who can know the precise consequences of their actions before they take them. Indeed,
the book is never closed on the consequences of our actions, which keep on producing effects
long, long after the actor herself has left the stage. Further, basing legal and moral condem-
nation (or approval) of the use of force on what ultimately occurs carries with it the possi-
bility that less careful, perhaps less scrupulous, powerful states will act first (since they
cannot be criticized at the time of action) and worry about justification later (maybe much
later). Such a situation would only perpetuate and extend the dominance of a few wealthy,
aggressive states.
54. Of course the intervening nation must also consider the effects of the intervention
on its own people. But there is a danger here that can easily interfere with a nation's mo-
tives for intervention. If positive consequences to the intervening nation will flow from the
intervention, it is all too easy to intervene, and then use the proper motives as an after-the-
fact rationalization. In order to avoid this merely rhetorical use of the proper motives, a
nation should look only at the negative consequences of its action on its people. To consider
the positive consequences is to court the danger of being swayed by the wrong considera-
tions. It may well be argued that this is an unrealistic requirement. But that a nation cannot
successfully disengage the consequences to itself from its decision to intervene is merely one
of the many reasons why intervention is unlikely to be justifiable in any actual case. Only if
a nation does make its decisions on the basis of a disinterested desire to resist evil and a
realistic assessment of the consequences to others (and not to itself, except insofar as those
consequences are negative), is humanitarian intervention justified.
55. See Schachter, Legality of Invasion, supra note 1, at 649.
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cally claimed God) as their co-pilot. 6
IV. CONCLUSION
Circumstances may be such that the use of force against an oppres-
sive regime may be justified. Still, application of the standards delineated
above would generally lead to a realization that few interventions are
valid legally or morally. It would be the rare case indeed in which human-
itarian intervention is justified. The proposed standards are strict. Like
all standards, however, they are not easy to apply and may not speak
clearly in any given set of facts. Application of these standards requires
extensive, detailed, and objective knowledge of the facts of the case at
hand. Such knowledge may be beyond our abilities, at least in the con-
temporary world,57 but in the absence of sure knowledge about actual
events inside another country, and in the absence of any generally ac-
cepted international fact-finding process, nations must be extremely wary
of using force, regardless of how legitimate that use may seem to be.
It is absolutely essential that nations refer cases of human rights vio-
lations to international bodies, to seek to find as broad-based a consensus
as possible on the facts that allegedly justify the use of force. Most impor-
tantly, leaders and citizens of all nations must always keep in mind the
plain and painful fact that war is obscene, that it means death and great
suffering, and that a new world order must be founded upon a shared
desire to forego the use of that obscene weapon and seek other ways to
ensure that human rights are protected, self-determination is guaranteed,
and international peace and security are created.
56. See Corfu Channel case, supra note 11, at 35.
57. See Ryan & Ferrell, supra note 4.
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Alternatives to the Use of Force and the
Role of the United Nations
CHARLES S. MILLIGAN*
I. THE CENTRAL PURPOSE OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The subject of this paper, "alternatives to the use of force," goes to
the essence of the United Nations. The U.N. addresses numerous other
subjects as well and arguably succeeds more in other areas than in this
central purpose. Because various limitations and deficiencies of the U.N.
will be addressed, it is important for me to dissociate myself entirely from
those whose criticism undermines both internationalism and peace
processes,' and also from those who laud the several types of utopianism2
which discount the role of political structures and international law in the
quest for world peace.
The U.N. Charter's most familiar words are "to save succeeding gen-
erations from the scourge of war."3 The Charter states further that the
U.N.'s goal is "to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one
another."4 Clearly, attitudes and habits of mind have a role in sustaining
governmental peace policies. The Preamble also recognizes the necessity
for structures and instrumentalities to promote both peace and other
goals. Thus the U.N. intends "to unite our strength to maintain interna-
tional peace and security; and to ensure, by the acceptance of principles
and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save
in the common interest."5 Subsequent articles of the Charter implement
these purposes, accompanied by authorization to devise new instruments
as changing times bring forth new problems or opportunities.
The Gulf War has directed attention to the Charter provisions which
allow the authorization of armed force.' However, two important qualifi-
* Emeritus Professor of Philosophy, Iliff School of Theology.
The core of this paper was presented at a conference on "The Use of Force in the Post
Cold War Era," March 15, 1991, sponsored by the International Legal Studies Program of
the University of Denver College of Law. Material has been added in the light of subsequent
events, but the basic position remains as presented.
1. See, e.g., The Heritage Foundation and the United Nations: Dying Dia-Tripes,
United Nations Ass'n, USA, Nov. 1989.
2. See, e.g., Ronald Glossop, Toward Democracy for the World Community, unpub-
lished paper presented at the Conference on The Ethics of Democracy, sponsored by the
Institute for Advanced Philosophic Research at Estes Park, Colorado, August 15, 1991.
3. U.N. CHARTER preamble.
4. Id.
5. Supra note 3 (emphasis added).
6. U.N. CHARTER art. 39-51; see also UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL, RESOLUTIONS
RELATING TO THE SITUATION BETWEEN IRAQ AND KUWAIT, U.N. Doc. DPI/11-4/Rev.
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cations, less frequently cited, exist. First, armed force, especially if used
offensively rather than defensively, may be used only as a last resort.
7
The Charter provides for active use of armed force in several places. For
example, Article 45 states:
In order to enable the United Nations to take urgent military mea-
sures, Members shall hold immediately available national air-force
contingents for combined international enforcement action. The
strength and degree of readiness of these contingents and plans for
their combined action shall be determined, within the limits laid
down in the special agreement or agreements referred to in Article 43,
by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff
Committee.8
Clearly, defensive use of force is distinguishable from an offensive or in-
vasive use, although admittedly the line between them can blur in many
actual situations.
Second, when the Security Council authorizes the use of armed force,
it is not a blanket endorsement. Instead, force may be used to the degree
and within the limits set by the authorizing resolution and by provisions
noted in other articles." Once combat has begun, it is extremely difficult
to observe restraint. For example, the Bishop of London, the Very Rever-
end Winnington-Ingram, during World War I urged young English
soldiers to "kill Germans . .. to kill the good and the bad, to kill the
young and the old, to kill those who have shown kindness to our wounded
... As I have said a thousand times, I look upon it as a war of purity."10
Ultima ratio regum (the final argument of kings, force). Self-re-
straint is difficult in times of tension and conflict as they are not politi-
cally profitable. Nonviolent procedures require self-imposed restraints
from the beginning and throughout their operation. This would require a
shift from world leaders who exploit fears and hatred, and escalate the
1-40059-(1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 846-64 (May 1991).
7. The U.N. must observe stages of intensity. Chapter VII of the Charter deals with
"action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace, and acts of aggression."
Article 40 provides for "provisional measures" involving communication and recommenda-
tions "in order to prevent aggravation of the situation." These measures must be imple-
mented "without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned." Arti-
cle 41 outlines measures the Security Council may authorize "not involving the use of
armed force" (emphasis added). Article 42 provides for the use of force in a defensive en-
forcement role, in case "measures provided for in Article 41 would be inadequate or have
proved to be inadequate." This is similar to the weapons police carry to back up their en-
forcement, but do not normally use unless compliance with their orders requires the coer-
cive power of physical force. As Article 42 states: "Such action may include demonstrations,
blockade, and other operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations."
8. Supra note 6, at art. 45 (emphasis added).
9. Id. at arts. 41-43.
10. See Swords into Plowshares, Plowshares into Swords, LIBERTY, Sept.- Oct. 1985, at
4; see also Dick Cheney, Associated Press, Aug. 2, 1991 ("I think it was a catharsis.., that
sort of lifted the burden").
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rhetoric of violence and passion, to leaders able to convincingly articulate
the wisdom and courage of steadiness, persistence and effectiveness to-
ward solutions. Above all, leaders and the public must exercise patience
when patience is required for constructive results. William Ernest Hock-
ing spoke of this during World War I. After asserting the importance of
the ability to act and sustain motivation, he added, "[b]ut readiness to
wait, the negative element in morale, is as important as readiness to act,
and oftentimes it is a harder virtue.""1 Consider also the words from
Louis B. Sohn, Bemis Professor of International Law, Emeritus, of
Harvard, which serve as a summary of the discussion to this point. Speak-
ing of the proposed addition of new rules for international behavior, he
says:
Such rules will not help, however if national decision-makers should
continue to arrogate to themselves the right to determine in each case
whether the rules permit them to engage in a particular activity re-
gardless of consequences to other countries. This kind of traditional
self-judging privilege has to be replaced by conferring on impartial
international tribunals or boards the power to decide whether a par-
ticular activity is legal; what are the bounds for that activity, and
what correlative restrictions should be imposed on other parties to
avoid unnecessary provocation. All disputes should be settled "legally,
not lethally" as escalation of any dispute can endanger the future of
mankind and the life on our planet. The Charter of the United Na-
tions is correct in emphasizing that any dispute or situation, "the con-
tinuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security," is of concern to the United Nations as a
whole. "'2
II. HINDRANCES TO THE UNITED NATION'S EFFECTIVENESS
The Charter of the United Nations reflects circumstances at the time
of its adoption on June 26, 1945.11 Inevitably developments since then
have occurred which render some of the concerns less important. Con-
versely, other circumstances have arisen which were unforeseen and not
provided for in the Charter. That time causes change would not have sur-
prised the founders, but I imagine they would have been very surprised
- and dismayed - about some of the particulars of those changes. The
U.N. founders would have been astonished that good people in allegedly
democratic nations would exploit fears for political gain; that Stalin
would become paranoid with such tragic consequences; that Joseph Mc-
Carthy would dominate the U.S. political scene, unopposed by an other-
wise decent U.S. president, to leave a legacy of deceit and suspicion; or
that the Cold War between the superpowers would become the basis of
international politics for nearly forty years. The founders anticipated ba-
ll. W. E. HOCKING, MORALE AND ITS ENEMIES 17 (1918).
12. BENJAMIN B. FERENCZ, A COMMON SENSE GUIDE TO WORLD PEACE viii (1985).
13. The United Nations Charter came into force October 24, 1945.
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sic cooperation between the powers which in short time became obsessive
enemies. This lack of international cooperation has hindered the fulfill-
ment of the Charter.
Additionally, the Charter called for the establishment of a Military
Staff Committee, to be composed of "the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent
members of the Security Council or their representatives."'" It was to
function as an advisory group, providing counsel and guidance to the Se-
curity Council in particularly sensitive and difficult situations. It has
never functioned. 5
Also, the individual veto power which the five permanent members of
the Security Council possess has often been blamed for the U.N.'s inabil-
ity to act. It was thought at the time that the United States Senate would
not ratify membership without the protection of national interest; the
other four nations may have had similar sentiments. Although it is true
that the veto power has often stymied the Security Council, in retrospect
it is at least arguable that, given the Cold War and the rise of nationalism
and fundamentalism, the U.N. might have perished had it not been for
the veto power. The Soviets might have left the U.N. when votes were
consistently going against them during Stalin's reign. Similarly, the
United States might have left during Vietnam and Nicaragua, if votes
had been taken. It seems the veto power was necessary; the world and the
national leaders were not ready for a supranational decisionmaking body
on issues of war and peace.
The International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the
United Nations, was a functional continuation of the Permanent Court of
International Justice of the League of Nations. Authorized under Chapter
XIV of the Charter, it has its own detailed statute. Every member of the
U.N. is ipso facto a member of the International Court of Justice. When a
dispute between nations occurs over a legal matter, the issue "should as a
general rule be referred by the parties to the International Court of Jus-
tice in accordance with the provisions of the Statute of the Court."'" The
superpowers have been unwilling to use the Court on issues which they
consider vital to their national interests. For instance, when in 1984 Nica-
ragua brought an action against the United States, alleging violations of
international law, President Reagan refused to accept the Court's juris-
diction, withdrew the U.S. as a party to the case, and subsequently termi-
nated its acceptance of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court.17 This
response to both the International Court and international law was a
14. Supra note 6, at art. 47.
15. The U.N. military action in Korea, 1950-53, was under the U.N. flag, but not under
command of the Secretary-General, who had delegated command to General MacArthur.
Security Council action was possible only because the Soviet delegate had walked out ear-
lier. On the unworkability of the Military Staff committee, see FERENCZ, supra note 12, at
36.
16. Supra note 6, at art. 36, 3.
17. See U.S. DEP'T STATE BULL., Jan. 1986, at 67.
VOL. 20:1
ALTERNATIVES TO USE OF FORCE
blow to principles of justice among nations and to the Court's power.
One other failing remains to be mentioned, which is the inability to
expedite significant arms control. Article 26 states:
In order to promote the establishment and maintenance of interna-
tional peace and security with the least diversion for armaments of
the world's human and economic resources, the Security Council shall
be responsible for formulating, with the assistance of the Military
Staff Committee referred to in Article 47, plans to be submitted to the
Members of the United Nations for the establishment of a system for
the regulation of armaments.5
Those charged with national and international responsibility have failed
to implement weapons control.19 If one nation does not trust another,
that is all the more reason (1) to wish to see that nation's arsenal limited,
and (2) not to threaten that nation by spectacular accumulation of power-
ful weapons and increasingly hostile rhetoric.2" A nation only needs
enough armaments to show it is serious, not easily cowed, and not to be
taken lightly. The conventional Cold War rationale has many flaws, but
the transition from MAD (Mutually Assured Destruction) to "Who's-
Ahead-In-The-Arms-Race?" seems extremely illogical.2 1 Of all the unten-
able assumptions that leaders of nations make, none is more suspect than
''our enemy will perceive sanity as weakness."
U.N. initiatives are often stymied by states with veto power or by a
majority coalition in the General Assembly. Nevertheless, the Secretary-
General at times needs to speak out bluntly, taking responsible leaders to
task. Although hampered by national policies which limit constructive ac-
tion, the position, insofar as it involves heavy responsibilities, carries
strong leadership requirements. Part of the U.N.'s meaning and symbol-
ism implies that it should be a few notches above the common level of
nationalism. Moreover, there are some occasions in which the Secretary-
General has the role of moral spokesperson for the people of the world
(Javier Perez de Cu6llar has been a marked improvement in this regard).
Similarly, although they are selected as national representatives, U.N.
Ambassadors should promote U.N. purposes.
A reflection on the history of our own government reveals that re-
sponsible criticism of social intitutions can correct and improve them.
18. Supra note 6, at art. 26 (emphasis added).
19. See 20 DEF. MONITOR, No. 4 (1991); see also Middle East Missile Sales: The Sup-
pliers and the Supplied, 13 NUCLEUS 5 (1991); STANLEY FOUNDATION, BEYOND COLD WAR 21-
37 (1990); Swords Into Plowshares, UNESCO COURIER, Mar. 1982, at 5-33; ARM CONTROL,
DISARMAMENT, AND NATIONAL SECURITY 89-121, 365-75 (Donald G. Brennan ed., 1961).
20. Oct. 15: "We're dealing with Hitler revisited;" Oct. 23: a comparison with Hitler's
"Death's Head Battalions;" Nov. 1: "brutality that I don't believe Adolf Hitler ever partici-
pated in;" quoted in More than a Madman, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 7, 1991, at 20.
21. See generally STEVEN KULL, MINDS AT WAR: NUCLEAR REALITY AND THE INNER CON-
FLICTS OF DEFENSE POLICYMAKERS (1988)(interviews with top level people in the Defense De-
partment and related industries).
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The Bill of Rights became effective in 1791. Seven years later the Alien
and Sedition Act contradicted the First Amendment by outlawing at-
tempts toward "unlawful assembly, or combination" and publishing "any
false, scandalous and malicious writing" bringing into disrepute the U.S.
government, Congress, or the President. As Professor Morris says, "The
Sedition Act was aimed at repressing political opposition," and it was
"carried out in a partisan manner. '22 It took three years for the Act to be
repealed, convictions pardoned, and fines restored with interest. That was
the same length of time it had taken to ratify and activate the Bill of
Rights. Criticism and debate of social institutions is one way to maintain
the health of such institutions. The more democratic an institution, the
more likely that there will be certain built-in inefficiencies and a risk of
faulty decisions. The mature reaction to these problems is to work and
vote for amendment where possible.
A similar maturity ought to apply to the United Nations, which re-
lates to far more complex institutional relationships than we have in our
country: numerous languages, ancient hostilities, deeply imbedded cul-
tures concentrated in definite areas, vastly greater populations, and the
obstacles posed by ingrained and competing national sovereignties.
Though our national government has more than two hundred years of
governmental experience, social momentum, and individual loyalty un-
dergirding it, most would agree that our government needs improvement.
Obviously, this also applies to the fledgling United Nations, which lacks
the police enforcement powers of a city, state or nation.
III. THE PEACE-KEEPING FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
The 1988 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to the U.N. Peace-Keeping
Forces, paying tribute to the "young people of many nations.., who, in
keeping with their ideals, voluntarily take on a demanding and hazardous
service in the cause of peace."2 2 More than 500,000 men and women from
fifty-eight countries have served in U.N. peace-keeping forces. There are
currently more than 10,000 from thirty-five countries serving as peace-
keepers under the U.N. flag. More than 700 have died while serving. In
many respects these Blue Berets, Soldiers of Peace, have forged peace
when the General Assembly was unable to act because of U.S./U.S.S.R.
hostility. As the Secretary-General stated in a lecture at Cambridge
University:
[T]he onset and persistence of the Cold War could have paralyzed the
[United Nations] . . . But it is a measure of the inner vitality and
resilience of the Organization that, instead of allowing this factor to
block all its endeavors, it found other ways of defusing conflicts. It
originated the concept of peace-keeping to contain hostilities at the
22. RICHARD B. MORRIS, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN HISTORY 129 (1953).
23. United Nations Association USA, United Nations Focus, Peace-Keeping, at 40-47
(1989). [Hereinafter "UNA Peace-Keeping"].
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regional level. The technique of conflict control ... in diverse theaters
has been one of the most constructive innovations in the field of inter-
national affairs in our age.24
The U.N. Charter does not provide for Peace-Keeping Forces; it does
however, support such operations. The Preamble lists as one of its main
purposes, the establishment of "conditions under which justice and re-
spect for obligations arising from treaties and other sources of interna-
tional law can be maintained." Chapter VI, "Pacific Settlement of Dis-
putes," addresses negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration, judicial settlement, use of regional institutions or arrange-
ments, "or other peaceful means of their own choice."
"Peace-Keeping" refers to situations where conflict has momentarily
subsided and where there is grave danger that the peace will collapse.
The presence of the Blue Berets prevents the parties from becoming em-
broiled in conflict and keeps the parties working peacefully together,
seeking negotiated settlements. There are two types of Peace-Keeping op-
erations: Observer Missions, teams of unarned military officers; and
Peace-Keeping Forces, including all ranks of troops which carry light
weapons, normally used only in self-defense. The Secretary-General
stated:
In a larger perspective, we must work towards a time when war will
cease to be an acceptable option of national policy or a possible means
of settling disputes and when a reliable and respected international
system will take its place. In this perspective, the development of in-
ternational peace-keeping has an essential place, just as the concept of
civil police was essential to the development of the rule of law within
nation states.2"
The achievements of the Soldiers of Peace should be better known.
As observers, they were on the Iran-Iraq cease-fire line, in Afghanistan,
India-Pakistan, southern Lebanon, the Golan Heights, and Cyprus. As for
what they do, Sir Brian Urquhart, former Under-Secretary-General for
Special Political Affairs at the U.N., has said, "It is like the staff in a
hospital engaged in getting the patient's temperature down and keeping
him reasonably healthy. And when you get to a certain point, a great sur-
geon may be able to arrive and deal with the problem. 2 6 Typical of the
assignments of peace-keeping operations are:
1. Observing a situation and reporting to the Secretary-General;
2. Investigating incidents and negotiating to avoid resumption of
fighting;
3. Physically controlling of buffer zones;
24. Id. at 40.
25. Id. at 47.
26. Id. at 43.
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4. Controlling movements of armed personnel and weaponry in sensi-
tive areas;
5. Verifying compliance or violations in regard to cease-fire or other
agreements;
6. Assisting in maintaining law and order;
7. Assisting local governments to restore normal order after fighting
has taken place; and
8. Providing humanitarian assistance to the local population.
Implicit in these functions is recognition that after severe fighting
many normal operations of an area will have broken down, such as police
coverage, emergency medical services, and communications. Several such
U.N. operations, both in Iraq and at its borders, provided such relief and
health care. Sadruddin Aga Khan, who carried out similar assignments in
Afghanistan, released reports based on field studies of the need in many
places for food, blankets, and medicine.17 These reports undoubtedly
played an important role in persuading the Security Council to authorize
limited Iraqi oil exports, under the Secretary-General's supervision, to fi-
nance such relief.
28
Security Council Resolution 687, adopted on April 9, 1991, mandated
the official cease-fire and also called for the establishment of the United
Nations Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM).29 On that same date
Javier P6rez de Cu6llar announced that 300 military observers and 680
soldiers had been deployed in the demilitarized zone between Iraq and
Kuwait to monitor military personnel withdrawals, equipment withdraw-
als and traffic. Additionally, the U.N. is also charged by Resolution 687
with overseeing the elimination of Iraq's chemical, biological, and nuclear
weapons."
IV. PEACE-MAKING FORCES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
Peace-Making refers to situations where armed conflict exists and
where the U.N. has been called in to mediate. Thus it differs from Peace-
Keeping, which applies to situations in which there exists a fragile peace,
truce, or cease-fire in effect." In actual practice the two functions may
27. See Patrick E. Tyler, Mounting Health Crisis Seen in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, June 3,
1991, at Al; see also Interview with Sadako Ogata, U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees,
in KAYHAN INT'L, reprinted in WORLD PREss REV., July 1991, at 11.
28. Security Council vote August 15, 1991. It is ironic that with all the additional de-
mands made upon the United Nations, and despite the vote by the U.S. Congress in 1990 to
begin annually paying 20 percent of the amount owed to the U.N. until it is paid off, as of
June 1991 no arrearage payments have been made. Thomas K. Hafen, U.N. Force Deployed
in Gulf, THE INTERDEPENDANT, June-July 1991, at 4-5.
29. U.N. SC Res. 687, reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 847 (1991).
30. U.N. SC Res. 687, supra note 29.
31. United Nations Association USA, United Nations Focus, Peace-Making, at 48-55
(1989).
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overlap and intermingle, as was apparent in Lebanon, Afghanistan, and
Syria-Israel. Peace-Making operations require a stronger need for protec-
tion since the risk is high of a sporadic attack on U.N. personnel. Peace-
Making armaments are inadequate for sustained defense; they are in-
tended only to provide temporary deterrence sufficient to impede an at-
tack until greater force arrives. "U.N. peace-keeping works through per-
suasion, moral force and diplomatic pressure, as opposed to military force
and coercion. '.2 "Alternatives to the use of force" does not completely
divorce the possible use of defensive force. Commitment to peaceful
methods simply reverses the conventional "fight first and talk later"
stance. However, two attributes provide an advantage to the U.N. forces:
impartiality and permanence. Javier P6rez de Cu6llar said in his Nobel
Peace Prize acceptance address:
The Secretary-General and his representatives may not be more tal-
ented than national diplomats, but they have the advantage that they
are independent of States. They are, consequently, more able to win
the confidence of parties to a conflict in the exercise of good offices.
Their permanence, however, is a distinct advantage in the case of pro-
tracted negotiations. Indeed, one reason we were able to seize as rap-
idly as we did the opportunity for peace, offered us by the changing
international climate, was because we had, for years, been maintaining
close contact with the parties involved and working tirelessly to bring
their views closer together.
3 3
Nambia's achievement of independence exemplifies this impartiality
and permanence. Resolution 435 of the Security Council in 1978 called for
free and fair elections to choose a Nambian constituent assembly. 4 For
ten years the Security Council and the Secretary-General diligently
worked, mainly behind the scenes, to secure these elections. In January
1989 the Security Council was able to put Resolution 435 into effect, end-
ing more than twenty years of warfare.3 " Six months later more than
6,000 people - military and civilian - from 109 nations were cooperat-
ing in the U.N. Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG). The military
component monitored the cease-fire and withdrawal, demobilization, and
assistance to the civilian component. This component had the responsi-
bility for preventing intimidation or interference with the election pro-
cess, and, if necessary, to ensure the good conduct of the territory's ex-
isting police forces, and to do so with scrupulous impartiality.
In 1987 the Secretary-General announced that all issues had been re-
solved in the U.N. plan, save one: South Africa's insistence that
Namibia's independence must be linked to Cuban withdrawal of forces
from Angola. In late 1988 a U.S. mediated accord was signed at the U.N.
32. Id. at 55.
33. Id.
34. U.N. SC Res. 435, reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1563 (1989).
35. See generally Reports, Documents on Peace in Southwestern Africa and Transi-
tion for Namibian Independence, 28 I.L.M. 944 (1989).
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by Angola, Cuba, and South Africa, implementing the U.N. plan for
Namibia's independence with a U.N. military observer mission and the
U.N. Angola Verification Mission (UNAVEM), to verify the redeploy-
ment and gradual withdrawal of Cuban troops from Angola.3 6 The words
of Theodore C. Sorensen appropriately highlight the magnitude of such a
victory:
The single greatest enemy of law is war ... War requires power; law
limits power. War feeds on emotion; law is based on reason. War justi-
fies emergency measures; law requires a long-range perspective. War
weakens law, distorts it, abuses it, overrides it, suspends it. War, I
repeat, is the single greatest enemy of law.37
The encouragement garnered from such words is necessary, for, as the
Secretary-General has said:
Our powers of destruction have increased to the point where it is
madness to use them. The necessity of the rule of law in our crowded,
interdependent planet is becoming increasingly evident. It is clear
that if we fail to act together on many matters we may lose the capac-
ity to act at all.38
V. THE COSTS OF THE GULF WAR
Examination of the Gulf War in terms of its costs and benefits pro-
vides a necessary background for consideration of the costs and benefits
of alternatives to force. The purpose of the following list is to give a broad
picture of the many forms of "cost" of the Gulf War. Data are not availa-
ble for a precise and complete accounting; some of the forms of value
destroyed are not quantifiable, yet their reality is palpable, and some of
the collateral effects are knowable only to a small extent.
A. Financial
The monetary cost might seem to be the easiest to calculate, but
there are many aspects which are inaccessible. The Pentagon announced
the total cost of $61 billion, which was higher than previously stated and
well beyond contributions from other nations. 9 This figure does not in-
clude the $9 billion debt forgiveness granted to Egypt (and similar gratui-
36. Id.
37. Theodore C. Sorensen, Law: The Most Powerful Alternative to War, 4 FORDHAM
INT'L L.J. 13, 15 (1980).
38. United Nations Focus, Peace-Making, supra note 31, at 55 (quoting the Secretary-
General's Nobel Peace Price acceptance address). The comment in the Stanley Foundation
report states, "[It] is not internationalism that is in crisis, but rather multilaterialism that is
in disarray." The United Nations and the Future of Internationalism, at 14 (1987). A prob-
lematic challenge not dealt with here is that most wars since World War II have been within
nations, not between two nations. The Gulf War was an exception, but while that was going
on there were twenty-eight other conflicts being fought within nation-states, not including
Yugoslavia.
39. Gulf War Price Tab Pegged at $61 Billion, L.A. Tisss, Nov. 8, 1991, at 15, col. 1.
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ties to other nations), the loss or abandonment of equipment, businesses
with losses either from disruption in the area or consequences in commu-
nities (airlines, restaurants, health services and other enterprises re-
stricted because were employees summoned to war), and in addition, the
general effect on the economy. The financial cost of the war cannot be
limited to the United States alone. For example, thousands of Filipino
workers were dismissed. Many women who were domestic workers were
not paid wages and, because of their gender, had no standing in either
Iraqi or Kuwaiti courts. The number of such workers from several third
world countries was very large and the money they sent home was impor-
tant to both their families and to their home countries' depressed econo-
mies. 40 Consequently, $61 billion only begins to address the full financial
cost.
B. Casualties
The U.S. and Allied Forces casualties were remarkably low, consider-
ing the intensity of their use of force. Thirty five of the 148 American
combat deaths,4 ' or 23%, were from friendly fire.2 A senior military offi-
cial stated that more than 100,000 Iraqi soldiers and more than 100,000
civilians died during the forty-three days of combat.' 3 Others place the
figures much higher.
Staggering casualties also occurred after the war. Estimates are ex-
ceedingly rough; perhaps 20,000 were killed in the Iraqi civil war and
somewhere between 2,000 and 5,000 Kuwaitis were killed during the occu-
pation by Iraq." The U.S. government has not released any official infor-
mation about Iraqi deaths, even though the Geneva Convention lists this
as a requirement after the conclusion of a war. We know even less about
the permanent injuries: blindness, insanity, loss of limbs, or to what ex-
tent children were the victims. Whatever the eventual totals, the deaths
and injuries were far from insignificant when thought of in human rather
than statistical terms, and in global rather than merely American terms.
C. Refugees
Again estimates vary, but roughly three million refugees fled into
Iran, one million into Jordan, and two million into or at the border of
Turkey. This does not include the displaced workers from the Philip-
pines, India, and Pakistan or the Palestinians and Iraqis fleeing from per-
secution in post-war Kuwait. Kuwait has been deporting 300 foreigners a
week as late as August, according to the Red Cross. Prior to the Gulf War
40. Innocent Lives in the Balance, ASIAWEEK, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REv., Nov.
1990, at 20.
41. Bill Gannon, Gulf War Tactics Being Scrutinized; High-Tech Weaponry Had
Flaws, THE GAzrrE, Sep. 21, 1991, at B6.
42. Id.
43. Steven Thomma, Knight-Ridder News Service, May 30, 1991.
44. Id.
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there were more than fifteen million refugees in the world, more than half
being in the Middle East and South Africa.4" This emphasizes the re-
gional impact of adding three to five million more refugees to what was
already a critical situation.
D. Environment and Resources
Reports on environmental damage have varied, depending on what
factors were measured, the extent of the survey, and who paid for the
study. It will probably be some time before effects on the flora and fauna
can be accurately determined. However, if environment refers to potable
water, acceptable air quality, unpolluted shores and cities with adequate
sewage, we do know that Iraq and Kuwait have suffered severe damage."'
Of course damage from oil slicks and smoke from the fires has been
widely publicized. These were the direct result of armed conflict. During
the months the sanctions were in effect there were no oil wells set on fire.
It was in January that Iraqi troops opened the pipes from the al-Ahamdi
terminal and dumped oil into the gulf. As was stated in one report:
At the same time, the Allied air campaign bombed tankers and refin-
eries, adding thousands of more barrels to the slick, which at one time
flowed south toward Saudi Arabia. Experts agree, however, that about
3.25 million barrels that were dumped into the gulf by Iraqi troops
and Allied air raids proved far easier to clean up than the Doomsday
estimates [released by Pentagon officials] of 12 million to 13 million
barrels. 7
A typical estimate is that eighty-five percent of Kuwait's wells were
set on fire by Iraqis on February 22, burning six billion barrels a day, a
terrible, unjustifiable and senseless act. Add to that the amount of fuel
consumed in the gigantic transport of troops and equipment and the
more than 100,000 sorties flown over Iraq.4s This was far and away the
largest consumption and loss of this non-renewable resource in a compa-
rable period in the history of the world. One major purpose of the war
was to protect Gulf oil reserves for the future. It must be conceded that
armed force failed to accomplish this effectively.
45. World Refugee Survey, 1989 World Refugee Statistics, at 30, 31 (U.S. Comm. for
Refugees, Washington, D.C., 1989). This does not include refugees who have resettled.
46. E.g. Patrick E. Tyler, U.S. Officials Believe Iraq Will Take Years to Rebuild, N.Y.
TimSs, June 3, 1991, at Al; Prof. Jassem Al-Hassan on the oil fires, Associated Press, August
13, 1991; Melinda Liu, Apocalypse Near, NEWSWEEK, Apr. 1, 1991, at 14-16.
47. Carol Rosenberg, report on the Gulf oil spill, Knight-Ridder News Service, Apr. 18,
1991.
48. Susanne M. Schafer, Air Force: War Against Iraq Decided Within Hours, Associ-
ated Press release, Mar. 18, 1991. As of February 4, there had been 44,000 sorties over Iraq,
one for every minute since the war began. It was later determined that 640 wells had been
set on fire.
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E. Other Costs
One could continue to summarize additional types of costs of the
Gulf War. Such a list would include: diversion from domestic issues; di-
version from global problems of hunger, oppression, conflict, and dis-
placed persons; intensification of ethnic prejudices (toward Kurds, Pales-
tinians, Shiites, and in the U.S. toward Arabs); destruction of the infra-
structure in Iraq; destabilization of governments; archeological damage;
and the deterioration of attitudes. The latter refers to attitudes of mind
and spirit; the cynacism which occurs (e.g., silent leges inter arma [laws
are silent in time of war] 9 and Aeschylus' time-honored statement, "In
war, truth is the first casualty").5
VI. POSITIVE RESULTS OF THE GULF WAR
It cannot be denied that there were positive results from the Gulf
war, the chief one being that the Iraqi army was driven out of Kuwait.
This, however, occurred at a terrible price - the destruction of Kuwait.
Part of this took place during Iraq's invasion and initial occupation, part
was intensified in response to the bombing which began January 16.
Many art treasures taken from Kuwait were returned, as was some of the
stolen gold." Some of these treasures, however, were deliberately de-
stroyed. However, if the war was primarily to oust Saddam, it did not
achieve its objective. The CIA's part in urging Kurdish revolt52 was based
on somewhat defective intelligence, if it was thought that such a revolt
would lead to Saddam's downfall. But the war did demonstrate the effec-
49. Cicero, For Milo iv.
50. There are several examples of this maxim. The soldier who claimed to have been
brutally tortured by his Iraq captors was featured repeatedly, but when it was revealed that
his facial bruises were the result of a plane accident and self-inflicted blows, coverage was
slight. See Michael Wines, After the War: P.O. W.'s; Ex-PO. W.'s Offer Accounts of Terror
and Torture in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. .15, 1991, at 1, col. 5. U.S. intelligence officers said
they found shipping documents in Arabic that showed the equipment was delivered after
the embargo took effect in August. Ten days after the war was over the State Department
released a brief which stated that no such documents were found. See Paul Bedard, U.S.
Probes Iraq's Rearming; Jordan Denies It Is Conduit, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1991, at Al.
Moreover, the President emphasized that the actions of the U.S. would be defensive and
that the sanctions would be given time. However, within four days he called for an "in-
terdiction" (blockade). False information was given out in connection with the tragic bomb-
ing of the air raid shelter February 13. See, e.g., John Barry, What Really Happened,
NEWSWEEK, Feb. 25, 1991, at 20. One might well say that such things are inevitable in war;
this is precisely the point. Deception is inextricably attached to war and it leads to a pro-
gressively easier public toleration of deception. Cf. Media Ethics Update, Spring 1991; Ved
P. Nanda, The Iran-Contra Affair - A Symptom of a Malady?, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 368-
370 (1989).
51. Walter Putnam, Kuwaitis to Visit Baghdad to Reclaim Art Treasures, Associated
Press, Aug. 12, 1991. Among the stolen materials was art worth at least $500 million and
forty tons of gold.
52. Tim Weiner, CIA Broadcasts Urged Kurds On, Knight-Ridder News Service, April
6, 1991.
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tiveness of the Patriot anti-missile missiles and the coordination of the
Allied troops. It also dispelled some false beliefs, i.e. that Arab soldiers
would never surrender to non-Arab forces." Another important conse-
quence was the condition that Iraq destroy its chemical weapons, biologi-
cal weapons, and nuclear materials and laboratories.
VII. NON-VIOLENT METHODS
Nonviolent methods of addressing conflict also have costs and limita-
tions. One major limitation is that such methods are slow to accomplish
their goals, and thus are politically difficult to sell. People like to see re-
sults. Political opponents often charge weakness and cowardice, insisting
that such methods do not work. Nonviolent methods do not have dra-
matic appeal suitable for headlines and televised excitement. This disad-
vantage is not minor, for effective social procedures must have public
support. Hate can be aroused by shouting a few words and waving a
bloody shirt. Understanding requires pedestrian explanation, patience,
and long-term dedication. That sanctions can achieve remarkable trans-
formations under the most difficult circumstances is illustrated by South
Africa; however, that has taken many years."
A second limitation is that results are not guaranteed. That is true of
all methods for promoting public policy, but somehow people expect one
hundred percent results from pacific procedures. They do not however,
make the same connection between force and its failures. Before the Gulf
crisis, 435,000 U.S. troops were stationed at 395 major military bases in
thirty-five foreign countries, with another 47,000 naval and marine corps
personnel aboard ships in foreign waters. During the 1980s the U.S. spent
$160 billion or more every year to defend Western Europe, $30 to $40
billion to defend parts of Asia, and $20 to $40 billion to protect U.S. ac-
cess to Persian Gulf oil.5 5 It can hardly be argued that these investments
have prevented problems and failures. However, few ask, "How did $300
billion spent in ten years to protect Persian Gulf oil prevent the invasion
of Kuwait or its loss of oil," or, "How did $350 billion bring stability to
the Philippines or human rights to Pakistan?"
At the same time, educated people can be entirely ignorant of the
accomplishments of the United Nations while complaining about its inef-
fectiveness. Obviously the task of educating the public on these matters
has been neglected. But as Pierre Elliott Trudeau has said, "Government
leaders everywhere are very much involved in the politics of war; they are
53. Russel Watson, After the Storm, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 11, 1991, at 28.
54. See Ved P. Nanda, The Case for Comprehensive Multilateral Sanctions Against
South Africa-A Legal Framework, in EFFECTIVE SANCTIONS ON SoUTH AFRICA (G. Shepherd
ed.) (1989); Lindiwe Mkhondo, South African Apartheid - One Conflict That's Being Re-
solved, WORLD WISE, July 1991; Ved P. Nanda, When Do Sanctions Work?, DENVER POST,
July 28, 1991.
55." See generally 21 DEF. MONITOR, No. 1 (1991).
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not very much involved in the politics of peace." ' Yet, the facts are not
difficult to comprehend. Secretary-General Perez de Cu~llar pointed out
that the 1989 price of U.N. peace-keeping was $1.5 billion, almost exactly
one percent of the world's official arms exports for 1987, $164 billion.5 7
A third limitation is that sanctions make life more difficult for the
populace, especially the poor. The rulers and the privileged manage very
well. Oddly enough, the ordinary people understand this and take the
hardships very well. Their anger turns toward their rulers who have
brought these hardships to pass. This contrasts with those who have in-
stead suffered a forceful attack. Their anger and fear turn upon those
who attack them, not their rulers. It was the Blacks in South Africa who
wanted the sanctions to continue.58 In World War I, production of war
material actually increased in Hamburg as a result of the devastating
bombing." It is strange to hear those who express great sympathy for the
populace enduring the hardships of sanctions dismiss the tragedies and
terrors visited upon them by round-the-clock bombing.
Sanctions also penalize businesses stationed in the quarantined area.
This provides a major reason for the political opposition to sanctions in
South Africa as well as Iraq. The utilization of weaponry and its support
brings profit to selected industries and prestige to the military; nonvio-
lent methods do not. Of course the government acquires debt in the for-
mer and the national economy is far better off when nonviolent proce-
dures are followed, but that is politically difficult to sell compared with
immediate and visible profit, which is why Heilbroner calls this arrange-
ment "military socialism."60
A fourth limitation of economic and diplomatic measures is that they
require restraint despite intensified public passions. Kuwait was ravaged,
held hostage, and was vulnerable. Such a situation calls for delicacy, skill,
and shrewdness, not bombast and rash threats. But the most vocal part of
the public clamors for violent and rash actions. Some hostages may be
killed regardless of the type of response undertaken. However, hostages
may not appreciate a frontal attack to rescue them if the collateral effect
is to increase the possibility of torture and death. If the Gulf War was for
Emir Shaikh Jabir al-Ahmad al-Jabir as-Sabah and members of the
Sabah family, such costs were inconsequential. If it was for the Kuwaitis
who stuck it out - the people themselves, including the 61% of the resi-
dents who were not Kuwaitis - then there is yet some accounting to be
56. Trudeau, The Nuclear Imperative, reprinted in WORLD PRESS REV., Jan. 1985, at
27.
57. UNA Peace-Keeping, supra note 23, at 47.
58. President Bush lifted U.S. sanctions against South Africa July 10 1991, but the
African National Congress and others opposed this. See Christopher S. Wren, DeKierk's
Victory: Without Resolving the Issue of Power, Pretoria Regains World Acceptance, N.Y.
TIMES, July 11, 1991, at A10.
59. JOHN KENNETH GALERAITH, THE AFFLUENT SOCIETY 161-63, and 132 (1958).
60. ROBERT L. HEILBRONER, AN INQUIRY INTO THE HUMAN PROSPECT 39 (1974).
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done.
VIII. CONCLUSION
I have stressed the political difficulties in mustering support for non-
violent social and international policies, because I believe that they are
the greatest barrier for such mature and effective measures, exacerbated
by the temptation for politicians to appeal to the violent and dramatic.
When the fighting ends, you still have to turn to negotiation to deal with
the settlement.
It is instructive to examine the news reports over the past few years
to see how frequently our government has publicly cautioned other states
to avoid bloodshed and violence, appealing for calmness and reason, at
the same time that we were using force and threat of force in our per-
ceived national interest. Our leaders understand perfectly well that to ne-
gotiate with your enemy is not a sign of weakness or cowardice, but of
wisdom and maturity - when it comes to other nations. We recom-
mended this policy to the Soviets with regard to the Balkan states, to
China in dealing with the dissidents in Cambodia, and many other places.
The U.S. has proclaimed the effectiveness of sanctions against Nicaragua,
Cuba, the U.S.S.R., Libya, Zimbabwe, Panama, while claiming that sanc-
tions do not work when it comes to China, South Africa, El Salvador, and
Iraq.
In the late fall of 1990, almost every day some high government offi-
cial announced that sanctions were ineffective and would never work in
Iraq. However, in December, CIA Director, William Webster testified
before the House Armed Services Committee that sanctions were having
a powerful effect in Iraq. Iraq was running out of cash, faced shortages of
basic foodstuffs, its tanks would gradually become inoperable, and its air
force would be able to maintain current operations for only three to six
months.6 Presumably, due to his intelligence resources, he was in a bet-
ter position than anyone else to report on this. Ironically, on the same
day as Webster's testimony, the Secretary of State was urging the Senate
to threaten war because the sanctions were a failure. Webster was not
heard from in public until January when he revised his story, saying that
although sanctions would adversely affect the Iraqi Air Force, "The Iraqi
Air Force is not likely to play a major role in any battle for Kuwait."62
Verbal violence between states and leaders, such as President Bush
and Saddam Hussein, often muddles rational reasoning. A tragic example
occurred at the CIA's urging the Kurds to overthrow Saddam, as a result
of a secret order by Bush for the CIA to transmit Kurdish language radio
broadcasts into Iraq, and for tactical intelligence to be given to Kurdish
61. Lars-Erik Nelson, CIA Chief Did a Flip on Gulf War, N.Y. DAILY NEWS, January
15, 1991.
62. Id. Webster resigned May 8, 1991.
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rebels in Turkey. 3 The civil war which followed the armistice was a
bloodbath. Deaths from attacks by Iraqi Hind helicopters were matched
by refugees dying from disease and starvation. The U.N. team reported
2,000 dying each day in May; a State Department official said it was
3,000; a Harvard team said as many as 170,000 Iraqis could die by the end
of summer.6 4
Another example of being deluded by rhetoric is seen in the cliches
which become common when public passions are inflamed; for example,
"we have to teach him a lesson, or there will be other tyrants." As for this
cliche, which I call the "Didactic Theory of War," if war "teaches" so
well, how is it that the bombing of Tripoli did not deter the coup attempt
in Grenada in 1983, and why did not the Grenada action prevent
Noriega's theft of the Panamanian election in 1989, and why did not the
Panama invasion prevent Saddam Hussein's aggression in Kuwait in
1990?
A final example of the double-standard is the propensity to judge
failures in the use of force and/or technology by one set of criteria and to
judge failures in programs of constructive human relations or social prob-
lem-solving by entirely different criteria. However, when there is a failure
or a disappointment in a program which is nonviolent and socially con-
structive in its purpose, all too often the response is, "Well, that goes to
show that things like that do not work." Thus any failure or delay in
effect of sanctions against Iraq was met with rejection of all economic and
diplomatic means for coping with the problem.
There are times in life when destructive force must be used. But this
should be a last resort in international relations, and if we are ever to
have a livable world it is imperative that we learn better ways to use al-
ternatives to force.
63. See generally Weiner, supra note 52.
64. Knight-Ridder News Service, May 30, 1991.
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Draft Indictment of Saddam Hussein*
AD HOC UNITED NATIONS CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL, PLAINTIFFS
V.
SADDAM HUSSEIN AND THE MILITARY, POLITICAL AND
ECONOMIC ADVISORS OF IRAQ, DEFENDANTS.
Under the authority of the United Nations General Assembly/Secur-
ity Council, through Articles 10, 11, 20 and 29 of the United Nations
Charter authorizing creation of subsidiary organs, an Ad Hoc United Na-
tions Criminal Tribunal is hereby created. This tribunal has jurisdiction
to hear all claims, render judgment and impose any justified punishment
against Saddam Hussein, his political, military and economic advisors,
and other unnamed Defendants. These criminal charges stem from the
invasion and occupation of Kuwait by the forces of Iraq under the direc-
tion of Saddam Hussein and the other Defendants beginning on or
around August 2, 1990.
COUNT ONE - CRIMES AGAINST PEACE
That the Defendants, Saddam Hussein and his political, military and
economic advisors, and other unnamed Defendants did commit crimes
against peace by planning, preparing, initiating and prosecuting a war of
aggression that culminated on or about August 2, 1990 with the invasion
of Kuwait in violation of international treaties, agreements and assur-
ances, to wit:
CHARGE I:
That in violation of Chapter I, article 2, sections (1) and (4) of the
United Nations Charter, of which Iraq is a signatory, Saddam Hussein
and the other Iraqi Defendants, through their army, did violate the sover-
eignty, territorial integrity and political independence of Kuwait, an inde-
pendent nation state and signatory of said Charter, in contravention of
Iraq's international duties and obligations.
CHARGE II:
That in violation of the General Treaty for Renunciation of War as
an Instrument of National Policy of August 27, 1928, 46 Stat. 2343, 94
L.N.T.S. 59 (1929), the Defendants resorted to a war of aggression as an
instrument of Iraqi national policy to solve an international dispute by
invading and occupying the sovereign State of Kuwait.
* This draft indictment was submitted by the Commission for International Due
Process of Law to the Secretary-General of the United Nations in October 1990.
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CHARGE III:
That in violation of the customary international law principle prohib-
iting the use of force (Nicaragua v. United States of America, [1986]
I.C.J. Rep. 14, 192), Iraq engaged in this war of aggression against
Kuwait.
CHARGE IV:
That in violation of Article 25 of the U.N. Charter, the Defendants
refused to accept and carry out the twelve specific resolutions adopted by
the U.N. Security Council ordering them, inter alia, to withdraw Iraqi
forces from Kuwait and to permit the restoration of Kuwait's lawful
government.
COUNT Two - WAR CRIMES
CHARGE I:
That the Defendants, Saddam Hussein and his military, political and
economic advisors and other unnamed Defendants, did commit violations,
see Amnesty International, Iraq/Occupied Kuwait - Human Rights Vio-
lations Since August 2, 1990, MDE 14/16/90, December 1990, of the laws
of war contained in the Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3365, to
which Iraq acceded on February 14, 1956, and of customary laws of war,
by carrying out the invasion and subsequent occupation of Kuwait, to wit:
SPECIFICATION 1: In violation of Part III, Section 1, of this Conven-
tion, the Defendants did by and through the military forces of Iraq en-
gage in the murder, torture, mutilation and cruel treatment of the people
of Kuwait and nationals of other countries in that the forces under the
command of the Defendants committed numerous execution-type
murders of civilians without previous judgment being pronounced by a
legally constituted court, and without affording all the judicial guarantees
recognized as indispensable.
The Iraqis also engaged in the use of torture against innocent men,
women and children, such as unprovoked severe beatings, including use of
fists, belts, hot metal rods, hot skewers, kickings, the application of elec-
tric current, burning, pouring acid on them, urinating and defecating
upon them.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that, in violation of Article 18 and Article 56 of
this Convention, the Defendants failed to respect and protect civilian
hospitals organized to give care to the wounded, sick, and infirm and for
maternity care. That, in fact, these facilities were ransacked, stripped of
their equipment, and the patients of these facilities were left to die for
lack of treatment.
SPECIFICATION 3: In that, in violation of Article 20 of this Convention,
the Defendants failed to respect and protect persons regularly engaged in
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the operation and administration of civilian hospitals, including personnel
engaged in the search for, removal, transport and care of wounded and
sick civilians, the infirm and maternity cases. A number of female nurses
were abducted and raped, and a number of male doctors and assistants
were shot for attempting to alleviate the suffering of the sick or injured.
SPECIFICATION 4: In that, in violation of Article 25 of this Convention,
the Defendants prohibited correspondence and exchange of news between
persons in Kuwait and persons outside of Kuwait.
SPECIFICATION 5: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 27 of
this Convention, violated the rights of all protected persons with respect
to their persons, their- honor, their family rights, their religious convic-
tions and practices, and their manners and customs. The Defendants
failed to protect them from acts of violence or threats thereof. Women
were raped and subjected to forms of indecent sexual assault prohibited
under this Article. Religious figures were subjected to torture, including
having the hair of their beards pulled out.
SPECIFICATION 6: In that, in violation of Article 28 of this Convention,
the Defendants used protected persons to shield certain military objec-
tives by holding at least 83 hostages at strategic and military targets.
SPECIFICATION 7: In that, in violation of Article 31 of this Convention,
the Defendants exercised physical and moral coercion against protected
persons to obtain information from them, by shooting or raping family
members before their eyes and engaging in other forms of physical
torture.
SPECIFICATION 8: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 33 of
this Convention, engaged in numerous forms of collective punishment,
such as razing homes in neighborhoods where resistance was suspected
and generally pillaging the country of almost everything of value.
SPECIFICATION 9: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 33 of
this Convention, refused to allow thousands of persons to leave Iraq of
their own free will, and denied those persons any legal process. This of-
fense includes forbidding Western hostages to leave Iraq, closing the bor-
der with Jordan, and forbidding Arabs whose governments sided with the
coalition from leaving Iraq.
SPECIFICATION 10: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 53
of this Convention, destroyed the real and personal property of protected
persons and the State of Kuwait; this destruction was not absolutely nec-
essary to military operations and occurred for the most part after military
operations had ceased.
SPECIFICATION 11: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 55
of this Convention, failed to ensure that food and medical supplies were
available to the population of occupied Kuwait. The defendants requisi-
tioned food and medical supplies without considering the needs of the
population of occupied Kuwait or paying fair value for these requisitions.
SPECIFICATION 12: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 57
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of this Convention, unnecessarily requisitioned the hospitals of occupied
Kuwait to care for Iraqi military casualties, without consideration for the
needs of the Kuwaiti population.
SPECIFICATION 13: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 59
of this Convention, failed to allow relief to the inadequately supplied
population of occupied Kuwait, despite offers by the International Com-
mittee of the Red Cross and the Red Crescent Societies to send consign-
ments of food and medical supplies. And that these consignments were
intercepted at the Kuwait border by Iraqi Armed Forces.
SPECIFICATION 14: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 62
of this Convention, failed to allow protected persons in occupied Kuwait
to receive any consignments of aid sent to them individually.
SPECIFICATION 15: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 63
of this Convention, prohibited internationally recognized Red Cross Soci-
eties, such as the Red Crescent, from fulfilling their missions as defined
by the International Red Cross Conferences. No other humanitarian or-
ganization operating under similar principles was allowed to ensure the
living conditions, public services or distribution of relief to the population
of occupied Kuwait.
SPECIFICATION 16: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Section V
of this Convention in its entirety, refused to establish any information
bureau to allow communication with any internees or to report any vital
information to the next of kin or protecting party of protected persons in
occupied Kuwait.
CHARGE II:
That the Defendants, Saddam Hussein and his military and eco-
nomic advisors and other unnamed Defendants, did commit violations of
the laws of war as contained in the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, T.I.A.S. 3363, which
was acceded to by the State of Iraq on February 14, 1956, and of custom-
ary laws of war, in carrying out the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, to
wit:
SPECIFICATION 1: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 17 of
this Convention, used physical and mental torture to coerce prisoners of
war to reveal information other than as permitted under this Convention.
Troops of the coalition taken as prisoners of war by the Defendants were
displayed on Iraqi national television with varying degrees of injuries.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 19 of
this Convention, prohibited prisoners of war from being evacuated to safe
camps away from the combat zone, and instead moved them to military
sites likely to be targeted by the coalition forces.
SPECIFICATION 3: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Article 23 of
this Convention, detained prisoners of war in areas where their presence
was intended to render certain points or areas immune. According to the
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Iraqi Ministry of Industry, one prisoner of war was killed in one of these
areas. The Defendants also failed to provide any information regarding
the location of Prisoner of War Camps as required by this Convention.
SPECIFICATION 4: In that, in violation of Part III, Section V, Articles
69 through 77 of this Convention, no contact with the outside world has
been allowed to the prisoners of war taken by Iraq. This includes failure
to provide the required notice of capture, failure to allow into Iraq any
relief shipments for prisoners, and failure to establish any facilities to
provide for the transfer of this information.
SPECIFICATION 5: In that, the Defendants, in violation of Part V of
this Convention, made no attempt to establish an information bureau to
provide information as to the status and health of prisoners of war, nor
was any provision made for representatives of relief societies to visit pris-
oners of war or provide for the relief of these prisoners.
CHARGE III:
That since the invasion and occupation of Kuwait, in violation of Ar-
ticles 22, 23(e) and (g) and 25 of the Hague Convention (No. IV. of Oct.
18, 1907) Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat.
2277; the Defendants launched surface to surface missiles at populated
cities in Israel and Saudi Arabia only for the purpose of instilling terror.
The bombardment of these cities served no military purpose and consti-
tuted wilful and wanton destruction of civilian populations.
CHARGE IV:
That in violation of customary international law principles dating
back to the Hague Convention of 1907, the Defendants, who are subject
to the application of customary laws of war, are guilty of war crimes.
CHARGE V:
That in violation of the Convention on the Prohibition of Military or
Any Other Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques of
May 18, 1977, 31 U.S.T. 333, T.I.A.S. No 9614, which Iraq signed on Au-
gust 15, 1977, the Defendants deliberately released millions of gallons of
crude oil into the Persian Gulf for the express purpose of gaining military
advantage while creating effects extremely harmful to human welfare.
COUNT THREE - CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY
CHARGE I:
That the Defendants, Saddam Hussein and his military and eco-
nomic advisors and other unnamed Defendants, did, through the Iraqi
armed forces, commit crimes against humanity, see Amnesty Interna-
tional, supra, namely "deportation and other -inhuman acts committed
against any civilian population before and during" war, as specified in the
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Charter of the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, by murder-
ing, deporting, torturing and otherwise inhumanely treating the civilian
population of Kuwait as well as other nationals during the invasion of
Kuwait and the subsequent war to liberate Kuwait. In addition, these
crimes violate other norms of international law to which Iraq is bound,
including the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Pris-
oners of War, T.I.A.S. 3364, the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, T.I.A.S. 3364, both of
which Iraq acceded to in 1956, the Convention Against Torture and Other
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment of Dec. 10, 1984,
entered into force June 26, 1987, U.N. Doc. A/Res./39/46 (1984), which
has already become an accepted norm under principles of customary in-
ternational law; and the International Convention Against the Taking of
Hostages, U.N. Doc. A/RES/34/146 of Dec. 17, 1979, to wit:
SPECIFICATION 1: In that the Defendants committed the calculated
murder, through the use of extrajudicial executions, of hundreds of
Kuwaiti civilians and former military personnel as well as other nationals,
including Egyptians, Iranians, Pakistanis, British and possibly others.
These executions were outside the context of armed conflict, and the vic-
tims were unarmed at the time of their deaths. These killings were
targeted at specific individuals.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that, the Defendants did commit systematic tor-
ture and numerous inhuman acts against the people of Kuwait and other
foreign nationals, sometimes during and after weeks of detention. Torture
included beatings, the use of fists, belts, hot metal rods, and hot skewers,
kickings, burning of the skin with fire and acid, sexual torture, mock exe-
cution, electric shocks, falaqua (beatings on the soles of the feet), close
range shootings, knife slashes, exposure to extreme hot and cold for ex-
tended periods, suspension from electric fans, placing of heavy weights on
the body, pulling out fingernails and body hair, and forcing victims to
watch relatives being tortured. During torture, the suffering of the detain-
ees was compounded by their deprivation of medical treatment while in
custody and, following their release, by the almost total absence of medi-
cal facilities.
SPECIFICATION 3: In that, the Defendants placed foreign civilians at
and near military installations in Iraq and Kuwait for use as "human
shields" against possible attack by the coalition forces.
SPECIFICATION 4: In that during the war launched by coalition forces
to secure Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait, the Defendants caused opposing
force's prisoners of war to be subjected to inhuman and illegal treatment,
including beatings, placement at or near potential coalition targets, and
coercion to extract statements favorable to Iraq.
CHARGE II:
That the Defendants, by and through the Iraqi armed forces, violated
international law as specified in the 1945 Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, 58 Stat. 1544, the 1946 Judgment of the International
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Military Tribunal, Nuremberg, 2 Germany (see, e.g., 22 I.M.T. Trial of
the Major War Criminals 411 (1948)), the Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, T.I.A.S. 3365, and
other recognized legal norms, by committing crimes against humanity
under the category "persecutions on political" or other grounds, to wit:
SPECIFICATION 1: In that the Defendants committed numerous
murders against the civilian population of Kuwait on political and other
grounds.
SPECIFICATION 2: In that the Defendants committed torture against
the civilian population of Kuwait and other foreign nationals as enumer-
ated in Charge I, Specification 2 of this Count, on political grounds.
SPECIFICATION 3: In that the Defendants, in violation of Article 22 of
the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of 1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95,
entered into force April 24, 1964, violated the premises of numerous dip-
lomatic missions within Kuwait; in violation of Article 26 of this Conven-
tion, the Defendants unlawfully restricted the freedom of movement and
travel of diplomatic agents within the territory of Kuwait; and in viola-
tion of Article 30 of this Convention, the Defendants unlawfully violated
the private residences of diplomatic agents within the territory of Kuwait.
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INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL
MARKETS SECTION
Securities Regulation in the European
Community
SAMUEL WOLFF*
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Overview
The European Economic Community ("EEC" or "Community") has
relentlessly pursued its objective of creating a single European market by
1992. In 1989 and 1990 the EEC worked vigorously in the area of securi-
ties regulation and financial services, adopting directives governing pro-
spectuses, banking and insider trading, and proposing directives regard-
ing investment services, capital adequacy and takeovers. The prospectus
directive1 will allow certain issuers from member states to make public
offerings throughout the Community using a common prospectus. The
banking directive will allow a bank to provide a variety of banking ser-
vices, including investment banking services, if authorized by its home
state, throughout the Community on the basis of a single license. The
investment services directive, if adopted as proposed, similarly will allow
investment firms to operate throughout the EEC with a single license.
These licenses will allow banks and investment firms to tap potential
markets of 320 million customers.2 The banking and investment services
* Special Counsel for Holme, Roberts & Owen, Denver, Colorado. Formerly, Deputy
Chief, Office of International Corporate Finance, Securities and Exchange Commission. The
author appreciates the contributions of Harold S. Bloomenthal to this article. This article
previously appeared in Emergin Trends in Securities Law (Clark Boardman Callaghan,
1991).
1. Council Directive of 17 April 1989 Coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing-
Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Prospectus to be Published When Transferable Securi-
ties are Offered to the Public, art. 21(1), 1989; see infra § 10.02[2] [hereinafter Prospectus
Directive].
2. Note, The European Community's Second Banking Directive: Can Antiquated
United States Legislation Keep Pace?, 23 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 615, 624 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter EC Banking Directive].
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directives address the status of entities from non-EEC countries, and
firms from non-member countries need to be sensitive to the institutional
arrangements that will be necessary to compete in this market. The issue
for the 1990's is not whether the EEC will have an impact on the interna-
tional capital markets; the issue is simply the magnitude of the impact.
The EEC at present is the most active and influential organization in
the nascent field of international securities regulation. It has been called
"the world's primary actor in accomplishing regulatory harmony in the
field of securities regulation."' The Community has established "the
world's only multinational securities regime"4 and has demonstrated that
"substantial regulatory harmony can be achieved in the field of securities
regulation."' Although, even aside from the EEC, the internationalization
of securities regulation is underway,' with a number of organizations par-
ticipating in the process,7 "the [EEC] has become the major force for
global regulatory harmony." 8 "No other bilateral or multilateral interna-
tional accords have approached this degrdee of success."9 Although the
SEC's multijurisdictional disclosure system 0 has the potential to rival the
EEC system, it remains to be seen whether it will transcend its present
North American boundaries.
The prospectus directive referred to above, which the EEC adopted
in April 1989,11 mandates imposition of a prospectus requirement for all
transferable securities publicly offered within a member state that are not
already listed on an exchange within such state, absent an exemption.
The impact of the directive is reduced by the exemption for Eurosecuri-
ties which are not the "subject of a generalized campaign of advertising or
canvassing." 2 A mutual recognition provision of this directive establishes
significant privileges for issuers: where public offerings are made within
short intervals of each other in two or more member states, a prospectus
3. Warren, Global Harmonization of Securities Laws: The Achievements of the Euro-
pean Communities, 31 HARV. INT'L L.J. 185, 193 (1990) [hereinafter Global Harmonization].
4. Id.
5. Warren, Regulatory Harmony in the European Communities: The Common Mar-
ket Prospectus, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 19, 53 (1990) [hereinafter Regulatory Harmony].
6. E.g., Hawes, Internationalization Spreads to Securities Regulators, 9 U. PA. J.
INT'L Bus. L. 257, 262 (1987).
7. E.g., the International Organization of Securities Commissions and Similar Organi-
zations, International Accounting Standards Committee, International Auditing Practices
Committee of the International Federation of Accountants, Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development, U.N. Commission on Transnational Corporations, International
Federation of Stock Exchanges, Group of Thirty, Federation Experts Comptables
Europeens, Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on International Standards of Ac-
counting and Auditing, International Councils of Securities Dealers and Self-Regulatory Or-
ganizations, and International Society of Securities Administrators.
8. Regulatory Harmony, supra note 5, at 53.
9. Id. at 52-53.
10. See Multijurisdictional Disclosure System, Sec. Act Release No. 6902 (June 21,
1991) [Current Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 84,812.
11. See Prospectus Directive, supra note 1.
12. Prospectus Directive, supra note 1, art. 2, sec. 2(l), and art. 3, sec. (M.
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prepared and approved in accordance with the prospectus and listing par-
ticulars directives must be recognized and accepted in all member states.
The 1989 prospectus directive and a separate mutual recognition directive
adopted in 1990 continue to integrate the listing and public offering
processes in the Community by allowing a company to use listing particu-
lars and prospectuses almost interchangeably.
The Community has also been extremely active in the past several
years in the banking field, adopting three important directives in 1989:
the Second Banking Directive, and two directives relating to capital and
solvency requirements for banks. In 1990 the EEC released a proposal for
the supervision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis. The Second
Banking Directive will establish a single banking license applicable
throughout the Community for the provision of banking services author-
ized by the home state. Banks authorized in their home state also will be
able to provide investment banking services on a community-wide basis
pursuant to the single license. This is expected eventually to lead to wider
acceptance of "universal banking" (provision of both commercial and in-
vestment banking services) throughout the Community. The Second
Banking Directive permits entities from non-member states to operate in
the EEC through subsidiaries, but establishes a procedure under which
they may be excluded if EEC banks experience difficulty in accessing the
markets of such non-member countries. The Second Banking Directive
contains an important grandfathering provision for previously established
institutions. "For non-EC financial institutions, one thing is clear: ignor-
ing developments in Europe and their strategic implications could result
in exclusion from the world's largest single banking market."'"
In February 1990 the EEC released an amended proposal for a direc-
tive on investment services. In general, this directive would provide for a
home state license that would allow investment firms to provide in any
member state the investment services that are authorized by the home
state. As of early 1991 the member states were deadlocked over an
amendment to the proposed directive that would restrict off-exchange
and off-market trading activities by investment firms. In April 1990 the
EEC released a separate proposal for a Council directive on the capital
adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions. This directive also
has been controversial as many participants are concerned that high capi-
tal requirements may drive business away from the Community." The
EEC adopted a directive on insider trading in 1989 and proposed an
amended directive on takeovers in 1990.
13. BATT, MIDDLETON AND ZENIC, 1992 AND BANKING INSTITUTIONS: MARKETS, MERGERS,
MARGINS, EUROPE-1992: THE REPORT ON THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 316 (1989).
14. Barchard, et al., Bank Opposes Brussels Capital Directive, FIN. TIMES Feb. 5, 1990,
at 53.
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B. Introduction to the Community
The European Economic Community is one of the three "communi-
ties" constituting the "European Communities, '15 which are often re-
ferred to as the "European Community" ("EC"). Six countries founded
the EEC by the Treaty of Rome in 1957,16 and since that time six others
have acceded to the treaty. The current members of the EEC are
Belgium, Germany, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Den-
mark, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Greece, Spain and Portugal.1" The
Treaty of Rome requires, among many other provisions, that member
states "progressively abolish" restrictions on the movement of capital and
the freedom to provide services within the community. '8
The EEC is a supranational organization,1 9 its activities and relations
governed by a system of "Community law." 0 The jurisprudence of the
Court of Justice of the European Community has defined two principles
that serve as the foundation of the EEC's legal system.2 1 First, the Court
has held that EEC law, within its sphere of applicability, takes prece-
dence over national law.22 Second, the Court has held that individuals
have the right to invoke EEC law directly in their own national courts,
15. The other two communities are the European Coal and Steel Community and the
European Atomic Energy Community. The three communities "are, for practical purposes
one Community," and are often referred to as such, since they have common decision-mak-
ing bodies. ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT, EUROPEAN TRENDS 1989-1990 15 (1990) [hereinaf-
ter EUROPEAN TRENDS].
16. Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, done at Rofie, March 25,
1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11 (hereinafter Treaty of Rome).
17. EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE INSTI-
TUTIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3 (1990) (hereinafter EC INSTITUTIONS). These 'coun-
tries are hereinafter referred to as the "member states." West Germany was one of the
founding members of the EEC. East Germany became a member of the EEC not by acces-
sion but by reunifying with West Germany. A Bigger Germany, A Bigger Community, THE
ECONOMIST, Aug. 25, 1990, at 41. Turkey, Austria, Cyprus and Malta have applied for EEC
membership, but the Community has indicated it will not accept any new members until
1993 at the earliest. The Makings of a New Constellation, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 4, 1990, at
41. It is anticipated that Sweden may apply for membership, and if so Finland is likely to
follow. Id.
18. Treaty of Rome, supra note 2, arts. 67, 59.
19. Reynolds, Introduction to the European Economic Community: Its History and Its
Institutions, 8 LEGAL REFERENCE SFVICES QUARTERLY 7, 11 (1988). "The twelve Member
States have done much more than allocate mutual obligations; they have created a suprana-
tional authority." Id. at 12.
20. "When we speak of Community law, we mean neither international nor national
law, but an actual and unique 'droite communautaire.'" Id.
21. Thieffry, Van Doom and Lowe, The Single European Market: A Practitioner's
Guide to 1992, 12 B.C. INT'L & CoMP. L. REV. 357, 359 (1989) [hereinafter Thieffry].
22. Id. "The supremacy of EC law over the national laws of the member states is well
established." Global Harmonization, supra note 3, at 213, n. 171 citing T. HARTLEY, THE
FOUNDATIONS OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY LAW (1988); Review of the European Economic
Community Council and Commission: Securities Regulation, Franchising Agreements, and
Knowhow Licensing, 1 TRANSNAT'L L. 281 (1988).
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which gives EEC law a supra-national character."
In 1985 the European Commission presented a "White Paper" out-
lining a program for removing all "physical, technical and fiscal barriers
between EC countries by the end of 1992 . . .""' The White Paper dis-
cussed, among other things, the remaining steps in the area of capital
movements and financial services in order to create a "European financial
common market." 5 The White Paper contained about 300 items of EC
legislation necessary to complete the internal market.2 6 In 1986, the mem-
ber states entered into a new treaty, "clumsily titled the 'Single European
Act,' ,,27 that amended the Treaty of Rome." The Single European Act is
of critical importance to the development of the common market because,
inter alia, it eliminates the requirement of unanimous voting for most
directives.2 9 Formerly, the adoption of all directives required a unanimous
vote of the Council.3 0 The Single European Act substituted "qualified ma-
jority voting" for unanimity in the case of all Council votes on directives
that have as their purpose the establishment of the internal market, with
several exceptions."1 In addition, the Single European Act in general
changed the EC's approach from strict harmonization to common mini-
mum standards subject to mutual recognition.3 2 "As a result, the EC's
1992 program has enjoyed remarkable success, and most observers are op-
timistic that its goals will be achieved.""
The four principal institutions of the European Communities are the
European Parliament ("Parliament"), the Council of Ministers ("Coun-
cil"), the European Commission ("Commission") and the Court of Jus-
tice. 4 The Parliament consists of over 500 delegates elected by universal
suffrage in the member states." The organization does not actually enact
legislation although it does participate in the legislative process in various
ways. 6 Parliament adopts the EC budget and has supervisory responsibil-
23. Thieffry, supra note 21, at 359.
24. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL COMMON MARKET 18 (1989). See
Completing the Internal Market, White Paper from the Commission to the European Coun-
cil (COM No. 85) 310 (June 14, 1985).
25. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL COMMON MARKET 18 (1989).
26. Appel, EEC-1992 and the Securities Industry, 23 REV. SEC. & COMM. REG. April 11,
1990, at 67.
27. Reynolds, supra note 19, at 16.
28. Single European Act of 17 February 1986, 1987 O.J. (L 169) 1, 3 Common Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) V 21,000. The Single European Act is not a legislative act but rather an amend-
ment to a treaty.
29. EC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 7; EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN Fi-
NANCIAL COMMON MARKET (1989); Regulatory Harmony, supra note 5, at 24.
30. EUROPEAN TRENDS, supra note 15, at 21.
31. Id. at 13. At present, there are 76 votes in the Council, 54 of which constitute a
"qualified majority." Appel, supra note 26, at 68, n. 6.
32. Regulatory Harmony, supra note 5, at 24.
33. Id. at 24-25.
34. EC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17.
35. Id. at 3; Reynolds, supra note 19, at 18.
36. Reynolds, supra note 19, at 18. The Parliament is the only body directly responsi-
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ity over the Commission.3 7 The Council, the principal decision-making
body of the EC, consists of ministers from each member state.3 8 The
Council may only consider legislative proposals which the Commission
presents," must consult with the Parliament and is subject to review by
the Court of Justice.4 The Commission is composed of members, at least
one from each state, appointed by mutual agreement of member states."
The members of the Commission "may not receive instructions from any
national government and are subject to the supervision of the European
Parliament which is the only body that can force them collectively to re-
sign." '42 The Commission proposes legislation to the Council,' imple-
ments EC policies and attempts to ensure that rules of the EC are fol-
lowed.4 4 The Court of Justice considers questions such as possible
conflicts between Community legislation and the applicable treaties" and
interprets EC law upon the request of national courts.48 The Court is the
final interpreter of the treaties and the validity of the national legislation
implementing them.47
EEC law is expressed through several means, including directives,
regulations, decisions and judgments of the European Court.4' A directive
is an act adopted by the Council or the Commission.4' The majority of
the measures in the securities and financial services area are Council di-
rectives.50 Directives are binding on the member states to which they are
addressed but permit them to determine the method of implementation,"
usually within a specified time period. A directive does not have immedi-
ate effect, but must be incorporated into national law, 2 a process the EC
ble to the citizens of the member states. Id. at 21.
37. EC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 5.
38. Id. at 6. In addition to the general council, specialized councils are also constituted.
Reynolds, supra note 19, at 21.
39. EC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 6.
40. Reynolds, supra note 19, at 22.
41. EC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 7.
42. Id.
43. The Commission made 624 proposals to the Council in 1989. Id. at 8.
44. Id. at 7-8. The Commission serves as the "executive branch" of the EC, responsible
for its daily operation. Reynolds, supra note 19, at 23. In 1989 the Commission had a staff of
14,262 civil servants. Id. at 24.
45. EC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 17, at 9. The Court has "total jurisdiction" over the
Treaty of Rome. Reynolds, supra note 19, at 26.
46. Id.
47. EUROPEAN TRENDS, supra note 15, at 20.
48. Thieffry, supra note 21, at 360-61.
49. EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL COMMON MARKET 15 (1989); Eu-
ROPEAN TRENDS, supra note 15, at 21.
50. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET: A COMMON MARKET
FOR SERVICES iii (1989).
51. Id.
52. EUROPEAN TRENDS, supra note 15, at 21. Member states which do not enact the
implementing legislation may be challenged by the Commission in the European Court. Id.
at 21.
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calls "transposition." Member states may not "justify non-application of
a directive on the grounds of domestic difficulties or legal rules, even
when the rules deal with constitutional issues."" Unlike directives, regu-
lations apply generally and directly in all member states.5 4 "[R]egulations
have immediate effect and convey individual rights for citizens which the
national courts are obliged to protect.""'
The European Commission has worked "resolutely" toward the com-
pletion of the internal market and has made considerable progress toward
this objective. 6 By 1990 the Commission had transmitted to the Council
all of the proposals announced in 1985;57 as of March 1990, the Council
reported that it had adopted about 60 percent of them." While the Com-
munity has made significant progress in the area of EC legislation, it has
experienced more difficulty in the national implementation phase of the
internal market." In 1989 the Commission released a report indicating
that only 7 of the 68 single-market measures adopted by the Council had
been transposed into national law.60 "Even when E.C. directives are
translated into national law," according to the Commission, a "'nitpick-
ing interpretation of the rules' by national bureaucracies often results in
discrimination against citizens from other Community countries."'" In
1990, the Commission commented that the member countries had im-
proved their record on transposition.6 2 As of March 1990, the member
states, according to the Commission, had transposed 21 measures into na-
tional law. 3 Some countries have been slower than others in transposing
Community directives.
6 4
53. Theiffry, supra note 21, at 360, citing Commission v. Italian Republic, Comm. Mkt.
Rep. (CCH) 14,399 (1986).
54. Thieffry, supra note 21, at 359; EUROPEAN TRENDS, supra note 15, at 21.
55. Thieffrey, supra note 21, at 359, citing Leonesio v. Italian Ministry of Agriculture
and Forestry, 1972 E. Comm. Ct. J. Rep. 287, 293, 12 Comm. Mkt. L. R. 343, 352 (1973).
56. Fifth Report of the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament Con-
cerning Implementation of the White Paper on the Completion of the Internal Market,
COM(90)90 final at 1 [hereinafter Fifth Progress Report].
57. Id.; Commission Sets Out Work Programme for 1991, Com. Mkt. Rep. (CCH), No.
673 (Jan. 24, 1991).
58. Fifth Progress Report, supra note 56, at 2.
59. DELAYS THREATEN SINGLE-MARKET PROGRAM, EuRoPE-1992: REPORT ON THE SINGLE
EUROPEAN MARKET 325 (Sept. 13, 1989).
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Fifth Progress Report, supra note 56, at 4.
63. Id.
64. As of 1989, Italy had the greatest backlog; the United Kingdom and Denmark had
among the best records. Id.; DELAYS THREATEN SINGLE- MARKET PROGRAM, EuRoPE-1992:
THE REPORT ON THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 325 (Sept. 13, 1989). Spain, Portugal,
Greece, Belgium and Ireland have also experienced delays in implementing the EC direc-
tives. DELAYS THREATEN SINGLE MARKET PROGRAM, EUROPE-1992: THE REPORT ON THE SIN-
GLE EUROPEAN MARKET 325 (Sept. 13, 1989).
1991
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
II. STOCK EXCHAMGE AND PROSPECTUS DIRECTIVES
A. Stock Exchange Listing
The EC's two stock exchange directives have become increasingly sig-
nificant with the adoption in 1989 and 1990 of directives further integrat-
ing the listing and public offering processes in the European Community.
These directives permit, inter alia, listing particulars to function as a
prospectus and a prospectus to function as listing particulars in qualify-
ing cases. The prospectus directive, adopted in 1989 and discussed below,
"further develops the EC's integrated disclosure system in which prospec-
tuses and listing particulars ultimately may be used almost interchangea-
bly throughout the common market."6 The principal stock exchange di-
rectives, adopted in 1979 and 1980, concern the conditions to listing
securities for trading on a stock exchange "situated or operating within" a
member country (the "Listing Conditions Directive") 66 and the disclosure
and filing requirements applicable to such listing (the "Listing Particulars
Directive").6 7 The Listing Conditions Directive sets forth minimum con-
ditions for the admission of securities to listing on a stock exchange lo-
cated in the EEC, and requires member states to ensure that securities
may not be admitted to listing in their country unless the conditions of
the Directive are satisfied." These listing conditions involve matters such
as the size of the issuer, its period of existence, and the distribution of its
shares in the market.6 9 The directive imposes numerous responsibilities,
including reporting obligations, on issuers of listed securities. 70 The direc-
tive does not prohibit the listing of shares from non-EC countries, but
provides that if shares of such a company are not listed in the issuer's
home country or principal market, they may not be listed in an EC coun-
try unless the authorities are satisfied that the absence of the home coun-
try/principal market listing "is not due to the need to protect inves-
tors." 1 Non-EC issuers listing in an EC country are required to meet the
minimum conditions and obligations of the directive as enacted into na-
tional law in the particular country involved.
65. Regulatory Harmony, supra note 5, at 33.
66. Council Directive 79/279/EEC of 5 March 1979 Coordinating the Conditions for the
Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1979 O.J. (L 66) 21, as amended
by Council Directive 82/148/EEC, O.J. (L 62) 22 (concerning implementation dates) [herein-
after Listing Conditions Directive].
67. Council Directive 80/390/EEC of 17 March 1980 Coordinating the Requirements for
the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Listing Particulars to be Published for
the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Exchange Listing, 1980 O.J. (L 100) 1 [herein-
after Listing Particulars Directive].
68. Listing Conditions Directive, supra note 66, preamble and art. 3. Members also
must ensure that issuers admitted to listing are subject to the obligations imposed by the
directive. Id.
69. Id., schedule A. For example, a company must, in general, have published or filed
its annual accounts for three financial years preceding the listing application. Id.
70. Id., schedules C and D.
71. Id., schedule A, no. 7.
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The purpose of the Listing Particulars Directive is to coordinate the
differences in member state disclosure requirements applicable to stock
exchange listing." This directive requires member states to ensure that
the listing of securities upon a stock exchange in their territory is contin-
gent upon the publication of a disclosure document referred to as "listing
particulars."7 The disclosure document must contain the information
necessary to enable investors to make an "informed assessment" of the
financial position and prospects of the issuer.74 Since the line item dis-
closure requirements7 5 are "without prejudice to the obligation referred to
in article 4," this directive imposes a general obligation to disclose mate-
rial facts in the listing application.7 6 The Listing Particulars Directive al-
lows a member state to create numerous exemptions, such as exemptions
for securities that have been publicly issued or issued in connection with
a takeover bid where within the preceding year the issuer published an
equivalent disclosure document in that state.
77
The Listing Particulars Directive sets forth detailed disclosure re-
quirements based upon whether the securities to be listed are debt or
equity securities.78 Listing particulars may not be published until they
have been approved by the competent authorities, 7 9 at which time they
must be published."' Listing particulars may be published either by inser-
tion in one or more newspapers circulated throughout the member state
or as a brochure to be made available to the public."'
The Listing Particulars Directive provides that when applications for
listing the same securities on stock exchanges in several member states
are made within short intervals of each other, the authorities in each
state should cooperate with each other "to avoid a multiplicity of formali-
ties and to agree to a single text," where appropriate."3 The Listing Con-
ditions Directive has a similar provision." In 1987 the Council adopted a
directive requiring significantly further reciprocity in the listing process.8'
72. Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 67, preamble.
73. Id., art 3.
74. Id., art. 4.
75. Id., art. 5.
76. Id., providing that member states shall ensure that listing particulars contain at
least the items of information provided for in Schedules A, B or C. The directive does not,
however, use the word "material."
77. Id., art. 6, no. 1.
78. Id., art. 5, no. 1, schedules A and B.
79. Id., art. 18, no. 2.
80. Id., arts. 3, 18, and 20; Global Harmonization, supra note 3, at 211.
81. Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 67, art. 20.
82. Id., art. 24.
83. Listing Conditions Directive, supra note 66, art. 18, no. 2. "Where applications are
to be made simultaneously or within short intervals of one another.... the competent au-
thorities shall communicate with each other and make such arrangements as may be neces-
sary to expedite the procedure and simplify as far as possible the formalities and any addi-
tional conditions...". Id.
84. Council Directive 87/345/EEC of 22 June 1987 amending Council Directive 80/390/
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This directive applies when applications are made to list securities on two
or more exchanges located in the EC, in which event listing particulars
are to be prepared in accordance with home state rules and approved by
home state authorities.8 5 Once so approved, "listing particulars must, sub-
ject to any translation, be recognized by the other Member States in
which admission to official listing has been applied for, without it being
necessary to obtain the approval of the competent authorities of those
States and without their being able to require that additional information
be included in the listing particulars."8' If the issuer's registered office is
not located in a member state, it must choose an EC country to supervise
its listing. 7 The directive allows EC countries to restrict application of
the foregoing rules to listing particulars of issuers having their registered
office in a member state.88
In 1990 the Council adopted Directive 90/211 (the "Integration Di-
rective"), discussed more fully below, further integrating disclosure in the
listing and public offering process.8 9 Directive 89/298 (the "Prospectus
Directive"), also discussed below, provides that where public offers are
made within short intervals of one another in two or more member states,
a public offer prospectus prepared and approved in accordance with cer-
tain of its provisions must be recognized as a public offer prospectus in
the other member states "on the basis of mutual recognition. '"90 Under
the Integration Directive, where application for listing in one or more
member states is made and the securities in question were covered by a
prospectus prepared and approved in any member state in accordance
with certain provisions of the Prospectus Directive91 in the three months
EEC Coordinating the Requirements for the Drawing Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the
Listing Particulars to be Published for the Admission of Securities to Official Stock Ex-
change Listing, 1987 O.J. (L 185) 81.
85. Id., amending Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 67, art. 24.
86. Council Directive 87/345/EEC, supra note 84, art. 24(a). The authorities of any EC
country may, however, compel the inclusion of certain limited information specific to the
country in which listing is sought. Id.
87. Id.
88. Id., art. 1, amending Listing Particulars Directive, supra note 67, art. 24. Directive
87/345 also contained a provision concerning the recognition of public offer prospectuses as
listing particulars. Directive 87/345, supra note 84, art. 1, amending Listing Particulars Di-
rective, supra note 67, art. 24. This provision was "limited to circumstances in which a
listing is sought on exchanges in two or more member states and where another member
state has approved the prospectus, in accordance with the Listing Particulars Directive,
within three months of the further application." Regulatory Harmony, supra note 5, at 30-
31. A 1990 amendment to the Listing Particulars Directive (discussed below) superseded
this provision.
89. Council Directive 90/211/EEC of 23 April 1990 amending Council Directive 80/390/
EEC. See also In Respect of the Mutual Recognition of Public Offer Prospectuses as Stock
Exchange Listing Particulars, 1990 O.J. (L 112) 24 [hereinafter Integration Directive].
90. Council Directive 89/298/EEC of 17 April 1989 Coordinating the Requirements for
the Drawing-Up, Scrutiny and Distribution of the Prospectus to be Published When Trans-
ferable Securities are Offered to the Public, art. 21, no. 1, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 8, 14.
91. Specifically, articles 7, 8 or 12 of the 1989 Prospectus Directive. Article 7 requires
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prior to the listing application, the public offer prospectus must be recog-
nized as listing particulars in the member states in which listing is
sought.9 2 The Integration Directive extends the mutual recognition of
prospectuses as listing particulars to all prospectuses that have been ap-
proved by any member state, regardless of whether the securities have
been listed previously on a member state's exchange.9 3
B. Prospectus Directive
The Council adopted the Prospectus Directive on April 17, 1989 to
coordinate the requirements for the "drawing-up, scrutiny and distribu-
tion" of a prospectus to be used when securities are offered to the pub-
lic.9 " The purpose of the directive is to encourage "the creation of a genu-
ine European capital market. 9 5 The directive applies to securities offered
to the public for the first time in a member state if such securities are not
already listed on a stock exchange in that state.96 Member states must
ensure, absent an exemption, that any offer of securities to the public
"within their territories" is subject to the publication of a prospectus by
the offeror.9 7 The prospectus must be published or made available no
later than the time when an offer is made to the public."
The directive is expressly inapplicable to certain types of offers, in-
cluding, without limitation, offers of securities to a "restricted circle of
persons."99 Various types of securities also are excluded, such as certain
government securities; securities offered in connection with a takeover bid
or merger; certain debt securities; 100 and "Eurosecurities which are not
the contents of a prospectus and the procedures for reviewing and distributing it to be de-
termined in accordance with the Listing Particulars Directive, where a public offer relates to
securities that are the subject of a listing application in the same member state. Article 8, a
corresponding provision applicable where a public offer is made in one member state and
listing is sought in another member state, provides that the offeror "shall have the possibil-
ity" of preparing the prospectus in accordance with the Listing Particulars Directive. Article
12 authorizes a member state to allow the preparation of a prospectus on the basis of the
Listing Particulars Directive even when listing is not being sought.
92. Integration Directive, supra note 89, art. 2, amending para. 1 of art. 24(b) of the
Listing Particulars Directive. In this event it will not be necessary to obtain the approval of
the authorities in the member states in which listing is sought. Authorities in these states
may not require the inclusion of additional information in the prospectus, except for infor-
mation specific to the country of admission.
93. See Global Harmonization, supra note 3, at 214, n. 181 and accompanying text;
Integration Directive, supra note 89, art. 2, amending Listing Particulars Directive, supra
note 67, art. 24(b)(1); see Prospectus Directive, supra note 1, art. 12; Regulatory Harmony,
supra note 5, at 31.
94. Prospectus Directive, supra note 1.
95. Id., preamble.
96. Id., art. 1.
97. Id., art 4.
98. Id., arts. 9 and 16.
99. Id., art. 2, no. 2.
100. Id., art. 5(a) (debt securities issued by certain financial institutions); id., art. 5(b)
(certain debt securities guaranteed by a member state or subdivision thereof); id., art. 5(c)
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the subject of a generalized campaign of advertising or canvassing." '
The provision for Eurosecurities, which includes both Euroequity and
Eurobonds, will exclude huge amounts of securities issued annually in the
Euromarket from regulation in the EC.10 2 "Eurosecurities" are not, how-
ever, exempted from the Prospectus Directive if they are the subject of "a
generalized campaign of advertising or canvassing." The exemption for
Eurosecurities appears to have been born of competitive
considerations. 10
The Prospectus Directive approaches public offerings on the basis of
whether the securities in question will be listed in a member state. If a
public offer of transferable securities is made in a member state and at
the time of the offer the securities are the subject of a listing application
in the same state, prospectus requirements must be determined in accor-
dance with the Listing Particulars Directive as distinguished from Article
11 of the Prospectus Directive.0 4 This rule applies to both the prospectus
content requirements and the procedures for reviewing and distributing
the prospectus, subject to "adaptations appropriate to the circumstances
of a public offer."' ° Thus, in this context, the Prospectus Directive incor-
porates the Listing Particulars Directive to establish the content of and
review procedures relating to the prospectus. If a public offer is made in
one member state and listing is sought on a stock exchange in another
member state, the person making the public offering must have the possi-
bility of using a prospectus governed by the Listing Particulars Directive
as opposed to the Prospectus Directive, in terms of both content and pro-
cedure, subject to any changes necessary to reflect the circumstances of
the public offer. 0 6
In the case of public offerings of other securities (i.e., securities not
subject of a listing application), the prospectus must contain information
necessary in order to enable investors to make an informed investment
(certain other debt securities considered by national law as debt securities issued or guaran-
teed by the state).
101. Id., art. 2, no. 2. "Eurosecurities" are transferable securities which are underwrit-
ten and distributed by a syndicate of which at least two of the members have registered
offices in different states; are offered on a significant scale in one or more states other than
that of the issuer's registered office; and may be subscribed for or initially acquired only
through a bank or other financial institution. Id., art. 3.
102. See Regulatory Harmony, supra note 5, at 46, n. 167.
103. Id. at 38-41. "From the beginning, an all-pervasive fear of the Eurobond market
taking flight to Zurich or elsewhere outside the EC dictated opposition to the [Prospectus]
Directive." Id. at 39. "The United Kingdom and Luxembourg were concerned 'that the
[Euromarket] would be driven offshore to Zurich rather than submit to the prospectus obli-
gation.'" Id., n. 132, quoting Rules Requiring Detailed Prospectuses Adopted by EC; Will
be Effective 1991, 20 Sec. Reg. & L. Rep. (BNA) 1975 (Dec. 23, 1988). "Once it became
clear... that a Eurobond exemption could be secured, the goal was expanded to include
Euroequities as well." Regulatory Harmony, supra note 5, at 41.
104. Prospectus Directive, supra note 1, art. 7.
105. Id.
106. Id., art 8.
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decision.1 0 7 Without limiting the foregoing, Article 11 of the Prospectus
Directive sets forth the minimum prospectus disclosure requirements
member states must adopt applicable to prospectuses for a public offer of
securities not to be officially listed on an exchange in a member state.'
Prospectuses for unlisted securities must be published or made publicly
available pursuant to procedures established by each member state.0 9
The member states may provide, however, that the person making the
offering may prepare the prospectus, in terms of its content, and subject
to appropriate adaptation, in accordance with the Listing Particulars Di-
rective, even though the securities in question are not subject of a listing
application." 0 In this event, prior scrutiny of the prospectus is made by
authorities designated by the member state."' A prospectus so prepared
and approved by a member state in the three months preceding applica-
tion for listing must be recognized, subject to translation, as listing par-
ticulars in the member states in which application for listing is made." 2
Such a prospectus must also be deemed to satisfy the prospectus require-
ments of other member states in which the same securities are, simulta-
neously within a short time period, offered to the public."13
A member state may choose to allow issuers not proposing to apply
for official listing to comply with Article 11 disclosure rather than com-
pelling them to satisfy the same disclosure standards applicable to issuers
concurrently applying for admission to official listing on an exchange in a
member state. Further, a member state is not compelled to give such issu-
ers the alternative of complying with the more stringent disclosure stan-
dards of the Listing Particulars Directive, but may limit those standards
and procedures to securities for which an application for listing is to be
made. This, of course, would require that the issuer be able to satisfy the
conditions to listing. Under the Prospectus Directive, a member state has
no obligation to recognize a prospectus meeting the requirements of an-
other member states that satisfies only the Article 11 requirements. Pre-
sumably, issuers contemplating a multi-member state offering will be mo-
tivated to comply with the more stringent disclosure standards relating to
securities to be listed, if that alternative is available to an unlisted secur-
ity in an appropriate member state, in order to have the benefit of the
107. Id., art. 11, no. 1.
108. Id. Member states may allow the omission from the prospectus of otherwise re-
quired information under certain circumstances, such as if the disclosure of the information
would be "contrary to the public interest." Id., art. 13, no. 1(b). The member state also may
permit omission of information if the disclosure thereof would be "seriously detrimental" to
the issuer, if omission would not be likely to mislead the public. Id. Similar accommodation
may be made in the case of sellers other than the issuer or an agent thereof, in respect of
information not normally in the possession of the seller. Id., no. 2.
109. Id., art. 15.
110. Id., art. 12(1).
111. Id., art. 12(2).
112. Integration Directive, supra note 89, art. 2, amending Listing Particulars Direc-
tive, supra note 67, art. 24(b)(1).
113. Prospective Directive, supra note 1, art. 21(1).
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multi-prospectus recognition provision. Some may conclude, however,
that the cost of meeting the more stringent disclosure standards outweigh
the mutual recognition benefit.
The Prospectus Directive requires a member state to recognize, sub-
ject to translation if necessary, a prospectus (other than an Article 11
prospectus) approved in another member state in accordance with the di-
rective. Where public offers are made within short intervals of one an-
other in two or more member states, a public offer prospectus prepared
and approved in accordance with the Prospectus Directive (other than an
Article 11 prospectus) must be recognized as a public offer prospectus in
such member states.1 1 4 The member states may not impose any approval
requirement or require additional information to be included in such pro-
spectus, other than certain country-specific information. " ' Article 21 of
the Prospectus Directive will permit EC companies prepared to satisfy
the disclosure requirements of the Listing Particulars Directive to sell se-
curities, simultaneously or within a short time period, in several EC coun-
tries on the basis of one prospectus. The directive permits member states
to limit this reciprocity requirement to issuers having their registered of-
fices in a member state. " ' The EC may negotiate agreements with non-
EC countries pursuant to which it would recognize, for purposes of the
Prospectus Directive, prospectuses prepared and reviewed in accordance
with the foreign law of non-member countries, provided such foreign law
gives equivalent protection, even if it differs from the directive.1 1 7 This
possibility, however, is subject to "reciprocity,"' 18 meaning subject to ac-
ceptance by the particular foreign country of prospectuses prepared in
accordance with EC law. Although no negotiations between the SEC and
the EC have been publicly reported, it is possible that at some future
date this provision may serve as a basis for negotiating a multijurisdic-
tional disclosure system between the United States and the EC.
C. Continuous Reporting
The Listing Conditions Directive establishes the framework for the
periodic reporting of information in the EEC. A company listing its
shares on a stock exchange located within the EC must comply with the
obligations set forth in Schedule C to the Listing Conditions Directive.1 1 9
Schedule C obliges a company to inform the public "as soon as possible"
of any major new, non-public developments which may substantially af-
fect the price of the company's shares. 120 The company must release to
114. Id., art. 21.
115. Id.
116. Id., art. 21, no. 4.
117. Id., art. 24.
118. Id.
119. Listing Conditions Directive, supra note 66, art. 4, no, 2. A company listing its
debt securities must comply with Schedule D. Id.
120. Id., schedule C, T 5(a). The authorities may exempt the company from this re-
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the public, as soon as possible, its most recent "annual accounts" and
"annual report.""12 This information must comply with Council Directives
concerning companies' accounts and also give a "true and fair view" of
the company's financial position, or "more detailed and/or additional in-
formation must be provided."' 2 2 Schedule C and D require disclosure of
additional information, 2 s and if the company's shares are listed on stock
exchanges in different member states the company must release
"equivalent information" to each market. 1 4 Member states may establish
additional periodic reporting requirements."
25 .
The Council has supplemented the reporting requirements of the
Listing Conditions Directive with the adoption of a directive requiring
the annual publication of mid-year reports.' 26 This directive applies to
any company listed in a member state, even a company headquartered in
a non-EC country. Listed companies must publish half-yearly reports
within four months of the end of the first six-month period of each finan-
cial year. The reports must include the "net turnover" and the "profit or
loss before or after deduction of tax" during the relevant period"17 and for
the corresponding period for the previous year."12 The half-yearly report
must also include an explanatory statement that discusses significant in-
formation concerning the companies activities and profits and losses"29 as
well as, to the extent possible, "the company's likely future development
in the current financial year."" The mid-year report must be published
in the member states where the shares are listed or otherwise be made
available to the public."'
D. National Laws
The prospectus provisions of the English Companies Act was the
model on which the Securities Act of 1933 was based." 2 The Companies
quirement if the disclosure would prejudice the legitimate interests of the company.
121. Id., no. 4.
122. Id., no. 4(c).
123. E.g., id., no. 5(b) and (c); schedule D, no. 4(b) - (d).
124. Listing Conditions Directive, supra note 66, art. 6(a). If a company's shares are
listed in a member and non-member state, the company must release to the member state
market information "at least equivalent" to that released in the non-member state, "if such
information may be of importance for the evaluation of the shares." Id., no. 6(b).
125. Id., art. 4.
126. Council Directive 82/121/EEC of 15 February 1982, 1982 O.J. (L 48) 26.
127. Id., art. 5, nos. 1 and 2. Member states may enact more stringent or comprehensive
rules than those established by this directive, if such rules apply generally to all companies
or to all companies of a given class. Id., art. 3.
128. Id., art. 5, no. 5.
129. Id., art. 5, nos. 1 and 6.
130. Id., art. 5, no. 6.
131. Id., art. 7, no. 1.
132. See SELIGMAN, J., THE TRANSFORMATION OF WALL STREET 62-63 (1982). The unique
contribution of the Securities Act of 1933 was to provide a waiting period between the filing
of a prospectus as part of the registration statement and the effective date after which the
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Act of 1985, a codification of the amendments over the years to the Com-
panies Act, includes the current statutory prospectus provisions,"' and
Schedule 3 to that Act sets forth the prescribed content of a statutory
prospectus. s4 The prospectus requirements of the Companies Act are sat-
isfied by delivering the document meeting the statutory prospectus re-
quirements for registration to the Registrar of Companies."35 The Regis-
trar is a ministerial official who is authorized to refuse registration of the
prospectus only if (1) it is not dated, or (2) not signed in accordance with
the requirements of the Act, or (3) it does not have attached documents
required by the Act.1"6
If a company is able to meet the admission requirements of The
Stock Exchange and a member firm is prepared to act as a sponsor and
underwriter, the process of going public (or going to market) in the
United Kingdom and the process of listing on the Exchange are inter-
twined and basically the same. 3 7 Prior to the adoption of the the Finan-
cial Services Act of 1986 (FSA), the application for listing required the
publication of Listing Particulars meeting the requirements of the Rules
of the exchange and the prospectus had to meet the requirements of the
Exchange and the statutory requirements of Schedule 3 of the Companies
Act. 38 For many years Appendix 34 to the Yellow Book prescribed in
detail the information to be included in a prospectus which overlapped
the information required in the Listing Particulars. The Adoption by the
EC of the Sixth Directive relating to the content of Listing Particulars
resulted in a 1984 revision to the Yellowbook, which, with a series of
amendments, are the current rules of the Exchange. The 1984 revisions
(and subsequent amendments) eliminated Appendix 34 and moved rele-
vant provisions and procedures relating to the offering phase of the pro-
spectus into the Rules relating to Listing Particulars.' " The Listing Par-
ticulars and the Prospectus, in effect, became one and the same document
for an issuer going public and concurrently applying for admission of the
securities being offered to the Official List of the Stock Exchange.
The Financial Services Act of 1986, essentially leaves this process un-
disturbed with respect to securities publicly offered subject to admission
securities could be offered. Id. Schedule A to the Securities Act, prescribing the content of
the prospectus, also drew on the prospectus requirements of the then much maligned New
York Stock Exchange. Id. at 57.
133. Companies Act of 1985, Pt. III, consisting of §§ 56-79.
134. Companies Act of 1985, § 56(1).
135. Companies Act of 1985, § 64(1).
136. Companies Act of 1985, § 64(5).
137. 10 INTERNATIONAL CAPITAL MARKETS AND SECURITIES REGULATION § 1.08[2] (Harold
S. Bloomenthal & Samuel Wolff, eds., 1991 revision) [hereinafter ICMSR].
138. See id., § 1.08[21[a].
139. See ADMISSION OF SECURITIES TO LISTING, § 3, ch. 1 (contents of listing particulars),
§2, ch. 1 (application procedure), § 2, ch. 3 (publication of listing particulars) [hereinafter
YELLOWBOOK].
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to listing.14 No security can be admitted to the Official List of the Stock
Exchange except by complying with the listing rules of the competent
authority.14" ' The Council of The Stock Exchange is designated by the
FSA as the competent authority. 4 2 The FSA also requires that before the
Listing Particulars are published as required by the listing rules of The
Stock Exchange that a copy of the Particulars be delivered to the Regis-
trar of Companies and a statement to that effect must be included in the
particulars. 4" The Prospectus Directive, which, in effect, incorporates the
Listing Particulars Directive under these circumstances, adds little if any-
thing to this basic process other than, perhaps, requiring that the Partic-
ulars be referred to as a Prospectus when being used to satisfy the re-
quirements of the Prospectus Directive. The Prospectus Directive merely
requires for securities offered subject to being listed that "the contents of
the prospectus and the procedures for scrutinising and distributing it
shall, subject to adaptations appropriate to the circumstances of a public
offer," conform to the standards of the Listing Particulars. 44 The UK
issuer complying with the requirements described above in the U.K. and
the notice 45 and publication requirements'" of the Prospectus Directive
in the other member states in which the securities are to be offered
should be entitled to the benefit of the mutual recognition provisions of
the Prospectus Directive.
41
Securities can be publicly offered in the United Kingdom subject to
admission to dealings on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM), a second
tier market also supervised by The Stock Exchange. 48 The application
procedure and content of the particulars or prospectus are governed by
the Stock Exchanges Green Book. Although admissions to dealings and
dealings on the USM are governed by the Stock Exchange, securities so
admitted are not listed securities. Securities are also publicly offered in
the United Kingdom that are subsequently traded off the exchange. Part
V of the FSA requires that before any security not to be officially listed
can be advertised for sale that a prospectus be filed with the registrar of
companies.'4 The content of the prospectus is to be determined by the
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI). 50 The DTI has authority to
accept a prospectus meeting the rules of an approved stock exchange ad-
mitting the securities for dealings in lieu of its own prospectus
140. See ICMSR, supra note 137, § 1.08[2][c].
141. Financial Services Act, 1986, § 142.
142. Id., § 142(6).
143. Id., § 149.
144. Prospectus Directive, supra note 1, art. 7.
145. Id., arts. 14 and 17.
146. Id., arts. 15 and 16.
147. See ICMSR, supra note 137, § 1.08[2].
148. See id., § 1.08[2][b].
149. Financial Services Act, supra note 141, § 160(1).
150. Id., § 162(1).
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requirements.' 51
The FSA contemplated that Parts IV and V of the FSA would re-
place the prospectus provisions of the Companies Act by repealing Part
III of that Act.152 The DTI, shortly after the enactment of the FSA, im-
plemented Part IV of the FSA and Part III of the Companies Act was
thereby repealed as to securities offered subject to listing on The Stock
Exchange.158 The DTI has been slow, however, in implementing Part V of
the FSA and the Companies Act prospectus provisions remain applicable
to other public offerings of securities. The result has been that companies
going to market subject to being listed on the USM have to use a pro-
spectus meeting the requirements of the Green Book and Schedule 3 to
the Companies Act of 1985.
On July 12, 1990, the DTI published a Consultative Document out-
lining and discussing in broad terms the implementation of Part V of the
Financial Services Act and harmonization of the Part V prospectus with
the requirements of the Prospectus Directive.5 The expectation was that
the DTI would propose draft regulations by the end of 1990 implement-
ing Part V and permitting compliance with the Prospectus Directive by
April 17, 1991, the date by which Member States were to have adopted
measures necessary to comply with the Prospectus Directive.155 As of
March 28, 1991, the draft regulations had not been published '5 and the
prospectus requirements relating to an offering of securities not to be ad-
mitted to the official list continue to be governed by Schedule 3 to the
Companies Act of 1985.
In October of 1990, The Stock Exchange adopted rules governing the
mutual recognition of listing particulars approved by the competent au-
thority of another Member State."' The Rules provide that four copies of
the qualifying documents must be submitted at least 14 days prior to the
intended publication. ' No publication can take place until The Stock
Exchange confirms in writing that the application qualifies for mutual
recognition.1 59
The Stock Exchange extensively regulates the continuing disclosure
obligations of an issuer that has securities listed on the exchange, includ-
ing annual accounts and half yearly reports that conform with the related
EC Directives.10 The Green Book requires companies listing securities on
151. Id., § 162(3).
152. Id., § 212(3), sch. 17, pt. I.
153. SI 1986 No. 2246.
154. DTI, Consultative Document on Listing Particulars and Public Offer Prospectuses:
Implementation of Part V of the Financial Services Act 1986 and Related EC Directives.
155. Prospectus Directive, supra note 1, art. 26.
156. David Cook, Likelihood of a Simplified Route to Public Listing Remains Elusive,
FIN. TMnms, March 28, 1991, at p. 31, sec. I.
157. YELLOWBOOK, supra note 139, § 8, ch. 2.
158. Id., § 8, ch. 2, 3(a).
159. Id., § 8, ch. 2, 1 3(b).
160. Id., § 5, ch. 2 (primary listing), § 8, ch. 3 (foreign companies with a secondary
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the USM to undertake to include with the directors' annual report speci-
fied information and to either send shareholders a half-yearly report or
publish such report in a leading daily newspaper.
In France, the Minister of Finance approved three new stock ex-
change regulations in 1988.161 The regulations govern the conditions for
listing on the stock exchange, delisting, and disclosure requirements for
public offerings.16 Subsequently, the Commission des Operations de
Bourse ("COB") adopted new rules designed to comply with the EC di-
rective of June 22, 1987 governing mutual recognition of listing particu-
lars. 68 Pursuant to the new rules, EC issuers listing in one member coun-
try can use, in effect, the same listing particulars in France. 6 "
The Federal Republic of Germany has eight stock exchanges, located
in Berlin, Bremen, Dusseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Hannover, Munich
and Stuttgart. 6 ' There are plans to re-establish a stock exchange in Leip-
zig. The largest volumes by far are transacted by the stock exchange in
Frankfurt, where about 65 percent of the all equities (70% of bond deals)
are traded, and Dusseldorf, where about 20 percent of the total volume is
traded. The total volume of stocks traded on the German stock exchanges
in 1989 was US $810.5 billion, making the German market in terms of
trading the fourth largest after the United States, Japan and the United
Kingdom.166
The German stock exchanges operate independently of one another.
They each have their own rules, which in turn are subject to local and
federal laws. In addition, the stock exchanges in Berlin and Hamburg are
subject to control and supervision by the local Chambers of Industry and
Commerce, while independent associations of stock exchange members
exercise control and supervision over the stock exchanges in Bremen,
Dusseldorf, Hannover and Stuttgart, and a stock corporation whose
shares are held by the stock exchange members now controls the Frank-
furt stock exchange. The supervising agents, in turn, are responsible to a
state commissioner in each federal state (Land) of the Federal Republic,
having jurisdiction over the location where the stock exchange is
listing on The Stock Exchange).
161. France: Amendments to Stock Exchange General Regulations Approved, Doing
Business in Europe (CCH) T 98-165, at 97,185.
162. Id., citing Arretes of July 6, 1988, 1988 J.O. 9154, 9158 (Reg. No. 88-03, -04). See
also France: Further Amendments to Stock Exchange General Regulations Approved, Do-
ing Business in Europe (CCH) 98-210, at 97,212; France: CBV's New Rules Define Condi-
tions of Delisting, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Nov. 22, 1989).
163. COB Rules Harmonized With the EC, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 2 (March 12,
1990). See Directive 87/345, supra note 84.
164. COB Rules Harmonized with the EC, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 2 (March 12,
1990).
165. See ICMSR, supra note 137. See Eberhard Rohm's discussion of securities regula-
tion in Germany, chapter 8C.
166. Annual Report 1989, Federation of the German Stock Exchanges.
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situated.167
There are three principal markets in Germany - (1) trading in listed
securities on the eight German stock exchanges (the Amtlicher Handel);
(2) trading in unlisted securities on one of the stock exchanges (Ger-
egelter Markt), and (3) unregulated trading in Unlisted Securities (Un-
geregelter Freiverkehr), also called Telefonverkehr (Telephone Trade).168
The Amtlicher Handel involves an official listing and is similar in this
respect to The Stock Exchange in London. Section 36 BorsG, which was
amended in accordance with the EC-Directive on Listing Particulars) 69
and the EC-Directive on Admission to Securities Listing, govern this pro-
cess. 7 ' If an application is filed with listing boards at more than one ex-
change, all listing boards have to approve the application unanimously.'
The stock exchanges were required by the Reform Act of December
16, 1986 to establish a separate market in unlisted securities (the Ger-
egelter Markt)7 2 to facilitate original issues by small and medium-sized
corporations that cannot meet the listing requirements for the Official
Trade (Amtlicher Handel).'7 3 The Geregelter Markt is comparable in this
respect to the Unlisted Securities Market in the United Kingdom.
The going public process in Germany for securities to be listed on an
exchange is similar to that in the United Kingdom. An application for
listing must be made to the Listing Board of the exchange and must be
accompanied by a Prospekt (Prospectus) and is subject to Sec. 36-49
BorsG which incorporates into national law the requirements of the EC
Listing Particulars Directive.7 7 Regulations issued pursuant to the new
statute contain detailed disclosure requirements.' 75 These procedures, as
in the United Kingdom, do not require significant modification in order
to comply with the requirements of the EC Prospectus Directive.'
76
The application for trading in the Regulated Market, however, re-
quired only a business report that would not necessarily comply with the
standards established by Article 11 of the Prospectus Directive. Germany
adopted the Securities Prospectus Requirements Act, which, among other
things, specifies the content and use of a prospectus in compliance with
167. See ICMSR, supra note 137, § 8C.0215].
168. See id., § 8C.04[2].
169. Council Directive 80/390, 1980 O.J. (L 100/1) (1980), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) V
1731.
170. Council Directive 79/279, 1979 O.J. (L 66/21), Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) $ 1721.
171. See ICMSR, supra note 137, § 8C.04[1][b].
172. Sections 71 - 77 BorsG contain the amendments reflecting the Reform Act Bor-
senzulassungs-Gesetz (BGBI.I, at 2478).
173. See ICMSR, supra note 137, § 8C.04[2].
174. See id., § 8C.07[4].
175. This Regulation is the Verordnung uber die Zulassung von Wertpapieren zur am-
tlichen Notierung an einer Wertpapierborse (Borsenzulassungs-Verordnung - BorsZuIV) of
April 15, 1987 (BGBI.I, Page 1234).
176. See ICMSR, supra note 137, § 8C.07[4].
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the requirements of the Prospectus Directive. 1 7 The Prospectus Directive
is also implemented by provisions providing for acceptance by German
stock exchanges of prospectuses accepted by the issuer's home country
exchange. s17 Germany also imposes periodic reporting requirements on is-
suers of listed securities.79
Spanish regulation is based upon the Securities Market Act of 1988
The National Securities Commission (Comision Nacional del Mercado de
Valores) approved rules in December 1989 allowing foreign issuers to list
their securities on the Spanish exchanges.180 A prospectus must be fur-
nished when securities are offered to the public.' The December 1989
rules also established periodic reporting requirements applicable to for-
eign issuers listed on Spanish exchanges.
182
Italian securities law imposes a notice and prospectus requirement in
the event of a public offering in Italy of domestic or foreign securities. 18 3
The listing process is governed by Regulation 4088 of May 24, 1989,
which has been reported to "comprehensively embod[y] all relevant EC
Directives and supersede previous regulations.' ' 8 Regulation 4088 pro-
vides that if a public offer prospectus has been made public within six
months of an application for listing in Italy, and contains information
equivalent to that called for by Regulation 4088, the regulatory authority
(Commissione Nazionale per le Societa e la Borsa) may simply allow the
filing of a notice updating the prospectus in satisfaction of the listing ap-
plication requirements.'85 A public offer prospectus prepared in accor-
dance with the law of another member state may be recognized as listing
particulars in Italy if the listing application in Italy is filed within three
months of regulatory approval in the other member state.8 8
An issuer publicly offering securities in the Netherlands must publish
177. Wertpapierkverkausprospekt Gesetz. See ICMSR, supra note 137, § 8C.07[4].
178. West Germany: German Stock Exchange Act Amended, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Sept.
1989, at 43.
179. See ICMSR, supra note 137, § 8C.08.
180. Spain Implements New Rules for Foreign Stock Trading, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 5 (Jan. 31, 1990); see also Spanish Commission Allows Foreign Share Listing, Doing
Business in Europe (CCH), No. 211, at 6 (Feb. 8, 1990). Compliance Is High for New Dis-
closure Rule, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 5 (March 12, 1990). Listing by foreign issuers is
supervised by the Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores in the case of foreign and
domestic issues. Garrigues, et. al., Spain, in Issuing Securities: A Guide to Securities Regu-
lation Around the World, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Supp. July, 1990, at 43 [hereinafter Guide].
181. Article 3 of the Securities Market Law applies to all securities whose issuance or
trading takes place on Spanish territory. Guide, supra note 180, at 39.
182. Spanish Commission Allows Foreign Share Listings, Doing Business in Europe
(CCH) No. 211, at 6 (Feb. 8, 1990).
183. Guide, supra note 180, at 26 (Supp. July 1990), citing Law No. 216 of June 7,
1974, art. 18, as amended by Law 77 of 1983. See also Italy: Ministry Seeks Transparent
Trading on Reformed Bourse, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 5 (Aug. 2, 1989).
184. Guide, supra note 180, at 30.
185. Id. at 31.
186. Id. at 32.
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a prospectus whether the securities will be listed or unlisted. 187 The pro-
spectus is governed by stock exchange rules in the case of listed securities
or law in the case of other securities.' The Netherlands applies virtually
no formal rules or regulations to the issuance of Eurobonds in its terri-
tory.189 Listed companies must publish periodic reports. 9 ' In 1989, the
Dutch Minister of Finance, by decree, authorized a new regulatory body
(Securities Board of Netherlands) to begin supervising the Dutch ex-
change and its members.' 9 '
In 1990 Belgium adopted new regulations designed to implement the
EC listing directives. 1" The new law assigned supervision of the listing
process to one of the stock exchange authorities and the concomitant re-
porting requirements to the Banking Commission.'9 3 Luxembourg also
enacted new legislation governing the financial services industry in
1990."" Under the new legislation, the Stock Exchange Commission re-
places the Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois as the authority responsi-
ble for regulating securities to be quoted on the Luxembourg Stock
Exchange. 195
III. FINANCIAL SERVICES
A. Banking
The most important recent development in the EC banking program
is the adoption of the Second Council Directive on December 15, 1989
(the "Second Banking Directive"),' 96 which member states are required to
187. Guide, supra note 180, at 33.
188. Id. at 33, citing Wet Effectenhandel.
189. Id. at 36.
190. Id.
191. NORMAN POSER, INTERNATIONAL SECURITIES REGULATION 424 (1991).
192. Bruyneel and Peeters, Too Much Red Tape?, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1990, at 12.
193. Id.
194. Financial Legislation Consolidated, FIN. TIMES, FINANCIAL REGULATION REPORT
(Feb. 1991).
195. Id.
196. Council Directive 89/646/EEC of 15 December 1989 On the Coordination of Laws,
Regulations and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the
Business of Credit Institutions and Amending Directive 77/780, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 1. The
First Banking Directive, adopted in 1977, currently is in force in all member states. EC
Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 619. The First Banking Directive requires EC countries
to establish an authorization procedure for banks and sets minimum conditions for such
authorization. POSER, supra note 191, at 347, n. 22. The United Kingdom implemented the
First Banking Directive through the Banking Act of 1979. THE SECURITIES ASSOCIATION, IN-
VESTMENT SERVICES DIRECTIVE: A COMMENTARY AND ANALYsIs 20 (March 1989) [hereinafter
SECURITIES ASSOCIATION]. Other relevant EC legislation includes Council Directive 86/524/
EEC (Oct. 27, 1986) (list of exclusions of certain credit institutions); Council Directive 86/
635/EEC 1986 O.J. (L372) 1, (annual accounts and consolidated accounts of banks and other
financial institutions); Commission Recommendation 87/63/EEC (Dec. 1986) (deposit guar-
antee arrangements); and Commission Recommendation 87/62/EEC, 1986 O.J. (L 033) 10,
(monitoring large exposures of credit institutions), in addition to the directives discussed
below.
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implement by January 1, 1993. The directive will establish a single license
applicable throughout the EEC for the provision of banking and other
financial services. The directive disallows "host" member states from re-
quiring authorization or endowment capital for branches of credit institu-
tions authorized in other member states.1" 7 Thus, with one license, a
credit institution will be able to provide a wide variety of financial ser-
vices throughout the EEC. The Second Banking Directive thus is of sin-
gular importance in the field of European finance. 198
While the First Banking Directive requires a bank based in one
member state to obtain authorization from eleven different states to
branch throughout the community, 99 the Second Banking Directive de-
pends upon home state supervision and mutual recognition. On the basis
of these principles, "credit institutions"2 00 are entitled to engage in, on a
community-wide basis, any or all of the following activities, provided that
such activities are covered by the home state authorization: acceptance of
deposits from the public; lending; trading transferable securities, money
market instruments, options and futures, foreign exchange, and exchange
and interest rate instruments; providing investment and financial advi-
sory services; participating in stock issues and providing services related
to such issues.20 ' A credit institution may only engage in the activities
that are covered by its authorization from its home country. 20 2 It is ex-
197. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 6. The "host" member
state is the member state in which a credit institution has a branch or in which it provides
services. Id., art. 1. The "home" member state is the member state in which a credit institu-
tion has been authorized in accordance with article 3 of the First Banking Directive. Id.
198. EC Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 625, citing 21 BULL. EC 1-1988, pt. 1.2.2, at
12 (April 1988).
199. See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET: A COMMON MAR-
KET FOR SERVICES 5.
200. A "credit institution" is an undertaking "whose business is to receive deposits or
other repayable funds from the public and to grant credits for its own account." First Coun-
cil Directive 77/780/EEC of 12 December 1977 on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations
and Administrative Provisions Relating to the Taking Up and Pursuit of the Business of
Credit Institutions, 1977 O.J. (L 323) 30, as amended by Directive 86/524, 1986 O.J. (L 309)
15.
201. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, preamble, annex, and art.
18. Other activities credit institutions may engage in on a community-wide basis include
financial leasing; money transmission services; issuing and administering means of payment
(e.g., bankers' drafts); issuing guarantees and commitments; money brokering; safekeeping
and safe custody services; and credit reference services. Id., annex. Banks may engage in
other activities (i.e., those not included in the Annex) to the extent permitted by the Treaty
of Rome. Second Council Directive, supra note 196, preamble; Ewing, The Single Market of
1992: Implications for Banking and Investment Services in the EC, 13 HASTINGS INT'L &
CoMP. L. REV. 453, 458 (1990).
202. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 18; EC Banking Direc-
tive, supra note 2, at 23 (licensing home country determines the scope of the activities in
which the bank may engage). See also 1992 and Banking Institutions: Markets, Mergers,
Margins, EUROPE 1992 THE REPORT OF THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 316, 317 (August 30,
1989) (single license would allow a bank to practice throughout the community activities
permitted by home country).
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pected that competition among E.C. states will lead to wide acceptance of
"universal" (combined commercial and investment) banking.2 03
Under the Second Banking Directive, supervision of a credit institu-
tion generally is the responsibility of the home member state.0 4 Host
member states are responsible, in cooperation with the home state, for
supervising the liquidity of branches established in their state "pending
further coordination"20 5 by the EC. The Second Banking Directive does
not disturb the ability of host states to take remedial actions when appro-
priate or to prevent or punish irregularities committed within their terri-
tories which are contrary to any rules they have adopted "in the interest
of the general good."20 6
The Second Banking Directive permits a credit institution licensed in
one member state to engage in the activities specified above in other
member states through the establishment of a branch or by directly pro-
viding services."' Member states must also provide that the specified ac-
tivities may be undertaken by any financial institution2 " from another
member state, "whether a subsidiary of a credit institution or the jointly-
owned subsidiary of two or more credit institutions," if numerous condi-
tions are satisfied.20 9 The directive establishes the procedures pursuant to
which a credit institution may open a branch or directly provide services
in another member state.210
A duly authorized credit institution may engage in any or all of the
activities specified in the Annex to the directive, including trading in se-
curities, participating in stock issues and providing services relating to
such offerings, if the activities are authorized by the licensing member
203. 1992 Spurs Call for U.S. Banking Reforms, EUROPE-1992: THE REPORT ON THE
SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 592 (April 1990). See also 1992 and Banking Institutions: Mar-
kets, Mergers, Margins, EUROPE-1992: THE REPORT ON THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 316,
317 (Aug. 30, 1989), which summarized the competitive situation as follows: "Ultimately,
therefore, countries whose regulatory systems are more restrictive than that envisioned by
the Commission would come under pressure to liberalize their markets to prevent domestic
institutions from being placed at a competitive disadvantage against foreign institutions
within their own national boundaries."
204. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 13.
205. Id., art. 14, no. 2. Host member states are also responsible for measures resulting
from the implementation of their monetary policies, "[w]ithout prejudice to the measures
necessary for the reinforcement of the European Monetary System." Id.
206. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 21, no. 5. "This shall
include the possibility of preventing offending institutions from initiating any further trans-
actions within their territories." Id. Any such limitation on freedom to provide services
would, however, be subject to judicial review. Id., art. 21, no. 5.
207. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art 18, no. 1.
208. A "financial institution" is any firm other than a credit institution the principal
activity of which is to acquire holdings or to engage in the activities listed in the Annex to
the Second Banking Directive except for taking deposits (or providing credit reference or
safe custody services). Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 1; see also
EC BANKING DIRECTIVE, supra note 2, at 623, n. 38.
209. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 18, no. 2.
210. Id.
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state.2 1' Banks operating under a banking license may provide all such
services authorized by the home member state, including investment ser-
vices, without obtaining additional authorization under the proposed In-
vestment Services Directive, discussed below.212 Banks providing invest-
ment services in member states would be subject, however, to other
provisions of the proposed Investment Services Directive." 3
Member states must prohibit persons or firms that are not credit in-
stitutions from carrying on the business of taking deposits or other repay-
able funds from the public, with several exceptions.2 14 Credit institutions
must apply to a member state for authorization to carry on the business
of banking. In general, the authorities may not grant such authorization
where initial capital is less than ECU 5 million."' 5 A credit institution's
"own funds" generally must meet the minimum applicable requirement
at the time of its authorization. 216 "Own funds" are funds that are the
property of the bank, as opposed to "client funds" which are on deposit
with the bank but are the property of depositors. 1 7 In considering
whether to authorize an applicant to operate as a credit institution, the
authorities of a member state must be satisfied as to the suitability of the
owners to operate the business.
The Second Banking Directive permits entities from non-member
states to form subsidiaries under the laws of member states for the pur-
pose of engaging in banking activities. The directive establishes, however,
a procedure pursuant to which the EC may monitor the treatment of en-
tities from member states in non-EC countries. If credit institutions from
member states experience difficulties in engaging in banking activities in
non-EC countries, member states must notify the Commission. If a non-
EC country denies EC credit institutions "effective market access compa-
rable to that granted by the Community to credit institutions from that
third country," the EEC may to seek, through negotiation with such other
countries, "comparable competitive opportunities" for Community credit
institutions.1 ' If EEC credit institutions do not receive national treat-
ment 1 6 in another country, "the Commission may initiate negotiations in
211. Id., art. 18.
212. Ewing, supra note 201, at 462, citing Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Direc-
tive on Investment Services in the Securities Field, 1989 O.J. (C 298) 6, 9. "The general
provisions of the Banking Directive will apply in this context unless otherwise specified in
the Investment Directive." Id.
213. See infra note 253 (only art. 9, nos. 2, 11 and 13 of the Investment Services Direc-
tive apply to investment firms that are credit institutions authorized by their banking li-
cense to engage in securities business).
214. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 3.
215. Id., art. 4.
216. Id., art. 10, no. 1.
217. COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET:
A COMMON MARKET FOR SERVICES 17 (1989).
218. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 9, no. 3.
219. A country provides national treatment when it affords the same competitive op-
portunities as are available to domestic institutions. EC BANKING DIRECTIVE, supra note 2,
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order to remedy the situation. '220 In the event member state banks expe-
rience difficulty in engaging in banking activities in third countries, the
member state may temporarily suspend decisions on applications to en-
gage in banking by companies from these particular countries. 221 In these
cases, the Council, based upon a proposal from the Commission, will de-
cide whether to continue such restrictions.2 2 The Commission may not,
however, interfere with the establishment of subsidiaries by credit insti-
tutions already authorized in the EC or with the acquisition of shares in
EC credit institutions by such previously authorized institutions.2 21
Therefore, financial institutions from outside the EC should consider es-
tablishing a subsidiary in at least one EC country prior to 1993.24
Branches that have commenced their activities, in accordance with
host member state provisions, before the entry into force of the national
provisions implementing the directive are treated as duly authorized
branches under the directive.2 5 The provision of the directive pursuant
to which a credit institution from one member state may directly provide
services in another member state does not affect rights of a credit institu-
tion providing services before the entry into force of the provisions
adopted in implementing the directive. 2 6
The Second Banking Directive regulates the acquisition of shares of
EC credit institutions by providing that member states must require per-
sons proposing to acquire a "qualifying holding" in a credit institution to
inform them of the proposed acquisition.2 7 The member state authorities
may object to the proposal within three months of notice on the grounds
that the acquiror is unsuitable.2 8 Persons selling their qualifying holdings
in credit institutions or reducing them below certain thresholds must
at 626, n. 65; Regulatory Harmony, supra note 5, at 51, n. 198, quoting MICHAEL CALIN-
GAERT, THE 1992 CHALLENGE FROM EUROPE: DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNTrY's
INTERNAL MARKET 85 (1988) ("treatment no less favorable in like circumstances than that
accorded domestic firms").
220. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 9, no. 4. The First
Banking Directive conditions access to the EC by banks from non-EC countries on "reci-
procity." EC Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 626. The Second Council Directive 89/646/
EEC represents a liberalization in this regard.
221. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 9, no. 4.
222. Id., no. 4.
223. Id.
224. 1992 and Banking Institutions: Markets, Mergers and Acquisitions, EUROPE 1992:
THE REPORT ON THE SINGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 318 (August 30, 1989); Furlonger, Boarding
the EC Ship: Is it Now or Never for U.S. Banks?, INT'L FIN. L. REV. 9 (May 1989).
225. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 23.
226. Id., art. 23, no. 2.
227. Second Council Directive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 11. A "qualifying hold-
ing" means an interest which represents 10% or more of capital or voting rights or which
enables the holder to exercise significant influence over the management of the issuer. Id.,
art. 1, no. 10. A proposed acquiror must also notify the member state authorities if he in-
tends to increase his proportion of voting rights or capital above the 20%, 33%, or 50%
level, or if the credit institution would become a subsidiary. Id., art. 11, no. 1.
228. Id.
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likewise notify member state authorities.229
Another recent directive in the banking area relates to the publica-
tion of annual accounting documents by a branch of a credit institution
located in a member state in cases where the head office of the credit
institution is outside that state.130 The Council took the position in this
directive that a branch with its head office in another member state is not
required to publish separate accounts covering solely branch activities. 2 '
Member states must require branches of credit institutions and financial
institutions having their head office in another member state to publish
annual accounts (and related information) of the credit institution or fi-
nancial institution.2 2 Branches may not, however, be required to publish
annual accounts relating solely to their own activities.3 3 Member states
may require branches to publish certain additional information about the
branch.234 Where the main office of a branch is outside the EC, member
states may require separate branch accounts in certain cases.23 5
In 1990, the Commission presented a proposal for the supervision of
credit institutions on a consolidated basis s.23 If adopted by the Council,
this measure will enable member states to supervise on a consolidated
basis banking groups the parent of which is not a credit institution but is
a "financial holding company. 2 37 A 1983 Council directive requires super-
vision of credit institutions on a consolidated basis, but is only applicable
to banking groups the parent of which is a credit institution.28 The ob-
jective of the proposal is to give supervising authorities a more complete
perspective of the solvency of credit institutions belonging to a group,
and therefore to enhance protection for depositors. 2 9 Under the proposal,
"a bank would not be able to obtain a reduction in its regulatory capital
requirements simply by shifting activities previously conducted within
the bank to a non-banking affiliate. '240
229. Id., no. 3.
230. Council Directive 89/117/EEC of 13 February 1989, 1989 O.J. (L 44) 40.
231. EC Briefings: Foreign Bank Branches, INT'L FIN. L. REV., March, 1989, at 43.
232. Council Directive 89/117/EEC, supra note 230, art. 2.
233. Id., art. 2.
234. Id.
235. EC Briefings: Foreign Bank Branches, INT'L FIN. L. REV., March, 1989, at 43.
236. Proposal for a Council Directive Relating to the Supervision of Credit Institutions
on a Consolidated Basis, COM(90)451 final - SYN 306, 1990 O.J. Eur. Com. (C 315).
237. Id., explanatory memorandum, at 1. A "financial holding company" is an institu-
tion the subsidiaries of which are exclusively or primarily one or more credit institutions or
financial institutions. Id.
238. Id. See Council Directive on the Supervision of Credit Institutions on a Consoli-
dated Basis, 1983 O.J. (L 193) 18. Under this directive, the member state in which the credit
institution has its head office is charged with supervising the institution and its branches
throughout the community. EC Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 620.
239. Id.
240. EC Official Urges Congress to Consider EC Firms When it Mulls Banking, 56
Banking Report (BNA) 125 (Jan. 21, 1991) (quoting Leon Brittan, vice president of the
Commission).
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B. Investment Services
In February 1990, the Commission submitted to the Council an
amended proposal for a directive on investment services ("Investment
Services Directive").2 4 ' It is not clear when or in what form the Council
ultimately will adopt the directive. Although the EC in general had
planned for the new investment services regime to become effective si-
multaneously with the new banking program on January 1, 1993, '242 this
result is unlikely to be achieved. One of the purposes of the Investment
Services Directive is to ensure that, non-banks not covered by the Second
Banking Directive, are not put at an unfair competitive disadvantage in
relation to banks.2 2 If the member states implement the Second Banking
Directive before the Investment Services Directive, non-banks will be at a
severe disadvantage in the EC in relation to banks. Many of the provi-
sions of the Investment Services Directive reflect, mutatis mutantis, the
provisions of the Second Banking Directive.244
As of February 1991 the Commission was debating proposed amend-
ments to its earlier proposal, with member states in sharp disagreement
over the proposed amendments.2 45 One group of member states, led by
France, supports an amendment to the Investment Services Directive to
restrict investment firms from engaging in "off-exchange" trading.24 e
Other countries, such as Britain and Germany, strenuously oppose
France's initiative which is at odds with their loosely regulated off-ex-
change markets.247 In February 1991 the Council of Economic and Fi-
nance Ministers formed a working group to address the issue of off-ex-
change trading248 and the Council met in July of 1991 to consider a
241. Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securi-
ties Field, 1990 O.J. (C 42) 7 [hereinafter Investment Services Directive]. The Commission
previously proposed the Investment Services Directive on December 16, 1988. Proposal for a
Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field, COM(88) 778-SYN 176.
242. Clarkson, EC States Continue War Over Investment Regime, REUTERS (Dec. 14,
1990); see Investment Services Directive, supra note 241, art. 25. A legislative committee in
Britain has emphasized that the investment services directive should become effective at the
same time as the banking directive. United Kingdom: MPs Urge Speedier Adoption of In-
vestment Services Rules, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Aug. 16, 1989).
243. SECURITIES ASSOCIATION, supra note 196, at 16.
244. Proposal for a Directive on Investment Services in the Securities Field, COM (88)
778-SYN 176, Explanatory Memorandum, Sec. I.
245. London, AIBD Opposes Plan to Amend EC Directive, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 28, 1991,
at 30.
246. Pan-European Share Markets: More Matter, Less Art, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 8,
1990, at 86; Finance Ministers Deadlocked On Off-Exchange Trading Regulations, Int'l
Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 6 (Dec. 1990).
247. Id.; Clarkson, EC States Continue War Over Investment Regime, REUTERS (Dec.
14, 1990). See also New Draft of EC's Investment Services Directive Could Fail to Resolve
Differences, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1 (Oct. 22, 1990). Inasmuch as trading on German
stock exchanges is limited to several hours per day, German banks engage in off-exchange
trading during the periods when the exchanges are closed. POSER, supra note 191, at 399.
248. EC Working Group Set Up to Shepherd Proposed Investment Services Directive,
Daily Rep. for Executives (BNA) A-2 (Feb. 26, 1991). The working group was to report back
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proposed compromise which would leave it to each member state to de-
termine what is to be considered a regulated market.249 The effect of such
compromise would be to permit each state to determine the extent to
which the single passport to engage in the securities business extends
within its borders to securities that are not listed on an exchange in a
member state.
The Investment Services Directive provides for a home state license
which will allow investment firms to provide in any member state the
investment services that are authorized by the home member state.
25 0
The firm may provide investment services directly or by establishing a
branch in another member state.2"1 The following are "investment ser-
vices" encompassed within the directive: brokerage; dealing as principal;
market-making; portfolio management; underwriting; investment advice;
safekeeping and administration. 25 2 The investment firm may provide the
foregoing services with respect to transferable securities (including units
in undertakings for collective investment in transferable securities):
money market instruments; financial futures and options; and exchange
rate and interest rate instruments. 252 The host state may not condition
the right to provide investment services (either directly or through the
establishment of a branch) on any authorization, capital requirement or
similar condition. A controversial provision requires host member states
to grant access by investment firms from other member states to mem-
to the Council of Economic and Finance Ministers on April 8, 1991. Id.
249. Hill and Waters, New Effort to Find EC Accord on Investment, FIN. TIMEs, July
8, 1991, at 12, col. 5.
250. Investment Services Directive, supra note 247, arts. 3 and 12. An "investment
firm" is any natural or legal person whose business is to provide any "investment service."
Id., art. 1, no. 2. "Investment service" is defined below. The "home member state" is the
member state where the investment firm has its registered office, or its head office if it does
not have a registered office. Id., no. 4. If the investment firm is a natural person, the home
member state is the member state where that person has his principal place of business. Id.
251. Id., art. 12, no. 1. The procedures for establishing a branch and for providing ser-
vices are set forth in articles 14 and 15, respectively.
252. Id., art. 1, no. 2, and annex.
253. Id. It should be noted that pursuant to the Second Banking Directive, credit insti-
tutions will be able, among other things, to trade securities and participate in stock issues
on the basis of their banking license, if authorized by the home state. Second Council Direc-
tive 89/646/EEC, supra note 196, art. 18, annex. A bank may provide these services on the
basis of its banking license (if covered in its authorization) without obtaining additional
authorization under the Investment Services Directive. Ewing, supra note 201, at 462, citing
Opinion on the Proposal for a Council Directive on Investment Services in the Securities
Field, 1989 O.J. (C 298) 6, 9.; Lobl and Werner, 1992 Effects on Securities Regulation and
Mergers and Acquisitions in the European Community, 21 ANN. INST. SEC. REG. 9, 16
(1989). Thus, for example, a German bank which was authorized by the banking authorities
to engage in securities business would not also be required to be authorized by a securities
regulator. SEcuarnus ASSOCIATION, supra note 196, at 17. Certain provisions of the Invest-
ment Services Directive would apply to such activities, however. Investment Services Direc-
tive, supra note 241, art. 2. The "prudential" rules of the Investment Services Directive
would apply to all institutions doing securities business, whether banks or non-banks. SE-
cuRrrias ASSOCIATION, supra note 196, at 18.
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bership of stock exchanges and "organized securities markets" in their
country.25 4 This provision specifically applies to banks as well as non-
bank investment firms. 2
56
Investment firms are required to be authorized by their home state
but not the host state prior to providing investment services.2 "1 To obtain
home state authorization, a person must apply to the home state, furnish
a plan of operations, satisfy capital requirements, 2 7 and disclose the
names of principal owners who must satisfy home state suitability re-
quirements. 258 While the directive allows member states to license subsid-
iaries of companies governed by the law of non-EC countries, it estab-
lishes a procedure similar to that of the Second Banking Directive for
monitoring the treatment of EC investment firms in third countries. 25 9
Member states, subject to review by the Council, may limit or suspend
the licensing of firms from third countries, except for the establishment
of subsidiaries by investment firms already authorized in the EEC or the
acquisition of shares of EC firms by such previously authorized firms.2 6 0
The Investment Services Directive expressly allows member states to li-
cense subsidiaries of companies governed by the law of non-EC coun-
tries.2 ' The directive does not cover the establishment of branches within
the community by investment firms domiciled outside the community,
but member states may not apply to such branches provisions that result
in more favorable treatment than that accorded to branches of member
state investment firms.2 82
The directive requires investment firms at all times to maintain the
initial capital requirement, which, subject to certain exceptions, will be
incorporated by reference from the capital adequacy directive.2 62 Under
one provision of the Investment Services Directive that applies to banks
254. Id., art. 13. The right of access applies when investment firms are authorized to
provide "broking," dealing or market-making services by their home state and similar ser-
vices are provided by host state stock exchanges or organized securities markets. Id. The
host state must also ensure that such investment firms have access to membership of clear-
ing and settlement systems on the host state exchanges or markets which are available to
members of such exchanges and markets. Id.
255. Id., art. 2. See Kellaway, EC Investment Market Plan Hits Trouble, FIN. TIMEs 3
(Nov. 20, 1990). The directive establishes a corresponding right for investment firms dealing
in financial futures and options. Id., art 13, no. 3.
256. Investment Services Directive, supra note 241, art. 3.
257. Capital requirements that will be applicable to investment firms are treated in a
separate proposal. See infra § 10.03(3].
258. Investment Services Directive, supra note 241, arts. 3 and 4. The home member
state has the exclusive responsibility of administering the capital and suitability require-
ments applicable to the initial authorization. Id., art. 9, no. 3.
259. Id., art. 7.
260. Id., art. 7, no. 5.
261. Levintin, The Treatment of United States Financial Services Firms in Post-1992
Europe, 31 HARv. INT'L L.J. 515 (Spring 1990).
262. POSER, supra note 191, at 350; Investment Services Directive, supra note 241, art.
5.
263. Investment Services Directive, supra note 241, art. 8.
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as well as investment firms, home member states must require investment
firms authorized by them to "make sufficient provision against market
risk" in accordance with the capital adequacy directive.
2 64
Like the Bank Directive, the Investment Services Directive grants
primary supervisory responsibility over an investment firm to the home
country. The directive requires member states to adopt "prudential"
rules governing the investment firms they license and gives them "exclu-
sive competence" to administer such rules, regardless of whether that in-
vestment firm establishes a branch or directly provides services in an-
other member state.2 65 These "prudential rules" must govern the
following aspects of investment firms' business, among others: adminis-
trative and accounting procedures and internal control; segregation of
money and securities; insurance arrangements to protect investors against
losses arising from the failure of the firm; recordkeeping; and conflicts of
interest.266 At least initially, the EC may continue to allow the host state
to regulate some aspects of investment firms' business (e.g., conduct of
business, advertising).267 It is anticipated that "conduct of business" rules
eventually will be the subject of another EC directive. 26
The directive provides an important grandfathering provision for in-
vestment firms already operating in EC countries. Investment firms au-
thorized in their home member state before the effectiveness of the na-
tional provisions implementing the Investment Services Directive will be
considered to be licensed for purposes of the directive, if the license were
given under conditions equivalent to those of the directive. 26" The direc-
tive makes a corresponding provision for branches operating in another
member state270 and investment firms providing services in a member
state prior to the effectiveness of the national provisions implementing
the directive. 27 1
C. Capital and Related Requirements for Banks and Investment Firms
1. Own Funds and Solvency Ratio Directives
The Council adopted the "own funds" directive in April 1989 to de-
scribe the types of funds banks must maintain.2 7 2 The "own funds" direc-
264. Id., art. 9, no. 2.
265. Id., art. 11, no. 1.
266. Id., art. 11.
267. Appel, supra note 26, at 70.
268. Lobl and Warner, 1992 Effects on Securities Regulation and Mergers and Acqui-
sitions on the European Community, 21 ANN. INST. SEc. REG., vol. 29, 17 (Nov. 1989); New
Directive Underway on Capital, Market Risk, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 9 (June 7, 1989).
269. Specifically, the firm will be grandfathered if the authorization were given under
equivalent conditions to those set out in arts. 3(2) and 4 of the Investment Services Direc-
tive, supra note 241, art. 24.
270. Id. art. 24, no. 2.
271. Id., no. 3.
272. Council Directive 89/299 of 17 April 1989 On the Own Funds of Credit Institu-
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tive establishes a common definition for the capital of banks to assess
compliance with initial capital requirement.13 "Own funds are the funds
which are the property of the bank, as opposed to client funds which are
on deposit with the bank but the property of the clients."" 4 This direc-
tive defines which items constitute "own funds," including (without limi-
tation) paid-up capital reserves, revaluation reserves, funds for general
banking risks, value adjustments, cumulative preferential shares and sub-
ordinated loan capital.7 5 Regulatory authorities use the size of own funds
in calculating acceptable lending levels.27 The directive separately cate-
gorizes "original own funds" and "additional own funds. ' 27 7 Original own
funds consists of the highest quality items and additional own funds con-
sists of items of lesser quality. 78 In recognition of the fact that "items
constituting additional own funds are not of the same nature as those
constituting original own funds, the amount of the former included in
own funds must not exceed the original own funds..."'"
The definition of own funds is critical for the solvency ratio directive
the Council adopted in December 1989.280 In general, the directive con-
cerns the amount of funds banks must keep in reserve in relation to out-
standing loans28' and establishes the manner in which the ratio should be
calculated. 82 The ratio expresses the relation of own funds to total assets
and off- balance-sheet items, weighted according to the degree of credit
risk.2 83 The ratio relates principally to the credit risks involved in the
event of counter-party default. 28 ' The numerator of the equation is "own
funds" as defined in the own funds directive, discussed above.285 The de-
nominator is the total of the risk-adjusted assets and off-balance sheet
items specified in the directive.28 6 The denominator distinguishes between
degrees of risk associated with particular assets and off-balance sheet
items, and with particular categories of borrowers. 28 7 Beginning January
1, 1993, credit institutions will be required to maintain at all times a sol-
tions, 1989 O.J. (L 124) 16. See EC Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 622.
273. Appel, supra note 26, at 70.
274. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, COMPLETING THE INTERNAL MARKET: A COMMON MARKET
FOR SERVICES 17 (1989).
275. THE EUROPEAN FINANCIAL COMMON MARKET 30 (1989).
276. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 274, at 17.
277. Council Directive 89/299, supra note 272, preamble.
278. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 274, at 17.
279. Council Directive 89/299, supra note 272, preamble.
280. Council Directive 89/647 of 18 December 1989 On a Solvency Ratio for Credit In-
stitutions, 1989 O.J. (L 386) 14.
281. EC Banking Directive, supra note 2, at 622.
282. Appel, supra note 26, at 70.
283. Council Directive 89/647, supra note 280, preamble and art. 3, no. 1.
284. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 274, at 25.
285. Council Directive 89/647, supra note 280, art. 4.
286. Id., art. 5, nos. 2 and 3.
287. EUROPEAN COMMISSION, supra note 274, at 25.
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vency ratio of at least 8%118 unless national regulatory authorities pre-
scribe a higher minimum ratio. 89
2. Capital Adequacy Directive
In April 1990 the Commission adopted a proposal for a Council Di-
rective on the capital adequacy of both investment firms and credit insti-
tutions ("Capital Adequacy Directive"). " The Commission's principal
objectives in formulating this proposal were to establish common condi-
tions for the establishment of investment firms; to subject banks and in-
vestment firms to substantially equivalent requirements concerning "own
funds;" to enhance the "international competitiveness" of the financial
centers of the EEC; and to protect investors.2 91 It is unclear when the
Council will adopt the proposal as a directive.
Member states will be required to apply the Capital Adequacy Direc-
tive to "investment firms" and "credit institutions," and may adopt mea-
sures more stringent than those required by the directive if they
choose. 22 Investment firms must have initial capital of at least ECU
500,000, with certain exceptions. " This minimum capital requirement
does not apply to credit institutions, which are governed in this respect
by the capital provision of the Second Banking Directive." In general, an
investment firm's capital may not fall below that initially required for
authorization. 9 5
The Capital Adequacy Directive requires investment firms to provide
a specified amount of their own funds for risks associated with certain
activities.2 9 Credit institutions, however, for their part, would be re-
quired to meet either (i) the capital requirements of the solvency ratio
288. Council Directive 89/647, supra note 280, art. 10.
289. Id. On December 2, 1988, the French Banking Commission issued a memorandum
implementing a solvency ratio for international banks. Implementing the Cooke Ratio, INT'L
FIN. L. REV., Feb., 1989, at 46-47. In 1991 the United Kingdom implemented the Solvency
Ratio Directive and the Own Funds Directive. Together these two directives establish "a
new capital regime for UK banks." New Banking Rules Made in U.K., Doing Business in
Europe (CCH) 7 (Feb. 12, 1991).
290. Proposal for a Council Directive on Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms and
Credit Institutions, COM(90)141 final - SYN 257, 1990 O.J. (C 153) [hereinafter Capital
Adequacy Directive]. For purposes of arts. 3-6 of the Capital Directive, "investment firms"
refers to investment firms which are neither credit institutions, local firms, nor firms en-
gaged "purely" in the business of rendering investment advice. Id., art. 3, no. 1. A "local
firm" means certain firms involved with financial futures or options. Id., art. 2.
291. Capital Adequacy of Investment Firms, BULL. E.C. 4-1990 14, 15 (1990). "Own
funds" means "own funds" as defined in the own funds directive, Directive 89/299, except
that the definition may be modified as specified in art. 2 of the Capital Adequacy Directive.
292. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 290, art. 1, no. 2.
293. Id., art. 3, no. 2.
294. EC Briefings: Capital Adequacy, INT'L FIN. L. Rv., June 1990, at 44.
295. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 290, art. 3, no. 8.
296. Id., art. 4.
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directive, 97 or (ii)(A) the capital requirements of Annex 2 (regarding po-
sition risk) and Annex 3 (regarding counterparty/settlement risk) of the
Capital Adequacy Directive in respect of their proprietary trading posi-
tions, and (B) the requirements of the solvency ratio directive in respect
of the rest of their business.2"' Thus, national regulatory authorities may
either apply the solvency ratio directive to all of the activities of a credit
institution, or may apply the Capital Adequacy Directive to the credit
institution's securities activities.2"' The purpose of the provision is to es-
tablish a level playing field for the large universal banks and smaller non-
bank specialty firms.300 British securities firms, for example, are accus-
tomed to a more "flexible system of regulation," while German universal
banks "carry out investment services on the basis of strict bank solvency
rules."30' 1 The proposed directive gives member states a choice, in effect,
between regulating banks' securities activities on the basis of banking sol-
vency ratios or the capital adequacy provisions.
302
Investment firms must provide a specified amount of capital to cover
four categories of risk: position risk; counterparty/settlement risk; foreign
exchange risk; and other risks.30 3 These risks must be quantified in accor-
dance with the directive, the sum of them constituting the "own funds
requirement." Investment firms must ensure that their own funds re-
quirement is lower than or equal to their own funds.30 4 The Capital Ade-
quacy Directive has been an extremely controversial proposal. "Securities
firms in London have voiced their fear that high capital adequacy re-
quirements would make entry into the business so expensive that it would
drive international securities business away from the European Commu-
nity, and that London would have the most to lose from such a
development.' '30 5
IV. TAKEOVERS AND ACQUISITIONS
A. Takeover Directive
The Commission adopted an amended proposal for a directive on
takeover bids in September 1990 ("Takeover Directive"). 0 This directive
297. See supra note 280.
298. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 290, art. 4, no. 4.
299. EC Briefings: Capital Adequacy, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June 1990, at 44.
300. EC Commission Proposes Investment Services Minimum Capital Requirements,
54 Banking Report (BNA) 756 (April 30, 1990).
301. Dickson, EC Unveils Capital Adequacy Plans, FIN. TIMES, April 26, 1990, at 28.
302. Id.
303. Capital Adequacy Directive, supra note 290, art. 4, annexes 2-5.
304. Id., art. 4, no. 1.
305. POSER, supra note 191, at 351; TSA Warns Member Firms on Latest EC Draft
Capital Adequacy Directive, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1 (Jan. 31, 1990); Bank of Eng-
land's Kent Warns on Capital Adequacy, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Feb. 26, 1990);
Barchard, Waters and Kellaway, Bank Opposes Brussels Capital Directive, FIN. TIMES, Feb.
5, 1990.
306. Amended Commission Proposal for a Thirteenth Council Directive on Company
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applies to the laws of the member states that relate to takeover bids for
securities of an issuer governed by the law of a member state."' 7 The
Takeover Directive as amended only applies if the securities are admitted
to trading on a member state market "which is regulated and supervised
by authorities recognised by public bodies, operates regularly and is ac-
cessible, directly or indirectly, to the public"."0 For purposes of the direc-
tive, a "takeover or other general bid" is an offer made to the sharehold-
ers of a company to purchase all or part of their securities for cash or in
exchange for other securities.3 9 The Takeover Directive would impose
both substantive and disclosure requirements on the offeror. A person
who acquires securities that, when added to his existing ownership, equal
a percentage of a company which the member state may not set at more
than one-third of the voting rights of the issuer, must make a bid to ac-
quire all of the securities of the issuer. 310 Member states may adopt ex-
emptions from this requirement. 1'
Member states must designate a regulatory authority to administer
the provisions of the directive.31 2 The authority responsible for reviewing
the takeover offer disclosure document is that from the member state in
which the target company has its registered office if the securities of the
target are listed on a regulated market in that member state.3 3 A disclos-
Law Concerning Takeover and Other General Bids, 1990 O.J. (C 240) 7 [hereinafter Take-
over Directive]. The Commission submitted an earlier proposal to the Council in 1989. Pro-
posal for the Thirteenth Council Directive on Company Law Concerning Takeover and
Other General Bids, COM(88)823 final SYN 186.
The amended proposal would require member states to adopt implementing provisions
by January 1, 1992, to become effective no later than January 1, 1993. Takeover Directive,
supra, art. 22. At present takeover regulation varies greatly within the member states. The
European Community's Proposed Directive on Takeover Bids and Its Impact on Share-
holders' Rights, 16 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 561 (1990). The United Kingdom has an extensive
system of takeover regulation, for example, while Germany does not. Id. Regarding takeover
regulation within the member states, see generally New Takeover Code Amendments to
Broaden MBO Disclosures, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1 (Jan. 17, 1990); New Takeover
Code Comes Under Review in Paribas Case, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 4 (Jan. 4, 1990);
EC's Sir Brittan Criticizes Dutch Takeover Defense's, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 4 (Nov.
22, 1989); EC Takeover Rules Threaten Dutch Defenses Say Executives, Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 4 (Oct. 25, 1989); Disclosure, Takeover Reforms to Meet International Prac-
tice, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Oct. 25, 1989); New Rules to Limit Takeover Defense Set
for Implementation, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 5 (Oct. 11, 1989); Final Takeover Codes
Issued, CBV Given Expanded Powers, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 5 (Oct. 11, 1989); EC
Takeover Proposal Unsound, Says Bourse Supervisory Board, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 7
(Aug. 2, 1989); Protection Against Hostile Takeovers, INT'L FIN. L. REv. 42 (March 1989).
307. Takeover Directive, supra note 306, art. 1, no. 1.
308. Id.
309. Id., art. 2.
310. Id., art. 4, no. 1.
311. Id., art. 4, no. 2C.
312. Id., art. 6, no. 1.
313. Id., art. 6, no. 3. If the securities are not listed in the member state in which the
target company has its registered office, the supervising authority in respect of the disclos-
ure document is the member state in which the securities were first admitted to trading on a
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ure document approved in accordance with the directive is entitled to
mutual recognition in the other member states.31 Member states must
vest the regulatory authority with necessary powers, including either the
power to forbid publication of an incomplete takeover disclosure docu-
ment or the power to order remedial action in respect of the document."1 5
In discharging its duties, the supervisory authority must seek to ensure
that (i) all shareholders of the "offeree company" (i.e., the target com-
pany) are treated equally; (ii) the shareholders have sufficient time and
information to make an informed decision; (iii) the board of directors of
the offeree company acts in the interests of all the shareholders "and can-
not frustrate the bid;" (iv) "false markets" are not created in securities of
the offeree company, the offeror company or other companies concerned
by the bid; and (v) offeree companies are not hindered in the conduct of
their business beyond a reasonable time by a bid. 16
The announcement provision of the Takeover Directive is somewhat
unusual by U.S. standards. "As soon as he decides to make a bid," the
offeror must announce his decision by informing the appropriate regula-
tory authority, the board of the target company, and the public. 1 7 After
making this announcement, the offeror must "immediately" prepare a
disclosure document and make it public.3 "8 The Takeover Directive con-
tains a detailed list of the minimum information which the offeror must
disclose.319 Prior to releasing the disclosure document to the public, the
offeror must transmit it to the regulatory authority,3 0 which may review
the document, require corrections, or prohibit publication thereof if it is
incomplete.321
The Takeover Directive also contains provisions relating to defensive
actions by the target company board. After the offeror has informed the
target's board of its decision to make a bid, the board may not, without
shareholder approval, issue securities; engage in certain defensive transac-
tions without regulatory approval; or acquire its own shares.32 In the
United States these matters generally are. not regulated by federal law
and usually are relegated to the decisional law of the states.
regulated market. Id.
314. Id., art. 6, no. 3.
315. Id., art. 6, no. 2.
316. Id., art. 6A.
317. Id., art. 7, no. 1.
318. Id.
319. Id., art. 10. If the offeror is using securities as consideration for the bid, and the
securities have been listed on a member state stock exchange in the preceding 12 months,
the offeror must transmit the listing particulars along with the takeover disclosure docu-
ment. Id., art. 10, no. 3. If the offeror is using unlisted securities as consideration, the take-
over disclosure document must contain information equivalent to that required by the List-
ing Particulars Directive. Id., no. 4.
320. Id., art. 7, no. 3.
321. Id., art. 6, no. 2.
322. Id., art. 8.
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The period for the acceptance of the takeover bid may not be less
than four weeks or more than ten weeks from the date the disclosure doc-
ument is made public.32 After commencement of the offer, it may be
withdrawn only under the circumstances enumerated in the directive.""
In "good time" before the expiration of the offer period, the target com-
pany board must prepare a disclosure document stating its opinion on the
bid and making it public.325 The directive also contains provisions regu-
lating competing bids. 2 '
B. Major Shareholdings Directive
The Council adopted a directive in December 1988 requiring disclos-
ure of substantial acquisitions or dispositions of the shares of listed com-
panies.2 This directive is analogous to Section 13(d) of the U.S. Securi-
ties Exchange Act of 1934. The directive applies to persons making
acquisitions or dispositions of holdings above specified thresholds which
involve changes in voting rights in issuers incorporated under the laws of
a member state and the shares of which are listed on a stock exchange in
one or more member states. 2 Member states must require any person
acquiring or disposing of a qualifying holding in such an issuer to notify,
within seven calendar days, the issuer and the competent authorities of
the member state the law of which governs the issuer.3 29 The person mak-
ing the filing must disclose the voting rights that he holds following the
acquisition or disposition. The notification requirement generally applies
to cases where, following the acquisition or disposition, the proportion of
voting rights held by the person exceeds or falls below one of the follow-
ing levels: 10%, 20%, 1/3, 50%, and 2/3.330 A company which has received
such a "declaration" (i.e., the subject company) must disclose it to the
public in each of the member states in which its shares are listed.3 31
C. National Laws
In 1990, the United Kingdom changed its requirements concerning
323. Id., art. 12, no. 1.
324. Id., art. 13.
325. Id., art. 14.
326. Id., art. 20.
327. Council Directive 88/627/EEC on the Information to be Published When a Major
Holding in a Listed Company is Acquired or Disposed Of, 1988 O.J. (L 348) 62 [hereinafter
Major Shareholdings Directive]. The implementation date for this directive was January 1,
1991.
328. Major Shareholdings Directive, supra note 327, art. 1. The directive does not ap-
ply to the acquisition or disposition of major holdings in collective investment undertakings.
Id., no. 3. Regarding collective investment undertakings, see infra § 10.06.
329. Id., art. 1. The seven-day period commences on the date when the owner learns, or
should have learned, of the acquisition or disposition. Id.
330. Id., art. 4.
331. Id., art. 1, no. 4.
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disclosure of major shareholdings.3 3 2 As amended, the Companies Act re-
quires disclosure of all shareholdings of three percent or more (formerly
five percent or more) in a U.K. listed company.33 In the period since the
announcement, the International Stock Exchange has been "deluged with
corporate stake announcements. 3 3 4 In 1989, Belgium enacted new legisla-
tion requiring the disclosure of major shareholdings. The new legislation
requires persons purchasing five percent or more of Belgian companies of
specified sizes to disclose the acquisition. One of the consequences of non-
compliance is disenfranchisement until a certain period after the pur-
chaser notifies the regulatory authorities.3 3 5 Spain adopted a new rule ef-
fective in 1990 that requires shareholders owning five percent or more of
listed companies to disclose publicly their holdings.3 ' The change report-
edly is an aspect of the reform program based upon the 1988 Financial
Securities Law.3 3 7 Italy adopted a rule in 1990 that requires public dis-
closure of more than two percent in either a publicly quoted Italian com-
pany or an Italian financial institution.3 8 These shareholdings as well as
changes of ownership must be reported to either the Commissione Na-
zionale per le Societa e la Borsa or the central bank, as appropriate.3 9
V. INSIDER TRADING
A. Insider Trading Directive
In November 1989 the Council adopted a directive on insider trading
the implementation date of which is June 1, 1992 ("Insider Dealing Direc-
tive").3 0 The member states must prohibit specified persons who possess
"inside information" from using that information "with full knowledge of
the facts" by purchasing or selling transferable securities of the issuer to
332. UK Corporate Disclosure Requirements Revised, Doing Business in Europe
(CCH) 8 (July 18, 1990).
333. Id.
334. Id.
335. See Belgium: Disclosure Requirements for Shareholdings - New Takeover Rules,
Doing Business in Europe (CCH) 98-205, at 97,209.
336. Spain: Disclosure, Takeover Reforms to Meet International Practice, Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 3 (Oct. 25, 1989).
337. Id.
338. Italy: New Rule on 2 Percent Holdings Goes Into Effect, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 1 (July 30, 1990).
339. Id.
340. Council Directive 89/592/EEC of 13 November 1989 Coordinating Regulations on
Insider Dealing, 1989 O.J. (L 334 ) 30 [hereinafter Insider Dealing Directive]. See generally
Hopt, The European Insider Dealing Directive, 27 COMMON MARKET L. REV. 51 (1990); A
New Look at the European Economic Community Directive on Insider Trading, 23 VAND.
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 135 (1990); EC Briefings: Insider Trading, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Aug. 1989, at
45.
Regarding member state implementation, see generally West Germany: Insider Trad-
ing Law Tightened, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1989, at 46; COB Sends Prosecutor Secret
Report on Insider Trading, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 4 (Aug. 16, 1989).
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which the information relates.""1 This prohibition applies to any person
who possesses inside information by virtue of his membership in the
structure of the issuer, his share ownership, or his access to information
through his employment, profession or duties. 42 The directive also ap-
plies the prohibition to other persons who possess inside information the
source of which "could not be other than" one of the previously enumer-
ated persons. 3" The member states must prohibit any such person from
disclosing inside information to third other parties outside the normal
course of his employment or professional duties, or procuring another
person on the basis of such information to purchase or sell securities ad-
mitted trading on a securities market as specified in the directive.
34 4
"Inside information" is non-public information "of a precise nature"
relating to an issuer or to securities, which, if public, "would be likely to
have a significant effect on the price" of the securities in question. 3 4 Un-
like U.S. law, the EC directive only applies to securities admitted to trad-
ing on a market which is regulated by "public bodies," "operates regu-
larly and is accessible directly or indirectly to the public. 34' The member
states must apply the prohibitions of the directive "at least" to actions
undertaken "within its territory" if the securities in question are admit-
ted to trading on a market of a member state.3 47 The directive only ap-
plies to purchases or sales effected through a professional intermediary. 34 8
The directive specifically permits member states to exclude transactions
effected without a professional intermediary outside a regulated
market.3 4
9
The Insider Dealing Directive also adopts a disclosure provision ap-
plicable to issuers. Article 7 applies one of the disclosure requirements of
the Listing Conditions Directive350 to all companies and undertakings the
transferable securities of which are admitted to trading on one of the
markets covered by the Insider Dealing Directive.3 51 This provision speci-
341. Council Directive 89/592/EEC, supra note 340, art. 2.
342. Id.
343. Id., art. 4.
344. Id., art. 3.
345. Id., art 1.
346. Id., art. 1. The directive prohibits the purchase or sale of "transferable securities"
under the described circumstances. "Transferable securities" include shares and debt securi-
ties, equivalent securities, and rights applicable thereto; futures, options, financial futures
and financial index contracts. Id.
347. Id., art. 5. A transaction will be deemed to be within the territory of a member
state if carried out on a regulated market (operated regularly and accessible to the public)
situated or operating within such territory. Id. See Hopt, supra note 340, at 79 (discussing
difficulty of applying territorial approach in view of computer oriented markets that have
more than one place of functioning).
348. Id., art. 2, no. 3.
349. Id.
350. Specifically, schedule C.5(a) of the annex to the Listing Conditions Directive,
supra note 66.
351. Hopt, supra note 340, art. 7.
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fies that the issuer must inform the public of any major new develop-
ments in its activities that are not public knowledge and which may lead
to substantial movement in the prices of its shares. "
The Insider Dealing Directive is "a major piece of capital market
law harmonisation in the European Community. . .based on convincing
and legal considerations." 5s According to one observer, "[t]he fact that
insider dealing will be prohibited all over the Community and that this
prohibition will have to be based on a clear and solid legal ground with-
out depending on the cooperativeness of the insiders themselves must be
considered as an improvement which was overdue. '3 5 4
B. National Laws
In the United Kingdom, trading in a security of an issuer by a person
having a prescribed association or position with the company (defined as
a "connected person"), or a person obtaining information from a con-
nected person, on a recognized stock exchange or in advertised securities
through an off market dealer on the basis of unpublished price sensitive
information is a crime under the Company Securities (Insider Dealing)
Act 1985.3 "5 The Department of Trade and Industry has responsibility for
enforcing the insider trading law. 56 The EC directive reportedly required
only a "'modest strengthening'" of British law.3 57
In France, the legislature passed a law enhancing the powers of the
COB to combat insider trading.35 Under the new provisions, the COB
may release its findings to the public, refer a case to the Stock Exchange
Council for disciplinary action or initiate judicial proceedings.3 59 In 1990
the government issued new regulations on insider trading.3 60 "Privileged
information" is defined as non-public, specific information concerning a
security, issuer, negotiable future or quoted financial product that, if
made public, could affect the price of the instrument involved. 61 The reg-
ulation applies to persons possessing privileged information by virtue of
352. Listing Conditions Directive, supra note 66, schedule C.5(a). The competent au-
thorities may exempt the issuer from this requirement under certain conditions. Id.
353. Hopt, supra note 340, at 80.
354. Id.
355. See ICMSR, § 1.08[5)[b].
356. DTI Says It Will Continue to Regulate Insider Trading, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 2 (1990).
357. United Kingdom: Changes in Insider Rules Make Directive "Useful," Int'l Sec.
Reg. Rep. (BNA) 2 (1989). In September 1989 the U.K. signed the Council of Europe Con-
vention on Insider Trading, which establishes a system for the exchange of information on
insider trading. United Kingdom: UK Signs Council of Europe Convention on Insider
Trading, Doing Business in Europe (CCH) 1 98-343, at 97,300.
358. France: Powers of Stock Exchange Transactions Commission Broadened, Doing
Business in Europe (CCH) 98-102, at 97,146.
359. Id.
360. France: Securities Regulations Approved on Public Disclosure, Pricing, Ruling
Requests, Insider Information, Doing Business in Europe (CCH) 1 98-604, at 97,518.
361. Id. at 97,522.
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an inside position, participation in a particular financial transaction, or
the practice of a profession or discharge of a duty."'2 These persons must
abstain from exploiting privileged information by purchasing or selling
the financial products that are the subject of the information, 3 ' and may
not disclose privileged information for a purpose other than that for
which it is held." 4 The 1990 regulation also imposes public disclosure re-
quirements relating to all instruments subject to the jurisdiction of the
COB. 6 5 Listed companies must disclose publicly, at the "earliest oppor-
tunity," all material facts which, if known, would significantly affect the
price of the security in question. " Any person planning to engage in, for
his own account, any financial transaction likely to affect significantly the
price of the securities of an issuer must disclose to the public, at the "ear-
liest opportunity," the terms of the proposed transaction.36 7
Traditionally, the German government has been relatively
uninvolved in the regulation of insider trading, delegating the task in ef-
fect to the stock exchanges and trade industries.36 8 German insider trad-
ing rules were bolstered in 1989 but remain non-statutory.3 "9 Belgium
criminalized insider trading in 1989.370 Belgian law imposes an obligation
on issuers immediately to disclose all facts that, if public, would signifi-
cantly affect the price of the issuer's securities. 7 ' Insider trading has not
been subject to regulation by the government in Italy."7 2 The Milan Stock
Exchange, it has been observed, "is notorious for insider trading, which is
not illegal. . . ,,. 3 The Netherlands enacted new insider trading legisla-
tion effective in 1989, authorizing criminal penalties.37 4 The law applies to
trading in the Netherlands of securities listed in the Netherlands and
trading from the Netherlands in foreign markets, on the basis of insider
information. 75 The Model Code adopted by the Amsterdam Stock Ex-
change also regulates insider trading.7  The Spanish Securities Market
Act, enacted in July 1988, contains prohibitions relating to insider
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. Id.
365. Id. at 97,518.
366. Id.
367. Id.
368. See ICMSR § 8C.11.
369. West Germany: Insider Trading Law Tightened, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Dec. 1989, at
46.
370. Belgian Government Approves Financial Markets Reform, Doing Business in Eu-
rope (CCH) No. 210 (January 16, 1990).
371. Bruyneel and Peeters, Too Much Red Tape, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1990, at 12.
372. Ministry Seeks Transparent Trading on Reformed Bourse, Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 5 (Aug. 2, 1989).
373. POSER, suprd note 191, at 416, citing Friedman, Flagging Milan Comes to Life
After Hours, FIN. TIMES, July 8, 1988, at 38, col. 4.
374. PosER, supra note 191, at 426.
375. Schreuder and Kasdorp, Guide, supra note 180, at 37.
376. Id.
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trading.3 77
VI. UCITS
A. UCITS Directive
The Council adopted a directive governing "undertakings for the col-
lective investment in transferable securities" ("UCITS") on December 20,
1985.78 UCITS are undertakings formed for the collective investment in
transferable securities of funds raised from the public. UCITS redeem
their own units at the request of the holders from the assets of the
fund,' 7 9 and thus are similar to "open-end" investment companies in the
United States.380 The directive provides that undertakings "may be con-
stituted according to the law of contract (as common funds managed by
management companies) or trust law (as unit trusts) or under statute (as
investment companies)."3 '' The implementation date for the UCITS di-
rective was October 1, 1989, except for Portugal and Greece which were
given until April 1992 to implement the directive.382
Under the directive, UCITS may not operate as such without author-
ization by the competent authorities of the member state in which they
are situated. 38 The laws of such member state, which must meet the min-
imum requirements of the directive, will govern both the authorization
and operations of the firm.38 Once authorized, UCITS may operate in all
member states,385 but must comply with the laws of such "host" states
that do not fall within the areas governed by the EC directive. 88 Since
the UCITS directive does not have a reciprocity provision comparable to
that of the Second Banking Directive, investment companies from non-
member countries may form EC-based affiliates to operate in the EC.387
The directive establishes detailed rules regarding the structure, obli-
377. POSER, supra note 191, at 440.
378. Council Directive 85/611/EEC on the Coordination of Laws, Regulations, and Ad-
ministrative Provisions Relating to Undertakings for Collective Investment in Transferable
Securities, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 3. See also Directive 88/220, 1988 O.J. (L 100) 31 (amending
Directive 85/611 in respect of the investment policies of certain UCITS); Council Recom-
mendation 85/612, 1985 O.J. (L 375) 19.
379. Id., art. 1. Article 2 of the directive excludes several funds from coverage, includ-
ing, inter alia, UCITS of the closed-end type; UCITS which do not promote the sale of their
units to the public within the Community; and UCITS which may be sold only to the public
in non-EC countries.
380. ICMSR, § 1.09[2].
381. Id.
382. UCITS Directive, art. 57; EC DIRECTIVE REMOVES INVESTMENT BARRIERS, EUROPE-
1992: THE REPORT ON THE SIGLE EUROPEAN MARKET 391 (Oct. 25, 1989). Italy, Germany and
the Netherlands missed the October 1, 1989 deadline. Id.
383. Id., art. 4.
384. ICMSR, § 1.09(2].
385. Id., art. 1.
386. Id., art. 44, no. 1.
387. ICMSR, § 1.09[2].
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gations, investment policies and disclosure obligations of unit trusts and
investment companies. With certain exceptions, UCITS may only invest
in transferable securities listed on a stock exchange in a member state,
dealt in on a regulated market in a member state, or traded on an ex-
change or regulated market in a non-member state provided such market
has been approved by the competent authorities or is provided for in law
or the fund's rules or articles of incorporation. 8 UCITS are not allowed
to borrow funds, with certain exceptions relating to borrowing on a tem-
porary basis or for the purchase of certain immovable property. 8 9 In gen-
eral UCITS must stand ready to re-purchase or redeem units from hold-
ers upon request. 9
B. National Laws
In the United Kingdom, investment companies are subject to regula-
tion under the Financial Services Act and the business conduct rules of
the Securities and Investments Board and self- regulatory organiza-
tions."9 In 1989 the U.K. published statutory amendments implementing
the UCITS directive. 92 Under the FSA, a "collective investment scheme"
is an arrangement with respect to property the purpose or effect of which
is to enable persons taking part in the arrangement to participate in or
receive profits from the acquisition, holding, management, or disposal of
the property. 93 A "unit trust scheme" is a collective investment scheme
under which the subject property is held in trust for the participants.9 "
One must be an authorized person 3 95 in order to establish or operate a
collective investment scheme since such activities under the Financial
Services Act constitute an investment business.96 The collective invest-
ment scheme must be separately authorized and is subject to extensive
regulation.3 97 The Department of Trade and Industry ultimately is re-
sponsible for investment funds but has delegated much of its authority to
the Securities and Investment Board.3 98 A collective investment scheme
formed in any EC country may be sold to the public in the United King-
388. UCITS Directive, supra note 378, art. 19. Article 19, no. 2, of the directive estab-
lishes certain exceptions relating to permissible investments which are generally limited to
ten percent of the assets of a UCITS.
389. Id., art. 36.
390. Id., art. 37. The directive provides several exceptions to this duty.
391. POSER, supra note 191, at 105.
392. United Kingdom: UCITS Directive Implemented, Doing Business in Europe
(CCH) 98-345, at 97,301.
393. Financial Services Act, supra note 141, § 75(1).
394. Id., § 75(8).
395. Id., § 3. In order to be an authorized person, one must be admitted to membership
in an appropriate self-regulatory organization. See ICMSR § 6A.03.
396. Financial Services Act, supra note 141, § 1(2), sch. 1, pt. II, 1 16.
397. Id., pt. 1, ch. 8.
398. Shipton and Kilner, Managing Money: A Guide to the World's Investment Fund
Market, INT'L FIN. L. REv., Supp. April 1990, at 88. [hereinafter Investment Company
Guide].
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dom, if the licensing state certifies that the undertaking complies with the
UCITS directive, and the undertaking follows U.K. marketing rules."' 9
In 1988 France enacted legislation designed to harmonize French law
on mutual funds with the EC UCITS directive."" The government
adopted additional regulations applicable to EC-based funds in late
1989.40" By early 1990, about thirty investment funds from other EC
countries had been authorized to offer securities in France."0 2
In 1989 the German Ministry of Finance issued a proposal designed
to implement the UCITS Directive in Germany.40 3 Germany subsequently
adopted the proposal, effective March 1, 1990, as amendments to the two
pertinent laws, the Domestic In';estment Company Act and the Foreign
Investment Funds Act.40 4 In Germany, domestic mutual funds are treated
like a bank and are subject to bank regulations in addition to investment
company rules.40 5 The Federal Banking Commission administers the in-
vestment company regulations.40 6 The German statutes as amended es-
tablish detailed rules for the sale in Germany of UCITS from EC member
countries. The Institut Monetaire Luxembourgeois clarified existing in-
vestment fund laws in a circular issued in 1991.407 The circular interprets
the investment company legislation Luxembourg enacted in 1988.40 s The
1988 legislation implemented the EC UCITS directive, making Luxem-
bourg the first country to do so.409 Since that time Luxembourg has made
a concerted effort to become the headquarters of the UCITS industry in
the EC.41 0 The legislation provides that UCITS from other EC member
countries may be freely sold in Luxembourg, subject to Luxembourg's
marketing rules and several other conditions. 1 1
Spanish law permits shares of investment firms from EC member
states to be publicly offered in Spain pursuant to the EC UCITS Direc-
tive.412 As of early 1990, the Netherlands was in the process of enacting
399. Id., at 92.
400. France: Bill Submitted on Mutual Funds, Doing Business in Europe (CCH) V 98-
195, at 97,201; France: Mutual Funds Law Enacted, Doing Business in Europe (CCH) 98-
211, at 97,213, citing Law No. 88-1201 of Dec. 23, 1988, 1988 J.O. 31.
401. Investment Company Guide, supra note 398, at 34.
402. Id.
403. West Germany: Implementing the UCITS Directive, INT'L FIN. L. REV., June
1989, at 42.
404. Investment Company Guide, supra note 398, at 101. See generally ICMSR, §
8C.09.
405. Id.; see ICMSR, § 8C.09[a].
406. Id.
407. Financial Legislation Consolidated, FIN. TIMES LIMITED, FINANCIAL REGULATION
REPORT (Feb. 1991).
408. Id.
409. Investment Company Guide, supra note 398, at 62. Luxembourg's implementing
statute of March 30, 1988 was published in the Official Gazette on March 31, 1988. Id.
410. See ICMSR, § 1.09[2].
411. Id.
412. Guide, supra note 180, at 45.
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legislation to implement the UCITS directive " " Under the draft Act on
the Supervision of Investment Institutions, UCITS licensed by other EC
countries will not need a further license to operate in the Netherlands,
provided evidence of the other license is produced, the fund satisfies the
standards of the UCITS directive and certain additional information is
furnished." 4 Belgium adopted new rules in 1989 and 1990 to implement
the UCITS directive." The provisions introduced a new form of unit
trust and opened the country's market to foreign unit trusts. '
VII. MISCELLANEOUS
A. Pan-European Market
The Federation of Stock Exchanges in the European Community
(FSEEC) announced in 1989 that it would work toward closer linkages
between European equity markets.4 17 The members of FSEEC agreed to
pursue the development of a "single stock exchange for Europe's largest
companies." ' FSEEC would begin by authorizing a shared information
system which would carry real-time price information as well as price-
sensitive company announcements.4 19 In January 1990 the chairman of
the FSEEC discussed a proposal for a " 'super-league' single equity listing
for Europe's leading 250 to 300 companies"420 which subsequently drew
questions from London's International Stock Exchange."2 The British
later put forward a separate proposal which would use London's SEAQ
International system as the foundation for a "European Wholesale Mar-
ket."' 2 In June 1990 the committee envisioned two parallel markets: a
"Eurolist" of leading European stocks aimed at the retail market and a
413. Investment Company Guide, supra note 398, at 45.
414. Id., citing Wet Toezicht Belegginginstellingen.
415. Belgium: New Form of Unit Trusts to be Introduced, Doing Business in Europe
(CCH) 98-299, at 97,267; Belgian Government Approves Financial Markets Reform, Do-
ing Business in Europe (CCH) No. 210 (Jan. 16, 1990).
416. Belgium: New Form of Unit Trusts to be Introduced, Doing Business in Europe
(CCH) T 98-299, at 97,267; Belgian Government Approves Financial Markets Reform, Do-
ing Business in Europe (CCH) No. 210 (Jan. 16, 1990).
417. Single Stock Exchange, INrr'L FIN. L. REV., Nov. 1989, at 43.
418. Id.
419. Id. This network, called Pipe, was created in May 1990. EC Bourses' 'Pipe' Project
Has Trading Ambitions, REUTERS (July 4, 1990).
420. Knight Sees EC 'Super-League' Equity Listing Forming in '91, Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 2 (Jan. 31, 1990).
421. 'Super-League' Proposal Still Faces Fundamental Questions, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 1 (Feb. 26, 1990); see Rousselle Sees 'Super-League' EuroEquity List as Inevi-
table, 3 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1 (March 12, 1990) (French regulator responding that
British were "reluctant Europeans").
422. ISE 'Super-League' Concept on FSEEC's July Meeting Agenda, Int'l Sec. Reg.
Rep. (BNA) 2 (1990). The European "wholesale market" would be founded upon SEAQ
systems and could be integrated with wholesale markets being developed elsewhere in Eu-
rope. Chairman of ISE Outlines Future European Market for Equities, FIN. TiMEs, FIN.
REG. RPT. (June 1990).
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European wholesale market catering to block trades.428 Like so many of
the EEC's initiatives, competitive considerations have become salient fea-
tures of the debate.
B. European Company Statute
In 1989 the European Commission issued a new proposal for a Euro-
pean Community statute after a seven-year hiatus.42 4 The proposal would
establish a Community-wide system of company law4 25 applicable to a
single legal entity formed in one EC country.426 A European Company, or
societas europeas,4 2 7 could be formed by two or more companies provided
at least two companies have their headquarters in two or more member
states. 18 The statute would "permit a multinational to unify capital and
personnel in several Community countries" and would "provide some
flexibility in setting off profits in one country against losses in an-
other. .. 429 One especially controversial provision involves the issue of
worker participation.8 0
VIII. CONCLUSION
In addition to the EEC's contribution to international trade and
commerce through the reduction of regulatory barriers, the Community
has constructed an important model which may be used in developing a
global system of securities regulation. Although other organizations, such
as the International Organizational of Securities Commissions (IOSCO),
are actively working to develop international norms in the area of securi-
ties regulation, the EEC at present is the most active and influential or-
ganization in the field. Whether in developing a system of international
securities regulation, the international community chooses to follow the
European Community Model, follows other models such as the U.S./Ca-
nada multijurisdictional disclosure system, or pursues the IOSCO ap-
proach remains to be seen. Irrespective of the approach the international
community ultimately takes to the question of international securities
regulation, it cannot and should not ignore the substantive and creative
work of the European Community.
423. FSEEC Begins to Map Out Technical Details for Pan-European Eurolist, 3 Int'l
Sec. Reg. Rep. (BNA) 1 (July 16, 1990).
424. See European Company Statute, Ir'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1989, at 44. See Global
Harmonization, supra note 3, at 207, n. 133, citing Proposal for a Council Regulation on the
Statute for a European Company, Eur. Parl. Doc. (COM 268 final-SYN-218) (1989).
425. Id.
426. Commission Revives Proposal for 'Societas Europeas', 2 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 1 (July 19, 1989).
427. Id. at 2.
428. European Company Statute, INT'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1989, at 44.
429. Commission Revives Proposal for 'Societas Europeas', 2 Int'l Sec. Reg. Rep.
(BNA) 1 (July 19, 1989).
430. European Company Statute, INir'L FIN. L. REV., Oct. 1989, at 44.
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FACULTY COMMENT
Old Jerusalem: Whose to Govern?
JOHN QUIGLEY*
When the United Nations Security Council criticized Israel in 1990
over shootings by Israeli police in east Jerusalem, Israel rejected the con-
demnation, replying that east Jerusalem was Israeli territory, and there-
fore the Council had no authority to concern itself. Israel refused to re-
ceive investigators the U.N. Secretary-General wanted to send to inquire
into the incident.'
Also in 1990, Soviet Jews immigrated to Israel in substantial num-
bers, and many settled in east Jerusalem. The city's Palestine Arabs pro-
tested, fearing a further solidification of Israel's control. The United
States protested on similar grounds. Israel took the position that it could
settle immigrants in east Jerusalem. 2
In 1991, when the United States pressed Israel to negotiate with the
Palestinians, Israel said it would not talk with Palestinian residents in
Jerusalem. Israel feared that talks with Jerusalem Palestinians about a
territorial settlement might imply that Israel did not have full sover-
eignty over Jerusalem.3
These controversies highlight the long-standing dispute over the sta-
tus of east Jerusalem. The government of Israel views it as Israeli terri-
tory. Under Israeli law, east Jerusalem is part of a larger Jerusalem and is
Israel's capital city. The Palestine Liberation Organization, on the other
hand, holds that east Jerusalem should be the capital of a Palestinian
state. The U.N. Security Council considers east Jerusalem to be territory
* Professor of Law, Ohio State University. LL.B., M.A., Harvard University. The au-
thor is grateful to Atty. Usama Halabi for comments on a draft of this article.
1. See infra text accompanying notes 78-81.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 71-77. "East Jerusalem" as used in this article
means the ancient walled city containing numerous holy sites, plus the surrounding area to
the north, south, and east, within borders defined by a regulation of the Israeli government,
see infra notes 54-56. It was territory under Jordanian control 1948-67. "West Jerusalem" is
the area to the west of the ancient walled city. It has been under Israel's control since 1948.
3. Thomas L. Friedman, Mideast Talks: Peace Might Be an Incidental Result, N.Y.
TIMES, July 24, 1991, at A8, col. 3.
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under Israel's belligerent occupation, and therefore subject to its scrutiny.
This article examines the legal status of east Jerusalem to determine
whether the United Nations may concern itself with Israel's conduct
there, and whether Israel may lawfully settle immigrants there. It also
examines the question of sovereignty in east Jerusalem, to sort out the
conflicting claims, and to determine who has the right to govern.4
I. HISTORICAL CONNECTIONS IN JERUSALEM
To answer these questions, it is necessary first to review the city's
history and the contending parties' connections to it. A key element in
any claim to territory is occupation. A state or people that can establish
its occupation, to a greater degree than others, will be deemed, at least
prima facie, the legitimate sovereign.' In the face of competing claims to
Western Sahara, the International Court of Justice used effectiveness of
occupation to resolve the question of sovereignty. The Court analyzed
acts of occupation and dominion by the contending parties and found
that the indigenous inhabitants had the strongest claim, based on long-
time occupation. Morocco, which also claimed sovereignty, had played a
certain role, but its acts of dominion, said the Court, were less
significant.6
With Jerusalem too, an analysis of sovereignty must begin with occu-
pation. Jerusalem historically has been a part of Palestine, and thus the
question of occupation and control of Jerusalem must be considered in
that context. Early in the second millennium B.C. it was a city of the
Jebusites, a sub-group of the Canaanites, the earliest recorded inhabi-
tants in Palestine. It was first conquered by the Israelites around 1000
B.C. and became the capital of the Kingdom of Judah. It was later con-
quered by the Babylonians in 587 B.C., and subsequently ruled by others
until Arabs from the Arabian Peninsula conquered Palestine in the sev-
enth century A.D.. During this time, the bulk of the population remained
the Canaanites.8
With the Arab conquest, the Canaanites took on the Arabic language,
and most assumed its religion, Islam. Since that time they have been re-
4. This article does not examine legal rights to territory other than east Jerusalem. The
author examines rights in all of historic Palestine in JOHN QUIGLEY, PALESTINE AND ISRAEL: A
CHALLENGE TO JUSTICE (1990).
5. R.Y. JENNINGS, THE ACQUISITION OF TERRITORY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 16-35 (1963);
Minquiers and Ecrehos case (France v. U. K.), 1953 I.C.J. 57.
6. Western Sahara (adv. op.), 1975 I.C.J. 3, 40-68. See also Island of Palmas, 2 U.N.
REP. INT'L ARB. AWARDS 829 (1928) (In a dispute between the Netherlands and the United
States over sovereignty in certain Pacific Ocean Islands, an arbiter relied on Dutch East
India Company agreements with local princes relating to the islands as more significant
than a United States claim that its predecessor in interest, Spain, had discovered them. The
arbiter found title in the Netherlands because of its greater exertion of control).
7. Judges 19:10-12.
8. HENRY CATTAN, JERUSALEM 21-24 (1981).
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ferred to as Arabs.' In the sixteenth century the Ottoman Empire con-
quered Palestine, and the area around Jerusalem became an Ottoman ad-
ministrative district. Still the Arabized Canaanites formed the bulk of the
population, along with a Jewish minority that remained from ancient
times, numbering about two percent."0 In the late nineteenth century,
Jews migrated to Palestine from Europe, augmenting the Jewish minority
to nearly ten percent by the end of the century. A large number of these
lived in Jerusalem where they numbered half the population."
After World War I, Great Britain assumed control of Palestine,
which for the first time became a separate territorial entity, with Jerusa-
lem as its administrative center. Britain permitted migration by Euro-
pean Jews, and by World War II they numbered thirty percent of Pales-
tine's population against seventy percent Arabs. In Jerusalem, Jews
numbered over half, although Arabs owned more land. 2
In November 1947, in a resolution favored by the European states
but opposed by most Third World states, the United Nations General
Assembly recommended dividing Palestine into an Arab and a Jewish
state with an economic union between them. Jerusalem would have be-
come a corpus separatum under the U.N. Trusteeship Council, because of
sites in the Jerusalem-Bethlehem area considered sacred in Judaism, Is-
lam, and Christianity.'3 The resolution as a whole was protested by the
Palestine Arabs, who staged public demonstrations and a commercial
strike. They considered it unfair to split a country in which they were a
seventy percent majority. The General Assembly's plan, moreover, would
have given the thirty percent Jewish population over half the territory.
In December 1947, intercommunal hostilities broke out. Palestine
Arab irregulars attacked convoys carrying supplies to Jewish settlements,
and Jewish military units attacked Arab towns. The Jewish Agency,
which represented Palestine's Jewish population at the U.N., had a regu-
9. See Arnold Toynbee, The Middle East, Past and Present, in THE ARAB-ISRAELI
IMPASSE 41, 48 (Majdia D. Khadduri, ed., 1968) (states that by World War II, "the Palestin-
ian Arabs had been the inhabitants of Palestine for more than 1,300 years," refers to the
time of the Arab conquest of Palestine, and states that this tenure gave them "a prescriptive
right").
10. Shmuel Ettinger, The Growth of the Jewish Centre in Palestine Before the British
Occupation, in A HISTORY OF THE JEWISH PEOPLE, at 915, 916 (Ben-Sasson ed., 1976). See
Julius Stone, Peace and the Palestinians, 3 N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 247, 249-250 (1970)
(stating, incorrectly, that Palestine under Arab and Turkish rule "was never exclusively
Arab or Moslem anymore than it was exclusively Jewish or Christian, either in population or
in cultural and religious concerns").
11. Ettinger, supra note 10, at 916-917.
12. Supplement to the Survey of Palestine 13 (Government Printer, Jerusalem, 1947)
(giving as estimates for Dec. 31, 1946, in Jerusalem, 99,000 Jews and 65,000 Arabs). CATTAN,
supra note 8, at 158 (map of Jerusalem in 1948 showing Arab and Jewish districts). See
Stone, supra note 10, at 255 (arguing, incorrectly, that "no identifiable people now survives
which can demonstrate any special relation to Palestine prior to the centuries for Jewish
statehood there.").
13. G.A. Res. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR Res. 131, pt. 3, U.N. Doc. A/519 (1947).
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lar army, the Haganah. Other groups seeking Jewish statehood in Pales-
tine had smaller armed contingents. Jerusalem was a prime target of an
offensive undertaken in December by one of these, the Irgun. Irgun leader
Menachem Begin, who later became prime minister of Israel, described
how "for three days, from 11th to 13th December [1947]," the Irgun
"hammered at concentrations of rioters and their offensive bases," by
which he meant Arab villages. Begin recounted, "We attacked again and
again in Jerusalem." 4
On January 5, 1948, the Haganah set a bomb in the Semiramis Hotel
in an Arab district of west Jerusalem, killing twenty-six persons. The
Haganah said in justification that it had information that the hotel
housed Arab irregulars. The British government, disputing that informa-
tion, denounced the Semiramis bombing as terrorist and a "dastardly and
wholesale murder of innocent people."15
During January and February, under the pressure of the Haganah-
Irgun attacks, Palestine Arabs fled from many areas of Palestine, includ-
ing Jerusalem. On February 5, 1948, David Ben-Gurion, who would be-
come Israel's first prime minister, ordered that Jews be settled in con-
quered and abandoned Arab areas. The Haganah rocketed Arab
neighborhoods in Jerusalem, with the apparent aim of frightening Arab
residents into fleeing, and many did.16
In a February 7 speech, Ben-Gurion said, "Since Jerusalem's destruc-
tion in the days of the Romans, it hasn't been so Jewish as it is now." In
"many Arab districts" in the western part of Jerusalem, he said, "one sees
not one Arab. I do not assume that this will change. 1 7 On February 12,
after a Jewish woman was shot in the Talbiyeh district of west Jerusalem,
a Haganah loudspeaker van drove through the neighborhood ordering the
Arab residents to evacuate.1 8
In April 1948, combatants of the Irgun and the Stern Gang (LEHI),
another Jewish military force, captured the village of Deir Yassin just
west of Jerusalem, and killed 250 of its civilian inhabitants. The Irgun
claimed that it killed the inhabitants while taking houses by force, but
witnesses said that it killed them after the fighting ended.'9 The Irgun
drove surviving Deir Yassin inhabitants in trucks through Jerusalem as a
14. MENACHEM BEGIN, THE REVOLT 337 (1951). In late January 1948, the Irgun Com-
mand selected four major Palestine Arab population centers as targets for a spring offensive:
Jerusalem, Jaffa, the Lydda-Ramleh plain, and the Triangle. Id. at 348. These were four
major Arab population centers in Palestine.
15. Sam Pope Brewer, Britain Condemns Haganah 'Murders,' N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 7,
1948, at Al, col. 2.
16. BENNY MORRIS, THE BIRTH OF THE PALESTINIAN REFUGEE PROBLEM, 1947-1949 50-52
(1987).
17. TOM SEGEV, 1949: THE FIRST ISRAELIS 25 (1986); MORRIS, supra note 16, at 52.
18. MORRIS, supra note 16, at 52.
19. Dana Adams Schmidt, 200 Arabs Killed, Stronghold Taken, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1948, at A6, col. 3; BEGIN, supra note 14, at 162-165.
VOL. 20:1
OLD JERUSALEM
demonstration to Jerusalem's Arabs, 20 and then killed these survivors. 21
The Haganah drove loudspeaker vans in Jerusalem announcing in Arabic,
"unless you leave your homes, the fate of Deir Yassin will be your fate. ' 22
By May, after the Jewish Agency had taken considerable territory in
Palestine, and 300,000 Arabs had fled in the face of its attacks, 2 the
Agency declared statehood for Israel.2" The Arab Higher Committee,
which represented the Palestine Arabs at the United Nations, saw this as
a violation of the rights of Palestinian inhabitants. In the Committee's
view, "the people of Palestine" were "an independent nation," while the
Jewish Agency headed "a rebellious minority which has revolted against
the sovereignty of the majority of the population of the country. 25
Transjordan and the Jewish Agency agreed that the Agency would
get the bulk of Palestine (the Mediterranean coastal area and some hin-
terland), and that Transjordan would get the West Bank of the Jordan
River. 8 When the Agency declared statehood, the Transjordanian Legion
occupied the West Bank but did not contest the Agency for the rest of
Palestine. There was no agreement about Jerusalem, however, and over
the spring and summer of 1948, the Transjordanian Legion and the Israel
Defense Force (I.D.F.) fought there. As neither side prevailed, they di-
vided the city, Israel taking the western part (by then overwhelmingly
Jewish in population because of the exodus of the Arabs), and Trans-.
jordan the eastern part (overwhelmingly Arab in population).
Count Folke Bernadotte, dispatched by the U.N. as a mediator,
urged that Israel permit the Arab refugees to return, and criticized Israel
for the seizure of real and personal property of the Arabs. 2 In Jerusalem,
three members of the Stern Gang assassinated Bernadotte, apparently in
20. HARRY LEVIN, I SAW THE BATTLE OF JERUSALEM 57 (1950).
21. MICHAEL PALUMBO, THE PALESTINIAN CATASTROPHE 52 (1987); Avi SHLAIM, COLLU-
SION ACROSS THE JORDAN: KING ABDULLAH, THE ZIONIST MOVEMENT, AND THE PARTITION OF
PALESTINE 164 (1988).
22. Erskine Childers, The Wordless Wish: From Citizens to Refugees, in THE TRANS-
FORMATION OF PALESTINE: ESSAYS ON THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE ARAB-ISRAELI
CONFLICT 165, 186 (Ibrahim Abu-Lughod ed., 1971).
23. Michael Akehurst, The Arab-Israeli Conflict in International Law, 5 NEW ZEALAND
U. L. REV. 231, 233 (1973); CHILDERS, supra note 22, at 193. Benny Morris, The Causes and
Character of the Arab Exodus from Palestine: the Israel Defense Forces Intelligence
Branch Analysis of June 1948, 22 MIDDLE EASTERN STUDIES 5, 10 (1986), quoting I.D.F.,
Intelligence Branch Report, The Emigration of the Arabs of Palestine in the Period 1/12/
1947 - 1/6/1948, June 30, 1948.
24. Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel, 1 Laws of the State of
Israel 3 (1948).
25. U.N. SCOR, 292d mtg. at 26-27, U. N. Doc. S/PV.292 (1948) (statement of Issa
Nakhleh, Representative, Arab Higher Committee).
26. SHLAIM, supra note 21, at 112-116. See also GOLDA MEIR, My LIFE 209 (1975); ALEC
KIRKBRIDE, FROM THE WINGS: AMMAN MEMOIRS 1947-1951 4 (1976).
27. Progress Report of the UN Mediator on Palestine, G.A. Res. 186, U.N. Doc. A/648
at 14 (1948).
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reprisal for these views.2 By late 1948 Jerusalem's pre-1948 Arab popula-
tion of 70,000 was reduced to an estimated 3,500.19
In December 1949, after it had admitted Israel to U.N. membership,
the General Assembly again proposed the internationalization of Jerusa-
lem under the U.N. Trusteeship Council.30 But neither Jordan nor Israel
showed interest.3 1
In 1950 the government of Israel made west Jerusalem its capital
city. Jordan formally incorporated the West Bank, including east Jeru-
salem, into itself."3 Jordan's parliament said, however, that it acted "with-
out prejudicing the final settlement of Palestine's just case within the
sphere of national aspirations, inter-Arab co-operation and international
justice."' Thus, Jordan recognized Palestine's right to exist that might be
effectuated at some future date.
In 1967, during a time of hostility with neighboring states, Israel cap-
tured the West Bank, including east Jerusalem. The hostilities grew out
of tension between Israel and Syria. Egypt, convinced that Israel would
attack Syria,3 5 asked the U.N. to remove its peacekeeping force from the
Israel-Egypt border so that Egypt could move against Israel "the moment
it might carry out any aggressive action against any Arab country."" U.N.
Secretary General U Thant pulled the U.N. Emergency Force (U.N.E.F.)
28. John Kifner, 2 Recount '48 Killings in Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 1988, at A3, col.
1 (The Stern Gang was headed by Itzhak Shamir, a future prime minister of Israel. Shamir
denied involvement in the assassination).
29. Ian Lustick, The Quiescent Palestinians: The System of Control over Arabs in
Israel, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF THE PALESTINIANS 64, 66 (Khalil Nakhleh & Elia Zureik eds.,
1980).
30. G.A. Res. 303, U.N. Doc. A/1251 at 25 (1949).
31. Mark I. Gruhin, Jerusalem: Legal & Political Dimensions in a Search for Peace, 12
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 169, 204 (1980); Whiteman, Corpus Separatum: Jerusalem, 1 Di-
GEST INT'L L. at 594.
32. Jerusalem Named Capital of Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 24, 1950, at Al, col. 2. Emer-
gency Regulations (Land Requisition - Accommodation of State Institutions in Jerusalem)
(Continuance in Force of Orders) Law, 4 Laws of the State of Israel 106 (1950).
33. The International Status of Palestine, 90 JOURNAL DU DROIT INTERNATIONAL 964,
980-982 (1963); Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea
and Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REV. 279, 289 (1968).
34. Albion Ross, Amman Parliament Vote Unites Arab Palestine and Transjordan,
N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1950, at Al, col. 2.
35. DAVID KIMCHE & DAN BAWLY, THE SANDSTORM: THE ARAB-ISRAELI WAR OF JUNE
1967: PRELUDE AND AFTERMATH 91 (1968); ARTHUR LALL, THE UN AND THE MIDDLE EAST
CISIS, 1967 7-8 (1968). On May 12 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol threatened Syria. Charles
W. Yost, The Arab-Israeli War: How it Began, 46 FOREIGN AFF. 304, 307 (1968); Weekly
News Bulletin (Government of Israel), May 9-15, 1967, at 20, in Amos Shaira, The Six-Day
War and the Right of Self-Defence, 6 ISRAEL L. REV. 65, 66 (1971). Syria complained to the
Security Council. U.N. SCOR 22d Sess., at 90 U.N. Doc. S/7885 (1967). (U.N. SCOR 22d
Sess. Supp. for April, May & June 1967) (letter of Syria to President of Security Council,
May 15, 1967).
36. MAi. GEN. INDAR JIT RIKHYF, THE SINAI BLUNDER: WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NA-
TIONS EMERGENCY FORCE LEADING TO THE SIx-DAY WAR JUNE, 1967 16 (1978) (Rikhye was
the U.N. commander and received this communication from Egypt).
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out of Egypt, and asked Israel to accept the U.N.E.F. on its side of the
border as a guard against a possible attack by Egypt, but Israel
declined.3"
Egypt announced it would close the Straits of Tiran to Israeli flag
vessels, and to any vessels carrying strategic goods to Israel." Again
Egypt said it acted to prevent Israel from preparing for an attack on
Syria.3 9 Egypt moved troops to the Israel-Egypt border to deter Israel
from attacking Syria.40 The I.D.F. understood that Egypt meant to inter-
vene only if Israel attacked Syria." The United States did not expect
Egypt to attack absent an Israeli invasion of Syria, and it so informed
Israel.2 On May 30, Egypt concluded a defense treaty with Jordan.
On June 4, Israel's cabinet authorized an invasion of Egypt, 3 and the
next day Israel's air force bombed Egyptian aircraft on the ground at
their bases and attacked by land into the Sinai Peninsula." Jordan retali-
ated by shelling into Israel around Jerusalem.' In the Security Council,
the United Arab Republic charged Israel with aggression,'4 but Israel
claimed that Egypt struck first.' Israel told the Council, "Egyptian forces
engaged us by air and land, bombarding the villages of Kissufim, Nahal-
Oz and Ein Hashelosha," and "approaching Egyptian aircraft appeared
on our radar screens."'' 8 In fact Egypt did not bombard the villages, and
its aircraft did not leave their bases. In its advance against Jordanian
forces, the I.D.F. captured east Jerusalem.
On July 7 Prime Minister Levi Eshkol acknowledged that Israel
37. REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE WITHDRAWAL OF THE UNITED NATIONS
EMERGENCY FORCE, U.N. GAOR 5th Sess. at para. 21, U.N. Doc. A/6730/Add.3 (1967).
38. Kenneth M. Lewan, Justifications for the Opening of Hostilities in the Middle
East, 26 REVUE EGYPTIENNE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 88 (1970).
39. 16 KEESING'S CONTEMP. ARCHIVES 22065 (1967).
40. Akehurst, supra note 23, at 240.
41. NADAV SAFRAN, FROM WAR TO WAR: THE ARAB-ISRAELI CONFRONTATION, 1948-1967
307 (1969).
42. LYNDON B. JOHNSON, THE VANTAGE POINT: PERSPECTIVES OF THE PRESIDENCY 1963-
1969 293 (1971). Alfred J. Hotz, Legal Dilemmas: The Arab-Israeli Conflict, 19 S.D.L. REV.
242, 264 (1974).
43. Asher Wallfish, Meir Reveals Text of War Decision, JERUSALEM POST, June 5, 1972,
at 1, col. 2. EDGAR O'BALLANCE, THE THIRD ARAB-ISRAELI WAR 35 (1972); JANICE G. STEIN
AND RAYMOND TANTER, RATIONAL DECISION-MAKING: ISRAEL'S SECURITY CHOICES, 1967 241
(1980); Howard Koch, June 1967: The Question of Aggression, 14 ARAB WORLD 10-13 (June
1969); KIMCHE & BAWLY, supra note 35, at 156.
44. PIERRE-MAIE MARTIN, LE CONFLIT ISRARLO-ARABE: RECHERCHES SUR L'EMPLOI DE LA
FORCE EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POSITIF 153-54 (1973). See generally, Tom J. Farer,
Law and War, in 3 THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER: CONFLICT MANAGE-
MENT 15, 41 (Cyril Black & Richard Falk eds., 1971)
45. O'BALLANCE, supra note 43, at 181.
46. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. 1347th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1347 (1967).
47. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. 1347th mtg. at 3 U.N. Doc. S/PV.1347 (1967) (communica-
tion of Israel to President of Security Council).
48. U.N. SCOR, 22d Sess. 1348th mtg. at 15, U.N. Doc. S/PV.1348 (1967) (statement of
Foreign Minister Abba Eban, Israel).
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struck first, but said it had done so in "legitimate defense," because it
anticipated an imminent Egyptian attack.49 As proof of Egypt's intent,
Israeli officials cited Egypt's request for the departure of U.N.E.F., its
closure of the Straits of Tiran, its positioning of troops near Israel, its
alliance with Jordan, and verbal threats by Egyptian President Gamal
Abdul Nasser.50
Israeli officials said later, however, that Israel had not expected an
imminent attack."' Chief of Staff Itzhak Rabin said that "the two divi-
sions" Egypt sent to the border "would not have been enough to unleash
an offensive against Israel. He knew it and we knew it.' ' 52 Menachem Be-
gin, later as Prime Minister, said that "the Egyptian Army concentrations
in the Sinai approaches do not prove that Nasser was really about to at-
tack us. We must be honest with ourselves. We decided to attack him.""3
The government moved quickly to change the status of east Jerusa-
lem. The Knesset (parliament) enacted a statute stating that "the law,
jurisdiction and administration of the state" of Israel "shall extend to any
area of Eretz Israel [the Land of Israel] designated by the Government by
order."" Using this statute, the government declared Israeli law applica-
ble to an area that included east Jerusalem, plus adjacent West Bank
territory of approximately equal size.55 The government merged the newly
enlarged east Jerusalem area with west Jerusalem. 50 This extension of ju-
49. Admission on Attack, THE TIMES (London), July 8, 1967, at 3, col. 7 (stating that
Eshkol "buried the often-repeated statement that Egyptian [air] and land forces attacked
Israel before she launched her devastating lightning offensive on June 5").
50. ALLAN GERSON, IsRAEL, THE WEST BANK AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 71 (1978); 1967
U.N.Y.B. 1967, 195-196; Stephen M. Schwebel, Comment, What Weight to Conquest?, 64
AM. J. INT'L L. 344, 346 (1970); Shaira, supra note 35, at 76.
51. HEINZ WAGNER, DER ARABISCH-ISRAELISCHE KONFLIKT IM VOLKERRECHT 434 (1971);
Joseph L. Ryan, The Myth of Annihilation and the Six-Day War, WORLDVIEW, at 38-42
(Sept. 1973).
52. Le gn~ral Rabin ne pense pas que Nasser voulait la guerre, LE MONDE, Feb. 29,
1968, at 1, col. 6 (Rabin said that Nasser did not think Israel would attack Syria, but that
Nasser put troops on the border to give the appearance of being the "savior of Syria").
53. Excerpts from Begin Speech at National Defense College, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21,
1982, at A6, col, 5.
54. Law and Administration Ordinance (Amendment No. 11) Law, 21 Laws of the
State of Israel 75 (1967). By a simultaneous law, the Knesset gave the Minister of the Inte-
rior the right to extend the boundaries of a municipality to include the area designated by
government order issued under this amendment. Municipalities Ordinance (Amendment
No. 6) Law, 21 Laws of the State of Israel 75 (1967). By order, the Minister of the Interior
expanded the borders of east Jerusalem, KOVETZ HATAKANOT (Official Gazette), No. 2063,
June 28, 1967, at 2670.
55. KovErz HATAKANOT (Official Gazette), No. 2064, June 28, 1967, at 2690; Sabri
Jiryis, Israeli Laws as Regards Jerusalem, in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINE PROB-
LEM WITH SPEcIAL REGARD TO THE QUESTION OF JERUSALEM 181, 182 (Hans Koechler ed.,
1981). See also KIMCHE & BAWLEY, supra note 35, at 215.
56. Municipalities Ordinance (Declaration on the Enlargement of Jerusalem's City
Limits), KovErz HATAKANOT (Official Gazette), No. 2065, June 28, 1967, at 2694, reprinted
in Order Unites Holy City, JERUSALEM PosT, June 29, 1967, at 1, col. 6.
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risdiction, which amounted to a de facto annexation of east Jerusalem , 7
was condemned by the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly as a
violation of the rights of the Palestine Arabs and of the law of belligerent
occupation."8 It was not recognized by other states.59
The government built large apartment complexes in east Jerusalem,
insulating it from the dense areas of Arab population. 0 This created a
Jewish-populated buffer zone between east Jerusalem and the West
Bank.61 In 1973 the Knesset made east Jerusalem residents eligible to
vote in Jerusalem municipal elections,62 but few did so, because of their
objection to Israel merging east Jerusalem with west Jerusalem.6 3
In 1980 the Knesset declared "Jerusalem, complete and united" to be
"the capital of Israel." The Knesset denominated this law a "basic law,"
giving it quasi-constitutional rank.64 The Security Council and General
Assembly declared the 1980 law a nullity.6"
In 1988 the Palestine National Council, a parliamentary body of the
Palestine Arabs, 6 laid plans to declare statehood for a Palestinian state.
Jordan renounced its 1952 incorporation of the West Bank, including east
Jerusalem, Jordan's King Hussein explaining, "We respect the wish of the
P.L.O.6 7 for an independent Palestinian state."6" The Palestine National
Council then proclaimed "the establishment of the State of Palestine in
the land of Palestine with its capital Jerusalem."6 9 The Council projected
57. GERSON, supra note 50, at 211.
58. S.C. Res. 252, 23 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 9, U.N. Doc. S/INF/23/Rev.1 (1968). S.
C. Res. 267, 24 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 3, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1 (1969). G.A. Res.
2253, 5 (emerg. spec. sess.) U.N. GAOR Res. 4, U.N. Doc. A/6798 (1967).
59. JOHN DUGARD, RECOGNITION AND THE UNITED NATIONS 11i-115 (1987); Antonio Cas-
sese, Legal Considerations on the International Status of Jerusalem, 3 PALESTINE Y.B.
INT'L L. 13, 28-32 (1986).
60. Sarah Graham-Brown, The Economic Consequences of the Occupation, in OCCUPA-
TION: ISRAEL OVER PALESTINE 167, 205 (Naseer Aruri ed., 1983).
61. RAFIK HALABI, THE WEST BANK STORY 42 (1982); W. THOMAS MALLISON & SALLY V.
MALLISON, THE PALESTINE PROBLEM IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 234 (1986).
62. Local Authorities (Elections)(Amendment No. 6) Law, 27 Laws of the State of
Israel 170 (1973).
63. ORI STENDEL, THE MINORITIES IN ISRAEL 135-136 (1973). Henry Kamm, Most Arabs
Boycott Jerusalem Election, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 1, 1974, at A2, col. 4.
64. Basic Law: Jerusalem, Capital of Israel, 34 Laws of the State of Israel 209 (1980).
65. S.C. Res. 478, 35 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 14, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1981). G.A. Res.
35/169(E), 35 U.N. GAOR Res. & Decs. 28, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
66. Members are selected by Palestine Arab communities and organizations. DAVID GIL-
MOUR, DISPOSSESSED: THE ORDEAL OF THE PALESTINIANS 156 (1982).
67. Palestine Liberation Organization, an administrative-executive body operating
under the authority of the Palestine National Council.
68. John Kifner, Hussein Surrenders Claims on West Bank to the P.L.O., N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 1, 1988, at Al, col. 6.
69. Palestine National Council, Declaration of Independence, Nov. 15, 1988, U.N.
GAOR, 43d Sess., Annex 3, Agenda Item 37 at 15, U.N. Doc. A/43/827, S/20278 (1988),
reprinted in 27 I.L.M. 1668 (1988); Al-Fajr Jerusalem Palestinian Weekly, Nov. 28, 1988,
at 5, col. 1 (official English translation).
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its state for the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, including east Jerusa-
lem." Thus, the reference to Jerusalem as capital was to east Jerusalem.
In 1990 large numbers of Jews from the Soviet Union began to immi-
grate to Israel, and the government announced plans to build new hous-
ing for them. Substantial numbers settled in east Jerusalem. 71 U.S. Presi-
dent George Bush said that Israel should create no "new settlements" in
east Jerusalem. 2 The State Department reaffirmed its position that east
Jerusalem was part of the West Bank, not of Israel.7 This new settlement
activity concerned east Jerusalem's Palestine Arabs, who feared that it
would solidify Israel's hold.74 A statement by Simcha Dinitz, head of the
Jewish Agency which organizes and finances Jewish immigration to
Israel, 75 fed these fears. Dinitz said that the Soviet immigrants would
"give Israel the numbers it needs to go to the negotiating table from a
position of strength."7 " The statement suggested that the immigration
would help Israel resist demands for the establishment of a Palestine
state.
The United States promised Israel a $400 million loan to build hous-
ing for Soviet Jews but demanded an assurance that Israel would not set-
tle the immigrants in east Jerusalem, or elsewhere in the West Bank. Af-
ter several months of negotiations, Israel refused to give the assurances,
but the United States still released the $400 million.77
In October 1990 a shooting incident occurred in east Jerusalem near
70. See Letter dated November 16, 1988 from the Deputy Permanent Observer of the
Palestine Liberation Organization to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary Gen-
eral, U.N. GAOR 43d Sess., Annex 2 Agenda Item 37 at 7, U.N. Doc. A/43/827, S/29278
(1988).
71. Herb Keinon & Walter Ruby, Warsaw Now Transit Point for Soviets, JERUSALEM
POST (int'l ed.), June 9, 1990, at 3, col. 1 (U.S. Reps. William Lehman and Peter Defazio
reporting statements by Israeli officials that 1400 had settled in and around east Jerusalem
from mid-1989 to mid-1990).
72. Excerpts of President Bush's Remarks at News Conference at End of Talks, N.Y.
TimEs, Mar. 4, 1990, at A22, col. 1. See also Thomas Friedman, Bush Questions Israeli
Claims to East Jerusalem, Creating Uproar, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 1990, at A8, col. 3.
73. Joel Brinkley, Labor Party Rejects Likud Terms for Palestinian Talks, N.Y.
TimEs, Mar. 6, 1990, at A3, col. 3 (statement of Margaret Tutwiler, spokesperson).
74. PLO Radio Broadcasts Intifadah Call No. 58, British Broadcasting Corp., Sum-
mary of World Broadcasts, June 18, 1990, pt. 4, at ME/0793/A/1 (quoting text of Call No. 58
issued by Unified National Leadership of the Uprising).
75. Herb Keinon & Eitan Milgram, Cabinet Gives Sharon Emergency Powers, JERUSA-
LEM POST (int'l ed.), July 7, 1990, at 1, col. 1 (Jewish Agency agreed to pay $362 million over
three years to absorb new immigrants); Garry Abrams, Homeward Bound: Operation Exo-
dus Lends Support to Soviet Jews in Their Return to Israel, L.A. TIMES, June 11, 1990, at
El, col. 2 (Mendel Kaplan, Chairman, Jewish Agency Board of Governors, saying that the
Agency provides all transportation cost to Israel for Soviet immigrants plus total living ex-
penses for their first six months).
76. Herb Keinon, Finland Gives Go-ahead to Fly Jews to Israel, JERUSALEM POST (int'l
ed.), July 14, 1990, at 3, col. 2.
77. Allison Kaplan, Alisa Odenheimer & David Makovsky, U.S. Gave Loan Guarantees
Without the Facts It Sought, JERUSALEM POST (int'l ed.), Mar. 2, 1991, at 1, col. 4.
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the Al-Aqsa mosque, in which Israeli police killed seventeen Palestine
Arabs. The U.N. Security Council condemned the killings and asked the
Secretary General to report on appropriate measures to be taken. It reaf-
firmed, as the basis for international action, its previous position that east
Jerusalem was under belligerent occupation. 8
Israel rejected the resolution on the grounds that east Jerusalem was
under its sovereignty and therefore rules of belligerent occupation did not
apply. It also refused admission to a team the Secretary General wanted
to send to investigate. It explained to the Secretary General, "Jerusalem
is not, in any part, 'occupied territory;' it is the sovereign capital of the
State of Israel. Therefore, there is no room for any involvement on the
part of the United Nations in any matter relating to Jerusalem. '79 Thus,
Israel's positiop was that east Jerusalem was territory under Israel's
sovereignty.
The Council adopted a follow-up resolution, "expressing alarm" at
Israel's rejection of the previous resolution. The Secretary General is-
sued his report, without being able to conduct an on-site inquiry, and
proposed a permanent U.N. role to monitor Israel's treatment of the Pal-
estine Arabs in the Gaza Strip and West Bank, including east
Jerusalem. 1
II. SELF-DETERMINATION
In the twentieth century, a new norm has emerged in international
law that is relevant to the status of Jerusalem. The concept of self-deter-
mination gave a people under foreign control a right to decide its political
destiny. Self-determination found its first manifestation in the mandate
system established by the League of Nations after World War I. The
League's Covenant required the states that took territory in World War I
to promote the well-being of its people as a "sacred trust of
civilization. "82
The mandate system was directly relevant for Jerusalem because the
League gave Great Britain a mandate to administer Palestine. The
League made the mandate of the "Class A" variety, meaning that Pales-
tine was provisionally recognized as independent.8 3 At the same time, the
78. S.C. Res. 672, U.N. Doc. SIRES/672 (1990), reprinted in Text of Resolution
Adopted by U.N. Council, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 14, 1990, at A10, col. 2.
79. David Makovsky, Israel Won't Cooperate with UN Envoys, JERUSALEM POST (int'l
ed.), week ending Oct. 20, 1990, at 1, col. 5. See also Shamir statement quoted in Report
Submitted to the Security Council by the Secretary-General in Accordance with Resolu-
tion 672, U.N. Doc. S/21919 at 3 (1990), reprinted in AL-FAJM JERUSALEM PALESTINIAN
WEEKLY, Nov. 12, 1990, at 8, col. 1, excerpted in Report by U.N. on Arabs, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 2, 1990, at A10, col. 1.
80. U.N. SCOR (2949th mtg.) U.N. Doc. S/RES/673 (1990), reprinted in U.N. Resolu-
tion on Israel, N.Y. TIMES, Oct 26, 1990, at All, col. 1.
81. Report Submitted to the Security Council, supra note 79, at 3-5.
82. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, 1.
83. LEAGUE OF NATIONS COVENANT art. 22, T 4.
1991
DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
League acknowledged Britain's commitment to promote the development
of a Jewish national home in Palestine, a fact that clouded the scope of
Britain's obligation to promote independence. 4
Self-determination received more thorough treatment in the United
Nations Charter, which stated that the organization would "develop
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples."8 Some commentators
concluded from the drafting history that this concept lacked normative
force. One argued that the Charter "acknowledge[d] the right of colonial
States to continue administering the non-self-governing territories," and
that it did not make self-determination a norm of law. 6
Although the U.N. Charter did not call for immediate termination of
colonialism, it required member states to regard their control over colo-
nies as a "sacred trust" and to transmit periodic reports regarding their
administration of them to the United Nations.87 It thus extended to all
administering states the obligations that under the League Covenant had
applied to states administering mandate territories.
The Charter referred to self-determination as a "principle" in the
Chinese, Spanish, English, and Russian texts.88 Some commentators ar-
gued that "principle" was less than a "right." One said that self-determi-
nation is an aspiration of the United Nations but "can hardly be regarded
as an absolute, either in international law or in international politics."88
But the French text, instead of "principle," said "right" (droit
d'auto-d~termination)." Treaty texts that vary in different official lan-
guages must be reconciled if possible. "Principle" can mean legal enti-
tlement, or something less. Since "principle" is ambiguous, it must be
read to mean "right."8 2
84. Mandate for Palestine, art. 2, 8 LEAGUE OF NATIONS, 0. J. 1007 (1922), See also
TERMS OF LEAGUE OF NATIONS MANDATES: REPUBLISHED BY THE UNITED NATIONS, U.N. Doc.
A/70 (1946), reprinted from Permanent Mandates Commission No. 466, League of Nations
Doc. C.529 M.314 1922 VI and C.667 M.396 1922.VI. See also Convention between the
United States and Great Britain Concerning Palestine, Dec. 3, 1924, 44 Stat. 2184.
85. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2.
86. NATHAN FEINBERG, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE
ARAB-ISRAELI CONFLICT 462 (1979).
87. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
88. U.N. CHARTER art. 1.
89. Eugene V. Rostow, Palestinian Self-Determination: Possible Futures for the Unal-
located Territories of the Palestine Mandate, 5 YALE J. WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 147, 154
(1979). See also, Note, Palestinian Arab Self-Determination and Israeli Settlements on the
West Bank: An Analysis of Their Legality Under International Law, 8 Lov. L.A. INT'L &
COMP. L.J. 551, 555 (1986).
90. U.N. CHARTER art. 1, 2.
91. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 33, V 3, opened for signature May
23, 1969, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27, reprinted in 63 AM. J. INT'L L. 875, 886 (1969), re-
printed in 8 I. L. M. 679, 693 (1969) (treaty terms are presumed to have the same meaning
in each official language).
92. "Principle" is often used in a normative sense in treaties. See, e.g., Wolfgang
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The International Court of Justice has found the Charter provision
on self-determination to import legal entitlement. In a 1971 case concern-
ing Namibia, which, like Palestine, had been under a League of Nations
mandate, the Court explained that the League Covenant gave a right of
self-determination to peoples under mandates, and that the U.N. Charter
expanded this right to peoples of all non-self-governing territories.93 The
General Assembly referred to self-determination, as found in the Charter,
as a right.9 '
The existence by 1947 of a right to self-determination meant that as
Britain announced its intent to withdraw, the people of Palestine had a
right to statehood. By that time Britain and France, the two states that
held mandate territory in the region, had given independence to the other
mandate territories - Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq. The people of Palestine
- Arabs with a Jewish minority - were similarly entitled to indepen-
dence. When the Jewish Agency tried by force to prevent them from
achieving statehood, the Palestine Arabs, as the putative sovereign, could
lawfully defend themselves.9
III. THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF JERUSALEM
The U.N. General Assembly proposed to treat Jerusalem separately
from the rest of Palestine. In proposing a partition of Palestine, as indi-
cated, the Assembly called for Jerusalem to be a "corpus separatum" be-
tween a Jewish state and an Arab state.96
However, the resolution was only a recommendation and was never
put into effect. The resolution said that the Assembly "considers that the
present situation in Palestine is one which is likely to impair the general
Benedek, Progressive Development of the Principles and Norms of International Law Re-
lating to the NIEO: The UNITAR Exercise, 36 OSTERREICHISCHE ZEITSCHRIFT FOR OFFEN-
TLICHES RECHT UND VOLKERRECHT, 289, 307-311 (1986). The use of "principle" elsewhere in
the Charter indicated that the Charter drafters used it in a normative sense. See, e.g., U.N.
CHARTER art. 2, para.4 (provision designated as a "principle" prohibiting use of force be-
tween states).
93. Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in
Namibia (South-West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, 1971 I.C.J.
16, 31.
94. G.A. Res. 421 V (D), 5 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at 43, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950),
Vote: 30-9-13 (referring to "ways and means which would ensure the right of peoples and
nations to self-determination"). See also G.A. Res. 545 VI, 6 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 20) at
36-37, U.N. Doc. A/2119 (1952), Vote (on quoted paragraph): 40-4-10 (referring to Resolu-
tion 421(D) by saying that there the Assembly "recognized the right of peoples and nations
to self-determination as a fundamental human right"). The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights, which, according to its preamble, is based on the Charter, defines self-
determination as a right. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 1., Dec.
19, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171.
95. DEREK BowE'rr, SELF-DEFENCE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (1958). See generally
Schachter, The Right of States to Use Armed Force, 82 MICH. L. REV. 1620, 1626 (1984).
96. G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/519, at 146 (1947).
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welfare and friendly relations among nations. '97 The phrases "general
welfare" and "friendly relations" are drawn from a Charter provision that
gives the Assembly the power of recommendation." This indicated that
the Assembly, in keeping with its powers, understood that it was making
only a non-binding recommendation.
Member states understood that the resolution was only a recommen-
dation.'9 Britain told the Security Council that it would not implement
partition so long as Arab or Jewish authorities objected.100 The United
States said that the resolution carried only "moral force."101 When it be-
came clear that the resolution would not be implemented, the United
States suggested the possibility of a temporary U.N. trusteeship over Pal-
estine. 10 2 The Council asked the Assembly to explore solutions other than
partition, but the Assembly had no success.103
As for Jerusalem, after the partition idea failed, the General Assem-
bly reiterated its call for internationalization.1 04 Although the city was
never internationalized, its status was never resolved. Though various na-
tions recognized Israel as a state, they did not recognize Israeli sover-
eignty over west Jerusalem."° ' In explanation, the United States and
others cited the General Assembly resolutions proposing an international
status for Jerusalem.1 06 Few states located embassies in west Jerusalem,
placing them instead in Tel Aviv.1 0 7 After more than four decades of Is-
raeli de facto control of west Jerusalem, most states continue to consider
the status of Jerusalem (east and west) to be unresolved.
97. Id. at 131.
98. U.N. CHARTER art. 14.
99. HANS KELSEN, THE LAW OF THE UNITED NATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF ITS FUN-
DAMENTAL PROBLEMS 195 (1950).
100. 3 U.N. SCOR (253d mtg.) at 271-272, (1948) (statement of Mr. Creech Jones,
U.K.).
101. 3 U.N. SCOR (253d mtg.) at 265, (1948)(statement of Mr. Austin, U.S.), reprinted
in 18 DEPT. ST. BULL. 294 (1948).
102. 5 Foreign Rel. U.S. 1948 801 (1976), 3 U.N. SCOR (271st mtg.), at 31-32 (1948);
Declaration by Austin on Palestine Situation in the Security Council, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20,
1948, at A2, col. 3.
103. S.C. Res. 44, 3 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 16 (1948).
104. G.A. Res. 194, U.N. GAOR Res. at 21, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948); G.A. Res. 303, U.N.
GAOR Res. at 25, U.N. Doc. A/1251 (1949). Gruhin, supra note 31, at 204-205.
105. G.I.A.D. Draper, The Status of Jerusalem as a Question of International Law, in
THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 55, at 154, 160.
106. Harry Howard, The Development of United States Policy in the Near East,
South Asia, and Africa During 1953: Part II, 30 DEP'T ST. BULL., Jan. 4 - June 28, 1954, at
328, 329; Corpus Separatum: Jerusalem, supra note 31, at 595, The International Status of
Palestine, supra note 33, at 976; Shlomo Slonim, The United States and the Status of
Jerusalem 1947-1984, 19 ISRAL L. REV. 179-252 (1984).
107. Antonio Cassese, Legal Considerations on the International Status of Jerusalem,
in THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF THE PALESTINE PROBLEM, supra note 55, at 144, 148-149. See also
Corpus Separatum: Jerusalem, supra note 31, at 595.
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IV. EAST JERUSALEM AND THE USE OF FORCE
To justify Israel's 1967 extension of jurisdiction over east Jerusa-
lem,108 Prime Minister Eshkol said that "Israel without Jerusalem is
Israel without a head."'0 9 But the 1967 legislation and decree did not
claim sovereignty. In a letter to the Secretary-General at the time, For-
eign Minister Abba Eban said, "The measures adopted relate to the inte-
gration of Jerusalem in the administrative and municipal spheres, and
furnish a legal basis for the protection of the Holy Places of Jerusa-
lem.'" ° He said that the term "annexation," which was being used at the
U.N. to criticize the measures, was "out of place." The government ar-
gued that the 1967 action was not an annexation and therefore did not
violate the law of belligerent occupation."
Eban's argument was weak, because there was no need to apply Is-
raeli law to protect the holy sites. This could have been done just as eas-
ily by applying Jordanian law, which Israel applied elsewhere in the West
Bank. Further, the law of belligerent occupation precludes the annexation
of occupied territory and, short of annexation, forbids the substitution of
the occupier's law for the law previously in force."'
Gradually the government moved closer to claiming sovereignty over
east Jerusalem. The 1980 statute stating that Jerusalem (both halves) was
the capital of Israel implied a claim of sovereignty over east Jerusalem. '"
While the statute did not mention sovereignty directly, if a state claims a
territory as part of its capital city, it must be claiming sovereignty. In
1990, during the controversy over the U.N. investigation of the AI-Aqsa
mosque killings, the government explicitly asserted sovereignty over east
Jerusalem.""
Israel claimed that its control of east Jerusalem, like its control of
the entire West Bank, was legally justified. It argued that it took the
West Bank, including east Jerusalem, by using force in self-defense.
Thus, Elihu Lauterpacht wrote:
Territorial change cannot properly take place as a result of the unlaw-
ful use of force. But to omit the word 'unlawful' is to change the sub-
stantive content of the rule and to turn an important safeguard of
108. See supra notes 54-57.
109. 'Israel without a Head', N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1967, at A16, col. 1.
110. Measures Taken by Israel to Change the Status of the City of Jerusalem, Report
of the Secretary-General, July 10, 1967, U.N. Doc. A/6753 at 3, reprinted in 6 I. L. M. 846,
848 (1967) (giving text of letter by Minister of Foreign Affairs Abba Eban).
111. ELIHU LAUTERPACHT, JERUSALEM AND THE HOLY PLACES 50 (1968).
112. Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, An-
nex: Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277,
2306 (1907); see also Bevans, TREATIES AND OTHER INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA 1776-1949 631 (1968); Convention Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, art. 64, Aug. 12, 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, at 328 (1950).
113. See supra note 64.
114. Report Submitted to the Security Council, supra note 79, at 5.
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legal principle into an aggressor's charter. For if force can never be
used to effect lawful territorial change, then, if territory has once
changed hands as a result of an unlawful use of force, the illegitimacy
of the position thus established is sterilized by the prohibition upon
the use of force to restore the lawful sovereign. This cannot be re-
garded as correct or reasonable.115
Lauterpacht's argument confused two separate situations. The first is
aggression by State A against State B, where State B in defending itself
enters the territory of State A and remains there. In this situation, State
B may remain only so long as is necessary to repel the attack initiated by
State A. The second is aggression by State A against State B, where State
A enters and occupies territory in State B. The question becomes whether
State B may initiate new hostilities to drive State A out of its territory.
Opinion on this issue is divided, but on the first question it is uniform, to
the effect that State B may use only such force as is necessary to repel
State A's attack and may remain in occupation only so long as is neces-
sary to ensure that State A will not resume its attack.
A state that takes territory while acting in self-defense is obliged to
withdraw once it has protected itself from the danger.11 It may not retain
territory it takes while repelling an attack. If Israel had acted in self-
defense, that would not justify its retention of the West Bank.117 Under
the United Nations Charter, there can lawfully be no territorial gains
from war, even by a state acting in self-defense.' The response of other
states to Israel's occupation showed a virtually unanimous opinion that
even if Israel's action was defensive, its retention of the West Bank was
not justified.1 9
Lauterpacht's argument was premised on the assumption that Israel
acted in self-defense in 1967. As indicated above, however, Israel did not
think that Egypt was about to attack.12 0 Even if Israel was concerned that
Egypt might attack at some future time, preemptive strikes are not per-
mitted under the United Nations Charter."1 The Charter characterizes
armed force as defensive only if it is used in response to an "armed at-
115. LAUTERPACHT, supra note 111, at 52. See also MARTIN, supra note 44, at 261-265
(arguing that Israel may retain the territories it took in 1967, on the theory that it took
them defensively).
116. JENNINGS, supra note 5, at 55-56.
117. J.R. GAINSBOROUGH, THE ARAB-IsRAELI CONFLICT: A POLITICO-LEGAL ANALYSIS 149,
158 (1986); MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 61, at 259.
118. Quincy Wright, The Palestine Conflict in International Law, in MAJOR MIDDLE
EAST PROBLEMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 13, 27 (M. Khadduri ed., 1972); Quincy Wright, The
Middle East Problem, 64 AM. J. INT'L L. 270 (1970).
119. S.C. Res. 476, 35 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1980);
DUGARD, supra note 59, at 113; Munkman, Review of Jerusalem and the Holy Places (Elihu
Lauterpacht), 43 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 306, 310 (1968-69).
120. See supra notes 51-53.
121. Akehurst, supra note 23, at 241. See also John L. Hargrove, Abating the Middle
East Crisis Through the United Nations (And Vice Versa), 19 KAN. L. REv. 365, 367
(1971).
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tack.' 1 22 "Armed attack" means that an attack must actually be in pro-
gress, or so near that the reality of the attack is evident.
Although neither the General Assembly nor the Security Council ever
adopted a resolution on the responsibility for the June 1967 hostilities,
both have called on Israel to withdraw from the territory it occupied.12
Regardless of who was responsible for the 1967 hostilities, Israel is pre-
cluded from retaining the territory it took.
Another thesis put forward to justify Israel's retention of the West
Bank, including east Jerusalem, was that Israel's taking of it was neces-
sary and proportional in relation to its security needs, and that this ne-
cessity did not immediately subside.2 4 But even if Israel had responded
to an imminent attack in 1967, it quickly eliminated any threat to itself.
At that point its defensive right would have ceased, and it would have
been obligated to withdraw.
25
Some analysts asserted that Israel might retain the West Bank, in-
cluding east Jerusalem, pending a peace agreement between itself and the
Arab states. 26 Others argued that it might lawfully retain them perma-
nently, because Jordan had not held lawful title and therefore that there
was no sovereign to whom the territories could revert. Israel, it was said,
particularly because it took the territories defensively, had a better claim
to title than anyone else."'7 That argument ignored, however, the gener-
ally recognized proposition that uncertainty over sovereignty provides no
ground to retain territory taken in hostilities. Even if Jordan held the
West Bank on only a de facto basis, Israel could not, even acting in self-
defense, acquire title. 28 The argument also overlooked the fact that the
Palestine Arabs collectivity had a sound claim to the West Bank on the
basis of their right of self-determination.
Israel's claim of self-defense was false. Jordan's responsive military
action against Israel was lawful, as collective self-defense under U.N.
Charter Article 51.1" Israel's use of force against Jordan was part of its
aggression against Egypt, and was therefore unlawful. This means that
Israel took east Jerusalem through aggression. Under the U.N. Charter,
122. U.N. CHARTER art. 51.
123. S.C. Res. 242, 22 U.N. SCOR Res. 8, U.N. Doc. S/INF/22/Rev.2 (1967); S.C. Res.
476, 35 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 13, U.N. Doc. S/INF/36 (1980); G.A. Res. 3414, Dec. 5,
1975, 30 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 34) U.N. Doc. A/10034 (1975).
124. John Norton Moore, The Arab-Israeli Conflict and the Obligation to Pursue
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes, 19 KAN. L. REv. 403, 425 (1971).
125. Hargrove, supra note 121, at 367.
126. Akehurst, supra note 23, at 242.
127. Yehuda Blum, The Missing Reversioner: Reflections on the Status of Judea and
Samaria, 3 ISRAEL L. REv. 279, 294 (1968); Schwebel, supra note 50, at 346; Stephen Schwe-
bel, Remarks, 1 ISRAEL Y.B. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 374 (1971); JULIUS STONE, ISRAEL AND PAL-
ESTINE: ASSAULT ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 52 (1981).
128. Cassese, supra note 59, at 24.
129. See supra note 45. See also O'Brien, International Law and the Outbreak of War
in the Middle East, 1967, 11 OPRis 692, 703 (1967).
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territory may not be taken by aggression, and once taken must be
returned.'
Hostilities between Jordan and Israel resulted from Israel's attack on
Egypt, with whom Jordan had a defensive alliance. Israel's attack on
Egypt in June 1967 constituted aggression, and Jordan's participation on
Egypt's side was justified as collective self-defense.' 3 ' Therefore, Israel's
military action against Jordan, during which it took east Jerusalem, con-
stituted aggression.
One other argument has been made to justify Israeli sovereignty in
east Jerusalem. It relies on the General Assembly's 1947 resolution on
partition and on the resolution's provision for the internationalization of
Jerusalem. Since internationalization was not effected, the argument
runs, Jerusalem became open to occupation by whichever of the benefi-
ciaries of the 1947 resolution might do so. Thus, Jerusalem was legally
open to occupation by Israel, which it occupied in 1967.12 This argument
is defective, however, because the 1947 resolution, as indicated above, was
merely a recommendation and, since it was not accepted, it created no
rights.' In addition, the self-determination right of the Palestine Arabs
meant that east Jerusalem could not be considered open to occupation by
Israel.
V. SETTLEMENT IN EAST JERUSALEM
The West Bank, including east Jerusalem, is under Israel's belliger-
ent occupation. This is so because Israel came into control through inter-
national hostilities. The government of Israel acknowledges that it holds
the West Bank under belligerent occupation but does not acknowledge
that status for east Jerusalem. Israel treats the two territories differently
under its legislation. East Jerusalem is part of Israel administratively; it
is governed by a city administration for all of Jerusalem. For the remain-
der of the West Bank, however, Israel has established a military govern-
ment that is the executive and legislative authority. Whereas east Jerusa-
lem is policed by Israeli police, the remainder of the West Bank is policed
by the Israel Defense Force.
The applicable law differs as well. For example, Israel's penal code is
used in east Jerusalem, and crimes are prosecuted in ordinary Israeli
courts. For the West Bank (outside east Jerusalem), on the other hand,
Israel uses the law in force at the commencement of the occupation,
namely, the law of Jordan, supplemented by military decrees issued by
Israel's military government. Most serious crime is prosecuted in Israel's
courts-martial, although some is handled, as are civil matters, in
Jordanian courts. Israel's Supreme Court uses the law of belligerent occu-
130. U.N. CHARTER art. 2, 4.
131. Supra note 122.
132. Gruhin, supra note 31, at 206-207.
133. See supra notes 97-103.
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pation in resolving controversies between the military government and
Palestine Arab residents of the West Bank."3 4
For east Jerusalem, as indicated, the Knesset has authorized resi-
dents to vote in municipal, though not in national elections. 38 The gov-
ernment of Israel issued identity cards to east Jerusalem residents, but
they have in the main retained their Jordanian citizenship, and Israel has
never considered them to be citizens of Israel.
Israel's view on the status of east Jerusalem has been rejected by all
other states that have expressed a view on the issue. 3 ' They do not find
Israel authorized to apply its own law in east Jerusalem. Nor do they find
Israel authorized to settle its own citizens there.3 7 East Jerusalem is
under belligerent occupation, and the law of belligerent occupation for-
bids an occupier to transfer its own population into the occupied terri-
tory.138 This is a manifestation of the more general norm that an occupier
may not change the character of the occupied territory. 3 ' Israel has en-
couraged its citizens to settle in east Jerusalem, in particular by building
apartment complexes there, and this activity increased in 1990 with the
arrival of the Soviet immigrants.
40
Settlement involves a major change in the character of occupied ter-
ritory. An occupier is required to preserve the territory intact pending
return of the territory. If it inserts its own population into the territory
and if that new population views itself as permanent, as is the case with
the Israeli settlers in east Jerusalem, the likelihood that the territory will
be returned is substantially reduced. Further, the insertion of the occu-
pant's population violates the rights of the inhabitants if their land is
taken, as it typically is, in order to provide space for the settlers.'4
The 1967 and 1980 statutes asserting an Israeli claim to east Jerusa-
lem are irrelevant in this regard. Whatever status east Jerusalem occupies
134. RAJA SHEHADEH, OCCUPIER'S LAW: ISRAEL AND THE WEST BANK 76-102 (1985). The
Court, like Israel's government, does not acknowledge the applicability of the Geneva Civil-
ians Convention, on the theory that the West Bank was not under Jordan's sovereignty
prior to 1967, but they do acknowledge the applicability of customary humanitarian law.
Their view regarding the Geneva Civilians Convention is rejected by scholars and by other
states. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 61, at 252-262; Jordan Paust, Gerhard von Glahn
& GOnter Woratsch, Report of the ICJ Mission of Inquiry into the Israeli Military Court
System in the Occupied West Bank and Gaza, 14 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REV. 1, 7
(1990).
135. See supra note 62.
136. S.C. Res. 478, 35 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 14, U.N. Doc. SiINF/36 (1981). G.A.
Res. 35/169(E), 35 U.N. GAOR Res. & Decs. 28, U.N. Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
137. S.C. Res. 452, 34 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs., U.N. Doc. S/INF/35 (1980) (calling on
Israel to cease the establishment of settlements "in the Arab territories occupied since 1967,
including Jerusalem").
138. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, Occupied Territories, art. 49, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950).
139. Supra note 112, art. 43.
140. See supra notes 60-61, 71.
141. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 61, at 262.
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as a matter of Israeli law, it is territory under belligerent occupation from
the standpoint of international law. A belligerent occupant may not en-
courage its citizens to settle in occupied territory. Moreover, the settle-
ment activity has potentially grave consequences for resolution of sover-
eignty in east Jerusalem.
VI. SOVEREIGNTY OVER EAST JERSUSALEM
Sovereignty in east Jerusalem belongs to its original inhabitants, on
the basis of their long-time occupation. 14 2 The seizure of east Jerusalem
in 1967 cannot defeat that right. The right of east Jerusalem's inhabitants
is based on self-determination, which is assertable against any belligerent
occupier, regardless of how it came into occupation.
The Palestine Arabs have a right to statehood in accordance with the
Declaration of Independence of 1988. That right is valid for the territory
contemplated for the Palestine state, namely, the Gaza Strip and the
West Bank, including east Jerusalem. This conclusion finds ample basis
in the international-legal principles relating to sovereignty over territory,
principles that include self-determination and non-aggression. East Jeru-
salem is part of the territory in which the people of Palestine are entitled
to exercise their right of self-determination by establishing a state.
The arguments that have been made by the government of Israel in
support of its continuing control of east Jerusalem are weak. Territory
taken during hostilities does not thereby fall under the sovereignty of its
occupier. Israel cannot claim east Jerusalem on the grounds that no other
state has a stronger claim, as the Palestine Arabs clearly have a strong
claim. Nor can Israel claim east Jerusalem on grounds of Israel's security.
That is simply not a basis for a claim to territory.
The status of east Jerusalem should be resolved as part of an overall
resolution of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict. East Jerusalem, or Jerusalem
as a whole, cannot be considered in isolation from the surrounding
territory.
The right of a people to achieve self-determination, or to oust an ag-
gressor from its territory, may be realized by armed force if other avenues
are exhausted. The Security Council's practice in cases involving use of
force by liberation movements in Africa during the 1970s and 1980s sug-
gests that when all else fails a people denied self-determination may re-
sort to forcible self-help to remove from its territory the state that is
holding it in dependence.14 s In an International Court of Justice case in-
volving Namibia, Judge Fouad Ammoun shared that view. Citing the
142. John Quigley, Palestine's Declaration of Independence: Self-Determination and
the Right of the Palestinians to Statehood, 7 B.U. INT'L L. J. 1 (1989).
143. Derek Bowett, Reprisals Involving Recourse to Armed Force, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 1,
36 (1972). See also S.C. Res. 268, 24 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 7, U.N. Doc. S/INF/24/Rev.1
(1970); S.C. Res. 273, id. at 9. S.C. Res. 290, 25 U.N. SCOR Res. & Decs. 13, U.N. Doc. S/
INF/25 (1971).
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French national movement under Nazi German occupation, and the Po-
lish, Czech, and Slovak peoples under the Austro-Hungarian Empire, he
said that a people has a right to armed struggle to achieve self-determina-
tion. "In law, the legitimacy of the peoples' struggle cannot be in any
doubt," he said, "for it follows from the right of self-defence, inherent in
human nature, which is confirmed by Article 51 of the United Nations
Charter." '
Armed force, however, is not an optimal means or a solution of first
use. It is a last resort. The international community, as required by the
U.N. Charter,"" should assist the Palestine Arabs in achieving self-deter-
mination by peaceful means.
VII. AN INTERNATIONAL ROLE IN EAST JERUSALEM
Pending a settlement of east Jerusalem's status, the fact that the
Palestine Arabs' sovereignty right remains to be effectuated has impor-
tant immediate consequences. At present, east Jerusalem, along with the
rest of the West Bank, is non-self-governing. Under the U.N. Charter, the
United Nations has oversight powers to determine whether states ad-
ministering non-self-governing territories are fulfilling their responsibili-
ties to the inhabitants. 4 6 The General Assembly has never analyzed east
Jerusalem (or the West Bank) from this standpoint, probably because the
notion of non-self-governing territories was developed for classic overseas
colonies. However, a territory under a long-term belligerent occupation is
not self-governing, and therefore falls within the non-self-governing cate-
gory. The U.N. Charter requires an administering state to report regu-
larly on the status of the territory and to promote self-government and
free political institutions." 7
Further, east Jerusalem remains an area under belligerent occupa-
tion, since it was taken by Israel during international hostilities. On this
basis as well the international community has a legitimate role. The Ge-
neva Civilians Convention regulates belligerent occupation and requires
all parties to ensure respect for the Convention whenever and wherever it
is applicable; 165 states are parties." 8 Thus, all these states are under an
obligation to ensure that Israel does not settle its citizens in east Jerusa-
lem, or physically abuse residents.
The Security Council has responsibility under the U.N. Charter for
situations of breach of the peace, and hostilities led to Israel's control
over east Jerusalem." 9 Following the October 1990 shooting incident near
the Al-Aqsa mosque, the Security Council viewed a videotape taken by a
144. Supra note 93, at 70 (separate opinion).
145. U.N. CHARTER art. 1., 1 2.
146. U.N. CHARTER art. 73.
147. U.N. CHARTER art. 73(e).
148. Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug.
12, 1949, General Provisions, art. 1, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (1950).
149. U.N. CHARTER chap. 7.
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Palestine Arab bystander and concluded that Israeli police had shot and
killed Palestine Arabs without justification. As indicated, it condemned
the shooting and asked the Secretary General to report on the incident.
150
The Security Council has jurisdiction to deal both with the day-to-
day situation in east Jerusalem and with proposals for a permanent set-
tlement. Its powers, as demonstrated in the Security Council's 1990-91
action in the Persian Gulf, are extensive. 51 The Security Council may use
economic sanctions and, if those were insufficient, military force, to effect
a settlement. The Security Council has every ground for using these pow-
ers to force Israel to withdraw from east Jerusalem.
1 5 2
On the several indicated bases there exist ample reasons for a strong
international role in east Jerusalem. The status of east Jerusalem is likely
to continue to be a source of contention. The international community
bears a responsibility to monitor developments there and to promote a
solution consistent with the legitimate claims of the contending parties.
From the standpoint of territorial right, as this notion is understood in
international law, the Palestine Arabs have a valid claim to east Jerusa-
lem. That does not mean they could not agree to a settlement whereby
the city would be internationalized, or whereby Jerusalem in its entirety
was controlled jointly by Israel and a Palestine state. 5 3 But no territorial
settlement for east Jerusalem can be imposed against their will.
The Security Council and outside states must, however, be guided in
the proposals they make by a consideration of the legal rights of the par-
ties. If the United Nations or any other proponent of a settlement departs
too drastically from legal entitlement, it runs the risk of a settlement that
will not last. Legitimate grievances may be swept under a rug tempora-
rily, but they have a way of seeping out. Any solution for east Jerusalem
that does not recognize the right of the Palestine Arabs would be fraught
with danger.
150. Supra note 78.
151. S.C. Res. 678, U.N. Doc. S/RES/678 (1990).
152. MALLISON & MALLISON, supra note 61, at 239 (pointing out that the failure of the
Council to utilize these powers quickly after 1967 permitted Israel to solidify its control in
east Jerusalem).
153. See, e.g., John V. Whitbeck, Two States, One Holy Land: A Framework for Peace,
MIDDLE EAST INTERNATIONAL, June 14, 1991, at 18 (proposing Jerusalem as a joint capital of
Israel and Palestine).
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Human Rights and Access to Health Care:
Comparison of Domestic and International
Law and Systems Implications for New
Medical Technologies in Time of Crisis
I. INTRODUCTION
Three years prior to the American Civil War, Abraham Lincoln
stated that "a house divided against itself cannot stand.", With the ad-
vent of international telecommunications, extensive travel and economic
interdependence, the world is shrinking. As witnessed by the AIDS epi-
demic2 and various strains of influenza,3 localized health problems in
third world countries quickly find their way into one's own back yard.4
Traditional methods for differentiating domestic and international health
problems have lost their meaning.5 With regard to what is currently
known about past and present health crises, the "global village" has be-
come a global house.
This house is extremely divided. The divisions begin with basic dif-
ferences in the way in which societies perceive human rights in general.
Differing philosophies lead to different systems.' When applied to health
care, present systems leave much to be desired.
The aim of this paper is to examine these differences from the per-
spectives of history, treaties and law. Once these differences have been
1. Abraham Lincoln, speech at the Republican State Convention, Springfield Illinois
(June 16, 1858). Lincoln borrowed this phrase from the New Testament of the Bible, Mat-
thew 12:25, Luke 11:17.
2. Dr. Jonathan Mann, Global AIDS into the 1990's, WORLD HEALTH, Oct. 1989, at 6.
3. CHARLES STUART-HARRIS, INFLUENZA, THE VIRUSES AND THE DISEASE 124-31 (2d ed.
1985).
4. Id.
5. George A. Gellert, The Obsolescence of Distinct Domestic and International Health
Sectors, 10 J. PUB. HEALTH POL'Y 421-22 (1989).
6. Louis Henkin, Rights: Here and There, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 1582, 1609 (1981).
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surveyed, they are analyzed in situations where their different systems
must work together. Their probable effects are examined in a potential
international crisis with regard to application of an incredible array of
new medical technologies. Obstructions to their use in a crisis are then
explored based on present law and actual experience. Conclusions and
recommendations flow directly from that analysis.
II. DIFFERING VIEWS ON BASIC HUMAN RIGHTS
The main philosophical difference in human rights perception has
been described as that between "freedom from," aspiring to individual
autonomy, and "having more," through more law and government.7 These
differences have also been termed "political" rights and "socio-economic"
rights. The political rights are immunities or rights against invasion by
the government. The socio-economic rights are rights to affirmative aid
and support by one's government.8
"You owe me nothing; I owe you nothing. You stay out of my way
and I'll stay out of yours." This expression has been described as consti-
tuting an important thread within the Anglo-American socio-moral
fabric.9 The American theory of rights is derived from individual freedom
and autonomy, not claims upon society to do for the individual what he
can not do for himself. The framers of the U.S. Constitution, perhaps due
to their difficulties with Great Britain, saw rights as freedom from abuse
by all branches of government.'0
In the United States, programs regarding public welfare do not exist
by constitutional mandate, but by the grace of Congress, subject to politi-
cal and budgetary constraints." There is no constitutional right to free-
dom from want."s Where some responsibility for individual welfare was
finally recognized, it was seen as secondary and supplementary."
Public welfare statutes are considered "entitlements" instead of
rights.'" U.S. courts have reviewed such entitlements based on the "equal
protection" clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitu-
tion.15 Their standard for review is whether or not "similarly circum-
7. Id.
8. Levy, Making Human Rights More Definite and Effective, in HUMAN DIGNITY, THE
INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 249 (A. Henkin ed. 1979).
9. SANFORD H. KADISH AND STEPHEN J. SCHULHOFER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES
206 (5th ed. 1989).
10. Henkin, supra note 6, at 1592.
11. Id. at 1587.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 1590.
14. Elliot v. Ehrlich, 280 N.W.2d 637, 641 (1979); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262
(1970).
15. Wendy K. Mariner, Access to Health Care and Equal Protection of the Law: The
Need for a New Heightened Scrutiny, 12 AM. J. L. & MED., 345, 347 (1986). The Fourteenth
Amendment states, "No State shall... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, cl. 1.
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stanced" individuals are treated by the government in a similar manner.8
Consequently, the courts will review whether or not one segment of the
poor is treated by the government differently from another segment of
the poor. They will not decide whether the poor are being treated differ-
ently from the wealthy.1 7 It does not guarantee equal treatment for all.' s
Within the U.S. several states have found that their own constitutions
provide greater protection than the Fourteenth Amendment. 9
The United States has ratified fewer human rights treaties than the
vast majority of countries.2 0 The U.S. is not a party to the International
Covenants on Human Rights."' Some authors believe that treaty ratifica-
tion would have little impact on American human rights because the "rel-
evant domestic law in many respects already ensures more rights than its
international counterpart.
2
In contrast, the French concept of freedom is not freedom from the
law, but through the law.2 1 It includes the economic and social benefits of
the welfare state as affirmative obligations of government. 2 When com-
paring their respective declarations of rights, due to their different histor-
ical backgrounds, the Americans declared what they had and the French
declared what they desired.
25
The French concept is in accordance with most international agree-
ments on human rights. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights in-
cludes the right to have basic human needs satisfied - food and shelter,
health care, and education.2 The International Covenant of Economic,
Social and Cultural Rights contains similar provisions. 27 The European
Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms contains identical con-
cepts providing for collective social rights, social welfare and the right to
education. 28
The Council of Europe under the European Convention on Human
16. Id. at 349.
17. Id. at 353-54. See also Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641 (1969) (rejecting
state residency requirements for welfare recipients as a denial of due process for poor
travelers).
18. Mariner, supra note 15, at 349.
19. Id. at 377.
20. Thomas Buergenthal, The U.S. and International Human Rights, 9 Hum. RTS. L.J.
141 (1988).
21. Id. at 142.
22. Buergenthal, supra note 20, at 161.
23. Henkin, supra note 6, at 1597.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 1592.
26. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 25 and 26, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. Doc.
A/810 (1948) [hereinafter G.A. Res. 217].
27. The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res.
2200 (annex), 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967).
28. The European Parliament Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms of 12
April 1989, reprinted in 10 Hum. RTS. L. J. 341 (1989) [hereinafter European Parliament
Declaration].
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Rights established a Commission and Court of Human Rights which
hears cases by both governments and individuals.2" In 1975 there were
approximately 2,000 cases brought before the European Commission of
Human Rights. In 1987, the number had grown to 3,675.30 About one-fifth
of these lead to applications that are decided by the Commission."1 The
compliance rate by defendant governments is thought to be unusually
high. " Finland became the twenty third Member State of the Council of
Europe on May 5, 1989 and signed the European Convention on Human
Rights."3
III. U.S. LAW REGARDING ACCESS TO HEALTH CARE AND ITS EFFECTS
There is no duty within the United States Constitution or statutes to
provide medical care for the indigent.3 4 The duty to provide indigent care
is most often found in state statutes.3 ' Nearly every state has a statutory
provision which authorizes or mandates state or local governments to pro-
vide medical care for the poor." Fifteen states have constitutional provi-
sions providing for such care. 7 Laws for the benefit of the public welfare
are generally construed liberally due to their remedial purpose, conse-
quently courts tend to favor mandatory interpretation unless a statute is
clearly permissive.3 " Where permissive', rather than mandatory, courts
will not compel governments to provide medical assistance.3 9
In recent years, state and local indigent care budgets have been
strained due to tax revenue declines, rising health care costs and changes
in federal reimbursement programs.' Thirty-seven million patients have
no health insurance.' The number of persons who lack health insurance
has increased by 34.7% from 1977 to 1983."' AIDS patients now fill 9% of
all hospital beds in New York City. It is estimated that 2,300 additional
29. Levy, supra note 8, at 20.
30. Henry G. Schermers, Has the European Commission of Human Rights Got Bogged
Down?, 9 HuM. RTS. L.J. 175 (1988).
31. Id.
32. Levy, supra note 8, at 20.
33. Announcement: Council of Europe Strausbourg, Finland Joins the Council of Eu-
rope and Signs the European Human Rights Convention, 10 HUM. RTS. L.J. 355 (1989).
34. See Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hospital, 826 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir.
1987).
35. M. Dowell, State and Local Government Legal Responsibilities to Provide Medical
Care for the Poor, 3 J. HEALTH L. 1, 3 (1988-89).
36. Id. at 4.
37. Id. at 6.
38. Id. See also Damon v. Secretary of HEW, 557 F.2d 31, 33 (2d Cir. 1977).
39. Dowell, supra note 35, at 4 n. 29; see also Perth Amboy Gen. Hosp. v. Board of
Chosen Freeholders, 386 A.2d 900 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1978).
40. Id. at 2.
41. Nancy Gibbs, Emergency, TIME, May 28, 1990, at 59.
42. See Dowell, supra note 35, quoting Robert Wood Johnson Foundation, Updated
Report on Access to Health Care for the American People, Special Report No. 1 (1983).
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beds will be needed in New York for the treatment of AIDS alone. 4 Gov-
ernment reimbursements often cover only half of the cost of treating the
poor." In emergency rooms the typical trauma patient bill in 1989 was
$13,000; on average, hospitals take a loss of $5,000 on each.45
"Research indicates that if life support is used on serious heart at-
tack victims within four minutes, and advanced life support within eight,
nearly 50 percent of them survive."' 6 Peoria, Illinois, saw traffic fatalities
drop 50 percent within a year of setting up their trauma network.47
Deaths among non-head-injured car accident victims dropped from an es-
timated 73 percent to 9 percent in Orange County, California.48 Despite
these remarkable advances in techniques and equipment, according to the
National Association of Hospital Development, 40% of the nation's acute
care hospitals will be closed by the year 2000.' Four of ten trauma cen-
ters in the City of Chicago have closed. Every hospital except one in Dade
County, Florida, has closed its trauma department. That remaining hos-
pital must service a population of two million residents.5" "The hospitals
don't just close their doors to poor people, when they're closed, they're
closed to everyone. '' 1
IV. EUROPEAN LAWS, INTERNATIONAL COVENANTS AND HEALTH CARE
The goal of equal access to health care is stated in a wide variety of
international documents. The World Health Organization (WHO) was the
first body to recognize the right to health as one of the fundamental
rights possessed by every human being.52 The World Health Assembly of
WHO adopted the "Health for All" resolution in 1977 stating that "the
main social target of WHO in the coming decades should be the attain-
ment by all citizens of the world, by the year 2000, of a level of health
that will permit them to lead a socially and economically productive
life."5" Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights54 recognizes the right to the "highest attainable standard
of physical and mental health," including "the creation of conditions
which would assure to all medical service and medical attention in the
event of sickness." Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of Human
43. Gibbs, supra note 41, at 65.
44. Id. at 59.
45. Id. at 63.
46. Id. at 59.
47. Id. at 63.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 64.
50. Id. at 59.
51. Id., quoting Virginia Price-Hastings, Director of Los Angeles Trauma Hospital
Programs.
52. Genevieve Pinet, The WHO European Program of Health Legislation and Health
for All Policy, 12 AM. J.L. & MED. 441, 443 (1986).
53. World Health Assembly Resolution WHA 30.43 (1977).
54. See G.A. Res. 2200, supra note 27.
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Rights 8 proclaims that everyone has the right to a standard of living ade-
quate to sustain health, including medical care and necessary social ser-
vices. Although not accorded the status of an international treaty,56 the
Helsinki Accords seek to bind signatories to the provisions of both the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights." Article 15(3) of the European
Declaration of Fundamental Rights and Freedoms5 8 declares that anyone
lacking sufficient resources shall have the right to social and medical
assistance.
Great Britain and Canada have had nationalized health care for an
extended period of time. 9 Several West European nations have followed
the principals of the international accords by enacting either socialized
medicine or proactive legislation that increases the role of government in
the provision of equal access to health services. Included among these na-
tions are Finland, Italy, Greece, the Netherlands, Sweden, Iceland, Nor-
way, Spain and Belgium.6 0
Recent statistics have indicated that "[e]quity in access to medical
care has clearly failed to assure equity in health."61 For instance, the in-
equity in mortality of social classes has widened since the implementation
of the National Health Service in Great Britain.6 2 The standard mortality
ratio for semiskilled and unskilled workers has steadily increased from
1951 to 1971.63 This indicates that proportionately far fewer semiskilled
and unskilled laborers survive long enough to meet the average life expec-
tancy. The difference between the mortality rates of these lower classes
and those of the upper social classes (professional and managerial) has
also grown substantially."" Scotland is now the nation with the highest
death rate from coronary heart disease. Finland, England and Wales are
not far behind.65
A similar pattern has developed in Canada. The difference in life ex-
pectancy between lowest and highest income levels was 4.5 years in the
late 1970's. The difference was eleven years for disability-free life expec-
tancy. "Poor people in Canada have, on the average, only 55 years of
55. See G.A. Res. 217, supra note 26.
56. HUMAN RIGHTS, PROBLEMS, PERSPECTIVES AND TEXTS 197 (F.E. Dowrick ed., 1979).
57. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act, Helsinki 1975, re-
printed in HUMAN DIGNITY, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 135, 140 (Alice H.
Henkin ed. 1979) [hereinafter Helsinki].
58. See European Parliament Declaration, supra note 28, at 344.
59. Editorial, How Important is Medical Care in a National Health Program, 9 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL'Y 7, 7-8 (1988) [hereinafter How Important].
60. Pinet, supra note 52, at 447-48.
61. Editorial, Ethical Essentials of a National Health Care Program, 11 J. PUB.
HEALTH POL'Y 5, 5 (1990) [hereinafter Ethical Essentials].
62. Id.
63. How Important, supra note 59, at 8.
64. Id. at 9.
65. Id. at 8.
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healthy life, that is, life free from disability, as compared with 66 years of
healthy life for rich Canadians."'6 6 During the 1970's Canada's death rate
from lung cancer rose by 60 percent and death from cirrhosis of the liver
by 25 percent.
6 7
Various reasons have been offered to explain these differences, in-
cluding unstable economies resulting in high unemployment.8 Socialized
medical systems have been strongly criticized for being overly bureau-
cratic, budget-oriented, and for only allowing support for the short-term
needs of its users, while neglecting new techniques and medical innova-
tion.6 9 The lack of emphasis on preventive medicine is frequently cited as
the biggest problem. It has been contended that "[e]quity in prevention is
more important than equity in medical care. "70
V. POTENTIAL INTERNATIONAL CRISIS - THE SPREAD OF RAPIDLY
CHANGING VIRUSES, THEIR EFFECTS AND PREVENTION
Both capitalist and socialist health care systems have logistic and fi-
nancial problems. Health complications experienced in one nation can
rapidly cross borders and become worldwide complications. The changing
nature of the AIDS virus and of influenza, coupled with the diminished
effectiveness of vaccines, illustrates the probability of new worldwide
problems that these disparate systems may have to address. This section
deals with the nature of these new challenges, prior to analyzing ways to
meet them and the laws that may prevent them from being met.
The WHO Global Programme on AIDs estimates that about one-
tenth of one percent of the world's population is infected with the human
immunodeficiency virus (HIV). About half of these people are in Africa,
forty percent are in the Americas, and the remainder are scattered
throughout the rest of the world.71 It is projected that at least seventy-
five percent of those infected will develop AIDS within twenty years."s
The lifetime medical costs for a single AIDS patient is estimated to be
approximately $150,000. At present, life expectancy for a newly diagnosed
AIDS patient averages about one year.73 For 210,000 additional cases, the
cost would exceed thirty billion dollars.7 4 A variety of nations, including
the United States, have enacted legislation designed to restrict the immi-
66. Id. at 9.
67. Id. at 8.
68. Id.
69. Note, Socialized Medicine: An Analysis of Bureaucratic Inefficiency, 8 DICK. J.
INT'L L. 101, 121 (1989).
70. How Important, supra note 59, at 9.
71. Dr. Jonathan Mann, Global AIDS into the 1990's, WORLD HEALTH, October 1989, at
6.
72. Dr. J. Chin, Understanding the Figures, WORLD HEALTH, October 1989, at 9.
73. Balaji B. Singh et al., The Impact of AIDS on Medical Disposables, 11 MED. DE-
VICE AND DIAGNOSTIC INDUSTRY 61, 61, September 1989.
74. Id.
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gration of those who might have AIDS."
While the effects of AIDS and its methods of transmission have been
publicized extensively, other facts about the virus have not received the
same degree of exposure. For example, the rate of genetic change for por-
tions of the AIDS virus has been found to be over a million times greater
than that of most normal (eukaryotic)71 cells.7 The AIDS virus is capable
of mutating in several different wayss7 8 including the sharing of genetic
material between different HTLV molecules.79 More than one predomi-
nant viral form has been persistently found within the same individual.8 0
A wider range of cellular types may be infected by HIV than was previ-
ously thought."1 Given the extensive variation in the genes of the AIDS
virus, it "clearly has the potential for drastically altering both its immu-
nologic and biologic properties." '2 The AIDS virus of today, including its
methods of transmission, may not be the AIDS virus of tomorrow.
The only other virus that approaches the rate of mutation of AIDS is
Influenza Type A.8" Although their modes of transmission and lethality
are currently different, Type A flu was studied extensively, and it is a
good example of the worldwide effect that an .organism can have in a
short period of time. In February of 1957, Type A influenza appeared in
China.8 4 By April, it had spread to Hong Kong and throughout Southeast
Asia; by May, it had spread to India and Australia."0 From that point, it
took only three more months to spread over the rest of the earth." In the
United States, Type A flu caused an estimated 70,000 excess deaths, with
health care and productivity losses of four billion dollars.8 7 In 1968, a
milder reoccurrence of the virus is estimated to have cost 34,000 lives and
two to three billion dollars.88
In 1977, the virus again reappeared, taking approximately eight
75. Note, The AIDS Pandemic: International Travel and Immigration Restrictions
and the World Health Organization Response, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 1043, 1052-55 (1988).
76. Eukaryotic cells are those with a nucleus; prokaryotic cells do not have a normal
nucleus. MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY, BOARD EXAMINATION REVIEW, Vol. 1, at 397, 8th ed. (Edith
Zak Helman et al. eds. 1975).
77. Bruno R. Starcich et al., Identification and Characterization of Conserved and Va-
riable Regions in the Envelope Gene of HTLV-III/LAV, the Retrovirus of AIDS, 45 CELL
637, 643 (1986).
78. Starcich, supra note 77, at 643.
79. Id. at 645.
80. Id.
81. Robin A. Weiss and Jay A. Levy, Virology Overview, 2 AIDS S, S2 (Supp. 1, 1988).
82. Starcich, supra note 77, at 646.
83. Id. at 643.
84. ARTHUR M. SILVERSTEIN, PURE POLITICS AND IMPURE SCIENCE, THE SWINE FLU AF-
FAIR 14 (1981).
85. Id. at 14-15.
86. Id. at 15.
87. Id. at 19.
88. Id.
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months to cover the earth. 89 During this outbreak, an additional strain of
the virus was isolated. The two versions occurred simultaneously in single
localized areas. 90 The infection rates in children of Great Britain varied
from twenty to eighty percent.9"
Vaccines developed to fight these viruses have limited effectiveness.
Despite many trials, and the use of vaccines for many years, the degree of
protection for rapidly changing viruses remains in doubt.92 One study es-
timates vaccine effectiveness to be only forty to sixty-six percent. 93 An-
other indicates only fifty to sixty-seven percent effectiveness.94
The World Health Organization has recognized that there are many
infectious diseases for which vaccines are not yet available or are not sat-
isfactory.95 Effective vaccines have been developed against smallpox, yel-
low fever, polio, measles, mumps, German measles and others. 96 While
immunization against rapidly changing viruses is still important, "no
short-term experience is a reliable guide to the future pending develop-
ment of other measures such as chemotherapy."9 7
VI. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
Given the potential for such rapidly breaking health problems, possi-
ble solutions should be reviewed prior to analyzing international legal re-
strictions that could prevent the use of these new remedies in a crisis.
Two promising concepts are presented. The first is genetically engineered
drugs, and the second is computerized medical devices.
A. Biotechnology and Genetically Engineered Drugs
In 1973, Paul Berg of Stanford University used a series of specialized
enzymes to remove a piece of genetic material from a monkey virus. A
similar process was used to open the DNA in another strain of virus. He
then linked the genetic material from the first virus with that of the sec-
ond. He was the first to succeed in combining the genetic code in two
different organisms. In 1980, he was awarded the Nobel prize in chemis-
try for his efforts.9"
Dr. Berg had founded the science of recombinant DNA. Recombinant
DNA technology makes it possible to change the genetic instructions of a
living cell, in order to produce desirable proteins and other large mole-
89. STUART-HARRIS, supra note 3, at 131.
90. Id. at 130.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 192.
93. Id. at 192, 198.
94. Id. at 193.
95. New and Activities, 66 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 515, 519 (1988).
96. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 84, at 9.
97. STUART-HARRIS, supra note 3, at 182.
98. THE ALMANAC OF SCIENCE & TECHNOLOGY, 89 (R. Goleb ed. 1990) [hereinafter
ALMANAC].
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cules in large quantities. These changes are inherited by each succeeding
generation of the cell.99
In the case of Diamond v. Chakrabarty, the United States Supreme
Court held that a human made living organism is patentable, as a new
and useful manufacture or composition of matter.10 0 More than one hun-
dred potential products for human use were estimated to be under devel-
opment by biotechnology companies in 1987.101 Sales of health care prod-
ucts derived through biotechnology were expected to approach 900
million dollars in 1988.102 Over two billion dollars had been invested by
1984,010 and 700 U.S. companies were using the technology by 1988.'04
This technology is adaptable to a wide variety of uses. An excellent
example is found in medication used to treat heart attacks. Approxi-
mately 4,000 people have a heart attack each day.105 Chances of survival
largely depend on how much permanent muscle damage the heart sus-
tained during the time a clot blocked the normal flow of blood into the
heart (myocardial infarction). 10 6 Tissue plasminogen activator (tPA), an
enzyme which is naturally present in uterine tissue, dissolves blood clots.
It is now being produced, by Genentec Inc., through genetically altered
bacteria. 10 7
In a European study, patients treated with the drug experienced
mortality reductions of 51% at fourteen days when compared to a control
group, and 36% at three months. When tPA was administered within
three hours of heart attack symptoms, mortality was reduced by 82% at
fourteen days post attack, and 59% at three months.10 8 "Activase" (tPA)
was approved by the FDA in November of 1987.109
Many believe that it will be the world's second billion dollar drug.1 0
One dose costs about $2,200, compared to $200 to $300 for another drug,
Streptokinase. Streptokinase also dissolves blood clots but is somewhat
less effective than tPA.111 Sales of tPA were estimated to be 180 million
99. Michael Traynor, Emerging Product Liability Issues in Biotechnology, 3 HIGH
TECH. L.J. 149, 159 (1988).
100. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1982).
101. ALMANAC, supra note 98, at 98, quoting U.S. Cong. Off. Tech., New Developments
in Biotechnology (1987).
102. Id., quoting Consulting Resources Corp. of Lexington, Mass.
103. Marciniszyn, What Has Happened Since Chakrabarty? 2 J. L. & HEALTH 141, 141
(1987-88), quoting Biotech Comes of Age, Bus. WK., Jan. 23, 1984, at 84-85.
104. Id. at 141.
105. Editorial, The TPA Decision, WALL ST. J., May 28, 1987, at 30, col. 1.
106. Id.
107. ALMANAC, supra note 98, at 99.
108. Frans Van de Werf, Lessons from the European Cooperative Recombinant Tis-
sue-Type Plasminogen Activator (rt-PA) Verses Placebo Trial, 12 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY
14a (Supp. 1988).
109. ALMANAC, supra note 98, at 98.
110. Marciniszyn, supra note 103, at 153.
111. Eric J. Topol, Tissue Plasminogen Activator: Why the Backlash?, 13 J. AM. C.
CARDIOLOGY, 1477 (1989).
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dollars in 1988. 12
Another example of recombinant DNA technique is Erythropoietin
(EPO). This is a human hormone that stimulates bone marrow cells to
grow into red blood cells. Kidney failure reduces production of EPO to
the extent that twenty-five percent of the 250,000 individuals worldwide
who require dialysis of their blood, also require frequent blood transfu-
sions. Using recombinant DNA techniques, EPO is now manufactured by
cultured mammalian cells." s
In clinical trials using EPO, virtually all severely anemic patients
were transfusion independent at the end of two months." 4 The market
for EPO is likely to go well beyond kidney patients to other anemic pa-
tients in need of increased red blood cell production,'1 5 including AIDS
and cancer patients." 6 The FDA released EPO for sale in June of 1989.1"
Interferons, proteins that the body produces in small quantities in
response to viral infections, provides a third example of this technique.
They stimulate infected cells to manufacture substances that prevent vi-
ruses from reproducing. They also stimulate some cancer cells to make a
type of protein that increases the chances that these cancer cells will be
recognized and eliminated by the immune system. Genetic material for
the production of interferons has now been spliced into two species of
bacteria and one species of mold.118 The FDA approved one type of in-
terferon for treatment of a specific type of cancer (hairy-cell leukemia) in
June of 1986."' Clinical evaluations have been underway for the use of
interferons in the treatment of several other types of cancer, influenza
and the common cold. 20
Other important developments in genetically engineered products in-
clude Human Growth Hormone for the treatment of dwarfism; In-
terleukins which stimulate the immune system and are currently used in
the treatment of kidney cancer; Factor VIII, one of the enzymes that
hemophiliacs lack rendering their blood unable to form clots; and Tumor
Necrosis Factor, which attacks tumors directly. More than eighty other
drugs produced by genetic engineering were being tested in humans at
the end of 1988.121
112. ALMANAC, supra note 98, at 99.
113. Id. at 105.
114. Epoetin Alfa Approved for Anemia Treatment, 262 JAMA 184 (July 14, 1989).
115. Anderson, Growing Pains for Amgen as Epoetin Wins U.S. Approval, 339 NATURE
493 (June 15, 1989).
116. Id.
117. ALMANAC, supra note 98, at 99.
118. Id.
119. Marciniszyn, supra note 103, at 151.
120. Id. at 151.
121. ALMANAC, supra note 98, at 105.
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B. Multiple-Use Computerized Medical Devices
Tremendous strides have also been made with electronic medical
equipment. Automated Centrifugal Blood Cell Separators effectively sep-
arate whole blood into three basic components: erythrocytes (red blood
cells), plasma and buffy coat (platelets and white blood cells). '22 Although
initially designed to collect and transfuse large numbers of platelets and
white blood cells, ' the advantages of being able to rapidly and accu-
rately remove specific elements from the blood were soon realized.
In an experiment involving two patients with drug resistant bronchial
asthma, for example, 40% to 80% of existing plasma protein was removed
from the blood stream. This fraction of the blood contains circulating im-
munocomplexes, auto-antibodies, toxins and metabolic products. Follow-
ing treatment with this procedure, the first patient had no attacks over a
period of five months. The other patient had no attacks for over a year.
Prior treatment with drugs was ineffective. 24
In 1984, the American Society of Apheresis appointed a committee to
review existing experience with the technology, and develop position pa-
pers based on the best available information. 125 A listing of over fifty pre-
sent and potential applications was presented. Included in that list was
mysathemia gravis, rheumatoid arthritis, sickle cell disease, lupus, Guil-
lain-Barre' syndrome, drug overdose and poisoning, hairy-cell leukemia,
multiple sclerosis, burns, asthma, AIDS and solid tumors.' 26 Since the
compilation of that data, this equipment has also been used in the treat-
ment of leprosy.'2 7
VII. FACTORS INHIBITING THE USE OF NEW MEDICAL TECHNOLOGIES
DURING AN INTERNATIONAL CRISIS
As remarkable as these new technologies in medicine may be, obsta-
cles to their use in an international crisis are formidable. A basic compre-
hension of methods used to test new medical products for safety is
needed to perceive the factors that may prevent their use in an interna-
tional emergency. In the United States, "adequate and well controlled"
studies, including human clinical investigations, are required for the pres-
entation of the substantial evidence needed for approval of a new medical
product. Effectiveness of a drug should normally be supported by more
than one well controlled trial and carried out by independent investiga-
122. Introduction, 1 J. CLINICAL APHERESIS 119 (1983).
123. Id.
124. Bamburger, Drug-Resistant Bronchial Asthma Successfully Treated with Plasma
Exchange, 2 J. CLINICAL APHERESIS 200, 200-205 (1984).
125. Introduction, 3 J. CLINICAL APHERESIS V (1986).
126. Id. at vi.
127. D. Wallach, Plasma Exchange in Severe Erythema Nodosum Leprosum, 9 INT'L J.
ARTIFICIAL ORGANS 183 (1986).
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tors.3 8 They generally require the administration of a placebo, a neutral
preparation given as a medicine, as a control for comparison. 129 In some
cases, this requirement may be abandoned for an "historical control
where a disease has a high and predictable mortality."13 0
Data from all animal studies are required to be reported, particularly
animal tests for cancer and birth defects (carcinogenicity and teratogenic-
ity). 31 Specific analysis of numerous drug interactions must be reported
using human test subjects. These effects are checked for differences with
sex, race, age and size, and might include such factors as disease severity,
concomitant illness, concomitant drugs, smoking and ethanol usage his-
tory and prior therapy.1 3 2 In order to support the safety and effectiveness
of each claim for the drug, each important segment of this analysis must
be "statistically" significant, according to a number of methods."'3
Biological factors for each test patient are studied. These include
items such as drug absorption, distribution within the body, metabolism
and excretion."" Dose range and dose response studies include such items
as the effects of the drug on heart rate, with exercise, at different dosage
levels. Other studies include effects on blood flow, kidney function, diges-
tive system motility, gastric acid secretion, the immune system, nervous
system, coagulation 3 5 and liver function.3 6
The aim of thoroughness is to attempt to identify all potential ad-
verse reactions to the product. Even with the best of studies, however,
this is impossible.137 Clinical testing using up to 500 patients can be ex-
pected to turn up adverse reactions that affect ten percent or more of the
population but may miss a less frequent danger. Delayed effects, unusual
toxic reactions and unpredictable effects due to genetic variables are diffi-
cult to detect.3 8s
A good example of the problem posed by human genetic diversity is
the essential enzyme glucose-6-phosphate dehydrogenase (G6PD) in red
blood cells. Over 370 genetic variants of this enzyme have been discov-
ered. ' 9 About forty variants are associated with a mild deficiency, but
128. U.S. Dept. Health Hum. Services, Public Health Service Food and Drug Admin.,
Guideline for the Format and Content of the Clinical Sections of New Drug Applications,
15 (July 1988) [hereinafter Guideline].
129. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(i) (1989).
130. 21 C.F.R. § 314.126(b)(2)(v) (1989).
131. Guideline, supra note 128, at 42.
132. Id. at 32.
133. Id. at 69.
134. Id. at 12.
135. Id. at 12-13.
136. Id. at 33.
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individuals are normally asymptomatic. Other variants are associated
with chronic hemolytic anemia. With another type of variant, the person's
red blood cells split apart (hemolyze) on exposure to factors such as fava
beans, infections or drugs. 40
As can be readily seen, demonstrating the safety of a new medical
product can be quite complex. This complexity produces and exposes a
number of weaknesses in international cooperation. These weaknesses se-
verely inhibit the ability to use a new medical product during an interna-
tional emergency. Five general areas of weakness are discussed below.
A. Failure to Recognize Foreign Clinical Data
As complex and time consuming as these safety studies are, many of
them are repeated needlessly. National specifications for the testing of
drugs vary widely throughout the world.1 4 1 Following the Thalidomide
disaster, WHO stated that "[c]linical trials are highly time consuming,
need very large numbers of patients to be observed according to generally
accepted principals and would often be facilitated by international coop-
eration." '142 A number of countries, such as France and Mexico, requires
that scientific data used for drug approval must be produced by their own
scientists exclusively within their own borders.' 3 One of the items in-
tended for European harmonization is the regulation of pharmaceuticals
and high technology medicines.1
4 4
Some progress has been made on mutual recognition of preclinical
testing such as animal studies and methods of determining drug purity.
Agreement to Good Laboratory Practices has been reached with Japan,
the United States, the United Kingdom, Switzerland, France and West
Germany in this area. 45 These agreements stipulate that each country
will recognize preclinical data that meet the regulatory requirements of
the other nation.'4 6
Human testing is quite different. The United States accepts human
test data from other nations, provided they meet the stringent require-
ments of "adequate and well controlled studies." Provisions for their use
are made in FDA guidelines issued regarding the submission of human
clinical data.1 47 This appears to be a major exception to the international
rule.
The Japanese, for example, do not accept most U.S. clinical data.
140. Id.
141. KAY, supra note 137, at 59.
142. Id., quoting WHA 15.41 (1962).
143. KAY, supra note 137, at 60.
144. RiCHARD HURWITZ, RAF FIN. CORP. REPORT 1, 5 (1990); European Renaissance:
The Economic Implications of the 1992 Internal Market, quoting Bus. AM., August 1, 1988.
145. Fairbain, Japan: Drug Regulations - A United States Industrial Perspective, 1
REGULATORY AFF. 25, 27 (1989).
146. Id.
147. Guideline, supra note 128, at 17, 21, 23, 25, 26, 87.
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Their position is that diet and genetics can alter a drug's metabolism.
Consequently, the effects of a drug may be different in Japanese as op-
posed to other races.4 8
Certainly there are differences. Japan has a very low rate of breast
and colon cancer and a high rate of stomach cancer. In the United States,
the reverse is true. However, when Japanese immigrate to the United
States, within one or two generations, they show the high colon and
breast cancer rates and low stomach cancer typical of Americans.' 9 The
low rate of cardiovascular disease in Japan changes in Japanese-Ameri-
cans who switch to American diets.5 0 One wonders if this is true scientific
justification for requiring across-the-board duplication of American
clinical data.
B. Multinational Requirements for Animal Testing
As discussed above, some agreements on mutual recognition of
animal test data have been reached. However, as they currently stand,
these procedures have a number of serious flaws. Their inherent weak-
nesses are another impediment to the use of new medical technologies in
a crisis.
As evidenced by cigarette smoking, a twenty to thirty year period
may exist between initial exposure to a carcinogen and the appearance of
cancer.' 5' Studies on animals, particularly for the purpose of testing for
cancer or birth defects, are therefore required by most nations. Included
among these are the United States;5 2 India (2 species, 1 rat or mouse);
Sweden (2 species, 2 dose levels); the United Kingdom (2 species, 1 small
rodent or rabbit); and Venezuela (3 species, 1 a non-rodent).5 3 Animal
cancer tests cost about $250,000 and take about three years to com-
plete." Due to the many types of cancer and length of time required,
accurate detection of a product causing cancer in only one percent of the
test animals would require the use of 10,000 rats or mice. 55 Fifty animals
at each of two doses are normally used. High doses are administered to
animals in an attempt to overcome this limitation."'
The World Health Organization has considered the issue of both
animal and human testing. In 1971 and 1972, WHO urged the creation of
an International System of Information on Drugs. One of its purposes was
to "reduce repetitive animal experimentation and unnecessary exposure
148. Fairbain, supra note 145, at 29.
149. Bruce N. Ames, Identifying Environmental Chemicals Causing Mutations and
Cancer, 204 SCIENCE 587, at 587 (1979).
150. Fairbain, supra note 145, at 29.
151. Ames, supra note 149, at 587.
152. Guideline, supra note 128, at 15, 32, 42.
153. KAY, supra note 137, at 60.
154. Ames, supra note 149, at 588.
155. Id. at 589.
156. Id.
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of human subjects to drugs.91 57
More serious problems exist. In a joint Finnish and Italian study a
broad variety of chemical substances, known to cause birth defects in
humans, was surveyed for its effects on animals. " Potent chemicals, such
as PCBs, while producing malformations in mice, produced none in rats
and rabbits. Experimental effects did not consistently reproduce the
problems observed in humans, nor were they similar in different animal
species. The authors of the study noted that while some of these sub-
stances did not produce malformations, they did induce some other ef-
fects. Other effects were resorption, still birth and decreased weight gain.
As a result, they concluded that animal testing for birth defects seems
justified.1"9 However, the Advisory Subgroup in Toxicology of the Euro-
pean Medical Councils, who commissioned the study stated that:
No conclusion can be drawn on the validity of the practice of testing
chemicals for teratogenicity. The variations of doses and responses...
reinforces the view . . . that only an increase in knowledge of the
mechanism of action of embryotoxins will lead to sound methods for
the prediction of this hazard of human exposure. 6 '
In 1979, "almost all of the dozen or so organic chemicals known to
cause cancer in humans also' caused cancer in some laboratory ani-
mals."1'' Far more information is known today. The folly of over-reliance
on animal testing is further indicated by the fact that lactose, the sugar in
human breast milk, causes cancer in rats. Common table salt, in large
amounts, causes birth defects in mice. Vitamin A, used by the human
body to strengthen bone, is as toxic to rodents as the pesticide parathion.
Thalidomide, which caused birth defects in thousands of humans, does
not cause birth defects in either mice or rats. 6 2 Despite serious shortcom-
ings, animal safety testing is required by most international regulatory
agencies.
Alternate methods of safety testing are now being developed. The
ability of a chemical to mutate or cause damage to human DNA is likely
to be the major cause of cancer and birth defects. " In the 1970s, Dr.
Bruce Ames and his colleagues developed an assay for detecting mutagens
and carcinogens (the Ames test). It is based on the ability of a chemical
to produce a mutation in a defective bacterial gene (i.e. a strain of Salmo-
nella), enabling it to no longer require a previously required nutrient. The
157. KAY, supra note 137, at 61, 62, quoting WHA 24.56 and WHA 25.61.
158. K. Hemminki and P. Vineis, Extrapolation of the Evidence on Teratogenicity of
Chemicals Between Humans and Experimental Animals; Chemicals Other Than Drugs, 5
TERATOGENESIS, CARCINOGENESIS AND MUrrAGENrsls 251-318 (1985).
159. Id. at 282-83.
160. Id. at 252.
161. Ames, supra note 149, at 588.
162. Richard Lipkin, Risky Business of Assessing Danger, INSIGHT, May 23, 1988, at 8,
12.
163. Ames, supra note 149, at 587.
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chemical to be tested is mixed with a liver extract used to convert the
chemical to forms used in the body (metabolites). This mixture is then
placed on a nutrient solution that does not contain the element that the
bacteria previously required in order to live. After incubation for two
days, the number of bacterial colonies growing on the solution is re-
corded. Each of these colonies is composed of descendants of a bacteria
that has been mutated from having a defective genetic instruction to hav-
ing a normal one.""
The original validation of the test showed that about 90% of the
known cancer causing substances tested were detected, other studies have
confirmed this observation. 6 5 Some specific classes of cancer causing
chemicals did not respond to the test. New strains of test bacteria are
being developed for improving the accuracy of the assay. 6
A major Japanese food additive, furylfuramide (AF-2), which tested
negative in two animal cancer tests, was shown to cause cancer using the
Ames Test. 16 7 One hundred million Japanese were ingesting this com-
pound. Based on the Ames data, additional testing was ordered. AF-2 has
now been banned.'68
The Ames test is currently being used in over three thousand govern-
ment, industrial and academic laboratories throughout the world.' In-
ternationally required animal tests for carcinogenicity and birth defects
have severe limitations. In addition to the lack of mutual recognition by
several nations, animal testing for cancer and birth defects has been
demonstrated to be inaccurate on a number of occasions. Considering
these limitations, in an international health crisis, the value of short term
testing, similar to the Ames test, would be immeasurable.
C. Rules Prohibiting Transnational Cooperation
Rules prohibiting the exportation of new treatments are another im-
pediment to international cooperation during emergencies. The United
States Drug Export Amendments Act of 1986 (DEAA)'170 was designed to
help U.S. drug producers in their battles with foreign competition. It did
so by allowing drugs that were not yet approved in the U.S. to be shipped
to nations where they had been approved.' The Act requires that a do-
mestic manufacturer, prior to exporting the drug, must be actively seek-
164. Id. at 589.
165. Id.
166. Bruce Ames, The Detection of Environmental Mutagens and Potential Carcino-
gens, 53 CANCER 2034, at 2034-36 (May 15, 1984) [hereinafter Detection].
167. Bruce N. Ames and Lynne Haroun, Letter to the Editor, 62 MUTATION RESEARCH
393-95 (1979).
168. Id. at 394.
169. Detection, supra note 166.
170. 21 U.S.C. §382 (1988).
171. Note, The Impact of the Drug Export Amendment Act of 1986 on Foreign Tort
Victims, 21 VANDER. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 809, 810 (1988).
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ing approval of the drug in the United States.1 7 2 It also requires that the
drug be exported to one of only twenty-one nations.7 3 The country to
whom it is shipped must have already approved the product, and it must
be available for sale in that country.174 Applications must be submitted
ninety days before the proposed shipment date.17' The Secretary of
Health and Human Services has thirty days to review it.'
7
1
These provisions are in direct contrast to those of the Helsinki Ac-
cords, which seek to expand international cooperation in the development
and testing of new drugs. 7 7 Although the imposition of restrictions in the
DEAA are probably to prevent re-importation of unimproved drugs to
the United States, their inflexibility could have serious ramifications.
During a crisis, the use of new medical technologies overseas would be
prevented for an extended period of time. New medicines, developed
within the United States, could not be used to treat a new disease in the
country of origin, until it had been allowed to spread well beyond its
borders.
D. The Cost of Drug Production
Experience has demonstrated that the distribution of production
costs also inhibits international cooperation in an emergency. It has been
estimated that of every 5,000 to 7,000 new substances evaluated for drug
production, only 1,500 survive the initial screening. Of these, only thirty
survive detailed pharmacological tests and only one of those complete the
battery of tests and becomes a marketable drug.'78 On average, it takes
eight years and six to seven million dollars to take that drug through the
requirements of FDA approval. 17 9 WHO, in an attempt to provide needed
drugs for underprivileged nations, established a special program on essen-
tial drugs.'"0 A number of drug manufacturers agreed to provide these
drugs under "financially favorable conditions."''
Under emergency conditions, however, experience indicates that even
these minimal levels of cooperation may be difficult to maintain. In the
spring of 1957, when it was first learned that a new strain of influenza
had developed in Hong Kong, various scientific advisory committees
urged the production and distribution of massive amounts of appropriate
172. 21 U.S.C. §382(b)(1)(A)(i)(II) (1988).
173. 21 U.S.C. §382(b)(4)(A) (1988).
174. 21 U.S.C. §382(b)(1)(B) (1988).
175. 21 U.S.C. §382 (b)(3)(A) (1988).
176. 21 U.S.C. §382(b)(3)(C)(i) (1988).
177. Helsinki, supra note 57, §111(4).
178. Kay, supra note 137, at 22.
179. Marianne Lavelle, Lawyers for a New Drug Must Practice Patience, 10 NAT'L L.J.,
June 27, 1988, at 1, 20.
180. Action Programme on Essential Drugs, WHA 32.42, May 25, 1979, quoted in Ur-
sula Wasserman, WHO: Essential Drugs for Developing Countries, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L.
444 n.2 (1982).
181. Id. at 446.
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influenza vaccine. 2 Unfortunately, there was never enough vaccine avail-
able in the right place, at the right time to halt the spread of the virus.
Manufacturers had been asked to make large investments in a vaccine
with no assurance that the disease would spread. If it did not arrive, they
would not be able to sell what they had produced. The disease spread
quickly and producers could not keep up with the demand. After the epi-
demic subsided, tens of millions of doses remained unused.' 3
Conditions similar to a "black market" were created for the drug.
Some groups were able to bid successfully for a vaccine that others could
not afford. Large corporations were able to keep production lines going by
immunizing their workers, while the poor could not obtain protection. Re-
ports appeared in newspapers concerning the ability of a baseball club,
for example, to immunize its healthy team, while high risk populations
did not have access to the vaccine."" Market economics do not appear to
respond well during a health emergency.
E. Prior Experience of International Organizations: The Problem With
International Efforts
Current international organizations are ill-equipped to handle a fast-
breaking medical emergency. Where successful programs have been con-
ducted by international groups, they have been typified by narrowly de-
fined circumstances. Highly technological issues are ill-suited to these
groups.
The eradication of smallpox stands as a major achievement of the
World Health Organization. WHO-supported national programs helped
eradicate the disease through vaccinations from 1958 to its last outbreak
in 1977.185 WHO's Expanded Programmes on Immunization (EPI) are
currently credited with sparing about 200,000 children from becoming
paralyzed with polio. Over one million deaths from measles, neonatal tet-
anus and pertussis in developing countries are prevented through this
program.186 It has been postulated that these programs succeed because
they are inexpensive, easily understood, easy to implement and bring im-
mediate visible benefits."8 "
With more complex issues, however, the record is not quite as en-
couraging. Under pressure from developing nations, WHO attempted to
pass measures designed to assure uniformity of drugs sold internation-
ally. ' These proposals included the creation of regional test facilities,
182. SILVERSTEIN, supra note 84, at 20, 21.
183. Id. at 21.
184. Id. at 22.
185. D.A. Henderson et al., Principals and Lessons from the Smallpox Eradication
Programme, 65 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 535-37 (1987).
186. R.H. Henderson, et al., Immunizing the Children of the World: Progress and
Prospects, 66 BULL. WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION 535 (1988).
187. Id.
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upgrading national regulatory capabilities, attempts to uniformalize man-
ufacturing controls, national certification of the quality of exported
pharmaceuticals and monitoring of adverse reactions to drugs.1 89
By 1976, WHO funding of the project had been severely cut. Two
reasons were seen as responsible. The first was that developing nations,
who originally pressed for the measures, eventually saw the program as
being irrelevant to their major needs. The second concerned the adminis-
trative, scientific and liability problems associated with reporting adverse
drug reactions."'
When handling scientific issues, international organizations have
been criticized for having serious weaknesses. A major problem is the
"one nation, one vote" rule that exists in the United Nations General
Assembly. 91 The bloc voting strength of underdeveloped nations has
dominated debates on technical assistance to less developed countries.
The selection of secretariats is not free from political influence. As a re-
sult, "sophisticated technological issues are frequently debated by politi-
cians and foreign ministry officials who have no expertise regarding them
nor any support of knowledgeable bureaucrats and private sector repre-
sentatives either at the meeting or in their national capitals.1 9 2
In'a rapidly developing international health crisis, this could be an
extreme handicap. Resource allocation and major decisions must be han-
dled by only the most well-informed individuals. The abuse of political
influence could result in chaos.
VIII. WALKING A TIGHTROPE - THE POLITICAL REALITIES OF DEALING
WITH A CRITICAL PRODUCT
Given their propensity for political influence and inability to deal
with technical issues, it is important to understand the realities that will
confront an international organization during a fast-breaking health care
emergency. The decision on when to release an experimental drug for
human use is highly charged politically and laden with difficult scientific
issues. The perils of releasing a drug too early or too late, are both severe
and numerous. Recent experiences in the United States and abroad illus-
trate the point.
In 1987, the FDA issued new regulations that permit the use and sale
of a drug that is still under investigation (compassionate use program).
These regulations permit such use provided the drug is used to treat an
immediate life-threatening disease, for which there is no alternative ther-
apy. The drug must be under investigation in an approved clinical trial,
and the sponsor of the clinical trial must be actively pursuing approval of
189. Id. at 187-88.
190. Id. at 188.
191. Id. at 189.
192. Id.
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the drug with "due diligence. 111 3 The purpose of the rule change was to
give desperately ill patients the opportunity to "decide for themselves
whether they would rather take an experimental drug or die of the dis-
ease untreated.1
94
The agency also created a "fast track" or expedited review process
for critically needed drugs. The aim of this policy is to cut down the time
required to review an application for the approval of a new drug. Alpha
interferon, mentioned in Section VI(A) of this article, was approved by
the FDA within six months of filing the new drug application. Even on a
fast track, FDA approval normally takes two years. 9 The antiviral drug
Azidothymidine (AZT), used in the treatment of AIDS, emerged from
testing in two years.1 96 As previously mentioned, most drug approvals
take an average of eight years. 9 ' The perils of this program have been
debated extensively in the press and in scientific periodicals.
A. The Perils of Approving a Drug Too Slowly
In an editorial entitled "Human Sacrifice," Wall Street Journal edi-
tors accused an FDA advisory committee of deciding to "sacrifice
thousands of American lives on an altar of pedantry."' 8 Advisory com-
mittees are composed of impartial experts assembled to "review and
make recommendations" with respect to matters pending before the
FDA. 199 Their comments are considered quite valuable but are not bind-
ing. The FDA commonly enlists the advice of such committees to obtain
unbiased reviews of the evaluation of a new drug product. 00 The "human
sacrifice" referred to in the editorial was that allegedly caused by the
committees decision not to recommend approval of tPA, previously re-
ferred to in section VI of this article.
On the day prior to the advisory committee meeting for tPA, another
Wall Street Journal editorial urged immediate approval.2 0' This article
stated that "bureaucratic progress must be measured against the real-
world costs of keeping this substance out of the nation's emergency
rooms," and emphasized that well over a thousand Americans go to their
deaths each day from heart attacks. 02 After the committee's refusal to
follow the Wall Street Journal editors' advice, still another editorial ap-
193. 21 C.F.R. §312.34 (1991).
194. G. Annas, FDA's Compassion for Desperate Drug Companies, HASTINGS CENTER
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195. Marciniszyn, supra note 103, at 151-52.
196. Id. at 154.
197. Lavelle, supra note 179, at 20.
198. Editorial, Human Sacrifice, WALL ST. J., June 2, 1987, at 30.
199. 21 C.F.R. §14.1 (1991).
200. Peter R. Kowley, et al., The TPA Controversy and the Drug Approval Process,
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peared. This one, entitled "The Flat Earth Committee," cited the clinical
trials used for the approval of another drug, streptokinase. The editors
decided that patients who received a placebo, in order to evaluate the
drug's effectiveness, "proved the drug's efficacy by going to their deaths"
and that data had come to supersede the purpose of helping sick people
get well.203
The advisory committee responded in a letter to the editor. They
pointed out that without adequate and well-controlled data, one cannot
distinguish between the wise early approval of a good drug, and the un-
wise early approval of a bad one.20 4 With regard to tPA, a higher inci-
dence of cerebral hemorrhage (bleeding in the brain) was observed at the
higher dosage levels of the drug. A severe stroke or death could occur in
one to four percent of the patients, at these higher dosage levels. The
dose of the drug was then reduced, but relatively few patients getting the
lower dose had been reported on in full. More data was needed to show
safety. In addition, the drugs used in the study were produced by two
different methods with one form differing from the other in several re-
spects. These included both the time the drugs remained in the blood-
stream and their peak effects. 20 5 The effects of the two needed greater
clarification. The additional data was produced and the drug was ap-
proved six months later.
In a separate response, the committee stated that had it recom-
mended approval, sponsors might be lead to believe that "predeliberation
pressure could force approval of an incompletely evaluated compound. '20 6
In the advisory committee meeting regarding EPO, also referred to in sec-
tion VI, an AIDS activist threatened to put thousands of AIDS activists
at the doorstep of the FDA if the drug was not approved immediately. 20 7
EPO might correct the anemia experienced by AIDS victims as a side
effect of therapy.
B. The Perils of Approving a Critical Drug Too Quickly
Through the FDA's compassionate use program, Dideoxyinosine
(DDI) was released to a greater number of patients while still under in-
vestigation. The drug is thought to be free of the side effects associated
with AIDS treatment using current drugs. A recent report from the man-
ufacturer indicated that of 8,000 patients who had been taking the drug,
290 died. While the National Health Institute observed that the death
rate was lower than that for the early trials of AZT, others labeled the
death rate "a disgrace," and called for more tightly controlled clinical
203. Editorial, The Flat Earth Committee, WALL ST. J., July 13, 1987, at 22.
204. Letters to the Editor, The FDA Cardio-Renal Committee Replies, WALL ST. J.,
Aug. 12, 1987, at 19.
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trials.2 "
While the "compassionate use" or "expanded access" program is
fairly new and for use with critical drugs only, history contains several
horror stories of non-critical drugs brought to the market too quickly.
Clioquinol, an antidiarrhea medication, caused blindness, paralysis or
death. In Japan alone, more than 10,000 people were injured by the
drug.20 9 High dose isoprenaline, administered to asthmatics, was responsi-
ble for sudden cardiac failures in England. 210 Genital malfcrmations were
found to be caused by the drug diethylstilbestrol (DES)." Thalidomide
caused thousands of birth defects.1 2 The effects of these drugs were not
immediate.
In another case, the drug Azaribine (Triazure) was withdrawn from
the market in the United States after being sold for one year. The drug
was found to be responsible for inducing blood clots. Eight cases were
reported with one death. A congressional hearing was held to determine if
the FDA had not done enough to protect patients.21
In 1979, the United States Supreme Court considered the petition of
cancer patients denied the drug laetrile. 21 "4 The court stated that a drug is
unsafe where its potential for injury may outweigh the possibility of bene-
fit, and that the FDA has never made exception for drugs used by the
terminally ill.2 15 They also stated that Congress expressed concern that
individuals with fatal illnesses should be shielded from fraudulent
cures.
2 18
The tightrope on which regulatory agencies must walk is extremely
narrow. Political and media pressures increase greatly when considering a
drug for the treatment of a terminal illness. In these situations, no matter
what the decision, the only thing one is guaranteed is intense opposition.
It is a perpetual case of damned if you do and damned if you don't.217
Current international organizations are clearly not structured to handle
these pressures.
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IX. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This article began with an examination of the historical and legal de-
velopment of human rights philosophies, and their evolution into differ-
ent systems. Each system has its unique problems. These problems be-
come more severe when different philosophies and systems are forced to
work together. Such would be the case in a sudden international emer-
gency. Based on prior experience and current scientific knowledge, that
emergency is a very real possibility.
The delivery of new, safe medical products to those in need is an
important aspect of providing equal access to health care. It is ironic that
so many nations that see health care as a human right, yet refuse to ac-
cept foreign clinical test data demonstrating the effectiveness of new
products. The paradox is extended by the fact that a major nation that
does not recognize health care as a right, the United States, has been
willing to accept human test data from other nations. In the United
States, however, export laws exist that bar the overseas shipment of an
experimental drug. In the event of a rapidly breaking crisis, these barriers
must fall. International cooperation is imperative during a global medical
crisis. Until recently, animal testing was all that was available to deter-
mine the long-term side effects of drugs. A few international agreements
have been reached with regard to mutual acceptance of animal test data.
This is only part of the problem. Studies have clearly demonstrated the
pitfalls of over-reliance on animal testing. In addition to being time-con-
suming and expensive, they can be inaccurate.
New methods of testing, such as the Ames test, provide a measure of
hope for resolving these difficulties. With improvement in short-term
tests, reliance on extensive animal testing might be reduced. This could
be critical in a worldwide emergency. International cooperation and mu-
tual recognition of test methods would again be required.
Some precedent for this concept exists. Testing drugs and devices for
fever-producing substances (pyrogens) was primarily accomplished by
testing rabbit colonies for temperature elevation following injection of the
drug or an extract of a device. ' As with other animal tests, the method
was expensive, time-consuming and subject to variability.2"9 In 1973, the
FDA announced approval of a substitute that could be performed in a
test tube (the LAL test).2 ° It was found to be more accurate, faster and
less expensive than using rabbits. Guidelines on its validation for routine
use by drug and device manufacturers were issued in 1987.22 '
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Costs and methods of reimbursement likewise inhibit the use of new
medical products during an emergency. Manufacturers need some finan-
cial assurances before launching into production of a product for which a
market might not be waiting. Without such assurances, both shortages
and a black market in medicine may develop.
The resolution of each of these problems requires a high level of in-
ternational cooperation. Current international organizations are ill-
equipped to handle these issues. Political pressures associated with criti-
cal medical products are enormous. The lack of technical expertise, cou-
pled with the politics of a "one-nation, one-vote" system, renders many
current international organizations incapable of dealing effectively with
challenges of this magnitude.
A new international accord is needed to formulate a world crisis
strategy. Elements of that strategy should include the following:
1. The transnational recognition of human clinical test data, generated
in accordance with mutually defined practices, for use in an
emergency.
2. The identification of true human genetic variants and their incorpo-
ration into a worldwide system for mutually recognized clinical
testing.
3. Mutual recognition of animal test data coupled with the funding,
development and acceptance of alternatives.
4. The creation of an account, within the World Bank, for the purpose
of funding increased production of new drugs. This account could be
used by qualified manufacturers in the early stages of a potential
health crisis. By doing so, manufacturers would have some assurance
of expense reimbursement while the new drug might be provided ear-
lier to help slow the spread of the disease.
5. The appointment of a highly qualified group of independent medi-
cal experts to oversee and direct these activities. This would include
the oversight of qualified clinical investigators and the international
use of experimental substances during emergencies.
Our recent history has demonstrated that we must at least have the
capacity to respond to a worldwide medical emergency. International
proclamations regarding health for all and equal access to health care are
truly admirable and represent worthy goals. Without confronting the re-
alities that divide us, however, we are blowing an uncertain trumpet.2 2
Dennis McElwee
222. Father Theodore Hesburgh, former president of Notre Dame University, said the
following: "The very essence of leadership is [that] you have to have a vision. It's got to be a
vision you can articulate clearly and forcefully on every occasion. You can't blow an uncer-
tain trumpet." TIME, May 1987, quoted in Tom PETERs, THRIVING ON CHAOS 399 (1987).
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International Agency and Distributorship
Agreements
RALPH B. LAKE*
DISTRIBUTORSHIPS, AGENCY AND FRANCHISING IN AN IN-
TERNATIONAL ARENA, edited by Dennis Campbell and Louis Lafili,
Kluwer Law and Taxation Publishers, Boston, Massachusetts (1990),
ISBN 90-6544-504-8, 222 pp., $59.00.
CLASEN, THOMAS F., INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AND DISTRI-
BUTION AGREEMENTS, Butterworth Legal Publishers (USA), Salem,
New Hampshire (1991), ISBN 0-88063-296-9, 4 Volumes, looseleaf,
$425.00.
COMMERCIAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS:
LAW AND PRACTICE IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITY, general editor, Guy-Martial Weijer, Graham &
Trotman, London, distributed in the United States by Kluwer Academic
Publishers Group, Norwell, Massachusetts (1989), ISBN 1-8533-358-1,
430 pp., $145.00.
The negotiation and preparation of international agency agreements
is the bread and butter work of the American international practitioner.
So much time is spent on these commercial relationships that they have
come to occupy a special place in the consciousness of U.S. international
lawyers. Indeed, some law schools offer courses exclusively on this sub-
ject.1 There are perhaps three explanations for the attention given to this
relatively narrow area of commercial practice. First, unlike many other
"international" commercial transactions, international agency and distri-
bution agreements are not just domestic transactions with an additional
international aspect. By definition, they almost always involve parties lo-
cated in different countries, and their preparation involves a considera-
tion of at least two legal systems. Second, international agency and distri-
bution agreements are among the few international relational contracts to
* Vice-President and General Counsel, Homewood Suites, Inc.; Member of the Board
of Advisors, Denver Journal of International Law & Policy.
1. See, e.g. 1990-1992 University of Denver College of Law Bulletin 12 (1989).
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which small businesses are frequently parties. Unlike transnational merg-
ers and acquisitions, construction agreements and the creation of corpo-
rate networks, they are not the exclusive preserve of large companies and
their lawyers. Finally, the relationship of foreign agents or distributors
and U.S. suppliers is a particularly difficult one and has become the sub-
ject of much governmental regulation and litigation.
There was a time when one of the principle measures of an interna-
tional practitioner's worth was awareness of sources of information. For
preparers of international agency and distribution agreements, foreign
regulations were in disparate sources, usually untranslated. International
business transactions courses in law schools which had a practical orienta-
tion often exuded the atmosphere of a secret society, with (frequently ad-
junct) teachers sharing with students not so much knowledge as sources
of information. Paucity of information, happily, is no longer the norm, as
the appearance of these books demonstrates. Each is different, and each
successfully achieves its purpose, although that purpose is not as well ex-
plained by each editor.
Leading the pack in practically every respect, including price value,
even at $425.00, is Thomas F. Clasen's International Agency and Distri-
bution Agreements. This is an excellent endeavor, and it fills a long-
standing need. The first of the four volumes in the set is a comprehensive,
well-written treatise which covers U.S. and foreign legal aspects of the
international agency and distribution relationship. The volume is divided
into three parts. The first is called Preliminary Considerations, and is
just that. The second, called Legal Issues, focuses on foreign laws which
regulate the agency and distributorship relationship,2 U.S. and foreign
(primarily EC) antitrust laws,3 tax considerations," intellectual property
issues,' and "other U.S. legal considerations. 6 The third section, Draft-
ing International Agency and Distribution Agreements, contains a very
well-organized analysis of considerations, such as dispute resolution, com-
missions, payments and termination. Two useful forms of agreement are
included as models; these are annotated with references to other parts of
the book.
The other three volumes consist of articles by practitioners in some
fifty countries. These articles contain translations of the relevant foreign
statutes,7 and add the necessary detail and hard law to the conceptual
2. THOMAS CLASEN, INTERNATIONAL AGENCY AND DISTRIBUTION AGREEMENTS Ch. 5
(1991).
3. Id. at Ch. 6.
4. Id. at Ch. 7.
5. Id. at Ch. 8.
6. Id. at Ch. 9. This section addresses the always thorny Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
and Anti-Boycott laws.
7. Lawyers affected with certain Weltmidigkeit might say that statutory provisions in
some of the countries covered (Yugoslavia, for example) are really only the point of depar-
ture on a rather stormy voyage, but every journey must have a beginning.
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framework contained in the first volume. Although they all cover similar
material - nature of the relationship, limitations on use, exclusivity and
termination - they are not identically organized. The presentation does
not suffer for the inconsistency. Indeed, an argument can be made that
the differences in emphasis reflect differences in importance. One as-
sumes the country chapters will be regularly updated, and if so, they will
constitute the substantive information one will need to prepare an agree-
ment to be performed in the countries treated.
Commercial Agency and Distribution Agreements: Law and Practice
in the Member States of the European Community, edited by Guy -
Martial Weijer, is, as the title indicates, much more limited in scope than
the Clasen book. This is not to denigrate it, because in my view its au-
thors have succeeded at covering the more limited topic. The book is a
product of the Association Internationale des Jeaune Avocats in
Belgium, and contains a chapter written by a local practitioner for each of
the Member States. There is a separate chapter which focuses exclusively
on Community law.8 The organization of the chapters is very rigid, the
outline for each country being identical. The emphasis is on the statutory
regulation of agency and distributorship agreements. There is no drafting
advice or forms. The chapters are informative and well-written, and many
readers will prefer the uniformity of organization to the more individual
approach of the country chapters. But for the existence of the Clasen
book, Weijer would be a significant contribution to the literature. As it is,
the book provides a less expensive summary of the statutory law of a
more limited geographic area. The only significant drawback is that it will
quickly become dated. Presumably, subsequent editions will appear, but
practitioners who frequently work with agency and distributorship agree-
ments will like Clasen's looseleaf approach.
Distributorships, Agency and Franchising in an International
Arena, edited by Dennis Campbell and Louis Lafili, is the least ambitious
of the books surveyed here. It is a collection of essays which briefly exam-
ines various issues associated with agency, distributorship and franchising
agreements. The essays were originally presented at a conference held in
Austria in 1989, and the book reflects the benefits and detriments of such
a format. The benefits are ease of approach and breadth of coverage. The
articles are surprisingly even, and are all written in a chatty style which
reveals their genesis as addresses. The detriments are repetition and in-
complete coverage of the material.9
The authors assume a minimum level of knowledge about these top-
ics, and the book cannot be intended as a reference work. Perhaps the
book could have been more accurately titled Some Current Issues of In-
8. EC antitrust regulation is handled in the first volume of the Clasen set.
9. Notwithstanding the title of the collection, Japan receives twelve pages of material,
and Latin America, probably the most difficult area of the world for U.S. suppliers, is
treated only by a ten page discussion of economic integration.
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ternational Distribution Law: A Colloquium. Within these limitations,
the book is informative, and I found it interesting. Although there are
summaries of the regulatory schemes of a number of countries, the speak-
ers were clearly more interested in discussing what one of the editors calls
"macro-economic and macro-political considerations." 10 Practically all of
the contributors discussed the effects of the revitalized EC in 1992. Two
contributors included forms, an agency agreement and a franchise agree-
ment, both of which are useful and well-done.
Interestingly, both the Campbell and Weijer books discuss franchis-
ing as well as agency and distribution. Clasen gives the topic of franchis-
ing less emphasis. However, this rapidly evolving method of interna-
tional operation is closely related to commercial agency and distribution
conceptually, and may well join them as a significant area of practice.
Overall, the Clasen work may well be the best book practitioners can
buy on international agency and distribution agreements. Those inter-
ested in the EC and those who do not wish to spend $425.00, will be well-
served by the Weijer book. The Campbell and Lafili book, although not a
reference work, contains much useful information.
10. DISTRIBUTORSHIPS, AGENCY AND FRANCHISING IN AN INTERNATIONAL ARENA 1 (Dennis
Campbell and Louis Lafili eds., 1990).
11. CLASEN, supra note 2, at § 3.3(b).
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Defending Deterrence
REVIEWED BY WAYNE E. DILLINGHAM*
DEFENDING DETERRENCE: MANAGING THE ABM TREATY RE-
GIME INTO THE 21ST CENTURY, edited by Antonia H. Chayes &
Paul Doty, Pergamon-Brassey's International Defense Publishers, Inc.
(1989); ISBN 0-08-036744-5, 286 pp. $35.00.
"The more you explain it, the more I don't understand it." So goes
the oft-quoted observation by Mark Twain. For many, such is the case
with the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty of 1972.1 There has been no
shortage of literature explaining this relatively brief arms control treaty
between the two nuclear superpowers. Yet, confusion remains as to how
the treaty should be implemented - especially in light of the changes in
world politics and advances in technology which have occurred since
1972.2 Defending Deterrence: Managing the ABM Treaty Regime into
the 21st Century$ adds one more book to the wealth of literature already
available on this topic. It is a most welcome addition: a single volume that
points out the treaty's ambiguities, asks the difficult questions, and offers
a framework for policymakers who must provide the answers. Whether or
not one agrees with the various policy positions offered or implied, no
serious student of the ABM Treaty should be without access to this work.
Defending Deterrence was produced under the auspices of the Amer-
ican Academy of Arts & Sciences, with support provided by the Carnegie
Corporation, the MacArthur Foundation and the Rockefeller Brothers
Fund. Antonia Handler Chayes, Chairman of Endispute, Inc. and a for-
mer Under Secretary of the United States Air Force, and Dr. Paul Doty,
Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University and Director Emeritus
of Harvard's Center for Science and International Affairs, are the book's
co-editors. The book's twelve chapters reflect the views and recommenda-
tions of a twenty-member working group 4 having well-recognized and
* Major, United States Air Force, serving as a judge advocate, currently Associate Pro-
fessor of Law at the United States Air Force Academy. The views expressed herein are his
own and do not represent the official views of any agency of the United States government.
1. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972, U.S.-
U.S.S.R., 23 U.S.T. 3435 [hereinafter ABM Treaty].
2. This review assumes that the reader has at least a basic understanding of the treaty's
purpose and provisions. Detailed discussions of the treaty's substantive provisions, the stra-
tegic doctrine of mutual assured destruction, and the technologies (present and foreseeable)
of ballistic missile defense are all well beyond the scope of this review.
3. DEFENDING DETERRENCE: MANAGING THE ABM TREATY REGIME INTO THE 21ST CEN-
TURY (ANTONIA H. CHAYES & PAUL DOTv eds. 1989) [hereinafter DEFENDING DETERRENCE].
4. The working group members and their positions, as of 1989, are listed on pages xiii-
xiv. The members are as follows: Dr. Albert Carnesale; Dr. Ashton B. Carter; Abram Chayes;
Antonia Handler Chayes, Esq.; Dr. Paul Doty; Ambassador Ralph Earle II; Dr. Barry E.
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respected expertise in law, policy, science, and technology. Senator Sam
Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee and an ex-
tremely important participant in the heated debate surrounding the
treaty's interpretation, provided a vigorous endorsement in his Fore-
word.5 Senator Nunn believes "it is only prudent that we carefully and
objectively examine the question of how we keep the ABM Treaty viable
for at least the next decade."6 He states in his Foreward that the group
has "admirably addressed ' 7 this question. He further states that, "in illu-
minating the pros and cons of alternative approaches for managing the
ABM Treaty regime, this study performs an extremely valuable service
for all those who are concerned about preserving deterrence and strength-
ening strategic stability through the end of this century and beyond.""
In his chapter on "Managing the ABM Treaty Regime: Issues Op-
tions,"9 Dr. Albert Carnesale (Professor and Academic Dean at Harvard
University's John F. Kennedy School of Government) makes the follow-
ing observations:
Two decades is a long time, especially in the worlds of high technology
and high politics. But twenty years have passed since formal negotia-
tions on the ABM Treaty began, and technology has evolved substan-
tially .... Applying the general language of the Treaty to these new
devices is a difficult and complex task.
Marked political changes also have taken place, both within the
United States and the Soviet Union and in the relationship between
them .... 10
How very true! The ABM Treaty does indeed exist within a constantly
changing environment.
Even during the relatively brief time since the 1989 publication of
the group's study, numerous events have transpired which directly impact
upon the treaty regime. For example, several members of the group com-
mented on the Soviets' radar at Krasnoyarsk in Siberia - whether it rep-
resented a material breach of the treaty and, if so, whether that breach
was militarily significant."1 On October 23, 1989, then-Foreign Minister
Fridling; Dr. Richard L. Garwin; Sherri Wasserman Goodman, Esq.; Ambassador Sidney N.
Graybeal; Dr. Theodore Jarvis, Jr.; Lieutenant Colonel (Dr.) Thomas H. Johnson; General
Robert T. Marsh (U.S. Air Force, Retired); Dr. Patricia Bliss McFate; Philip O'Neill, Esq.;
John E. Pike; John B. Rhinelander, Esq.; Dr. Jack Ruina; Major General John C. Toomay
(U.S. Air Force, Retired); and Charles A. Zraket. Biographies for the group's members, with
the exception of Mr. Pike, are provided on pages 267-71.
5. Senator Sam Nunn, Foreword, DEFENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at vii.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8. Id. at viii.
9. Albert Carnesale, Managing the ABM Treaty Regime: Issues and Options, in DE-
FENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 217-38 [hereinafter Issues and Options].
10. Id. at 218.
11. See Ashton B. Carter, Underlying Military Objectives, in DEFENDING DETERRENCE,
supra note 3, at 19.
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Eduard A. Shevardnadze admitted publicly before the Soviet legislature
that the radar had been an "open violation" of the ABM Treaty." The
Soviets had also agreed during the previous month to dismantle the ra-
dar."3 The members could not foresee the amazing strides that would
soon be made in the technology popularly known as Brilliant Pebbles.
Nor could they reasonably foresee in 1989 that Saddam Hussein's Iraqi
army would invade Kuwait and thus trigger Operations Desert Shield and
Desert Storm. Yet, as a result of these changes, the world was introduced
to (or at least made infinitely more aware of) the threat posed by Third
World nations in possession of technology such as the Scud missile.
At the same time, the world witnessed the benefits of having an ef-
fective defense against such missiles, as television screens displayed the
dramatic intercepts by U.S. Patriot missiles."' In his 1991 State of the
Union Message, President Bush announced a refocusing of the Strategic
Defense Initiative (SDI) so as to provide "protection from limited ballis-
tic missile strikes - whatever their source."15 He went on to state, "Let
us pursue an SDI program that can deal with any future threat to the
United States, to our forces overseas and to our friends and allies.""6 This
refocused program would provide what has now been termed "global pro-
tection against limited strikes" (GPALS).17
Although the working group foresaw none of the above events or
changes and was unable to address their ramifications within the study,
that fact in no way invalidates the study's results. On the contrary, the
12. Bill Keller, Moscow Says Afghan Roll Was Illegal and Immoral; Admits Breaking
Arms Pact, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1989, at Al.
13. Id.
14. Several members discussed the U.S. Patriot missile and other anti-tactical ballistic
missiles (ATBMs) in a variety of contexts, generally in analyses of non-ABM technologies
having ABM potential. See, e.g., Richard L. Garwin & Theodore Jarvis, Jr., Non-ABM
Technologies with ABM Potential, in DEFENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 81-110. The
most prophetic of these observations, however, was probably offered by John B. Rhine-
lander and Sherri Wasserman Goodman, discussing the treaty's legal environment: "[B]oth
NATO and Israel have expressed interest in ATBM systems to counter the threat posed by
short-range tactical ballistic missiles. The proliferation of conventionally or chemically
armed ballistic missiles in the Middle East may be the greatest incentive to development of
ATBMs." John B. Rhinelander & Sherri Wasserman Goodman, The Legal Environment, in
DEFENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 61. See also Kiernan, Cooper Lifts Veil of Secrecy
to Applaud DSP, SPACE NEWS, Apr. 1-7, 1991, at 6 (one writer's account of how the Patriot
missile operated in conjunction with space assets during Operation Desert Storm, and a
brief summary of the role played by other space assets during the conflict).
15. Patricia A. Gilmartin, Bush Plan to Refocus SDI as Defense Against Limited At-
tack Renews Congressional Debate Over Program, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Feb. 4,
1991, at 23.
16. Id.
17. Id. See also Kiernan, Brilliant Pebbles Survives Basic Shift in SDIO's Priorities,
SPACE NEWS, Feb. 11-17, 1991, at 18; and Kiernan, Rain of Scuds in Middle East Prompts
New SDI Debate, SPACE NEWS, Feb. 18-24, 1991, at 10 (both articles offer further explana-
tion of GPALS).
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members viewed the current ABM Treaty regime as a "living treaty""
that is "remarkably adaptable to change."' 9 In keeping with that view,
they emphasized the notion of a "treaty regime: not just the 1972 lan-
guage, but its abiding objectives and the processes and practices by which
they can be maintained over time."2 They did so "because many current
and future issues were not, and could not have been, addressed explicitly
by the drafters of the ABM Treaty in 1972."" The dramatic events of a
constantly changing environment validate the group's emphasis on the
treaty regime, rather than the treaty itself, and illustrate the need for
"managing the treaty regime." As the editors note:
Accommodating change without altering basic premises involves a
complex interplay of technology, international law, and diplomacy.
This is what we mean by managing a treaty regime. Although a great
deal of attention has been paid to the process of negotiating treaties,
little work has been done on the subsequent management of treaty
regimes in a changing technological context. 22
Management of the ABM Treaty regime, as the group's members en-
vision it, requires the parties to prefer treaty management over with-
drawal or abrogation. Many authorities would argue the wisdom of con-
tinuing, in today's world, to manage a treaty regime founded on the
strategic doctrine of mutual assured destruction. These authorities con-
tend that technological advances have made, or soon will make, deter-
rence based on strategic defense feasible and preferable. 3 Perhaps several
members of the working group may someday reach that same conclusion.
They certainly have not precluded the possibility. For now, though, they
have based their study "upon the premise that the United States will
continue to rely on deterrence provided by offensive nuclear systems well
into the next century, and will want to continue the support that the
ABM Treaty supplies to that posture." 2 4
Given such a premise, the working group determined that its most
valuable service would be to offer various options and a framework for
making policy choices among those options.25 In this regard, they defined
18. Paul Doty & Antonia H. Chayes, Introduction and Scope of Study, in DEFENDING
DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 5 [hereinafter Introduction].
19. Issues and Options, supra note 9, at 238.
20. Introduction, supra note 18, at 7.
21. DEFENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at x.
22. Introduction, supra note 18, at 14.
23. In response to this argument, the editors concede the following:
The SDI . . . reopened the basic question of whether U.S. security is best
served by the traditional doctrine of deterrence, with its reliable threat of re-
taliation, or by pursuit of defensive deployments that, if realizable, might pro-
vide greater security as well as an escape from the risks and moral burdens of
nuclear deterrence. The political allure of this vision is immense.
Introduction, supra note 18, at 6.
24. Id. at 1.
25. Id. at 2.
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their goal as follows:
U.S. policymakers and diplomats will be required to educate
themselves on the various options available and the likely conse-
quences that derive from each. Those who have carried out this study
know how demanding and difficult it is to keep in perspective all the
technological, political, legal, and diplomatic dimensions of this cru-
cial national security problem. It is the goal of this book to provide
some help in accomplishing that complex task.2"
To accomplish this goal, Defending Deterrence offers a "schematic
framework ' 27 to assist decisionmakers. This framework consists of three
"alternative approaches to resolving the many distinct, but inherently re-
lated, ABM Treaty regime issues to be addressed over time."2 Each of
these three approaches, as Dr. Carnesale points out, "is intended to be
consistent with the fundamental military, economic, and political objec-
tives of the ABM Treaty. '2 9 In formulating the approaches which com-
prise the working group's decisionmaking framework, the members fo-
cused on the levels of constraint imposed by the treaty. Following this
analysis, they grouped the "possible levels of constraint in three catego-
ries, each consistent with the fundamental objective of the existing treaty
regime to prevent nationwide ABM deployments and preparations for
rapid deployment .... ,,30 Each category corresponds to one of the three
alternative approaches. Dr. Carnesale provides a detailed discussion of
each approach in the book's final chapter;3 ' however, the editors also pro-
vide an outline of each in the Introduction:
1. The ABM Treaty approach: A level of activity corresponding
roughly to that embodied in U.S. policy before March 1983 and in U.S.
practice to date.
2. A more restrictive approach: Extensive restraints on collateral
or dual-mission technologies, in order to create a more secure buffer
against the development of ABM systems.
3. A more permissive approach: Considerable development and
testing of ABM-relevant technologies, including space-based components,
would be permitted. The risks of such a course might be judged accept-
able in view of the long lead time required for deployment of any space-
26. Id. at 15.
27. Id. at 10.
28. Issues and Options, supra note 9, at 233.
29. Id. For a more detailed discussion of these three objectives or goals for the ABM
Treaty regime, see id. at 218-21.
30. Introduction, supra note 18, at 10.
31. Issues and Options, supra note 9, at 233-36.
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based system.32
It would appear that decisionmakers need only adopt a single coher-
ent approach and then analyze all treaty regime issues accordingly. The
group's members negated the apparent simplicity and consistency of this
framework, however, by stating that "there is no implication that one of
these approaches must be adopted across the board.""3 In that regard,
they offer the following explanation:
The policymaker might find it better to seek tighter restraints in some
areas than others: for example, it might be desirable to relax some
constraints on space-based sensors, because of their other military
uses and the difficulty of defining and verifying the ABM capability of
sensors. But in such a case the reduced buffer to deployment might
require other adjustments, such as tougher restrictions on weapons."
The editors assert at the outset that they do not attempt to make
any choices among their three alternative approaches.3 Nevertheless,
there is much in Defending Deterrence to suggest that they do indeed
have a strong preference for the "ABM Treaty approach," which would
maintain the treaty regime as it currently exists. Dr. Carnesale is more
candid than the editors in this regard. He leaves nothing to implication
when he states that the book's "authors believe that a regime of the kind
currently in effect should be preserved for the foreseeable future . . .36
Other indicia of bias appear at various points throughout Defending
Deterrence. For example, the working group left little doubt about its
stand on the Reagan Administration's "broad interpretation" of the ABM
Treaty. The editors condemn the "broad interpretation" as having "been
rejected by the Congress, by all but one of the SALT I negotiators, and
by the substantial weight of legal opinion. ' 37 What is much more trouble-
some about the editors' bias is what is not found in the list of "Suggested
Reading" on pages 265-66. Among the recommended law review articles,
and rightly so, is the Chayes' article, "Testing and Development of 'Ex-
otic' Systems under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Ca-
per."38 On the other hand, conspicuous in its absence is "The ABM
Treaty and Strategic Defense Initiative, ' 39 authored by Judge Abraham
32. Introduction, supra note 18, at 10.
33. Id.
34. Id. For a more detailed discussion of this particular example and other examples of
this "mixed strategy of approaches," see Issues and Options, supra note 9, at 237.
35. Introduction, supra note 18, at 2.
36. Issues and Options, supra note 9, at 217.
37. Introduction, supra note 18, at 7. See also Sidney N. Graybeal & Patricia B.
McFate, Assessing Verification and Compliance, in DEFENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3,
at 179-80 (similar remarks).
38. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Testing and Development of "Exotic" Sys-
tems under the ABM Treaty: The Great Reinterpretation Caper, 99 HARV. L. REv. 1956
(1986).
39. Abraham D. Sofaer, The ABM Treaty and the Strategic Defense Initiative, 99
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Sofaer, Legal Advisor to the U.S. State Department and well-known pro-
ponent of the "broad interpretation." Both these articles appeared in the
same issue of the Harvard Law Review, presented in a point-counterpoint
fashion. By failing to reference the simultaneously published Sofaer arti-
cle, the editors at the very least leave themselves open to the criticism
that they fail to present their readers with a completely balanced view.
Despite such minor shortcomings, Defending Deterrence has much to
recommend it as a valuable reference source. This is true whether or not
one chooses to adopt its analytical framework or to agree with the work-
ing group's conclusions. The book offers a rare compilation of expert
views by twenty different authorities in their respective fields of law, pol-
icy, science, and technology. Furthermore, the two appendices provide a
ready reference to the ABM Treaty and its 1974 Protocol.4 0 Following
these appendices, the book also provides a List of Acronyms4 ' and a Glos-
sary, 42 each of which should prove extremely helpful to beginning stu-
dents of the ABM Treaty regime and of arms control issues in general.
As Professor Abram Chayes and Antonia Handler Chayes so very
correctly observe, "[t]he trouble-free treaty has yet to be written. 4 3 Our
experience with the ABM Treaty has in no way contradicted that asser-
tion. Nevertheless, troubles can be substantially reduced by proper man-
agement of the treaty regime. Whether and when strategic deterrence will
replace nuclear deterrence in a co-operative transition remains to be seen.
If we should decide to continue our reliance on nuclear deterrence based
on offensive systems into the 21st century, then our nation's policymakers
will need a coordinated and coherent approach to resolving the many dif-
ficult issues they are sure to face. In that regard, Defending Deterrence
has achieved its goal: to provide help in accomplishing this complex task.
HARV. L. REV. 1972 (1986).
40. DEFENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 239-50. Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems, July 3,1974, U.S.-U.S.S.R., Protocol, 27 U.S.T. 1645, entered into
force May 24, 1976.
41. DEFENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3, at 251-53.
42. Id. at 255-64.
43. Abram Chayes & Antonia H. Chayes, Living Under a Treaty Regime: Compliance,
Interpretation, and Adaptation, in DEFENDING DETERRENCE, supra note 3, ch. 11, at 198.
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